

The Korean Summit and Its Legacy: The Changing Military Equation on the Korean Peninsula

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THE CHANGING NATURE OF NORTH KOREAN MILITARY POWER

A major development in the military equation on the Korean Peninsula over the past 10 years has been the growing asymmetry between the military forces on either side of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The ROK-U.S. forces have consistently improved their overall military capability by making the best use of their economic and technological superiority over the North. South Korea's defense expenditure is now twice the size of North Korea's. North of the DMZ, on the other hand, due largely to poor performance of the economic sector, the North Korean military is suffering from shortages of various resources that directly impact military capability. In order to compensate for this disadvantage, the North Koreans seem to have decided to focus on "asymmetric forces"

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such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD), long-range artillery and multiple rocket launchers (MRL), missile forces, and special operations forces (SOF).

Such trends are gradually changing the nature of North Korean military forces and their objectives. In essence, North Korean forces are becoming more useful “to hurt” than “to occupy,” to use Thomas Schelling’s words.¹⁾ Mechanized and armored forces would be indispensable if one were to invade and occupy the enemy territory. However, North Korea’s mechanized and armored forces have been relatively neglected, and have not been adequately modernized. Today, the majority of North Korea’s tanks are T-54/55/59. As a result, the Director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) testified in February 2000 that:

North Korea’s capability to successfully conduct complex, multi-echelon, large-scale operations to reunify the Korean peninsula declined in the 1990s. This was, in large measure, the result of severe resource constraints, including widespread food and energy shortages.²⁾

Instead, North Korea is putting a large share of its resources in long-range artillery, MRL, missiles, WMD, and SOF. These are all very useful for destruction and disruption but cannot do much in terms of occupying enemy territories. As stated, this type of capability will provide the force to “hurt” but not to “occupy.”

Recent developments seem to suggest that the North Korean military build-up is more focused on enhancing its ability to attack

1) Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 1 and 6.

2) Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, “Military Threats and Security: Challenges Through 2015,” Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2000, available at [<http://www.dia.mil/sscibrief.html>], accessed on February 11, 2000.

strategic targets in South Korea, including Seoul. However, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the Korean Peoples' Army (KPA) to successfully conduct offensive, mobile operations to occupy Seoul, let alone all of South Korea.³⁾

North Korea is focusing not only on strengthening offensive capabilities but also on improving defensive capabilities. General Thomas A. Schwartz, head of the Combined Forces Command and of the US Forces Korea, testified in March 2001 that:

Recent force improvements include...emplacing anti-tank barriers in the forward area, establishing combat positions along major routes between Pyongyang and the Demilitarized Zone, improving coastal defense forces in the forward area, constructing missile support facilities, and procuring air defense weapons and fighter aircraft. Applying lessons from U.S. operations in Europe and Southwest Asia, the North Koreans also modified key facility defenses, dispersed forces, and improved camouflage, concealment, and deception measures.⁴⁾

In the defense white paper published in 2000, the Japan Defense Agency stated that North Korea had reportedly deployed additional air defense guns, probably for the purpose of enhancing the survivability of its forces.⁵⁾ Despite the general tendency to see the KPA as always offense-oriented, much of what it is doing is actually related to defense rather than offense.

3) Michael O'Hanlon, "Stopping a North Korean Invasion: Why Defending South Korea Is Easier than the Pentagon Thinks," *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 135-170.

4) Statement of General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command and Commander, United States Forces Korea before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 27, 2001, available at [http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/2001/010327ts.pdf], p. 5.

5) Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan*, Japanese edition (Tokyo, 2000), p. 37.

North Korea's "Military-First Policy (Seongun Jeongchi)"

Recently, North Korean authorities have placed emphasis on what they call the "military-first policy." They contend that:

Military confrontation is a life-and-death struggle which will determine whether we become an independent people or slaves of imperialism. The way to defend the destiny of the country is to counter strength with strength, and to meet the arrogant use of arms with merciless strikes...

