

How to Negotiate with North Korea: The Logic of Two-Face Games

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THE ONGOING NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS

In early October, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly visited Pyongyang to begin talks on a wide range of issues including North Korea's nuclear, missile, and conventional weapons threat. During discussions, the U.S. delegation presented recently acquired information that North Korea had been operating a program for several years to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons, which is in violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework. The most shocking development: North Korean officials acknowledged that they, indeed, had a nuclear development program and they considered the Agreed Framework null and void.¹⁾

Under the Agreed Framework signed in 1994, North Korea had supposedly frozen its nuclear development program in exchange for two safer light-water reactors that are now being constructed by the

1) U.S. Embassy Korea, "Transcript: Kelly Says No Final Decision on Status of N. Korea Agreed Framework," *Washington File* (November 20, 2002). [<http://usembassy.state.gov/ircseoul/www5130.html>]

Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). In light of Pyongyang's surprising acknowledgement, however, that agreement seems destined to collapse.

Since North Korea chose not to give up its nuclear development program, it is clear that the nuclear issue still looms. Perhaps Pyongyang has another card to play. The Agreed Framework provision states that "Dismantlement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be completed when the light-water reactor project is completed."²⁾

Thus, North Korea had plenty of room to manipulate the agreement. That is to say, when KEDO's light-water reactor project is delayed or when things do not go as North Korea would like, the nuclear development programs could be brought to the fore again. Not only was Pyongyang's confession predictable, but it demonstrates that the North Korean nuclear crisis is still progressing.³⁾

It appears that North Korea is fast becoming a runaway train armed with nuclear weapons, while Seoul and Washington work feverishly to prevent a disaster. But, it is hard to predict how this operation will turn out. A peaceful nuclear-free Korean peninsula,

2) Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Geneva, October 21, 1994

3) It is generally accepted that, by the early 1990s, North Korea did not regard the U.S. threat but its own internal economic crisis as a key threat to its existence. Thus, North Korea chose to change its policies to overcome its economic crisis through the negotiation with the U.S. on its nuclear development programs, which led to the Agreed Framework. By means of negotiating with the U.S., North Korea could secure two light water reactors and heavy oil. Despite all these, however, North Korea did not renounce its nuclear development program and could be maintaining its nuclear option policy. It is estimated that North Korea wanted to maintain its nuclear development program to secure the complement of KEDO project. In view of these facts, when KEDO's light-water reactor project is delayed or the existence of the regime is threatened, North Korean nuclear problems might be brought to the fore again.

inter-Korean détente and the lives of Koreans and others are at stake.

From the spring of 1993, when North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and to the Agreed Framework signed in October 1994, the U.S. and South Korea endured exasperating negotiations with North Korea. During those negotiations, the South Korean government found itself a mere observer to dynamics between the U.S. and North Korea as Pyongyang maneuvered to exclude it from the negotiation process. Meanwhile, with the breakdown of negotiations, South Koreans endured the threat of war on the Korean peninsula. The situation was so perilous that the U.S. was even planning an air raid on North Korea, totally unknown to Korean people at that time.⁴⁾ The Geneva Agreed Framework, which emerged from those difficult talks, however, did not end the crisis. Rather, it simply presented a framework to deal with the problems. For South Korea and the U.S., the results raised the strong need for establishing more effective negotiation methods vis-à-vis North Korea. South Korea, in particular, must revamp its negotiation strategies.

The article will review negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea, 1993-1994, based on the logic of two-face game theory. The two-face game will shed new light on negotiation strategies of both sides and can suggest new directions that can be taken in expected negotiations with North Korea.

THE LOGIC OF THE TWO-FACE GAME

Robert D. Putnam's conjecture of two-level games offers a interesting metaphor for the North Korean nuclear negotiations: While it is clear that domestic politics and international relations are often entangled, our theories have not yet sorted out the puzzling

4) Park Kwan-yong, *Four Crises and Shocks* (in Korean), (Seoul: Oruem, 2000), pp. 57-61.

tangle. It is fruitless to debate whether domestic politics really determine international relation, or the reverse. The answer to that question is clearly "Both, Sometimes." The more interesting questions are "When?" and "How?"⁵⁾

Since Putnam suggested his theory of two-level games, many analysts have applied the theory to international negotiations, proving that his conjecture was right. But, as it has been proved, Putnam's theory does have some leaks. First, the differing power distribution among countries makes the relative strength of a country the most important factor in explaining international negotiations. This means that the realistic paradigm of international relations still has some more explanatory power than the two-level game theory. Second, two-level game theory puts more emphasis on domestic factors, which limits the adaptability of the theory itself. Third, the negotiator is more autonomous than he is described by the two-level game theory.

