

Russia's South Korea Policy: A Comparison of Soviet and Post-Soviet Dynamics

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INTRODUCTION

Since 1990, when Russia established official diplomatic relations with South Korea, research focusing on the Korean peninsula has been an important dimension of Russian foreign policy. The environment for such research has been poor, however. Scant resources, more urgent political and security priorities, and lack of contacts between Korean and Russian scholars have limited such foreign policy studies to historical descriptions of Russian relations with Korea.

In an attempt to go beyond a descriptive explanation, this analysis uses Graham T. Allison's three conceptual models to better explain the orientation of Soviet and post-Soviet Russian foreign policy toward South Korea during the last two decades. For this purpose, comparing the 1983 shootdown of KAL 007 with the 1998 case of the expulsion of an alleged Korean spy provides appropriate case studies by which to gauge the orientation of Soviet and post-Soviet Russian foreign policy toward South Korea in the 1980s and 1990s. While the KAL 007 incident occurred during the Cold War

period, the spy expulsion incident took place during the Post-Cold War period. And while the KAL 007 crisis took place before the Russian Federation existed, the spy expulsion incident occurred after Russia had full diplomatic ties with South Korea.

The origin of the hostile relationship between South Korea and the Soviet Union goes back to the division of Korea after World War II. Supporting North Korea's "One-Korea Policy," the Soviet Union did not recognize South Korea as an independent state. In fact, the Soviets regarded it as a colony under U.S. imperialist control. South Korea also took an uncompromising anti-communist posture as a basic principle of its foreign policy. Therefore, up to the time of the shootdown of KAL 747, there was no substantial progress in relationship between the two states even though there had been some contacts during international organizational meetings.

With the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, however, the two countries could achieve rapprochement. The Soviet leadership wanted to improve relations with South Korea for the economic benefits, while South Korea sought security and diplomatic interests. Diplomatic relations were finally normalized in September 1990.

To increase economic benefits, the post-Soviet Russian government must intensify and improve foreign policy relations with South Korea. However, notwithstanding economic imperatives, our analysis suggests that given existing significant diplomatic political relations with North Korea on the Korean peninsula, Russian foreign policy planners are unlikely to pursue an asymmetrically South Korea-centered economic security policy.

In short, the purpose of this paper is to investigate Soviet foreign policy toward South Korea as well as post-Soviet Russian foreign policy from the perspective of comparison. As stated, we will use Graham T. Allison's three conceptual models as a research tool for comparison.

Methodology

After briefly summarizing the history of Soviet and post-Soviet Russian foreign relations toward South Korea, we will apply Graham Allison's three conceptual models to the cases of the 1983 KAL 007 and 1998 spy expulsion incidents.¹⁾ Because the two cases took place under very different international political environments and conditions, it is theoretically difficult to employ all Allison's three conceptual models in each case. During the Cold War and before diplomatic normalization with South Korea, Soviet foreign policy toward South Korea under communist party leadership heavily reflected the logic of the Cold War in which the Soviet superpower wielded one-sided, dominant power over South Korea in the context of an asymmetrical relationship. In Allison's words, the Soviet reactions toward the KAL 007 incident can be understood as "more or less purposeful acts of unified national governments" and as "patterns of organizational behavior."²⁾ Therefore, we apply the Rational Policy Model (Model I) and the Organizational Process Model (Model II) to the KAL 007 incident.

However, it should be noted that the Bureaucratic Politics Model

1) For methodological development, we refer to the following articles. Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 63, No. 3 (1969), pp. 689-718; Johathan Bendor, and Thomas H. Hammond, "Rethinking Allison's Models," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 86, No. 2 (1992), pp. 301-322; David A. Welch, "The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1992), pp. 112-146; Robert J. Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique," *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1973), pp. 467-490; Jiri Valenta, "The Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 94, No. 1 (1973), pp. 55-76; and Morton H. Halperin, "The Decision to Deploy the ABM: Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics in the Johnson Administration," *World Politics*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1972), pp. 62-95.

2) Graham T. Allison, *op. cit.*, p. 690.

Table 1. The Scope of Allison's Three Model

Time Elapse	← September 1, 1983	→ September 2, 1983 to Present
Actors	The Military	Yuri Andropov, Politburo Members, and the Military
Dominant Actor	The Military	The Military
Decisions	KAL 007 Shootdown	Cover-up
Allison's Three Conceptual Models	Model I and II	Model III

(Model III) can be applied to the KAL 007 incident in the context of the cover-up by the former Soviets' leadership after the shootdown on September 1, 1983. Table 1 summarizes the time elapse and decision-making process surrounding the KAL 007 incident. Although there is no indication that the military leadership consulted with, or was directly influenced by the Soviet leader Yuri Andropov or the other Politburo members regarding the decision to destroy KAL 007, their knowledge of past party policy was surely a factor in deciding to cover up the incident.³⁾ In this sense, we attempt to apply the Bureaucratic Politics Model (Model III) to the follow-up of the KAL 007 incident.