Today the WPK's [Workers' Party of Korea's] policy to give priority to the army is a guarantee for sure victory in diplomacy with the enemies.⁶⁾

These remarks, together with the changing force structure of the KPA, suggest that North Korea's political objective is shifting from "liberation of south Korea" to the preservation of the Kim Jong-il regime and the use of military force as a diplomatic bargaining chip. In other words, the KPA is becoming more of a political/diplomatic tool needed for both domestic and international political purposes, rather than a military tool needed for forced unification of the peninsula.

Taking into account these military and political changes, one can say that North Korea's strategy is changing from one of an "offensive strategy with the capability to occupy" to one that emphasizes "deterrence by hurting, or punishment" combined with "compellence backed by the threat of hurt." In other words, the strategy is changing from counter-force orientated one to counter-value orientated one.

It appears that North Korea no longer possesses the ability to

6) "WPK's Policy of Giving Priority to Army is Invincible," Rodong *Sinmun* and *Kunroja*, June 16, 1999, as quoted in *Korea Central News Agency*, cable report, June 16, 1999, available at [<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/9906/news06/16.htm#1>].

invade and conquer South Korea. Military analysts like Michael O'Hanlon contended that it would not be too hard to defend South Korea.⁷⁾ He is probably right. In addition, ROK-U.S.-combined Operations Plan 5027 (OP 5027) is reported to be aimed at occupying Pyongyang in the event North Korea starts armed hostilities.⁸⁾ The implication is that South Korea and the United States believe that it is possible to defend South Korea and then strike back.

Nonetheless, North Korea's ability to "hurt" appears to be working quite effectively to deter surrounding nations from putting pressure on it. The most important reason why the United States, Japan, and particularly South Korea wanted to avoid a military standoff in 1994 was not because of the fear that South Korea might be defeated or be occupied, but because the estimated casualties and damages were simply too horrendous. There would have been an estimated 52,000 U.S. military casualties and 490,000 South Korean military casualties, at a cost of 61 billion U.S. dollars in the first 90 days.⁹⁾ And in the case of an all-out war, there would have been one million people killed, including 80,000-100,000 U.S. citizens; the United States would have had to spend more than 100 billion dollars; and the damage incurred upon the two Koreas and surrounding nations would have amounted to more than one trillion dollars.¹⁰⁾ In other words, "deterrence by punishment," or the counter-value strategy, worked for North Korea.

North Korea is emphasizing its ability to impose such damages

7) O'Hanlon, *op. cit.*

8) Richard Halloran, "S. Korea, U.S. Draft Deadly Response Plan; If North Invades, Destruction is Goal," *The Washington Times*, November 19, 1998, p. A1, obtained through NEXUS-LEXUS; Richard Halloran, "...But Carry a Big Stick," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 3, 1998, p. 26-27; *Weekly Chosun*, No. 1559, July 1, 1999, available at [<http://weekly.chosun.com/news/html/199906/199906230003.html>]; and Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 312-316.

9) Oberdorfer, *op. cit.*, p. 315.

10) Oberdorfer, *op. cit.*, p. 324.

on its enemies. The Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland (CPRF) contended that:

The Yugoslav crisis is a test war to carry into practice “operation plan 5027-98” in Korea and a preliminary war for a second Korean war. However the U.S. are [*sic*] making a misjudgment. The Korean peninsula is not the Balkans. It is the unshakable faith and character of the Korean people and army to meet a challenge with thousand-fold annihilating strike and a war of aggression with a liberation war of justice.

If the U.S. misjudge [*sic*] the quality of the Korean people rallied around the great brilliant commander in one mind in the spirit of human bomb and unleash a war of aggression, the Korean people will not miss the opportunity to rise up as one in the spirit of annihilating the enemy, the spirit of “you shall die and I will stay alive,” deals a thousand-fold blow to the aggressors and accomplish the historic cause of national reunification, the cherished desire of the nation.

