

Bush's Second-Term Korea Policy: Prospects and Options for South Korea

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INTRODUCTION

The 2004 U.S. election culminated in a victory for incumbent President, George W. Bush. In the 2000 election, Bush had secured the presidency only by winning a majority of electoral votes, and his victory was tarnished even further in a chaotic legal dispute over voting irregularities and broken voting machines. In 2004, by winning both the popular vote and the electoral vote, he has successfully overcome the negative fallout from the 2000 election. The Republican Party has emerged the winner in this election by securing a majority in the two Houses, as well as electing eleven new Republican governors.

Although the *Economist* described this election as a choice “between an incompetent leader and an incoherent one,” the American people chose Bush, who has shown he can coherently handle his national security policy, the War on Terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).¹⁾

1) “The incompetent or the incoherent?” *The Economist*, October 30, 2004.

Apparently, the Republicans interpret this victory as a firm mandate for their policy, and Bush's second-term administration is expected to act more confidently in pushing forward most of its agenda. On the other hand, the Democrats may exert greater pressure on national security and foreign policies. Some even think that Bush could become more flexible in his second term in an effort to leave a legacy as a peacemaker.

Noteworthy in this election are the so-called "values votes." According to media reports, Bush's straightforward style and conservative values on issues such as homosexual marriage and stem cell research appealed to a certain segment of the American electorate, especially Evangelical Christians, plus traditional supporters—whites, males, Christians, Southerners and Republicans. Exit polls, however, suggested that Bush's victory was not given to him by right-leaning Christians, but by middle-of-the-road voters. Believing that the war in Iraq is an extension of the war on terrorism, they voted for the candidate who seemed more determined to handle national security. The war turned out to be favorable for Bush in strengthening his image as a national security president, despite strong criticism that it wasn't sufficiently justified and was ill planned.

The moral tenor of this election is likely to be reflected substantially in the national security and foreign policy of the second term, and matters related to anti-terrorism, counter-proliferation, democracy and human rights are likely to be at the top of the agenda. In relation to the Korean peninsula, issues calling for immediate settlement are the deadlocked Six-Party Talks, promoting proliferation security initiative (PSI), and implementing the new North Korean Human Rights Act, among others.

In the first news conference after the election, President Bush expressed his intention to spend the "political capital" he had earned in the election, meaning that he would push forward with the same foreign and security policy in his second term. At the same time, criticism from within his own party about his "go-it-alone" style may

convince him to soften his approach.

During the second term of the administration, will he continue his unilateral and hegemonic foreign policy? The paper will first address the tone of Bush's second-term foreign affairs and national security policy; second, it will consider Korean-American relations and North Korea policy; and third, it will discuss the consequences of his reelection in light of Korea's national security.

THE TONE OF BUSH'S SECOND-TERM NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY

After September 11, the U.S. abandoned its collective security strategy based on deterrence and containment, and switched to the offensive: preemptive strikes and an counter-proliferation policy against rogue states and hostile forces, backed by overwhelming military force.²⁾

Claiming that the greatest threat to freedom lay at the crossroads of radicalism and technology, Bush said that even weak states and small groups could exercise catastrophic power against powerful nations if they had access to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and ballistic missile technology. In order to counter terrorist attacks, a new and aggressive foreign policy was needed, including preemptive strikes, preventive action, use of nuclear weapons, and purposeful actions to force regime changes in rogue states.³⁾ This is the core of the so-called Bush Doctrine, and the national security and foreign policy of the Bush administration is based on it.

2) For the new national security strategy of the U.S., see John Lewis Gaddis, "A Grand Strategy," *Foreign Policy* (November/December 2002); The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002.

3) George W. Bush, "Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy, West Point," New York, Office of the Press Secretary, June 1, 2002.