After the Cold War and diplomatic normalization with South Korea in 1990, Russia as a once-great power has had two-way, reciprocal diplomatic relations with South Korea. Moreover, the multiparty election system has drastically changed Russian domestic politics as well. The election results have reflected a dynamic, two-stage transition: first, a transition from the Soviet communist dominant legislature to a pro-economic coalition legislature; and then, a transition from a pro-economic coalition legislature to a

3) Don Oberdorfer, *From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983-1991* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), pp. 54-57.

parliament (the State Duma) dominated by a coalition of the former communists and their allies. As a result, the legislative branch, with its own voice, has started to influence Russian foreign policy toward South Korea.⁴⁾ Because of the improved foreign relations as a partner with South Korea and the emergence of dynamic domestic politics, we believe that Russian reactions toward the spy expulsion can be understood as Allison's "outcomes of various overlapping bargaining games among players arranged hierarchically in the national government."⁵⁾ In this sense, we apply the Bureaucratic Politics Model (Model III) to the spy expulsion incident.

HISTORY OF SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET RUSSIAN FOREIGN RELATIONS TOWARD SOUTH KOREA

Since the former Soviet Union was militarily a part of the Asia Pacific region during the Cold War, it maintained tense relations with South Korea, which was viewed as a U.S. satellite state and thus an appropriate target of Soviet hostility. Soviet foreign policy planners considered North Korea as part of the Eastern bloc, which indeed at times reflected the dynamics of Sino-Soviet conflict. But they deemed South Korea as part of the West. However, the dominant bipolar East-West antagonism (i.e., the logic of the Cold War) based on the unidimensional and ruinously expensive military foreign policy priorities had begun to lose its effectiveness by the mid-1980s. Former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev embarked on a policy of demilitarization to open the possibility of political and economic relations with South Korea. On September 30, 1990, Gorbachev and President Roh Tae-woo established full diplomatic relations between their two countries. South Korea rewarded

4) See Jan S. Adams, "Who Will Make Russia's Foreign Policy in 1994," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 3, No. 6 (February 11, 1994), pp. 36-40.

5) Graham T. Allison, *op. cit.*, p. 690.

Gorbachev's overtures with a \$3 billion loan in 1991.⁶⁾ In this regard, Kim argues that the establishment of diplomatic relations was "one of the most significant events in the two countries' diplomatic history. It also signaled a turning point in the history of East Asian international relations in the last decade of the 20th century."⁷⁾

The demise of the Soviet Union resulted in the emergence of the Boris Yeltsin government in 1991. To increase political and economic benefits, Yeltsin and his foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, advocated a West-centric foreign policy that "Russia's foreign policy priority should be to join the 'civilized' (Western) world."⁸⁾ They included South Korea in that group. In November 1992, Yeltsin and President Roh Tae-woo signed a Treaty on the Basic Relations which proposed building Russo-South Korean relations on the basis of the shared ideals of freedom, democracy, and a commitment to a market economy.⁹⁾ "In a gesture of goodwill, Yeltsin also gave Roh the black box from flight KAL 007—downed by the Soviets in 1983—and said that Russians 'profoundly grieve over the deaths of completely innocent people.'¹⁰⁾ While Russia's improved foreign relations with South Korea through the 1994 summit meeting and the scheduling of the 1999 summit meeting¹¹⁾ did not substantially benefit Russian economic and political stability, it did cause a serious deterioration in relations with North Korea. As Elizabeth Stanley puts it, Russia's modest economic gains from improved relations with South Korea were not worth the expense of lost leverage over North Korea (especially in view of

6) Elizabeth A. Stanley, "Russia," in Robert Dujarric, *Korea: Security Pivot in Northeast Asia* (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hudson Institute, 1998), pp. 94-95.

7) Hakjoon Kim, "The Process Leading to the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between South Korea and the Soviet Union," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 37, No. 7 (1997), p. 637.

8) Elizabeth A. Stanley, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

9) *Ibid.*, pp. 104-105.

10) *Ibid.*, p. 105.