The U.S. aggressors and their followers involved in carrying on “operation plan 5027-98” will be reduced to ashes by flames of justice in the life-and-death war. They should clearly understand their opponent and act with discretion.¹¹⁾

A North Korean “military commentator” also noted that:

It is a revolutionary character of our People’s Army and people and their intrinsic mode of counteraction to answer fire with fire. The U.S. attempt to subdue us with threats and blackmail is foolish. Our People’s Army is replete with the spirit to resolutely safeguarding the leader, the spirit of human bombs and the spirit

11) “CPRF Denounces U.S. for Designing War Against DPRK,” *Korea Central News Agency*, cable report, May 29, 1999, available at [<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/9905/news05/29.htm#6>].

of suicidal attack, and these spirits are its specific character. If the U.S. warmongers finally kindle the train of war [*sic*] in disregard of this, our heroic armed forces will mercilessly annihilate the aggressors with the ideological strength built up for scores of years. We have powerful means and capabilities to defeat any armed invasion by formidable enemies at a sweep. There is no limit to this strike and on this planet, there is no room for escaping it. The target of our strike is not only the U.S. imperialist aggression forces but also the South Korean [*sic*] who are willing to serve as their bullet-shield and Japanese reactionaries and all others that support them behind the scenes. Our People's Army and people will mete out a [*sic*] stern punishment on anyone who dares to infringe upon the dignity and sovereignty of the Korean nation.¹²⁾

Finally, North Korea is actively using its military capability and/or potential capability to strengthen its diplomatic bargaining position. Since 1993, it has capitalized on that potential (and to some extent actual) capability to develop nuclear weapons, in negotiating with the United States. The result was the Agreed Framework of October 1994 that promised to provide North Korea with light-water reactors and heavy oil. Again in negotiations in 1998-99, North Korea used the underground site at Kumchang-ri to obtain aid from the United States.

It has also attempted to use its missile program as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the United States. In June 1998, the Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) issued a statement saying that:

As the United States has pursued economic isolation of the

12) "The United States Had Better Clearly Know its Opponent Before Attacking It," contributed by a "military commentator" to *Rodong Sinmun*, December 4, 1998, quoted in *Korea Central News Agency*, cable report, December 4, 1998, available at [<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/9812/981204.htm>].

DPRK [North Korea] for more than half a century, our resources of foreign money have been circumscribed. So, missile export is the option we could not but take. If the United States really wants to prevent our missile export, it should lift the economic embargo as early as possible and make a [*sic*] compensation for the losses to be caused [*sic*] by discontinued missile export.¹³⁾

North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan reportedly told visiting U.S. congressional representatives in Pyongyang that North Korea would stop exporting missiles if the United States paid 500 million dollars every year in compensation for the loss of income.¹⁴⁾ All of this leads to the conclusion that North Korea is using its potential and actual military strength to compel nations, including the United States, to comply with its wishes.

North Korea's threat of force is reinforced by the lack and/or perceived lack of rationality and stability in the North Korean system. Although North Korea's political system under the guidance of Kim Jong-il appears to be more stable than had been initially predicted, one cannot assume that a system that relies heavily on one person is without inherent unpredictability and volatility. Moreover, the country's economy remains precarious. A large number of North Korean refugees ranging from 10,000 to 300,000,¹⁵⁾

THE CHANGING ROK-U.S. MILITARY POSTURE

Just as the North Korean military force has changed, so has ROK-U.S. military strength. In a nutshell, the ROK-U.S. combined forces

13) "Nobody Can Slander DPRK's Missile Policy," KCNA commentary, *Korea Central News Agency*, cable report, June 16, 1998, available at [<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/1998/9806/news06/16.htm#2>].

14) *The Associated Press*, August 19, 1998.