This suggests the need to establish a new theoretical form, and the two-face game theory may be an alternative to the two-level game theory.⁶⁾

Adopting the logic of two-face games, this article attempts to analyze the negotiation strategies of the U.S., South Korea and North Korea during the period of 1993-1994.

First of all, consider the following scenario that might apply to any two-face game. There exist two faces in any kind of international negotiation: One is the external face, in which negotiations are held to reach an agreement, and the other is the internal face in which the negotiators are sent to the external face. Negotiators are subject to

5) Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-level Games," *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), p. 427.

6) For more details about the two-face game theory, see Jung Gi-woong, "Two-Face Game: An Alternative to Robert D. Putnam's Two-Level Game Theory," (in Korean) presented at an international conference hosted by the Korean Association of International Studies International Conference, October 11, 2002.

constraints that any tentative agreement must be ratified by their respective organizations. The negotiators could be heads of government representing nations, for example, labor and management representatives, or party leaders in a multiparty coalition. The internal face might consist of many nations or alliances, or it could be a nation, an organization or organizations, with a common interest to reach an agreement, but the preferences of each actor might vary. Actors of the internal face might be represented by a negotiator but, before the negotiations begin, they act strategically to choose a negotiator that meets their preferences. And they play games strategically vis-à-vis their counterparts, which include the negotiator and the internal actors of the counterpart organization. The negotiator chosen in this game might represent its internal face actors, has own preference and is subject to the constraint that any tentative agreement must be ratified by his or her internal face actors.

The strategies that can be drawn from the logic of the two-face game are summarized in Figure 1 and Table 1. In the two-face game, the negotiator is affected both by his internal actors and by his counterpart's internal actors. At the same time, the negotiator can take actions directed both at his internal actors and at his counterpart's internal actors. The internal actors on both sides, described as partial or passive actors in existing studies, are also regarded as active participants who try to influence games in the external and internal face.

EXAMINING NEGOTIATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA 1993-1994 BY THE LOGIC OF THE TWO-FACE GAME


X's (Anti-North Korean Nations') Internal Face Actors

By examining existing research on the negotiations with North Korea in 1993-1994, it is clear that the U.S. and North Korea were

Table 1. Strategies by the Logic of the Two-Face Game

Actors	Actions directed at	Strategies	Aims of strategies
Negotiator A	A's internal actors	Tying hands	Reducing winset by publically announcing hard-line policy to increase negotiation power
		Issuing	Reducing winset by activating internal face actors by issuing unexpected agendas to increase the negotiation power
		Cutting slack	Expanding winset by redefining issues
	B's internal actors	Targeting	Altering the internal balance of the other party by linking issues to increase the winset
		Reverberation	Increasing the winset of the other party by changing the general images of issues to increase negotiation power
		Issuing	Stirring political debate to activate internal actors of the other party to reduce the winset of the other party to get more concessions
Negotiator B	Chief of actors collusion	Exchanging political properties to expand each other's winsets	
A's internal actors	A's internal actors	Making alliances	Changing the internal face power distribution
	Negotiator A	Tying hands	Demanding moderate policies
		Cutting slack	Demanding hard-line policies
	Negotiator B	Transfacial lobby	Altering the policies by changing the preferences of the other party's decision-makers
		Suggesting agendas	Suggesting new agendas which aligns with his own interests
	B's internal actors	Transfacial alliance	Increasing negotiation power by cooperating with internal actors of the one party to expand the winset size of the other party
		Targeting	Altering the internal balance of the other party by linking issues to increase the winset
		Reverberation	Increasing the winset of the other party by changing the general images of issues to increase negotiation power
		Issuing	Stirring political debate to activate internal actors of the other party to reduce the winset of the other party to get more concessions

Figure 1. International Negotiations by the Logic of the Two-Face Game



Note: This diagram is illustrated from A's standpoint.

regarded as main actors. South Korea, Japan and China were sometimes regarded as actors, but they were treated as supporting actors, who had no significant influence on the negotiation process. This article suggests that there existed various actors throughout the process of negotiations with North Korea. In particular, South Korea and China are given much more importance in the negotiation process than they once were.

