

## Past, Present, and Future of the Korea-U.S. Alliance

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### INTRODUCTION

South Korean foreign relations have mainly been determined by how successfully it manages relations with its two major counterparts: one, the somewhat capricious nation of North Korea, and the other, the U.S., which has been a staunch ally since the signing of the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty. Given the current unpredictable environment of chaotic international relations, it is rare to see an alliance between nations that lasts so long. The ROK-U.S. alliance, in fact, has been one of the most successful alliances in the history of international relations. As the allies prepare to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of their ties, however, both must face the fact that the relationship has reached a turning point. And it is up to South Korea and the U.S. to make the inevitable changes.

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This paper aims to reevaluate the outcomes of the Korea-U.S. alliance over the past half a century and then, to examine the current situation and problems of the alliance. Finally, it will seek a desirable future alliance that can serve both nations' security interests. Although numerous studies, both domestic and abroad, have attempted to forecast the future alliance, the necessary changes have yet to be determined. Despite uncertainties, the issue is vital, not only to the future of Korea and the U.S. Asian strategy, but also to the entire East Asian security environment.

#### **FIFTY YEARS OF KOREA-U.S. ALLIANCE: SOUTH KOREAN PERSPECTIVE**

##### *The Achievements of the Korea-U.S. Alliance*

Clearly, the ROK-U.S. alliance has attained significant achievements over the past five decades. In terms of security, the most remarkable contribution has been the strong deterrent action of the U.S. Armed Forces.

First, U.S. Armed Forces in Korea (USFK) have played a pivotal role in maintaining peace and stability in Northeast Asian as well as in restraining North Korean provocations. Currently, USFK function as a "frontline partnership" guaranteeing the automatic intervention of the sole superpower in case of emergency. In order to achieve this purpose, it maintains its most forward deployed division, the 2nd Infantry Division clustered around the Uijongbu-Dongduchon area, near the demilitarized zone. Moreover, U.S. military capability and its state-of-the-art equipment are a strong complement to Korea's intelligence and early warning system.

Second, U.S. forces also contribute to Korea's continuing economic development by reducing peacetime expenses for national security. If the U.S. were to withdraw troops from Korea, the additional defense budget needed to make up for this loss of military

power would be astronomical. In addition to the 2nd infantry division, the 7th Air Force accounts for approximately 30 percent of total air power, significantly strengthening Korean national defense power. Approximately 10,000 Air Force personnel fly and maintain the F-16 Falcon and the A/OA-10 Thunderbolt combat aircraft, and perform myriad intelligence, logistics, planning, communications, and liaison duties with artificial satellite and U-2 aircraft. In addition, the economic effect of the USFK cannot be ignored. The war reserve ammunition stocks account for approximately 60 percent of the ammunition required in an emergency. And considering the maintenance costs in billions of dollars, the economic value of the USFK is enormous.<sup>1)</sup>

Third, the U.S. Forces in Korea, a symbol of the Korea-U.S. security alliance, contributes to maintaining stability in Northeast Asia, as well as Korea's strategic status. Considering geopolitical conditions in Korea, the ROK-U.S. security alliance maintains harmonious relationships with surrounding powers, guarantees the stability of the Korean unification process, and plays a key role in its future survival and prosperity even after unification.

In addition, on the socio-economic front, the alliance has contributed to exchange and cooperation between the two countries. A good example is trade: As of 2001, 15.9 percent of Korea's total imports, and 20.7 percent of its total exports were from trade with the U.S.<sup>2)</sup> Moreover, U.S. bases in Korea contribute to the regional economy.<sup>3)</sup> Secondly, the security assurance by the alliance was a

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1) Kang Jun-kwon, "Why are the U.S. Forces and Korea-U.S. Military Alliance Necessary?" *Journal of National Defense* (August 2000), pp. 25-26.

2) Taeho Bark, "Korean-U.S. Economic Relations: Past, Present and Future," in Baek Jong-chun and Lee Sang-hyun (eds.), *Korea-U.S. Relations in Transition: Korea-U.S. Alliance in Retrospect and Prospects for a New Strategic Partnership* (Sungnam: The Sejong Institute, 2003), Table 6, 7, 8, and 9; On the other hand, it aptly portrays the asymmetrical relations between Korea and U.S. that the America recorded 3.1 percent of total revenue and 2.9 percent of total exports through trade with Korea.