11) The 1994 summit meeting was held during Kim Young-sam's visit to Moscow and the 1999 by Kim Dae-Jung's visit to Moscow.

opportunities presented by the new Kim Jong-il government following the death of his father, Kim Il-sung, in July 1994).¹²⁾

In the same vein, Buszynski emphasizes that the Yeltsin government “had pursued the aim of promoting relations with Seoul while allowing the relationship with the North to deteriorate.”¹³⁾ Since the Yeltsin government opposed North Korean nuclear development, post-Soviet Russian foreign policy conflicted with that of North Korea. Further, when South Korea questioned the Yeltsin government regarding its commitment to the 1961 treaty of friendship with North Korea, Yeltsin made a concession to South Korea by notifying Seoul that the 1961 treaty would not be renewed in 1996.¹⁴⁾

Frustrated with the overall limited benefits of West-centric foreign policy, Yeltsin replaced foreign minister Kozyrev with Yevgeny Primakov in early 1996. Since then, post-Soviet Russian foreign policy has been a part of the general shift toward “Eurasianist foreign policy” designed to maintain a balance in Russia’s political relations between the East and the West. In this regard, Foreign Minister Primakov argued that “in addition to promoting good relations with the United States and the countries of Europe, [Russia] also should seek to cultivate strong ties with China, India, Japan, and ‘the countries of the Near and Middle East.’”¹⁵⁾ In September 1998 when Primakov took over as prime minister, he appointed his first deputy foreign minister Igor Ivanov to the foreign

12) Elizabeth A. Stanley, *op. cit.*, p.106; and “Kim Jong-il Era Dawns, with Military’s Status Enhanced,” *The Korea Herald*, September 1998, [<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/nknews/nk0998/nk09scs0.html>].

13) Leszek Buszynski, *Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War* (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger, 1996), p. 205.

14) This point was made by Terry M. Weidner, the Director of East Asian Area Studies at the University of Missouri, Columbia during a class presentation. See also Leszek Buszynski, *Ibid.*, pp. 201-212.

15) Coit D. Blacker, “Russia and the West,” in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., *The New Russian Foreign Policy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), p. 183.

minister's post he had vacated. Ivanov has long been a close associate of Primakov whose foreign policy resulted in a harder Russian line toward the West. Not surprisingly, when Ivanov visited the United States as foreign minister in October 1998, he said, "I believe that the current foreign policy [represents] Russia's national interests and enjoys the support of the majority of the political forces in the country."¹⁶⁾

Therefore, on the Korean peninsula, the Yeltsin government has attempted to restore a balance between the South and North at least since early 1996.¹⁷⁾ The shift of Yeltsin's foreign policy also may have reflected ascending military power over that of economic reformers in the domestic political struggle. Indeed, Buszynski argues that Yeltsin, "the main exponent of Russia's pro-Western policy became a hostage to domestic political forces, much reduced in terms of status, and bereft of the early enthusiasm and confidence."¹⁸⁾ In the same vein, Blank contends that "the logic and adherents of the militarizing approach to [South Korea] have apparently won the current round as the decision about the North Korean treaty and Russia's demand for inclusion in the nuclear reactor deal indicates."¹⁹⁾ It would appear that the spy expulsion incident in July 1998 provides still more evidence culminating in the shift of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy toward South Korea. According to a South Korean source, "an expert on Russian affairs said Russia's decision to expel the South Korean Intelligence officer, given his diplomatic status, was a symptom of Russia's changing foreign policy toward Seoul."²⁰⁾ Other evidence is that the Yeltsin government had shown signs of improving ties with

16) Quoted in Lally Weymouth, "What Ivanov Wants," *The Washington Post*, October 6, 1998, p. A23.

17) Elizabeth A. Stanley, *op. cit.*, p. 106; On Russia's modest economic gains from Korea, see Tsuneo Akaha, "Russia and Asia in 1995: Bold Objectives and Limited Means," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (1996), pp. 100-108.

18) Leszek Buszynski, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

19) Stephen Blank, "Russian Policy and the Changing Korean Question," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 35, No. 8 (1995), p. 719.

the initialing of a new amity pact to replace the 1961 treaty of friendship with North Korea that had been abrogated years ago.²¹⁾

In short, although Russia still has an economic imperative to deal with South Korea, it cannot ignore the domestic political pressure from what is left of the military establishment or from the former communists and their allies in the Duma, who demand that Russian foreign policy seek to maintain a balance between South and North Korea.

THE CASES OF THE KAL 007 AND SPY EXPLUSION INCIDENTS

The KAL 007 Incident

In tracing the KAL 007 incident in 1983, we realized that there were very few scholarly sources related to this crisis although there were American Congressional investigative sources regarding Soviet political aggression.²²⁾ This was not only because the incident occurred during the Cold War and before official Soviet diplomatic

20) "Moscow Throws Curveball in Diplomatic Imbroglio," *The Korea Herald*, July 27, 1998.