Table 1. Competing Vision of U.S. Grand Strategy

	Neo-Isolationism	Selective Engagement	Cooperative Security	Primacy
Analytic Anchor	Minimal, defensive realism	Traditional balance of power, realism	Liberalism	Maximal realism/unilateralism
Major Problems of International Politics	Avoiding entanglement in the affairs of others	Peace among the major powers	The indivisibility of peace	The rise of a peer competitor
Preferred World Order	Distant balance of power	Balance of power	Interdependence	Hegemonic
Conception of National Interests	Narrow	Restricted	Transnational	Broad
Regional Priorities	North America	Industrial Eurasia	Global	Industrial Eurasia & the home of any potential peer competitor
Use of Force	Self-defense	Discriminate	Frequent	At will
Force Posture	Minimal self-defense force	Two-MRC force	Reconnaissance strike complex or multilateral action	A two-power standard force

Source: Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," in Michael E. Brown, et al. (eds.), *America's Strategic Choices: An International Security Reader*, revised edition (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000), p. 4.

President Bush's national security and foreign policy can be viewed according to the usual analysis of American foreign policy. The most popular is the dichotomous view, which separates internationalism from isolationism. Another view focuses on the means, goals and types of foreign policy. With unilateralism, measures are taken based on the sole decision of the U.S.; With institutionalism, measures are taken based on decisions by the UN or other international organizations; and with multilateralism, measure are taken based on international organizations and through non-state entities.

Recently, focusing on the internationalist trend of U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War, the grand foreign strategy of the U.S. can be illustrated in Table 1.⁴⁾ In this view, the global strategy of the Clinton administration can be summarized as selective, but cooperative primacy. The "engagement and enlargement" strategy had elements of American primacy that emphasized the American role in the international arena and was tempered by cooperative security measures and selective engagement. In other words, the U.S. would engage in international issues in order to enlarge the free market economy community, which is in clear contrast to neo-isolationism.

On the other hand, the grand strategy of the Bush administration is characterized by its tendency towards American primacy. The neo-conservatives behind the Bush strategy maintain a hard-line ideology, believing in military strength based on the overwhelming power of the U.S.⁵⁾ This tendency will not suddenly change in the second term. (The Republicans and the Democrats clearly defined their national

4) Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," in Michael E. Brown, *et al.* (eds.), *America's Strategic Choices: An International Security Reader*, Revised edition (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000), p. 4.

5) Kim Sung-han, "Ideology and Strategy of the Neo-Conservatives of the USA" (in Korean), *Analyses of the Major International Issues*, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security of Korea, 2003; Tom Barry and Jim Lobe, "U.S. Foreign Policy—Attention, Right Face, Forward March," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, April 2002.

Table 2. Comparison of the Party Platforms in the U.S. Election 2004

	Republicans	Democrats
Slogans	- A Safer World and a More Hopeful America	- Strong at Home, Respected in the World
Security and War on Terror	- Iraqi War is Just - If necessary, preemptive strike is possible - Transforming U.S. global defense posture	- Iraq's WMDs are exaggerated - Restoration of global alliance and cooperative relations - Defending the US at all costs
Asia Policy	- South Korea is a valued democratic ally - Japan is a key partner in Asia - If China violates the Taiwan Relations Act, the US will help Taiwan defend itself	- Enhancing relations with its historic ally, Korea - Maintaining strong relations with Japan - Engaging China to secure its adherence to international trade, non-proliferation and human rights standards
North Korean Nuclear Program	- Complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement - Resolving through Six-Party Talks	- Complete, verifiable and irreversible elimination - Maintaining Six-Party Talks, preparing direct talks with the North
Economics	- Lower income tax - Safeguard private property rights - More competitive in the global marketplace	- Restoring fiscal deficit - Rolling back bush's tax cuts, reform health Care - Achieving energy independence
Social	- Opposing abortion - Banning same-sex marriages through Amendment - Limiting stem cell research	- Abortion should be legal - Marriage should be defined at the state level - Allowing stem cell research

security and foreign policy positions during the election campaign. Differences on major issues are compared in Table 2.⁶⁾

As of now, although Condoleezza Rice has been named Secretary of State, no one can be certain about the makeup of the new national security and foreign policy teams. Predicting the nature of the new administration may be easier by figuring out who will remain, instead of who will join.