3) According to the *Information on Korea*, for U.S. soldiers in Korea, the budget for

necessary prerequisite to the development of democracy and a market economy in Korea. Spurred by Korean democratization in the late 1980s, that commonality between the two countries catalyzed the development of Korea-U.S. relations.

Besides contributions, however, problems caused by the ROK-U.S. alliance should not be overlooked. In particular, inequalities inherent in the alliance have limited the growth of Korean society and the development of its self-determination, and has reinforced Korea's reliance on the U.S. politically, socio-economically, and culturally.

#### *Reasons for the Change in Korea-U.S. Alliance*

Challenges to the South Korea-U.S. alliance stem from a shift in the international order as well as domestic politics in both countries. For South Korea, the need for a shift is mainly because Korea's status has changed dramatically since the early years when unilateral U.S. aid was vital. After a bloody three-year civil war, South Korea achieved remarkable economic development and finally gained a working democracy. Korea is proud to have achieved a number of important feats: hosting the Seoul Olympics, joining the United Nations, becoming a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and co-hosting the World Cup. Naturally, Korea now wishes to be treated with the respect afforded its position in the global arena.

Furthermore, democratic evolution, along with the so-called information revolution since the late 1980s, not only expanded South Korea's political horizons, but also transmuted the politicized

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USFK consists of \$1,720,000,000 for wages and \$1,030,000,000 for operating expenses, for a total of \$2,973,000,000, which accounts for 0.9 percent of U.S. defense budget and same with the 24 percent of Korea defense budget. USFK spends 25 percent of their budget on local procurement and payment for local workers, contributing to the Korean economy. *Yeonhap News*, February 16, 2003.

younger generation. Age-old regional divisions have given way to generational confrontations. Consequently, members of post-war generation, relatively unaffected by the Cold War mentality, have begun expressing their own viewpoints on North Korea and the U.S. The 2002 Presidential election revealed this generation gap.

Perceptions of the North Korean threat will directly influence the ROK-U.S. security alliance. The rise of a younger generation that is sympathetic to North Korea and five years of the Sunshine Policy broadened the view on North Korea. A survey of South Korean students reflects that past hostility toward North Korea has decreased.<sup>4)</sup> Although conservatives are concerned by their view of North Korea, the shift, also embodied in the Sunshine Policy, is inevitable.

Despite continuous efforts during the Kim Dae-jung Government for reconciliation and cooperation toward Pyongyang, the North has not budged from its aggressive stance, or from the extreme concentration of power, *Juche* ideology, military-first policy, and brinkmanship tactics.<sup>5)</sup> Since it is assessed that North Korea has not changed substantially, a balanced view on North Korea is still necessary.

Perceptions on U.S. forces have also changed. Both allies must admit that the era of U.S. untied aid to Korea has passed. Yet, in spite of various changes over the past half century, Korea-U.S. relations are still based on the same circumstances as when the Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty was signed. A stark example is the inequality of SOFA, one of the most contentious issues. Because the nature of relations between the two countries has changed, an agreement that

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4) According to the survey, 38 percent of Korean college students consider North Korea amicably, 37 percent mark hostilely, and 25 percent showed neutral. Kim Yong-ho, "The Changing Dynamics of the Two Koreas and Surrounding Four Powers," paper presented at the third Conference hosted by the Graduate School of National Intelligence, *The Change and Continuity of Inter-Korean Relations in the Reconciliation and Cooperation Era* (October 25, 2002).

5) *Dong-a Ilbo*, February 17, 2003, A12.

better protects the interests of the Korean people is necessary for future Korea-U.S. relations.<sup>6)</sup> Security conditions in and around the Korean peninsula are also different since the historical South-North summit talks in June 2000. Therefore, it is now time to understand the Korea-U.S. alliance as a whole, integrating internal contexts of the alliance with external situational changes.

### THE U.S. STRATEGY AND THE ROK-U.S. ALLIANCE

In order to meet the above-mentioned domestic and international demands, the role and meaning of USFK, a major determinant in the future Korea-U.S. alliance, should be carefully estimated over the long term. The *raison d'être* of U.S. Forces stationed in Korea will be determined by U.S. global and Asia strategies, and by overall military planning.