21) Jae Hoon Shim, "Spy Wars: Seoul Fails to Rein in its Intelligence Agency," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 161, No. 34 (August 20, 1998), p. 26; and "Ill-timed Presidential Tour," *The Korea Herald*, May 18, 1999.

22) Since the KAL 007 incident in 1983, there have been various theories as to why KAL 007 entered Soviet airspace. While both former Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia have consistently charged it with espionage up to the present, Western analyses have been somewhat disconcerted and disputable. While some Westerners claim that KAL 007 was a spy plane, others more convincingly argue that the incident occurred due to human error such as a ten-degree error in calculating the longitude at Anchorage International Airport. Spy plan theories, for example, started in 1989 with an article, *Defence Attache*, by a London advertising man who had no technical expertise. David Pearson, a Yale doctoral candidate in sociology, also contributed an article to *The Nation* in 1984, arguing a

ties with South Korea, but also because the incident was exploited as a symbolic spy war between two superpowers, not as an issue between the former Soviet Union and South Korea. During the Cold War, the former Soviet Union used the incident as the basis for its political rhetoric mainly against U.S., but rarely against South Korea.

According to Young and Launer, due to total control over communications, the Soviet news on this incident was presented not for its own sake, but as proof that the postulates of the communist state were correct.²³⁾ Because of the one-sided political rhetoric of both the former Soviet Union and the United States, it seems to us that Allison's Model I and II can explain the Soviets' foreign policy procedure on the KAL 007 incident. It is extremely difficult to

conspiracy theory that the American government was, to some extent, responsible for the incident. However, according to the final report of the United Nations special group for the safety of commercial flying, the Montreal-based International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) on June 14, 1993 and several congressional hearing reports, the incident was an accident caused by human error. Although the causes are still debatable, it seems that KAL 007 pilots' negligence mainly contributed to the disaster. For more information, see Martin H. Levinson, "Books," *Reviews on the Book, Desired Track: The Tragic Flight of KAL 007, ETC: A Review of General Semantics*, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Winter 1996-97), pp. 473-474; Michael R. Gordon, "Ex-Soviet Pilot Still Insists KAL 007 was Spying," *The New York Times*, December 9, 1996, p. A12; James Oberg, "KAL 007: The Real Story," *American Spectator*, Vol. 26, No. 10 (October 1993), pp. 37-42; John Barron, "KAL 007: The Hidden Story," *Reader's Digest*, Vol. 139, No. 835 (November 1991), pp. 71-77; David Pearson, "K.A.L. 007: What the U.S. Knew and When We Knew it," *The Nation*, August 18-25, 1984, pp. 105-124; U.S. Government Printing Office, *USIA: Recent Developments: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, United States Senate, Ninety-Eighth Congress, First Session, September 22, 1983; and U.S. Government Printing Office, *Aircraft Navigation Technology and Errors: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Transportation, Aviation and Materials of the Committee on Science and Technology*, U.S. House of Representatives, Ninety-Eighth Congress, First Session, September 19, 1983.

23) Marilyn J. Young, and Michael K. Launer, *Flights of Fancy, Flight of Doom: KAL 007 and Soviet-American Rhetoric* (Lanham, New York and London: University Press of America, 1988), pp. 103-135.

identify the factors of Allison's Model III.²⁴⁾ However, as mentioned earlier, we can apply the Bureaucratic Politics Model (Model III) to the follow-up of the KAL 007 incident, which would help to better understand the foreign policy of the former Soviet Union. The Soviet government claimed that the KAL 007 incident was caused by one of American spying operations. In the context of Soviet strategic and political situations, Bolman and Deal aptly summarize the KAL 007 incident on September 1, 1983 as follows.

AT 3:12 a.m., Lieutenant Colonel Genadi Osipovich flew his SU-15 fighter right along side KAL 007. He was initially surprised to see flashing lights—unprecedented for a U.S. reconnaissance plane. He was even more surprised to discover a Boeing civilian aircraft. Osipovich told ground control about the lights, and two senior Russian officers speculated that the intruder might be a passenger plane. But Osipovich never mentioned that he had identified a Boeing 747. “They did not ask me,” he said later. In his mind, it had to be a spy mission, and he expected both a hero's welcome and substantial cash bonus for destroying the enemy target. But time was short—KAL 007 would soon leave Soviet airspace. Ordered to force KAL 007 to land, Osipovich concluded radio was useless, because the foreign pilots would not speak Russian. He flashed his lights and fired more than five hundred cannon rounds as a signal—but the shells contained no tracers and were invisible. There was no response. At 3:26 a.m., less than half a minute before KAL 007 was to exit Soviet airspace, Osipovich fired two missiles. He reported to ground control, “The target is destroyed.” Two hundred sixty-nine people fell to their deaths.²⁵⁾

24) This is lack of various sources which, as Allison argues, includes the full public record plus a large number of interviews with participants in the crisis. See Graham T. Allison, *op. cit.*, p. 691.

