

A Geopolitical Shift : Korean Peninsula After the Summit

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INTRODUCTION

An air of optimism is sweeping across South Korea and neighboring countries following the inter-Korean summit. Historic moments of the South-North summit talks were broadcast throughout the world real-time, from the very moment that North Korean Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il appeared at Sunan Airport to welcome President Kim Dae-jung to the adoption of the June 15 Joint Declaration. The landmark summit between the two countries was instrumental in shifting South Korea's paradigm regarding North Korea, and while a final assessment of the inter-Korean summit should be suspended until follow-up measures of the summit have materialized, a great number of South Korean experts and policy-makers firmly believe that the summit provided an impetus for the march toward unification of the two Koreas. Moreover, many share the view that the inter-Korean summit served as a historic opportunity for the two Koreas to shift their 50-year defensive strategies toward neighboring countries, creating a new dynamic within Northeast Asia, with the Korean peninsula at the

East Asian Review, 12(4), Winter 2000, pp.53-70

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Published by the IEAS, 508-143 Jungnung 2-Dong Songbuk-Ku Seoul 136-851 KOREA

center. Experts and policy-makers are suggesting a strategic plan that supports *détente* on the Korean peninsula, with the inevitable goal of establishing a new peace regime on the peninsula as well as dismantling the Cold War structure.

Examining the implications of such a dismantlement, necessitates a comprehensive understanding of the outcomes that would arise from changes in the *status quo* on the Korean peninsula. Investigating a wide range of pressures and strategic alternatives that arose immediately after the restructuring the "Korean Question" is also a task to be dealt with promptly. While the dismantlement of the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula is a necessary condition for the establishment of a new order in Northeast Asia, it will certainly not solve everything.

There are fundamental limitations to the perception that dismantlement of the Cold War regime or the adoption of Korean peninsula-centered perspectives constitute our sole Grand Strategy. Some argue that capabilities-based diplomatic and security strategies have gathered extensive strength in 21st century Northeast Asia. Others discuss Northeast Asia as having gradually become the competitive arena for continental powers and sea powers. In this connection, a thorough evaluation must be conducted to determine whether South Korea has the necessary capabilities, as well as strategic thinking, to pursue relations not only with North Korea, but to seek new dynamic relations with neighboring countries, and finally to bring about the unification process of the Korean peninsula.

Many believe that unification of the two Koreas will be realized in the end, however, excessive dependence on the normative reasoning regarding South-North relations is cautioned against, in order to effectively deal with a series of problems that may occur during the unification process, and to create the most favorable post-unification strategic environment for a unified Korea. Given this background, this paper analyzes: (1) Strategic implications after the destruction of the *status quo*; (2) Surrounding four powers' search for new Korean peninsula strategies and South Korea's options; and, (3)

Diplomacy and security guidelines for the unification process and the post-unification era.

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS IN CHANGING THE STATUS QUO

Hopes are running high that dissolution of the Cold War structure will solve most problems on the Korean peninsula. Optimists who share that view conclude that it would eliminate the constant threat of war and put an end to the ideological confrontation between the two Koreas. Moreover, it would win the endorsement by neighboring countries of inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation, and finally, would lead to the signing of a peace agreement. A vital part of achieving national identity, some argue that the exclusion of foreign influences, the withdrawal of U.S. forces, and the abolishment of South Korea's National Security Law are all prerequisites to dissolve Cold-War structure. While no one opposes the idea of drastically reducing the possibility of another war or the signing of a peace agreement between the two Koreas, there is a fundamental tendency to be overly optimistic about changing the *status quo* and underestimate the difficulties that lie ahead.

Just how long and to what degree the reconciliatory and cooperative mood between the two Koreas will endure is yet to be seen. Yet, the current positive developments on the Korean peninsula are not likely to continue unless the following issues are resolved beforehand.

First of all, an institutionalized arms control regime based on mutual confidence must be established in order to drastically reduce or eliminate the overall military threat posed by North Korea. Second, consistency of strategic objectives of the South and the North must be ensured, as this is one of the most essential prerequisites for achieving true inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation. To be more specific, South and North Korea should see eye-to-eye on the following issues: (1) North Korea's production of ballistic missiles

and other weapons of mass destruction; (2) Presence and status of the U.S. forces on the peninsula from a mid- and long-term perspective; and (3) Each country's military alliance with other countries. Third, without a doubt, the strategic gaps of the four surrounding powers regarding the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia should be minimized. Fourth, confidence-building measures and an institutional framework must be established to resolve problems that may arise during the unification process. The two Koreas are burdened with the task of adhering to the principle that the South and the North be the main actors in the unification process, while at the same time there is also a need for the two sides to induce participation, albeit limited, from neighboring countries. Fifth, relations among neighboring countries are likely to be shaped based on strategic assessment of each country independent of developments on the Korean peninsula so that the balance of power among neighboring countries could have a considerable effect on inter-Korean relations.