South Korea had a direct interest in the North Korean nuclear program, as it threatened the security of the Korean peninsula and

Table 2. X's Internal Face Actors

	Internal face actors	Constituents
	Chief negotiator	The U.S. delegation
	U.S. hawks	Dept. of Defense, CIA, Dept. of Energy, bureaucrats from the previous government, parliament driven by Republicans, conservative press, presidential candidates, munitions industries
X	U.S. doves and neutrals	White House, Dept. of State, liberal press, liberal scholars
(Anti – N.K.)	South Korean hawks	Blue House, National Security Planning Board, the Ministry of Defense, the Democratic Liberal Party, conservative press, veterans
	South Korean doves and neutrals	The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Unification, the Democratic Party, liberal press
	IAEA	Homogeneous actor, hawkish
	China	Homogeneous actor, dovish
	Japan	Homogeneous actor, moderates or somewhat hawkish
	Russia	Homogeneous actor, moderates

the lives of the Korean people. Consequently, it tried every possible means to influence negotiations. Japan, China, and Russia also tried to engage in the negotiation process since they had critical interests in regard with their own security and the power distribution in Northeast Asia.

Accordingly, although the U.S. was a main actor in the negotiation process, it was not totally independent of other nations, namely South Korea, Japan, China and Russia, in dealing with the nuclear issue. In other words, the U.S. had to take their interests into consideration and to pursue cooperation with its allies and other surrounding powers.

In this context, let us name the nations with common interests in

Table 3. Y's Internal Face Actors

	Internal face actors	Constituents
Y (North Korea)	Chief negotiator	North Korean delegation
	Government	Homogeneous actor represented by a chief negotiator

North Korean nuclear programs “X” (Anti-North Korea) and North Korea “Y.” X’s internal face consisted of various actors from the U.S., South Korea, Japan, China and Russia, and X’s chief negotiator would be chosen during the game.

X’s internal face actors might be national level actors or individual level actors. Owing to the democratic characteristics of the U.S. and South Korea, it is inevitable that the policies of the two nations would be drawn from a pluralistic policy-making process. Since the collapse of the Cold War, the pluralistic policy-making process has penetrated into the sphere of national security and foreign policy, which was once considered the exclusive rights of the president and the government. So, various actors including president, parliament, government agencies and many individual actors try to influence the national security and foreign policy decision-making process by various ways. Table 2 shows the simplified X’s internal face actors.

Y's (North Korea's) Internal Face Actors

This article assumes that North Korea was generally a homogeneous actor, whose regime was shut off from the rest of the world. Consequently, North Korea had an internal face consisting of homogeneous actors and an external face represented by a chief negotiator. Table 3 shows the internal face actors of North Korea.

X's Negotiation Strategies

Negotiation strategies vary according to whether the interests of the negotiator and his internal actors are aligned or opposed. When aligned, the negotiator tries to extract as many concessions as possible from his or her counterpart. When opposed, however, the negotiator may not wish to demand certain concessions from his or her counterpart based on his or her own interests.

In order to draw *X's* possible negotiation strategies from the logic of the two-face game, this article suggests some hypotheses as follows.

H1: The negotiator will not be fixed until negotiations begin.

H2: Greater domestic constraint is not always a bargaining advantage in international negotiations.

H3: When the interests of the negotiator and those of his or her internal actors conflict, the negotiator is much more likely to be affected by the other party's negotiation strategies.

When applied to the negotiations with North Korea, the hypotheses can be altered as follows: *X's* internal face actors have conflicting interests in North Korean nuclear programs, so the North Korean nuclear issue can be described as heterogeneous.⁷⁾

This means that each actor may take different approaches to solve North Korean nuclear problems and they may conflict during

7) The actors from the U.S. and South Korea had different interests in the North Korean nuclear issue. Thus, they had different concepts and approaches to it. The U.S. actors, whether hawkish or dovish, regarded the North Korean nuclear program as a crucial threat to its global strategies. On the other hand, South Korea had to pursue long-term nuclear policy which could ensure peaceful use of nuclear resources and, at the same time, prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. Consequently, regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, the strategic aims of the U.S. and South Korea were different and this makes the issue heterogeneous.

the internal face negotiation process.