#### *The U.S. Strategy Toward Asia*

Although the United States, the largest maritime nation, is located in the Western hemisphere, it needs friendly and available bases on the coast of East Asia in order to maintain its influence in the Pacific. Since the Second World War, it has paid significant attention to the East Asian region in order to contain communist expansion in the Far Eastern region. A general overview of the U.S. strategy toward Asia can be seen in the *East Asian Strategy Reports* (EASR) by the Department of Defense.

The basic direction of the 1998 EASR reflects "Shape, Respond, and Prepare," mentioned in the 1997 *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR), that the U.S. military "must be able to help shape the

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6) Lee Sang-hyun, "The Significance and Evaluation of SOFA Revision," in Hong Hyun-ik (ed.), *The U.S. Forces Korea in the Period of Inter-Korean Reconciliation* (Sungnam: Sejong Institute, 2003).

international security environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests, respond to the full spectrum of crises when directed, and prepare now to meet the challenges of an uncertain future.”<sup>7)</sup> In order to protect and promote security interests in Asia, the EASR defines the role of U.S. military as comprehensive engagement, or “Presence Plus” including not only the presence of U.S. military personnel in Asia but also a variety of other public and private interactions with the region.<sup>8)</sup>

After the 1995 EASR, the U.S. announced that they would maintain 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia Pacific region, with most of them concentrated in Korea and Japan. Stationed in South Korea, are the 8th and 51st Fighter Wings under 7th Air Force, and 2nd Infantry Division assigned to the 8th U.S. Army. And in Japan, the U.S. maintains the 5th Air Force, 7th Fleet, 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force and 9th Theater Support Command.

In case of a contingency, U.S. Forces’ lack of project ability from the mainland would cause the so-called “tyranny of distances” that necessitates access to forward bases. For example, sending troops from Seattle to Thailand requires 15 hours by plane, and 19 days by ship. And from Hawaii to Korea requires 9 hours by plane and 10 days by ship.<sup>9)</sup> U.S. military presence in the region and a friendly relationship with its allies, therefore, guarantees that the United States can respond more rapidly and flexibly to attain its strategic goals. The importance of Asia was reaffirmed in the 2001 QDR, by mentioning the importance of Northeast Asia and its allies and assuring its steady commitment on forward deployed forces.<sup>10)</sup>

Meanwhile, a report<sup>11)</sup> published by the RAND Corporation has

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7) William S. Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review* (May 1997), [<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr/>].

8) U.S. Department of Defense, *The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region* (1998), [<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/easr98/easr98.pdf>].

9) *Ibid*, pp.11-12.

10) U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (September 20, 2001), [<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf>].

gained significant attention by suggesting that Guam be used as a future hub for U.S. forward deployed forces. The salient point regarding military strategy is the expansion of U.S. forces allocation from Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia. The suggestion includes maintaining bases in Okinawa, the Philippines and Vietnam to prepare against possible conflicts in Korea and Taiwan. Those changes appear to be the first step of the Bush administration to embrace Japan and contain China.

The future U.S. strategy on Asia is based on the perception that access to existing forward deployed bases will be reduced. Eventually, that strategy will be dependent on projecting U.S. forces in distant anti-access or area-denial environments. The current military composition, which is focused on aircraft carrier and heavy infantry, will be transformed into one focused on longer-range warships, submarines, an intelligence network and state-of-the-art weapons.<sup>12)</sup> In this context, the size of USFK would almost certainly be reconsidered—although it has not been officially announced—should the North Korea threat subside.

#### *The Role and Status of the U.S. Forces Korea*

No one can deny that the presence of U.S. forces has significantly contributed to the security of the Korean peninsula on one hand, and to U.S. pursuit of Asian strategies on the other. The historic 2000 Inter-Korean Summit and its June 15 joint communiqué, however, left the status and role of USFK in question, and the post-Cold War atmosphere, globalization and increasing bilateral dependence further deteriorated its role. The South Korean views on U.S. forces are classified as follows:

First, those who prefer a *status quo* insist that U.S. forces should

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11) Zalmay Khalizad, et al., *The United States and Asia: Toward a New US Strategy and Force Posture* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001).