15) *Chosun Ilbo*, October 7, 1999; and *JoongAng Ilbo*, August 31, 1999.

have by now achieved “deterrence by punishment” capability as well as “deterrence by denial” capability. It has become quite apparent that even if North Korea attacked South Korea now, the ROK-U.S. combined forces would not only be able to stop it, but could also conduct counter-offensive operations into North Korea. This capability to threaten the survival of the North Korean regime has added much to the ROK-U.S. deterrent capability.

The central tool for the ROK-U.S. forces to impose punishment on North Korea is an operation plan that envisions occupation of Pyongyang, in the event war is initiated by North Korea. Operation sPlan 5027 (OP 5027) is said to involve plans to overthrow the North Korean regime and reunify the peninsula. Another reported option is that ROK-U.S. forces could mount preemptive strikes on enemy long-range artillery and bombers if signals of war became clear and apparent.¹⁶⁾ The implication of such a war plan is that if North Korea started a war, not only would the invasion fail, but the existence of the North Korean regime would be in serious danger. In 1999, the United States and South Korea agreed to launch a combined task force, the ROK-U.S. Combined Psychological Operations Task Force (CPOTF) headed by a South Korean general. During wartime, the CPOTF would be reinforced to bring North Korean people over to the side of the combined forces with as little popular resistance as possible, paving the way for a smooth transition to a unified Korea led by the South.¹⁷⁾

In addition, the United States and South Korea are strengthening their ability to “deny” the capability of a North Korean attack. One of the most important ingredients of such efforts is the development of measures to cope with a large number of artillery, rockets and missile forces. South Korea’s Defense White Paper 1998 explained:

16) *The Washington Times*, November 19, 1998, p. A1.

17) Oh Young-jin, “ROK, US Agree to Establish Psychological Welfare Force,” *Korea Times*, January 14, 1999.

By tracking down even the smallest movements in and around the enemy's missile bases, underground artillery positions, and MRLS, the ROK military continuously complements its automatic firing system to make an effective surprise counter-fire possible in contingencies.

In peacetime, the ROK military has selected enemy targets that pose the greatest threat, e.g., bases in which such equipment are deployed, as the central targets to be neutralized at the early stage of war. It is now doing its best to reach that goal.¹⁸⁾

Richard Halloran reported that the new ROK-U.S. combined war plan called for "defeating them [North Korean forces] in detail." In other words, the ROK-U.S. forces are prepared to defeat "every gun and tank emplacement near the 243-kilometre-long DMZ, as well as each ammunition depot and bridge, among other facilities."¹⁹⁾

Another focus of the ROK-U.S. strategy is North Korea's WMD. Particularly, measures against chemical use, a most likely threat, are being upgraded. In 1998, the South Korean military authority formulated the "Comprehensive Plans to Counter the Threat of Biological/Chemical Warfare,"²⁰⁾ and the NBC Protection Headquarters were established in 1999.²¹⁾ Chemical warfare preparedness is also emphasized in South Korean civil defense exercises.²²⁾

Related to defense against the WMD is ballistic missile defense (BMD). To meet the threat, the United States has deployed 48 Patriot (PAC-2) launchers in Korea,²³⁾ and South Korea is planning to procure surface-to-air missiles with BMD capability (SAM-X) in the next mid-

18) Ministry of Defense, Republic of Korea, *Defense White Paper 1998* (Seoul, 1999), p. 94.

19) Halloran, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

20) *Defense White Paper 1999* (Seoul, 1999), p. 67.

21) *Defense White Paper 1999*, p. 58.

22) *Defense White Paper 1999*, p. 58.

term defense plan between 2000 and 2004.²⁴⁾ These systems have point defense capability against incoming North Korean missiles, namely Hwasong-5/6 (or Scud B/C).

As far as conventional arsenals are concerned, the level of preparedness and modernization is much higher for the ROK-U.S. forces than for the North Korean military, and this conventional balance will likely continue to shift in favor of the ROK-U.S. side in the future.