Model I. Rational Policy: Individual Rationality

The KAL 007 tragedy, to some degree, resulted from a Soviet fighter pilot's "trigger-happy" rationality.²⁶⁾ As Bolman and Deal put it, since the pilot felt the airplane had to be carrying out a spy mission, he imagined not only a hero's welcome, but a substantial cash bonus for destroying the enemy target within a limited amount of time.²⁷⁾ Moreover, perhaps he feared that he would be expelled from the military if he did not properly deal with the intrusion into Soviet airspace. He must have known of a similar incident about five and a half years before, when a number of senior Soviet air defense officers were fired and perhaps shot for allowing KAL flight 902 to penetrate so far into Soviet airspace on the night of April 20, 1978 before it was downed.²⁸⁾ The Soviet fighter pilot made his decision to maximize his benefits of being promoted and to minimize the risk of being court-martialed or expelled from the military. That decision was to shoot down KAL 007.

Model II. Organizational Process:

Using Allison's three-step categories, we trace the former Soviet Union's organizational process regarding the KAL 007 incident.

(1) Organizational Intelligence - After an air defense control base in Sakhalin detected the intrusion of an unidentified aircraft into its airspace, it sent six interceptors. Unable to find it for a while, one of

25) Lee G. Bolman, and Terrence E. Deal, *Reframing Organizations: Artistry, Choice, and Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1997), p. 19.

26) See also "New Soviet Signals on KAL 7," *The New York Times*, September 25, 1983, p. S4-1; and Dusko Doder, "Soviets Said to Remove Air Officers; Civil Sources Cite Defense Failure in Korean Incursion," *The Washington Post*, October 5, 1983, p. A1.

27) Lee G. Bolman, and Terrence E. Deal, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

28) Kevin Klose, "Plane Incidents Contain Eerie Similarities," *The Washington Post*, September 4, 1983, p. A11.

the Soviet interceptors finally located KAL 007, which gave the ground base and fighter pilot much less response time.²⁹⁾

(2) Organizational Options - After detecting KAL 007, there were two options: forcing it to land or shooting it down. Under the rigid Soviet system, the standard organizational option regarding airspace intrusion was that the Soviet air defense authorities were "inclined to shoot first and think about it later. No Soviet air defense officer [was] likely to be court-martialed for shooting at a foreign aircraft. He could even be shot for allowing a foreign plane to enter, and then make good its escape."³⁰⁾ The conventional practice was also ascertained by Soviet border law and internal instructions which indicated that the Soviets would, "as the last resort, shoot down aircraft of any type overflying prohibited military zones if they fail to obey instructions or warning signals to land"³¹⁾ regardless of civilian or military, deliberate or unintentional.

(3) Organizational Implementation - Since the fighter pilot could not force it to land, he was told to destroy it before it escaped from Soviet airspace. According to Dusko Doder, "the Soviet Far East command had been in direct telephone contact with top military officials in Moscow on several occasions prior to the downing of the plane...[but] the political leadership had not been consulted."³²⁾ That is, the Soviet defense made the decision on the basis of information provided by local commanders who were anxious that the intruding airplane would leave Soviet airspace. As Bolman and Deal put it, "less than half a minute before KAL 007 was to exit Soviet airspace, Osipovich fired [the] two missiles."³³⁾

29) David E. Pearson, *KAL 007: The Cover-Up* (New York: Summit Books, 1987), pp. 65-80.

30) Joseph C. Harsch, "KAL Flight 7: Long-term Consequences," *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 22, 1983, p. 23.

31) Charles Maechling Jr., "Superpower Football; KAL Flight 7-the Legal Aftermath," *The Christian Science Monitor*, October 14, 1983, p. 16.

32) Dusko Doder, *op. cit.*, p. A1.