Since each actor, especially South Korea and the U.S., wants to send its own negotiator to the external face game, they compete seriously at the internal face till the negotiations begin. Even after negotiations open, internal face actors try to influence the negotiator to steer the results of the negotiations in the direction of their own interests.

Besides, considering the homogeneous characteristic of North Korea, X's internal face actors may prefer strategies that alter their own winset instead of altering North Korea's, since altering North Korea's internal constraint is almost impossible. In this case, tying hands, issuing and cutting slack strategies toward X's internal face actors can be effective for X's negotiator, and, for X's internal face actors, tying hands and cutting slack strategies toward its negotiator can be effective. And this suggests that X's negotiator and internal face actors are much more likely to be influenced by North Korean negotiation strategies, for they have different interests in the agenda.


Figure 2 illustrates the negotiator, internal face actors and the strategies mentioned above.

North Korea's Negotiation Strategies

In general, the winset of an organization depends on its own internal face game, so it is impossible for an opposing negotiator to influence it. According to the logic of the two-face game, however, the possibility certainly exists that a negotiator can influence the internal face of the other party by adopting some practical strategies that could expand the winset size of the other party. Targeting linkage, which changes the structure of issues by linking issues to create a policy option, or using reverberation, which tries to influence directly on the internal face of the other party to change the image of the issues, might be suggested as such strategies.

In addition, this article suggests some new strategies. According to the logic of the two-face game, strategies to reduce the winset size

Figure 2. X's Two-Face Game and Negotiation Strategies



Note: This diagram is illustrated at X's standpoint. Solid lines are working strategies, while dotted lines are not.

of the other party can be effective. In general negotiations, since reducing the winset size decreases the possibility of ratification, the negotiator is not likely to adopt such strategies. But, when the

interests of internal actors of the other party are heterogeneous, the winset-reducing strategies, such as issuing, may yield unexpected concessions from the negotiator of the other party.

As a negotiator, North Korea is relatively autonomous from its internal constituents. On the other hand, X's internal constituents are heterogeneous. Furthermore, information on North Korea's internal face game is strictly limited, while the information on X's internal face game is almost fully open. Thus, North Korea's negotiation strength depends much more on the strategies of its negotiator than on the current situation.

In view of this, if the new strategies above are applied to the North Korean decision-making process, they can be summarized as follows:

First, North Korea will try to influence X's internal face game to choose the negotiator, and thus create hospitable surroundings for negotiations. Taking the intentions and strategic aims of North Korea into consideration, North Korea's preferable negotiation counterpart is the U.S.


Second, X's internal actors have different interests in the negotiation agenda of North Korean nuclear problems. When interests are heterogeneous, the effective strategies for the other party are winset-reducing strategies. So, North Korea will try to reduce X's winset to yield unexpected concessions by adopting strategies such as issuing, targeting and reverberation. Besides, recognizing the huge difference in information availability of the two sides, North Korea may have much more negotiating power than X.

Figure 3 illustrates the arguments mentioned above.

APPLYING STRATEGIES TO THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS

Selecting the Negotiator

In the early stages of the North Korean nuclear issue, when

Figure 3. North Korea's Two-Face Game and Its Strategies

Note: This diagram is illustrated at North Korea's standpoint. Solid lines are working strategies, while dotted lines are not.

Pyongyang announced its withdrawal from the NPT, the U.S. and South Korea tried to pressure North Korea through international organizations, especially the U.N. But the U.S. and South Korean governments, who wanted to impose sanctions against North Korea through the U.N. Security Council, met with opposition from China. Shortly after North Korea's withdrawal announcement, when the IAEA attempted to introduce the agenda before the U.N. Security Council, the Chinese ambassador to the U.N. announced that China would oppose any attempts to introduce the North Korean nuclear

issue before the U.N. Security Council. On March 23, 1993, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen announced at a press conference for foreign reporters that it would oppose any international attempts to take sanctions against North Korea. Then, Prime Minister Li Peng also announced at another press conference that China did not want the North Korean nuclear issue to be introduced before the U.N. Security Council and would oppose any sanctions against North Korea. At the same time, North Korea insisted that the U.S. be its negotiating counterpart, since, it claimed, the nuclear crisis arose from Pyongyang's shaky relationship with the U.S. and from U.S. global strategies.