Finally, the ROK-U.S. forces are improving their ability to deal with possible contingencies other than war, including the possible collapse of North Korea. For example, in the annual Ulchi-Focus Lens combined exercise, South Korean forces conducted training to determine how to inspect ships with refugees and then, how to transport the refugees to detention camps, should North Korean refugees arrive on the South Korean coast by sea.²⁵⁾

In sum, the change in military capabilities and posture resulted in the change in the military strategies of North and South Korea-U.S. forces leave it as it is.

North Korea:
 Offensive strategy—> Offensive strategy + Deterrence by denial
 and punishment + Compellence

South Korea-U.S.:
 Deterrence by denial—> Deterrence by denial as well as
 punishment

23) An interview conducted at Osan Airbase, Korea, on June 2, 1999 as part of the Symposium on East Asia Security (SEAS).

24) *Korea Times*, September 20, 1999.

25) *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, August 28, 1999.

THE ROLE OF MILITARY FORCE IN BRINGING ABOUT THE INTER-KOREAN SUMMIT

The inter-Korean Summit of June 2000 was realized through a combination of factors: political, economic, and international changes. In addition to these oft-mentioned factors, the changing military equation on the Korean peninsula appears to have played an important role in bringing it about. Throughout the 1990's, the overall military balance seemed to have shifted in favor of South Korea, and this shift made it possible for South Korea to take flexible and accommodating policies toward the North. When the military balance did not favor the South, South Korea could not take accommodation policy toward the North for fear of the latter's not reciprocating such a policy. Thus, the changing military balance made the Sunshine Policy a feasible policy option.

Furthermore, during the same decade, North Korea used up or overplayed its military-diplomatic cards. In the early 1990's, North Korea possessed three potentially very effective military-diplomatic bargaining chips: nuclear development, missile export and development, and a "war card" backed by its ability to effectively conduct local military provocations. By the end of the decade, however, it had played out its hand. In the process, there seemed to have been three decisive turning points.

The first one was the conclusion of the Agreed Framework in 1994 which ended the two-year crisis that had begun in March 1993 when North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT. With this, North Korea basically used up the nuclear card and after that the nuclear issue was set into a "framework."

The second turning point came with Japan's decision to formally participate in U.S.-Japan joint technological research on the TMD in 1998 and the Perry Report that followed in 1999. These actions were taken in the face of growing missile threat from North Korea, most vividly demonstrated by the Taepo Dong 1 missile launch in August

1998. The Perry Report essentially placed the missile issue into a “framework,” by playing North Korea against China. The report suggested that the North Korean missile test would encourage the United States and Japan to go ahead with their TMD (and NMD in the case of the United States) project, which China did not like. The report emphasized that the Chinese concerns with North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs were “in many ways comparable to U.S. concerns.” The report also stated that North Korea’s ballistic missiles were “an important impetus to U.S. national missile defense and theater missile defenses, neither of which is desired by China,” and thus suggested that China actively discourage North Korea from developing ballistic missiles. The report also made it clear to China that North Korean nuclear weapons “could provoke an arms race in the region and undermine the nonproliferation regime” which Beijing, as a nuclear power, had an interest in preserving.²⁶⁾ In other words, the United States and Japan succeeded in pitting North Korea’s missile development against Chinese security interests.

The third turning point came in June 1999 with the North-South naval clash in the Yellow Sea. In the past, North Korea had repeatedly used local military provocations as means of putting military-diplomatic pressure on South Korea. However, the decisive victory by the South Korean side demonstrated that North Korea’s ability to harass South Korea militarily had declined even in the areas adjacent to the Northern Limit Line (NLL) on the Yellow Sea, where North Korea had enjoyed a significant geo-strategic advantage in the past. North Korea seemed to have overplayed the “war card” and its effect was dramatically undercut by this incident. The sum of

26) William J. Perry, Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State, “Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations,” October 12, 1999, available at [<http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/easec/nkreview.htm>], accessed on August 1, 2000.

these military developments made the inter-Korean Summit meeting a lucrative option for North Korea.