During his first term, Bush's North Korea policy was somewhat inconsistent because of conflicts between hardliners—Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and John Bolton, and moderates—Colin Powell and Richard Armitage. In order to reconcile past controversies inside the administration, some key figures of the State Department are likely to be replaced, and the national security and defense staff will probably stay on. As a matter of fact, many experts say that Vice President Dick Cheney will play a greater role. On the whole, the new administration is likely to combine the ideas of the realist Cheney and the moralist Bush.

Notable is that experts on the Republican side expect the second term administration will be more hard-line, while the Democrat experts think there won't be much change in national security and foreign policy.⁷⁾ Although there are varied outlooks among experts, the fundamental element defining post-9.11 U.S. policy is the September 11 terrorist attack itself, a factor that transcends disparate party lines. Because of September 11 every thread of the U.S. social fabric is different from the past, and this has inevitably exerted a great influence on national security and foreign policy.

6) Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, *Issues of Democracy: Elections Guide 2004*, October 2004, pp.23-27; Lee Sang-Hyun, "An Outlook of the U.S. Presidential Election 2004" (in Korean), *Current Issues & Policy*, No. 92 (March 2004).

7) Concluded from interviews with experts on Korean affairs of D.C.-based think-tanks including Heritage Foundation, American Enterprise Institute, Brookings Institution, Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Stimson Center.

BUSH'S REELECTION AND KOREAN-U.S. RELATIONS

As with other areas of foreign policy, Bush's Korea policy in the second term is likely to continue without much change. There could be a new direction in the implementation of Korea policy, however, based on the tendency of past second-term administrations to leave a more positive legacy. Therefore the possibility cannot be ruled out that the current hard-line unilateralism could be toned down.⁸⁾

The dominant Republican view is that the Korea-U.S. alliance is drifting aimlessly, especially because of major differences on how each country wants to handle the North Korean nuclear issue. In Washington's view, Seoul has a carrot and no stick (or Plan B), and it doubts whether Korea will cooperate with the U.S. in putting pressure on Pyongyang. Furthermore, the administration believes that Seoul has the leverage to deal with Pyongyang in the Six-Party Talks, but is unwilling to use it.

Since the inter-Korean summit in June 2000, South Korean citizens, especially the younger generation, view the North less as an enemy than in the past. Against this backdrop, differing views regarding the "threat" of North Korea stand in the way of a truly effective Korea-U.S. alliance. Although Washington does not think the two countries necessarily have to share exactly the same perspective toward the North, it does believe they should agree on their respective roles.

Another difference regards the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, recently legislated in the U.S. Pyongyang believes the Act is aimed at ousting Kim Jong-il, and some South Koreans agree that purpose of the Act is to collapse the North Korean regime. On the contrary, some hard-liners in Washington were disappointed in the

8) Harry Sterling, "Bush's Hardline Approach to NK is Producing No Results," *Policy Forum Online*, Nautilus Institute, PFO 04-36A (September 30, 2004).

law, saying that it is little more than a statement on the universality of human rights with limited applicability.⁹⁾ They believe the Act will only be effective in protecting North Korean refugees in China through pressure on the Chinese government, but it will not restrict the behavior of the North Korean regime.

Another pending issue is redefining the ROK-U.S. alliance. Working-level contacts have been fairly constructive. The Bush administration seems to realize that its past unilateral stance was counterproductive, and in the second term it will adopt a more cooperative mode regarding U.S.-South Korea relations. The future of the alliance, however, is another story—coming up with a clear blueprint will take much longer. For this reason, South Korea and the U.S. decided to establish the Security Policy Initiative (SPI) at the annual ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting in October 2004.

As a matter of fact, the alliance issue was raised in accordance with the U.S. Global Defense Posture Review (GPR).¹⁰⁾ During his second term, Bush will continue to redeploy American forces according to the GPR, and American forces in Korea and Germany will be reduced over several years.¹¹⁾

The GPR is part of the U.S. military transformation in preparation for future threats. The U.S. force plans to transform itself from an industrial-age force to an information-age force, in line with information science and technology. New types of threats in the Post-Cold War era such as terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs call

9) Hazel Smith, "Brownback Bill Will Not Solve North Korea's Problems." *Jane's Intelligence Review* (February 2004).