Finally, truly institutionalizing inter-Korean reconciliatory and cooperative spirit requires both parties to act upon the agreed compromises regarding political, social, military, economic and legal matters. This may mean that South Korea's democracy and market economy will be transformed into a hybrid system in order to interface with North Korea's socialist planned economy. Such a scenario would bring unimaginable turmoil to the Korean peninsula. Whether a one nation-two systems transitional structure is realistic or not, it must be assumed that partial loss of the South's system and other compromises inevitable if we are to move towards unification through negotiations.

Aside from the conditions described above, there exist numerous stumbling blocks. The most difficult hurdle is North Korea's transformation into a normal state; yet if this condition is not met, inter-Korean cooperation will probably never get off the ground. Inter-Korean relations will enter into a new phase only if the following matters are addressed: regularization of summit and high-

level talks, active inter-Korean economic cooperation, fundamental resolution of the separated family issue, repatriation of abducted South Koreans and prisoners of war (POWs), and institutionalization of meaningful military confidence-building. The question that needs to be raised is whether the two Koreas can maintain the legitimacy of their respective systems, while simultaneously addressing the matters mentioned above. From one standpoint, the realization of a Cold War-free ambiance on the Korean peninsula seems possible. But, since the essence of the Cold War structure is inherent in the differing political regimes of the South and the North, without drastic concessions from both sides, it will be extremely difficult to change the *status quo* even if the two sides are seemingly moving toward peaceful coexistence.

If inter-Korean reconciliation becomes a reality, what strategies will neighboring countries seek and what strategic guarantees will they request from a unified Korea? While the discussion may be hypothetical, and in large part unrealistic at this point, it necessitates an assessment of all contingencies that may affect the peninsula in the future. The question is simple. How will surrounding powers, used to seeing a divided peninsula, react to a unified Korea? And how will they brace themselves for the change? A close look at official announcements made by neighboring countries after the South-North summit indicates that they welcomed the landmark summit and expressed their expectations for substantial changes in inter-Korean relations in the future.

Despite high hopes, it is unrealistic for us to believe that all neighboring nations will welcome a new variable, i.e., a unified Korea, with no strings attached. When neighboring countries consider the summit as a sign of the changing *status quo*, their strategy for the Korean peninsula would be reconsidered accordingly. That means the Korea question has already reached one important transitional phase.

For half a century, the divided peninsula acted as a buffer zone where geopolitical competition and conflicts among neighboring

countries were halted temporarily. Now, considering recent developments, the task at hand is to create an environment in which the Korean peninsula can assume the role of a strategic platform state. Claiming a new identity will mark a clear departure from the peninsula's unfortunate history, when it was the arena for clashes between continental powers and sea powers. As a strategic platform state, a unified Korea should be equipped with multi-polarized capabilities that will enable it to effectively cope with the possibility of clashes between continental and sea powers and to manage a diverse array of Korea strategies. In other words, South Korea needs to strengthen bilateral economic cooperation with China in a way that minimizes the various diverse conflicts between a greater China and an emerging Japan. There is also a need to establish a new Northeast Asian economic cooperative system centering on South Korea, Japan, and China. At the same time, however, South Korea must quietly tighten its security alliances with the U.S. and Japan, two major sea powers, even after unification, in order to effectively manage mounting pressure from other continental powers. Until the early 19th century, the Korean peninsula had no other choice but to join the domain of the continental power, losing an opportunity to effectively meet challenges posed by sea powers. Although it is very hard to exactly predict future developments, there is a distinct possibility that China would try to incorporate a unified Korean peninsula into its continental domain again. Then, the U.S. and Japan should hold in check China, while South Korea devises a strategy for the establishment of a new security cooperative with the U.S. and Japan.

Changing the *status quo* on the Korean peninsula not only signals a fundamental improvement in inter-Korean relations, but it bears geopolitical significance as well. Geopolitics highlights the importance of a *de facto* South Korea-U.S.-Japan alliance base on the South Korea-U.S. and the U.S.-Japan alliances that have existed for five decades. These two alliances are expected to remain effective during and after the unification process. South Korea has to maintain

its democratic tie until China either de-communizes or Taiwanizes. Wishful thinking will not help planning national security strategy. South Korea must adopt a national security strategy based on concrete needs, otherwise, the country will be unprepared to face a wider range of strategic choices brought on by unification.