THE ROLE OF MILITARY FORCE ON THE POST-SUMMIT KOREAN PENINSULA

Now that the Korean Summit has taken place, the question is how the above-mentioned changes in military equation on the Korean peninsula, conducive to the South Korean side, can be maintained and further strengthened in the future in order to enhance the outcomes obtained at the meeting. As President Kim Dae-jung has repeatedly declared, the Summit meeting was not about unification, but about peaceful coexistence. More specifically, it was about promoting political-military peaceful coexistence and economic integration of the two Koreas. So the question now is how best to plan a military policy or a military posture conducive to the objective of creating peaceful coexistence.

As was discussed in the final years of the Cold War, the basic requirement for peaceful coexistence is creating a situation where parties involved are mutually deterred, not by punishment but by denial. Along the same lines, the post-Summit military policy must be directed towards creating mutual deterrence by denial.

To bring about such a change, a system of arms control—formal or informal, explicit or tacit—would be indispensable. The ideal way to reach that goal certainly is to come up with a formal arms control agreement between North and South Korea through gradual, cooperative, formal negotiations. Unfortunately however, North Korea has not been forthcoming on this front. Despite repeated calls from South Korea, North Korea has not responded positively to talks on confidence-building or peace issues. In one sense, North Korea's unwillingness is understandable, because, as discussed above, it is trying to make the best use of its only remaining tool—military might—through its “military-first policy.”

Therefore, under the current circumstances, no short-term remedy exists. If North Korea continues to reject the establishment of a peaceful coexistence in military terms, South Korea, in conjunction with the United States, may need to physically create an environment in which North Korea would be better off with some kind of arms control than without. As we have seen, during the past 30-40 years, the strategic equation on the Korean peninsula has changed significantly in favor of the ROK-U.S side. Building on that basis, South Korea and the United States will probably be able to create such an environment in the mid to long term.

Then what type of approach would encourage North Korea to take that path, what would make it depart from “deterrence by punishment” and move toward “deterrence by denial”? Basically, there are two types. The first is to weaken North Korea’s capability to “hurt.” As evidenced by North Korean remarks on their ability to turn Seoul into “sea of fire,” the North’s forward-deployed long-range artillery, MRL, and rockets are the most important sources of its ability to “hurt,” and they are taking full advantage of it. It is, therefore, critical to undercut that ability by making necessary military preparations. The second way is to encourage North Korea to invest its limited resources on defensive systems and gradually transform its military forces to a more defensive-oriented system with “deterrence by denial” capability only.

In fact, South Korea and the United States have been doing a good job along these lines. As already discussed, South Korea and the United States have taken measures to compromise North Korea’s forward-deployed firepower, and to build capabilities to conduct strategic bombing operations and amphibious landing operations. The proper combination of offensive and defensive strategies is likely to affect North Korea’s decisions regarding its military buildup, and could lead this country in the right direction. In fact, North Korea appears to be responding to what the ROK-U.S. side has done. As General Schwartz testified, North Korea had been paying a lot of attention in the recent years to “emplacing anti-tank barriers in

the forward area, establishing combat positions along major routes between Pyongyang and the Demilitarized Zone, improving coastal defense forces in the forward area..., and procuring air defense weapons and fighter aircraft.” Furthermore, the North had “modified key facility defenses, dispersed forces, and improved camouflage, concealment, and deception measures.” As evidenced by these defensive measures North Korea has probably invested a great deal on such measures by partially diverting its limited resources from offensive military buildup.

As a result, it can be concluded that the current ROK-U.S. military policy is headed in the right direction. The only question we have now is how to make the current policy even more effective.

OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

Finally, this paper will suggest two possibilities for improving current policies and point out two challenges that we face. The first is to introduce “competitive strategy” in planning the ROK-U.S. defense buildup.²⁷⁾ Competitive strategy played an important role in U.S. defense planning in the 1980’s. For example, the strategy informed the United States in its decision to introduce stealth strategic bombers. The idea was that in a situation where war was not likely and where the name of the game was a “long-term peacetime competition,” it would be useful to plan a military buildup in a way that would put as much economic burden on the enemy as possible. For instance, the introduction of the stealth strategic bomber in the U.S. arsenal forced the Soviet Union to undertake necessary improvements in its air defense systems, which, with its extensive borders, imposed a very high financial burden on

27) For detailed discussions on the competitive strategy, see J.J. Martin, C. Makins, and G. Weaver (Science Applications International Corporation), “The U.S.-Soviet Long-Term Military Competition,” vols. 1 and 2 (San Diego, CA: SAIC, 1990).

the country.

Of course, the policy objective here should not be to destroy the North Korean economy; we are striving to do just the opposite. Nor should we exacerbate the military confrontation between the two Koreas. However, the competitive strategy would make sense on the assumption that North Korea will keep investing more or less the same amount of resources in the military buildup. Given the current North Korean economic situation and the country's determination to somehow rehabilitate its economy under the leadership of Kim Jong-il, such a strategy seems reasonable.

Another approach to improve the current policy is to encourage Russia, China, and perhaps other nations to sell defensive weapons, instead of offensive ones, to North Korea. Although the move is not meant to encourage North Korean military buildup and weapons transfers between North Korea on the one hand and Russia and China on the other, we have to recognize that the import of defensive weapons by North Korea is less worrisome and, to an extent, even necessary if we are to create mutual "deterrence by denial" situation. In a way, the recent report that North Korea was negotiating with the Russians for the acquisition of the S-300 surface-to-air missiles might not be entirely bad news.²⁸⁾ Again, on the assumption that North Korea will continue to spend the same amount of money on military buildup, it would be better if it spends that money for defensive rather than offensive purposes.

Turning to the challenges, it is more expensive to attain a level of deterrence by means of denial than by punishment. During the Cold War, even the relatively wealthy Western European countries relied heavily on nuclear deterrence—or deterrence by punishment, which was less costly than conventional deterrence by denial. Even the world's wealthiest country, the United States, does not completely rule out its option to exercise nuclear deterrence even in this new

28) *Kyoudou Tsuushin Nyusu*, May 18, 2001.

post-Cold War era. Temptation to rely heavily on deterrence by punishment is inevitably high for the North Koreans, given the fact that Seoul is close to the DMZ and, therefore, vulnerable to North Korean counter-value attack, and further by the fact that the North Korean economy is in a dire condition.

The second problem is that the most viable and potentially deadly chemical weapon issues have not been adequately addressed. Despite the fact that measures have been taken to improve counter-chemical capability of the ROK-U.S. forces, the South Korean civilian population is still exposed and vulnerable to chemical weapon use. Unfortunately, diplomacy does not appear useful in eliminating or even reducing the chemical weapons threat. A case in point, the Perry Report only briefly mentioned the chemical issue, saying that it could best be solved "multilaterally." It did not specify ways to tackle the issue, however.

CONCLUSION

As we saw in the Cold War period, changes in military balance or strategic equation cannot be brought about easily in peacetime. Rather, intended political objectives can only be reached, if they are ever to be reached, following a long period of consistently building necessary military capabilities so as to serve the political objectives. After all, it took the United States and its allies about 40 years to peacefully put an end to the Cold War.

At the same time, the Cold War proved that even in peacetime, military power could be made to serve political objectives well if properly engineered. The Clausewitzian dictum that war is a continuation of politics by other means does apply to the peacetime situation. Even in this relatively peaceful, post-Summit Korean peninsula, military force must be maintained and further developed in a consistent manner in order to serve post-Summit South Korean political objectives.