The U.S. and South Korean governments acceded to China's demand, accepting North Korea's proposal for U.S.-North Korea high level talks to deal with nuclear issue as a way of securing China's cooperation. Meanwhile, South Korea had no effective alternatives to proposals by North Korea, so the U.S. delegation acted as negotiator of the game.

The process above clearly indicates that China's strategy of tying hands strongly influenced U.S. policy toward North Korea, while North Korean strategies worked effectively in selecting the U.S. as its negotiation counterpart.

This article suggested a hypothesis that the negotiator will not be fixed until negotiations begin and the internal actors of each side play games to select their preferable negotiator. China's opposition against sanctioning North Korea and North Korea's demands to have direct talks with the U.S. support the hypothesis.

X's Strategies: Altering its Own Internal Constraints

When applying the logic of the two-face game to negotiations between X and North Korea, X's internal actors are expected to adopt strategies that focus on altering X's internal constraints rather than influence those of North Korea's. And the negotiation process

proves this.

Throughout negotiations, China generally adopted the tying-hands strategy, while South Korea repeatedly used the strategies of tying hands and cutting slack. In early stage of negotiations, South Korea failed to gain the position of chief negotiator first because of North Korea's strategies and second, due to the situation in world politics. It had no option but to pursue the strategy of influencing X's negotiator, the U.S. delegation.

After the first U.S.-North Korea high-level talks, Korean actors, especially the hawks, criticized the results of the first high-level talks, influencing the U.S. strategies, a concrete example of hypotheses mentioned above.

The South Korean government faced strong criticism from its hawkish members and was also dissatisfied with the result of the first high-level talks. Seoul made a strategic move to take the initiative in negotiations. In other words, it suggested that North Korean nuclear problems should be solved through negotiations between the two concerned countries, South and North Korea, which would reduce X's winset size and tie the hands of the U.S.

The problem of special envoys from South and North Korea further complicated the situation, increasing conflicts among the U.S., South Korea and North Korea. Indeed, South Korean president Kim Young-sam told *The New York Times* and the BBC, that he strongly opposed any additional concessions to North Korea. This brought a strong response from U.S. actors over South Korea's attitude. The U.S. attempted to placate South Korean actors through President Clinton's visit to South Korea and his speech at Panmunjom. The result of those actions was reflected in the second round of high-level talks.

After the end of the second round of talks to the Geneva Agreed Framework signed in October 21, 1994, various strategic actions were taken by X and North Korea: the exchange of special envoys between South and North Korea, IAEA's special inspection and general inspection, the conflict between the U.S. and South Korea over the

issue of comprehensive settlement, the “Agreed Conclusion” between the U.S. and North Korea, IAEA’s failure of inspections to North Korea, North Korea’s disposal of fuel rods which led to breakoff of negotiations, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s visit to Pyongyang, Kim Il-sung’s death, and the Geneva Agreed Framework. Throughout this period, X’s internal face actors tried to influence the U.S. decision-making process.

The IAEA’s strong position against North Korea put great constraints on the U.S. decision-making process, while South Korean hawks actively opposed the South Korean government’s concessions on the North Korean nuclear issue. Seoul was forced to acquiesce, which led to hard-line policies toward North Korea. At the same time, the South Korean government expressed strong opposition to U.S. comprehension policy. These actions limited the choices of the U.S. delegation, resulting in more concessions to North Korea, since it was feared that negotiations could be broken off.

In conclusion, throughout negotiations with North Korea, X’s internal face actors preferred to alter their own winsets, which worked unfavorably in the negotiation process by tying the hands of their negotiator.