33) Lee G. Bolman, and Terrence E. Deal, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

The KAL 007 tragedy can be interpreted as both miscalculated individual rationality and a defective organizational process during the Cold War era. The incident invoked fierce political propaganda between the former Soviet Union and the United State as well. According to a Soviet Air Marshal Pyotr S. Kirsanov, “the South Korean plane left Alaska 40 minutes late ‘to synchronize’ its flight over Soviet territory with an American reconnaissance satellite. That...allowed the satellite to observe ‘a doubling in intensiveness of the work of [Soviet] radio and radar facilities.’”³⁴⁾ As opposed to the Soviet accusation, White House spokesman Larry Speakes emphasized that “the Soviets knew they were shooting down a civilian passenger plane, not a spy plane.”³⁵⁾ And in response to the Soviet propaganda, Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts to the Soviet Union increased by forty percent after the KAL downing.³⁶⁾ Let us trace how the Soviet political propaganda developed by utilizing Allison’s Model III Bureaucratic Politics.

Model III. Bureaucratic Politics:

Using Allison’s three categories, we trace the former Soviet Union’s bureaucratic politics regarding the follow-up of the KAL 007 incident.

(1) The Politics of Discovery - After the shootdown of KAL 007 on September 1, 1983, Soviet military channels and the State Department of the United States informed the Soviet leadership of the incident. The Soviet leadership, including Yuri Andropov and the other Politburo members, had no idea that their fighter planes had stalked and destroyed KAL 007 until the Ministry of Defense

34) *The New York Times*, September 25, 1983, p. S4-1.

35) Douglas B. Feaver, “Soviet Envoy Refuses to Accept U.S. Demand for Compensation,” *The Washington Post*, September 13, 1983, p. A15.

36) Richard L. Strout, “US Uses World Airwaves to Counter Soviet Rhetoric about KAL Incident,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 26, 1983, p. 3.

reported it to them.

(2) The Politics of Issues - The issue was to take the responsibility for or to deny and cover up the incident. While the Foreign Ministry suggested assuming responsibility for, and making apology for it, the Ministry of Defense asserted that the Andropov government had to deny it, and cover up any wrongdoing related to the destruction of KAL 007.

(3) The Politics of Choice - Andropov accepted the plan of the Ministry of Defense, maintaining that the Soviet Union had nothing to do with the KAL 007 incident. And he also insisted that the KAL 007 was a spy plane.³⁷⁾

In sum, the former Soviet Union, with its ideological and political propaganda programs, tried to justify the destruction of KAL 007, the United States responded it on its own behalf and on behalf of South Korea which did not have official diplomatic relations with the former Soviet Union at that time.³⁸⁾ Given the lack of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the South Korean government had no direct say in the political tempest that had developed.

The Spy Expulsion Incident

As mentioned earlier, the 1998 spy expulsion incident between Russia and South Korea occurred within the context of Russia's Eurasianist foreign policy to maintain a balance in Russian foreign policy relations with the West and East. The Eurasianist foreign policy was introduced right after Primakov replaced Kozyrev in early 1996. Unlike Kozyrev, Primakov sought a balance of power in the Russian foreign policy area toward South Korea. Primakov regarded the spy expulsion incident as a way to recover lost pride

37) Don Oberdorfer, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-57.

38) Bureau of Public Affairs, *KAL Flight #007: Compilation of Statements and Documents* Washington, DC: United States Department of State, September 1-16, 1983, p. 20.

after the collapse of Soviet superpower status. In addition, the incident reflected different domestic political pressures and opinions provided better information about “compromise, coalition, competition, and confusion among government officials who [saw] different faces of an issue.”³⁹⁾ In this sense, Allison’s Model III is applicable to this incident. A brief outline of the story is as follows.

On July 4, 1998, the Yeltsin government ordered a South Korean diplomat expelled after he was detained on suspicion of espionage. According to the Federal Security Service, a successor to the Soviet era KGB, he met with a deputy chief of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ First Asian Department, which dealt with North and South Korea as well as China and Mongolia.⁴⁰⁾ This was the first time the Russian government had expelled a South Korean diplomat on charges of spying since the establishment of diplomatic ties with the former Soviet Union in 1990.⁴¹⁾ In retaliation, on July 8, the South Korean government ordered the expulsion of a Russian diplomat who was declared *persona non grata* and given three days to leave the country. According to the South Korean Foreign Ministry, he had engaged in spying activities.⁴²⁾ On July 20, to reduce its number of intelligence agents in Russia, the South Korean government recalled five more diplomats.⁴³⁾ On July 26 and 28, to resolve the spy scandal, the foreign ministers of Russia and South Korea met in Manila. After the meeting, Yevgeny Primakov, the Russian foreign minister, said that the South Korean government had agreed to allow the return of

39) Graham T. Allison, *op. cit.*, p. 708.

40) “South Korean Diplomat Detained on Spy Charge in Moscow,” *The Associated Press*, July 9, 1998; “South Korea to Expel Russian Diplomat in Retaliation,” *op. cit.*, July 8, 1998.