10) For the effects of the GPR on the Korea-U.S. relations, see Sang-Hyun Lee, "A New U.S. Global Defense Posture and the Future of Korea-U.S. Alliance," *Korea and World Affairs* (Summer 2004), pp.121-123.

11) George W. Bush, "Remarks by the President to Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention," Dr. Albert B. Sabin Cincinnati Cinergy Center, August 16, 2004; Fred Barbash and Thomas E. Ricks, "Bush to Shift Troops Home--As Many as 70,000 Servicemen, 100,000 Civilians to Rotate Out of Europe and Asia," *Washington Post*, August, 16, 2004.

for a change from forward deployment to rapid deployment, and, accordingly, relations with the allies should be redefined, and policies related to American forces overseas should be reviewed.¹²⁾ The transformed military forces will focus on mobility on a global scale, placing emphasis on capabilities rather than on numbers.¹³⁾

The key concept of the 2004 U.S. defense strategy, as recently stated by the U.S. Department of Defense, is capabilities-based planning (CBP). The Pentagon categorizes threats against the U.S. into four groups: the irregular, the catastrophic, the traditional, and the disruptive. The most feasible type of threat is the catastrophic one—and it is the one to which the U.S. is most vulnerable. This category includes homeland missile attack, WMD proliferation to non-state actors, and devastating WMD attack on the allies.¹⁴⁾

The new U.S. defense strategy is designed to respond to the new security environment and threats in the Post-Cold War era. While the 1993 Bottom-Up Review assumed the possibility of major theater warfare and borderland disputes, the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) paid more attention to smaller scale contingencies, reflecting its experiences in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Haiti. Furthermore, the 2001 QDR adopted the so-called 1-4-2-1 strategy, laying substantial emphasis on the threats of failing states, asymmetric threats, and dissuading future military competition.¹⁵⁾

12) U.S. Department of Defense, *Transformation Study Report: Transforming Military Operational Capabilities*, April 27, 2001, [<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2001/d20010621transrep.pdf>].

13) "Transforming the U.S. Global Defense Posture," Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith, to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., December 3, 2003.

14) U.S. Department of Defense, "A Framework for Strategic Thinking," Briefing for Senior Level Review Group, August 19, 2004, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/defense_aug_19_2004.pdf].

15) In the 1-4-2-1 strategy, the U.S. must defend the homeland, deter possible aggression in four regions, defeat adversaries in two wars almost simultaneously and decisively defeat the adversary in any one of the wars. See U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, September 30, 2001, pp.17-21.

From the experiences of the September 11 terrorist attack and the subsequent War on Terror, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 2004 defense strategy emphasizes war against global terrorism, non-traditional threats and the threats of WMD and high-tech weapons more than conventional warfare. Future U.S. allies will be those who can participate in these new missions. The GPR is a result of this strategy change, and the American forces stationed in Korea are also included in the process, since the U.S. plans to withdraw a total of 12,500 troops and relocate Yongsan Garrison and the Second Infantry Division to southern areas—Osan and Pyongtaek.

The Bush Administration is expected to carry out the GPR without much change during the second term, meaning that the Korea-U.S. alliance is in the process of transforming into a strategy for the future.

BUSH'S REELECTION AND THE NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

President Bush's second term will be just as severe toward North Korea on moral grounds, with human rights and nuclear issues gaining importance. The complex mix of moralist Bush, realist Cheney and various neo-conservatives in the administration precludes any dramatic change in North Korea policy, and it will likely pursue an isolationist strategy. In any case, Washington is unlikely to "recognize" the North Korean regime through bilateral talks for the time being. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) will be maintained but will not likely be advanced further. While isolation and containment are the strategies now, the Bush administration could turn to a tougher policy if North Korea crosses the red line.