North Korea’s Strategies: Altering X’s Internal Constraints

North Korea was a tough negotiator throughout the negotiation process. In fact, North Korea’s withdrawal announcement was a strategic play to alter X’s internal constraints to have direct talks with the U.S. Before the withdrawal announcement, the South Korean government had stuck to the principle that the two Koreas should solve issues between themselves, opposing direct talks between the U.S. and North Korea. But North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT transformed the nuclear issue into an international problem. Debate thus spread from South Korea to the international community. This represents a typical issuing strategy, according to the logic of two-face games.

After the withdrawal announcement, North Korea gradually revealed its intentions: that only direct talks with the U.S. could solve the issues. In an interview with the *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, March 17, 1994, North Korean U.N. ambassador Ho Jong said that the key was in U.S. hands and that North Korea wanted the U.S. as its negotiation counterpart. On March 29, North Korea officially suggested U.S.-North Korea high-level talks. On the same day, in an editorial of *Rodong Shinmun*, North Korea blamed the U.S. for its withdrawal from the NPT and insisted that the U.S. should hold direct talks with the North. Since then, it had insisted on the direct talks with the U.S. through various means, clearly revealing its intention to exclude South Korea from negotiations. According to Pyongyang, South-North dialogue can only start again after settling the politico-military problems between the U.S. and North Korea. North Korea's strategies were very effective in selecting the negotiation counterpart.

North Korea also used issuing as an effective strategy toward X's internal face actors, especially South Korea. By announcing its withdrawal from the NPT, North Korea stirred hot debate in South Korea about its North Korean policy. Sticking to direct talks with the U.S. limited South Korea's options, and its proposal to exchange high-level special envoys caused heated arguments among South Korean internal face constituents about its North Korean policy. This is the typical strategy of issuing, which intends to reduce the winset size of the other party by introducing unexpected agendas.

While North Korea wanted the U.S. as its only negotiation counterpart, it could not ignore the fact that the U.S. and South Korea are allies. So, by suggesting the exchange of high-level special envoys, it attempted to stir up conflicts among South Korean actors, resulting in a reduction of the winset size of South Korea.

North Korea's strategy toward the U.S. and South Korea were apparent throughout the negotiation process. On March 19, 1994, the North Korean delegation threatened at the South-North dialogues that Seoul would "be in a sea of flames," a pronouncement that

directly affected the actions of X's internal face actors. In addition, its announcement of withdrawal from IAEA on June 13, former president Carter's visit to Pyongyang and its consent to hold inter-Korean summit meeting were precisely chosen strategies.

North Korea effectively influenced X's negotiator and its internal face actors by adopting winset reducing strategies as well as winset expanding strategies.

CONCLUSION

This article has tried to examine the strategies of both X (anti-North Korean nations) and North Korea during the period of North Korean nuclear negotiation 1993-1994 by adopting the logic of two-face games. It is worth noting that X's actors, including the negotiator and his or her internal constituents, had no choice but to adopt strategies to alter its own internal constraints, while North Korea was free to choose the strategies of winset reducing and expanding, thanks to the characteristics of its regime. The North Korean government operates relatively autonomously from its citizenry, which made it possible for North Korea to choose more effective negotiation strategies. In particular, North Korea succeeded in altering X's internal constraints regardless of its own winset, which made it possible for North Korea to gain the initiative throughout the negotiation process in spite of its relatively weak international standing. This in turn gave North Korea the power to lead the negotiation process and to extract more profitable results. While each debater may have a different evaluation of the Geneva Agreed Framework, North Korea clearly achieved its own objectives through the negotiations and the Agreed Framework.

This observation disproves the general hypothesis that internal constraints can increase the negotiator's negotiation power. The element of regime characteristics shows this. In other words, when negotiating with a counterpart that is independent of its internal

constituents, the other part negotiator, influenced from its internal face, has weaker negotiation power.

Therefore, South Korea and the U.S. should prepare for expected negotiations with North Korea by considering North Korea's regime characteristics. South Korea and the U.S. should establish strategies to nullify North Korea's influence on its internal face games. Hiding information or concealing the negotiation process from the public can be effective ways, but, considering the pluralistic decision-making process and democratic principles of the U.S. and South Korea, such strategies are nearly impossible. When negotiating with North Korea, the U.S. and South Korea must be aware of possible weakness in their position even when they can forecast North Korea's negotiation style. Thus, they need to establish new strategies to deal with it.