41) “Diplomat Expelled from Russia on Spy Charges—Korean Report,” *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, July 6, 1998.

42) “South Korea to Expel Russian Diplomat in Retaliation,” *The Associated Press*, July 8, 1998.

43) “South Korea Recalling Five More Diplomats from Russia,” *Xinhua News Agency*, July 29, 1998.

a Russian diplomat who had been expelled from Seoul in retaliation against Moscow's ouster of a South Korean official accused of espionage.⁴⁴⁾ However, South Korean foreign minister Park Chung-soo publicly denied it. On August 4, President Kim Dae-jung fired Park Chung-soo for mishandling the dispute with Russia.⁴⁵⁾ On September 17, after meeting with Russia's ambassador in Seoul, Yevgeny Afanasiev, Hong Soon-Young, the new South Korean foreign minister, announced that "the two countries agreed to stop the dispute and the tit-for-tat expulsion of diplomats."⁴⁶⁾

Model III. Bureaucratic Politics:

Using Allison's three categories, we trace post-Soviet Russian bureaucratic politics regarding the spy expulsion incident.

(1) The Politics of Discovery - On July 3, 1998, Russia's Federal Security Service (or FSB) caught a Korean diplomat in Moscow who had contacted a deputy chief of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs' First Asian Department to obtain information about North Korea. FSB detained him one day for investigation.⁴⁷⁾

(2) The Politics of Issues - The incident took place in the context of new Russian foreign policy, in which Foreign Minister Primakov stressed Russia's national pride, interest, and security. For example, according to one Korean intelligence officer, "Russia is escalating the conflict over spy charges in an attempt to pressure South Korea to buy its weapons."⁴⁸⁾ In the same vein, Agence France Presse reported that "the spy dispute was a 'proxy war' between the South Korean

44) "Russia, South Korea Settle Spy Dispute," *The Associated Press*, July 28, 1998; "Who is Lying? Park or Primakov," *The Korea Herald*, July 29, 1998.

45) "South Korean Foreign Minister Fired for Mishandling Dispute with Russia," *The Associated Press*, August 4, 1998.

46) "Russia, S. Korea agree to end Feud over Spy Expulsions," *Agence France Presse*, September 17, 1998.

47) *The Associated Press*, *op. cit.*, July 4, 1998.

48) *The Korea Herald*, *op. cit.*, July 27, 1998.

and Russian intelligence agencies vying for influence.”⁴⁹⁾

Moreover, there were symptoms of a new Russian foreign policy toward South Korea in early 1994.⁵⁰⁾ According to another Korean intelligence officer, South Korean intelligence officers in Russia had conducted intelligence activities somewhat freely before the incident because of South Korea’s economic aid of \$1.4 billion to Russia.⁵¹⁾ Yet, as Ko Jae-nam argues, Russian foreign policy toward South Korea “began to change when Pyongyang began earnest negotiations on its nuclear program with the United States, back in 1994.”⁵²⁾ Therefore, the Yeltsin government used the incident to recover Russia’s political leverage vis-à-vis North Korea.

(3) The Politics of Choice - Yeltsin and foreign minister Primakov’s choice was to expel the Korean diplomat who was caught “red-handed.”⁵³⁾ The Yeltsin government took a strong position on the incident, making no concessions to the South Korean government at this time.

49) “S. Korea FM apologizes for ‘lying’ over spy deal with Russia,” *Agence France Presse*, August 4, 1998.

50) Relations between post-Soviet Russia and North Korea have improved since a visit to Pyongyang by A. N. Panov, Deputy Foreign Minister and special representative of the Russian president, in September, 1994. For more information, see V. Moiseyev, “Russian and the Korean Peninsula,” *International Affairs*, Moscow, Vol.42, No.1 (January-February 1996), pp. 106-114; Robert H. Donaldson, and Joseph L. Noguee, *The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests* (Armonk, New York, and London, England: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 251-254; and Ingmar Oldberg, Helen Jarlsvik, Johan Norberg, and Carolina Vendil, *At a Loss: Russian Foreign Policy in the 1990s* (Stockholm, Sweden: Defence Research Establishment, 1999), pp. 110-115.

51) *The Korea Herald*, *op. cit.*, July 26, 1998.

52) *The Korea Herald*, *op. cit.*, July 27, 1998.

53) *Agence France Presse*, *op. cit.*, August 4, 1998.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET RUSSIAN SOUTH KOREA POLICY

As mentioned earlier, foreign relations between the former Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia and South Korea can be divided into two periods: the Cold War and the post-Cold War. While the former Soviet Union had no official diplomatic ties with South Korea during the Cold War, the post-Soviet Russian government established full diplomatic relations with the South Korean government in 1990. The Yeltsin government in Russia replaced the former Soviet government at the end of 1991. From the former Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russian perspective, North Korea fits into the Eastern group, while South Korea belongs to the West.