The most baffling problem for the Bush administration is the situation in Iraq. Time is running out: Iraq must hold a general

election in January and organize a democratic government by the end of 2005, and yet, the country is still in a state of war. The administration wants to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq as soon as possible, but that isn't feasible until the latter half of 2005. With Iraq, Iran and Europe drawing most of the attention, North Korea could drop even farther down the U.S. list of priorities. Nevertheless, the Bush administration will continue a close watch on developments in North Korea.

For this reason, it could take longer to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. On the one hand, the situation prevents tension from mounting between the U.S. and North Korea, which could exacerbate if the U.S. makes the North Korea issue a priority and starts to apply greater pressure. On the other hand, the situation could drag on as it is. That is, if North Korea continues to participate in the Six-Party talks and does not directly antagonize the U.S. non-proliferation policy by conducting nuclear tests and selling nuclear materials, North Korea's nuclear program may be tolerated and the country could even be accepted as a nuclear power.

At the South Korea-U.S. summit, held on the sidelines of APEC Chile 2004, President George W. Bush once again emphasized the Six-Party Talks, making it clear that Washington is not interested in bilateral talks with Pyongyang. Specifically, the Bush administration seems more interested in maintaining a brief period of tranquility by impounding the North Korea question in the Six-Party Talks framework. Even so, South Korea should be cautious that the nuclear issue does not veer out of control, keeping in mind that a number of "nightmare" scenarios still exist at the Pentagon.

Although the North Korean nuclear problem is likely to stay in the background, human rights will likely take center stage in the second term. With the Democrats' unanimous support, the North Korean Human Rights Act will gain momentum. What is more, both Houses of the Congress are more committed to the issue than the administration. Currently in South Korea, conservatives hold the initiative in raising the North Korean human rights issue. The Roh

government should change its lukewarm attitude, and devise a new, clearer approach that brings together both progressives and conservatives.

As a solution to the North Korean nuclear development program, the Libyan model has been raised recently; however, application would depend on at least three conditions: complete dismantlement of the nuclear program, addressing economic issues and the guaranteed preservation of the Kim Jong-il regime. These conditions are hardly acceptable to the Bush administration. For Washington, guaranteeing the survival of the Kim Jong-il regime is unimaginable, and to make things worse, verifying the complete elimination of the nuclear program is impossible unless North Korea opens its doors unconditionally. For Pyongyang, opening its doors and complying with all the guidelines required by the international nuclear watchdogs will be the last thing it wants to do in exchange for compensation.¹⁶⁾

At the November summit in Chile, President Roh Moo-hyun stated that South Korea would take an active role in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. Although some suggest this implies summit talks between the two Koreas, summit talks should not be considered as a channel for solving the nuclear problem unless there is a clear breakthrough. Everything should be agreed upon between South Korea and the U.S. before going to the summit talks, and transparency must be guaranteed. If facts, previously unknown to the U.S., were discovered in the course of the talks, it would damage the entire process. Moreover, Washington would insist that human rights and nuclear issues be on the agenda. Finally, Seoul must not “buy” the summit talks through payments to the North.

As of early December 2004, Pyongyang has not responded officially to President Bush's reelection, only publicizing its usual

16) For the applicability of the Libyan model to North Korea, see Mark Caprio, “Will North Korea Follow Libya's Lead?” *Foreign Policy in Focus* (April 2004), [<http://www.fpif.org/papers/2004nuke.html>].

critical rhetoric on North Korea-U.S. relations. It maintains that the North Korean nuclear program is a result of U.S. antagonism, and that it is simply using the issue as a means of self-defense. In sum, the North says it will give up its nuclear program if the U.S. gives up its hostile policy. Pyongyang has called for a simultaneous and comprehensive approach: dismantlement in exchange for compensation, with North Korea and the U.S. carrying out the agreement at the same time.¹⁷⁾

Through its Chinese channel, Pyongyang expressed its willingness to participate in the next round of Six-Party Talks, and it showed some flexibility by saying it will not insist on U.S.-North Korea direct talks. As the North has already used up its diplomatic and military cards *vis-à-vis* the U.S., its overall attitude at the talks will not change. Accordingly, when the new Bush Administration's foreign policy team fills up with hardliners as is anticipated, North Korea will adopt the muddling-through strategy without crossing the red line.