12) *Ibid*, pp.57-62.

be maintained because the real intentions of North Korea are unclear, and there has been no change in the military situation of North Korea, in spite of a positive atmosphere between the two Koreas after the summit. The second group advocates that partial adjustment, including reduction of military power and alteration of its composition, is required to quell anti-Americanism and promote peace between North and South Korea. In other words, they contend that U.S. forces should emphasize its role as a partner rather than an occupying force. Finally, another group stresses that withdrawal of U.S. forces in Korea needs to be discussed. They believe that the current state of U.S. forces hinders relations-building between the two Koreas due to the significant South-North power gap. As these different viewpoints show, the discussion has moved from “whether or not to change” to “how to change.”<sup>13)</sup>

On three different occasions since the Korean War, U.S. troop withdrawal has been a grave concern. The first was the Nixon Doctrine, stating in essence that Asian nations should not depend on the U.S. for their security but should strengthen their independence and national security. In the wake of failures in Vietnam, the Nixon Doctrine reflected U.S. public opinion to reduce American intervention in Asia. USFK was a test-case of the doctrine. In the Doctrine, the U.S. made it clear that it would not send troops to Asia in the event of war, and also implied that there would be a reduction or withdrawal of military forces in Asia. According to the Nixon doctrine, 20,000 U.S. troops in the 7th Division would be withdrawn from Korea by March 1971.

The second time was during the Carter administration, when South Korean President Park Chung-hee and U.S. President Jimmy Carter disagreed bitterly over human rights and the continued presence of U.S. forces. Subsequently, between 1977 and 1979, some

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13) Chung Sae-jin, “Analysis on the Reduction and Reformation of U.S. Forces in Korea” (in Korean) *Korea Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (2001), pp.29-34, 40.

3,600 troops were withdrawn. However Congress, as well as the Pentagon called the idea irresponsible, saying it failed to consider the security of the Korea peninsula.

The last and most recent reduction plan was led by U.S. senators Sam Nunn and John W. Warner. In July 1989, U.S. Congress adopted the Nunn-Warner Amendment to the 1989 Defense Appropriation Bill, which mandated a troop reduction in Korea from 43,000 to 36,000 by the end of 1991. The amendment contains provisions for three phases of troop reduction, with no specific end-target strength written into the legislation. Phase one of the amendment has been completed. Phases two and three are on hold, and have yet to be negotiated or implemented because of North Korea's refusal to allow mandatory inspection of its alleged nuclear weapons development facilities at Yongbyon.<sup>14)</sup>

As shown above, the discussion for re-allocation and reduction of U.S. forces is not new. The U.S. has studied the issue of U.S. forces abroad as a part of their revolutions in military affairs (RMA) and transformation strategy.<sup>15)</sup> During the Cold War, the focus had been on preventing a global confrontation, such as a nuclear war, or a world war between groups of allied nations. However, the end of the Cold War diversified the threat meaning that U.S. forces needed to respond to all kinds of unexpected military crisis, from nuclear war

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14) The first stage (1990-1992) included a reduction of 5,000 army personnel, 1,987 air force personnel—a total reduction of 6,987 troops. The second stage (1993-1995) included the re-composition of two brigades from the second division, one combat air force brigade from the 7th air force division, and the final stage (1996-) included maintaining required minimum forces in the long term, considering the degree of threat from North Korean and the consequent role of U.S. forces. U.S. Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking toward the 21st Century* (1992), [<http://russia.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/report-92.html>].

15) National Defense Panel, *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century* (December 1997), [<http://www.fas.org/man/docs/ndp/toc.htm>]; Les Aspin, and William Dickinson, *Defense for a New Era: Lesson of the Persian Gulf War* (Washington: Brassey's, 1992).

to humanitarian activities, to minimizing the loss of lives and collateral damage. The key aim of the transformation is to maintain the superior position of a frontline army, navy, air and space forces and to provide immediate responses to traditional military forces in case of war.<sup>16)</sup> As the transformation progresses, the focus of military operations is expected to move toward naval and air forces. U.S. infantry divisions are expected to be re-composed with small troops equipped with advanced weapons.<sup>17)</sup>

In concert with this movement, South Korea and U.S. defense ministers met in Washington, in December 2002. They reached an agreement in the 34th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) to co-research the future of U.S. forces in Korea over the next 20 and 30 years. The agreement is significant as the first official coalition to discuss the future of ROK-U.S. alliance in a half century. To that end, Korea and U.S. military forces launched a project called “Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative” this April.