Concerning the change in foreign policy, the former Soviet leaders maintained a so-called East-centric approach in which the West was regarded as a political and ideological enemy, while the post-Soviet Russian government has attempted to move closer to the West, appraised as a political partner and economic supporter.

Until early 1996, President Yeltsin and his first foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev pursued a so-called West-centric foreign policy where the West was deemed the savior of Russia's deteriorating economy. Successive foreign ministers, Yevgeny Primakov and Igor Ivanov, have sought a so-called Eurasianist foreign policy in which the Russian government has attempted to maintain a political balance between the West and East. For our research, it appears that Eurasianist foreign policy elites include geopoliticians and geostrategists, nationalists, and the former communists and their allies who argue that Russian national foreign interests cannot be sacrificed by the economic interests of the pro-Western groups.

As far as domestic politics are concerned, while the Soviet-era militant communists held total control of domestic politics and no political opposition was allowed, President Yeltsin and his foreign policy teams have been challenged by the complex domestic political

situation of the post-Cold War era. The ascendance of pro-market economy groups promoting reforms has contributed to the Yeltsin government's pro-Western foreign policy, but the growing influence of pro-military groups, which cherish Russia's security interests rather than free capitalist markets, have also challenged the pro-Western foreign policy of the Yeltsin government. Table 2 summarizes the orientation of Russian foreign policy toward South Korea.⁵⁴⁾

During the Cold War, Soviet foreign policy was consistent with pro-military power groups who ruled ideologically in the form of democratic centralism, reinforced by the strategic interests of the former Soviet Union against the West, and by extension, South Korea. So the Soviet government was able to exercise its predominant influence on foreign policy without any domestic disturbance. There was no significant evidence that Russian bureaucrats, who had different opinions, got involved in its foreign policy-making except for the follow-up of the KAL 007 incident as Allison's Model III suggests. The Soviet government used the KAL 007 incident for its political and ideological propaganda. After the Cold War, the West-centric and Eurasianist approaches characterized Russia's foreign policy toward Korea, which was, to a large extent, influenced by the dynamics of domestic politics and power struggle, as the spy expulsion incident suggests in Allison's Bureaucratic Politics Model. Now domestic politics is largely divided into two groups: pro-market economy groups, such as Yeltsin's supporters, which focus on market economic reforms, and pro-military groups such as the former communists and their allies in the State Duma and the military establishment. They focus on military issues and Russia's own strategic interests, similar to the logic of the Cold War

54) For Table 2, refer to the following. Elizabeth A. Stanley, "Russia," in Robert Dujarric, *Korea: Security Pivot in Northeast Asia* (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hudson Institute, 1998), pp. 93-113; Stephen Blank, "Russian Policy and the Changing Korean Question," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 35, No. 8 (1995), pp. 711-725.

Table 2. Orientation of Russian Foreign Policy Toward South Korea

	The Cold War	The Post-Cold War	
	No Diplomatic Ties With South Korea	Diplomatic Ties With South Korea	
Foreign Policy / Domestic Politics	East-Centric	Eurasianist	West-Centric
Pro-Economy	Conflicting	Semi-Cooperative (The Spy Expulsion Incident)	Cooperative
Pro-Military	Cooperative (The KAL 007 Incident)	Semi-Conflicting (The Spy Expulsion Incident)	Conflicting
Allison's Three Conceptual Models applied	Model I, II, and III	Model III	

of the former Soviet Union. The foreign policy of post-Soviet Russia has, in a word, become blurred because of domestic political dynamics.

CONCLUSION

During the last two decades, Soviet and post-Soviet Russian foreign policy toward South Korea has shifted from East-centric, to West-centric, and then to Eurasianist. The reorientation of current Russian foreign policy from West-centric to Eurasianist reflected the increasing erosion of the boundary between domestic policy and foreign policy, and by extension, national foreign policy. The spy expulsion incident was a good example.

In line with this foreign policy reorientation, the present Russian government handled sensitive diplomatic conflicts with South Korea very differently from its Soviet predecessor. Unhindered by any significant interference of domestic forces, the former Soviet

government exploited the KAL 007 incident to promote its political propaganda against the United States. President Yeltsin and his foreign minister Primakov used the spy expulsion incident not only as an attempt to recover Russian integrity, but also to mitigate the growing political pressure of domestic forces representing national security concerns of the former communists, geopoliticians and geostrategists, and nationalists.