Under the circumstances, it is likely that a new round of Six-Party Talks will convene in the near future. However, the talks, rather than being a forum for problem solving, will drag on in order to prevent tensions from rising. In the case of inter-Korean relations, the North will emphasize its usual slogan, *Minjok Gongjo* (inter-Korean cooperation) that aims at undercutting South Korea-U.S. relations, while reaping profits through economic cooperation.

Against this backdrop, South Korea needs to promote a triangular diplomacy. First, the Roh administration needs to persuade Washington to offer realistic and acceptable alternatives to

17) After the U.S. presidential election, North Korea mentioned it indirectly through Japan-based Chongryun's organ, *Choson Sinbo*, on November 5, 2004, under the title "North Korea-U.S. Relations after the Election: North Korea's Basic Position Remains." Domestically, North Korea made indirect references to U.S. President George W. Bush's reelection for the first time in *Rodong Shinmun*, November 9, using the term "reelected U.S. President."

Pyongyang, cautioning that too much pressure on North Korea may make the situation worse. And President Roh should warn the North that stalling will not guarantee an advantageous situation, stressing that inter-Korean relations cannot improve as long as the North remains nuclear. It is especially important to dissuade Pyongyang from testing the will of the Bush administration, for example, by delivering nuclear materials.

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH KOREA

The November U.S.-South Korea summit, the first after Bush's reelection, highlighted three points related to the North Korean nuclear issue. First, President Roh has said that South Korea will take an active role in resolving the issue. Second, President Bush has stated that he understands the position of the Roh administration in principle. Third, President Bush suggested that the North Korean nuclear issue would be high on the agenda during his second term.¹⁸⁾

While the South Korean media gauged the summit as a success, President Bush's statements were merely a reconfirmation of his previous position—the issue should be resolved peacefully and diplomatically within the framework of the Six-Party Talks. Nevertheless, two points should be noted: first, the hard-line stance toward South Korea was not apparent at the summit, and second, the U.S. suggested that North Korea's nuclear program was a high priority, using the term “vital issue.”

In the second term of the Bush Administration, relations between South Korea and the U.S. seem less than optimistic. The chief stumbling block is the nuclear issue, and for the U.S., it is directly related to the issue of terrorism, rather than to the North Korean

18) “President Roh's LA Remarks are to Influence the U.S. by Stating Korean Position Clearly,” *Chosun Ilbo*, November 17, 2004, A3.

regime or the Korean peninsula. War against terrorism is more than its foreign policy; it is a matter of national security. At stake is the American homeland and citizens' lives. After September 11, defending the homeland from the threats of terrorism is by far the biggest concern of the U.S., and most Americans are willing to sacrifice their rights and democracy to prevent terrorist attacks.

Seen from this perspective, a dramatic improvement in South Korea-U.S. relations is unlikely because of the fundamental difference in how the U.S. and South Korea perceive major issues. At this point, the most realistic goal for the two administrations would be to prevent the relationship from deteriorating. Since the Cold War and especially, since September 11, the U.S. has been transforming its national security strategy into a capability-based one, whereas South Korea's is still threat-based. This is a structural difference, and therefore, not temporary. Two nations facing one another across the Pacific must improve relations. They must recognize that the problem is a fundamental one, buried under other complexities such as differences between the U.S. and South Korea regarding threat recognition of North Korea, anti-Korean sentiment in the U.S., and anti-American sentiment in Korea.

In the long run, tensions could increase between the U.S. and the two Koreas, especially if the Bush Administration maintains an uncompromising foreign policy and overemphasizes principles, morality and ideology. Likewise, the Roh administration puts more weight on morality and ideological identity. Finally, Pyongyang also maintains a tight system armed with a military-first policy and the Juche ideology. Conflict is inevitable if all three foreign policies are ideologically inflexible. For this reason, the Roh administration, at least, should take a realistic approach, separating ideology from national security and foreign policy. National interest and security are what ultimately matter.