U.S. forces stationed in Korea are not only a deterrent against threats of North Korea, but also a key stabilizer of the entire East Asian region. Their absence could not only hinder the security of the region but even exacerbate a serious arms race, including nuclear weapons development.<sup>18)</sup>

From Korea’s point of view, U.S. forces, acting as a deterrent, significantly augments their military power, as long as the threat of North Korea is present. In addition, advanced weapons and military intelligence technology are necessary components for the Korean

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16) *Transformation Study Report*, “Transforming Military Operation Capabilities,” Prepared for the Secretary of Defense (April 27, 2001), pp. 1-3, [<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2001/d20010621transexec.pdf>].

17) A detailed discussion is related with the discussion of revolution in military affairs (RMA). Roh Hoon, and Lee Sang-hyun, “International Trend of RMA and Future War,” *2001 research report for the budget plan for defense* (November 2001).

18) Larry M. Wortzel, “Planning for the Future: The Role of US Forces in Northeast Asian Security,” *The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder*, No. 1388 (July 26, 2000), pp. 2-3.

Army. U.S. satellite systems, which keep vigil 24 hours a day, U-2 surveillance planes, and the Korean Combat Operations Intelligence Center (KCOIC) and the Combined Analysis Control Center (CACC) monitor and analyze the movements of North Korean military forces. Certainly, the intelligence capability of U.S. forces is a core factor in containing North Korea. In particular, North Korea's recognition of advanced U.S. information technology alone, contributes to effects on preventing war in Korea.<sup>19)</sup>

The overhaul of USFK, therefore, should not be bogged down by pro- and anti-America debate. Efforts should focus on how to enhance the preparedness and adaptability of the alliance so as to allow for possible changes in the future.

#### PREMISES FOR THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ALLIANCE.

Korea and the U.S. need to continue efforts to improve their partnership. There is already mutual understanding on the need for change, considering variables on the Korea peninsula, Northeast Asia and the global environment. However, Korea needs to be practical in focusing on its strategic advantages. In order to re-establish the Korea-U.S. alliance, the following factors should be considered.

First, Korea must recognize that its alliance with the U.S. is asymmetric. Given the lack of institutional mechanisms to secure national sovereignty, nations seek ways to protect their security such as military power, and an alliance is one way of improving national security. An alliance necessarily limits independent decision-making vis-à-vis national strategy. Especially, in cases of asymmetric alliance like the ROK-U.S. alliance, the trade-off between increased security

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19) Ministry of National Defense, "ROK-U.S. Alliance and USFK," (Seoul: MND, 2002), p. 54.

and decreased autonomy become more salient.<sup>20)</sup> Although an asymmetric ROK-U.S. alliance was necessary in state-building and militarization during the early decades, the alliance now faces demands by the Korean people who ask for a more symmetric relations. Despite President Roh Moo-hyun's bid for diplomatic independence, considering the current world military order, Korea would be wiser to pursue autonomy under the asymmetric alliance with practical objectives.

Second, it should be clear that the objective is not the withdrawal of U.S. forces, but building a fair relationship that includes amending the SOFA. Certainly, a desirable alliance must include discussion and compromise. However, in the past, the U.S. government unilaterally decided important matters that severely impacted Korea, and it failed to provide necessary information to the Korean government. A dramatic example: In 1994, the U.S. reportedly made plans to bomb North Korean nuclear facilities, without even informing the South Korean government.

Third, Korea and the U.S. should recognize the major significance of their alliance, which contributes to the strategic balance and security in Northeast Asia. With it, the U.S. can maintain a bridgehead in Korea, and Korea can take advantage of the security assets of U.S., even at some expense to its autonomy.

### CONCLUSION: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The ROK-U.S. military alliance, which served 50 years as a stabilizer for Northeast Asian security and as a prerequisite for South Korea's political and economic development, is now entering a period of transition. The U.S. continues to adapt its global strategy to

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20) Chang No-soon, "Trade-offs of Trade-off Model," *Korean Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (1996), pp. 79-81; James Morrow, "Arms versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security," *International Organization*, Vol. 47 (1993).

the Korean peninsula in the form of relocation and reduction, while South Korea tries to gain more autonomy without losing the alliance's power to deter. Recent candlelight vigils calling for SOFA revision conveyed a false impression of all-out anti-Americanism to the American public, further complicating the situation. Meanwhile, the North Korean nuclear crisis has raised South Korean concern on the possible weakening of the alliance. Under these circumstances, the new alliance should find their proper place with fewer complications, under the condition that it firmly continues in its role to defend the country from possible attacks from the North. In order to achieve this purpose, the following policies should be considered.

First, it is desirable to postpone the discussion of reduction and relocation of U.S. forces in Korea. Although, both governments have already made public plans for reformation and reallocation of the U.S. forces, it will only strengthen the brinkmanship strategy of North Korea. Considering North Korea's formidable nuclear and conventional military ability, U.S. forces are the biggest asset of South Korea's national security.<sup>21)</sup> Therefore, the issue should not be the sole responsibility of the Ministry of National Defense. Instead, it would be wise to form a government-level coalition to research and implement ideas later, when the security environment is more stable on the Korean peninsula.

Second, and most urgent, consensus must be reached regarding the policy with North Korea. Although Korea and the U.S. have announced several times that they are willing to meet with North Korea unconditionally, the two demonstrate increasing different levels of tolerance. While Korea wants to use carrots to bring about changes in North Korea, the U.S. wants to use the stick. In fact, different perspectives on the real intentions of North Korea have fueled tensions between South Korea and U.S. Therefore, to enhance

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21) Park Kun-young, "The New U.S. Strategy in Northeast Asia and Readjustment of the Korea-U.S. Relations" (in Korean), Sejong Institute, *National Strategy in Changing International Order* (Sungnam: Sejong Institute, 2002), pp. 44-47.

mutual understanding about North Korea, a project to study North Korea should be launched, bringing together specialists from both countries.<sup>22)</sup>

Third, the new Korean administration should respond to the anti-American movement appropriately. Growing anti-U.S. sentiment will trigger anti-Korea feelings among the U.S. public, which will ultimately sway public opinion toward withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea. Kim Dae-jung government's lukewarm response to civic demonstrations following the death of the teenage girls damaged the relationship with the U.S., although they gained support from Korean people on the revision for SOFA.

Fourth, a full transfer of wartime operational command (OPCOM) is unrealistic, and will only trigger U.S. concern that Korea-led Combined Forces Command (CFC) will control the U.S. troops, and in the end, U.S. forces will be withdrawn from Korea. Following the asymmetric ROK-U.S. alliance, a gradual staged process is needed to promote a stronger South Korean voice. The first step will be gaining a balanced power share in the ROK-U.S. CFC. By strengthening its own operational and intelligence ability over the long term, South Korea will be able to participate equally in the CFC and the ROK-U.S. Military Committee Meeting (MCM).

Fifth, the diplomatic base between Korea and the U.S. should be enhanced. With new leaders in the U.S. Congress and increasing participation by the post-war generation, perspectives and interests of the U.S. government on Korean peninsula issues have changed. So far, diplomatic efforts have focused on the administration, but Korea needs to actively respond to changes in the Congress, officially and unofficially. U.S. diplomatic policy is increasingly developed in Congress, and even the administration is seeking close cooperation with it.<sup>23)</sup> Moreover, in order to enforce the capability of Track-II, it is important to form a network between Korean specialists group,

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22) Nam Sung-wook, "U.S. Should Study North Korea" (in Korean), Korea Institute for Future Strategies, [<http://www.kifs.org>].

former government officials and think-tank personnel.

No one will deny that the ROK-U.S. alliance has contributed South Korea's state building and militarization for decades. Based on the alliance, it successfully developed its ruined economy and realized a prosperous country. During the transition period, both countries must remember that the broad principle should encompass the promotion of peaceful reunification of the two Koreas and deterrence of military provocation by North Korea. Furthermore, it should generate mutual benefits for Korea and the U.S. and reflect the independent development of defense capability based on the national pride and heritage of Korea.

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23) Deborah DeYong, "US Congress and Korea Policy," in Baek Jong-chun, and Lee Sang-hyun (eds.), *Korea-US Relations in Transition: Korea-US Alliance in Retrospect and Prospects for a New Strategic Partnership* (Sunnam: Sejong Institute, 2003).