STRATEGIES OF SURROUNDING POWERS: PRIOR TO THE INTER-KOREAN SUMMIT

From the 1970s to the 1990s, inter-Korean relations and neighboring powers' Korea strategies were summarized as flexible maintenance of the *status quo*. When the surrounding powers' balance of power was redefined, the South and North sought to make maximum use of their niche strategies, resulting in partial success. Such strategies were adopted as an expression of concern for the Great Power Consortium. Exemplary cases were the first round of inter-Korean dialogues promoted by the Park Chung-hee government, and the *Nordpolitik* policy and second round of inter-Korean dialogues pursued by the Roh Tai-woo government. However, fundamental limitations existed in inter-Korean dialogue during the 1970s because ideological confrontations between the West and the East were at their height. Inter-Korean dialogues in the 1990s did make substantial progress, but the growing instability of the North Korean regime at the time prevented further progress. In contrast, Korean experts at home and abroad gave high marks to the South-North summit in June 2000. Although past inter-Korean relations were faced with fundamental limitations because of the inconsistent and unstable nature of the environment in and outside the Korean peninsula, the inter-Korean summit on June 13-15 raised hopes for a dramatic turnaround in inter-Korean relations, as it was held under favorable internal and external circumstances.

The period spanning the 1970s and the 1990s produced a chronology of developments regarding inter-Korean relations and

neighboring powers' Korea strategies. The 1970s and the early 1980s saw normalization of relations among surrounding powers and attempts to bring about conditional engagement between the two Koreas. Neighboring countries revised and complemented their Korea strategies with U.S. Defense Secretary Kissinger's approval. Since the normalization of relations among surrounding powers in the 1970s, several diplomatic maneuvers have been carried out during the inter-Korean dialogues. This approach has had partial success, as evidenced by South Korea's abandonment of the Hallstein Doctrine, South Korea's decision to cooperate with communist countries by establishing non-governmental contacts, the diversification of unofficial dialogue channels between North Korea and Japan, and North Korea's diverse approaches and aggressive diplomatic measures toward the United States. However, these achievements fell short of fundamentally improving the *status quo* on the Korean peninsula. During the early 1970s, in the midst of ever-changing relations among the four powers, the two Koreas opted for reinforcement of internal governance as part of their respective efforts to moderate the speed of shifting relations among the four powers. Ultimately, the neighboring countries' conditional engagement ended in failure because of the Carter administration's attempt to withdraw U.S. forces from the Korean peninsula in the mid-1970s and North Korea's increasingly offensive South Korea policy.

During the period between the late 1980s and early 1990s neighboring countries tried to create new diplomatic and security strategies following the end of the confrontation between West and East. In the early 1980s, the Reagan administration reinforced its policy to keep the Soviet Union in check, while China announced its four principles for modernization and focused on modernizing its economy after Mao Zedong's death. In the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev pursued reform and open-door policies, despite the burden of an ever-increasing defense budget. Amid these changes, the U.S. rewrote its strategies regarding the world as a whole, and Asia in particular, for

the first time since the end of World War II. Consequently, the Pentagon published *Bottom up Review* which proposed a defense budget cut and an East Asia Strategy Initiative I & II (EASI I & II), basically a reevaluation of its Asian strategy. In essence, the end of East-West confrontation resulted in fundamental changes in neighboring countries' policies toward the Korean peninsula. In particular, the former Soviet Union, China, Eastern European countries, and Vietnam established diplomatic relations with South Korea, which was pursuing *Nordpolitik* at the time. Viewing the collapse of the communist bloc as a serious threat to its regime, North Korea had to seek new relations with South Korea. Thus, the two Koreas simultaneously became members of the United Nations in 1990, and signed the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula in 1991.

The period between the 1990s and the present can be characterized by the emergence of the Korean question as an international issues, and the institutionalization of inter-Korean negotiations. Following North Korea's withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), rising tensions on the peninsula, a new consensus was created among South Korea, the U.S. and Japan. In the early 1990s, partly discarding their defensive diplomacy, China and Russia declared a strategic partnership, challenging U.S. dominance as a superpower. In 1994, efforts increased to resolve North Korea's nuclear issues with the conclusion of the Agreed Framework between the U.S. and North Korea, and the launch of the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO). These developments gave rise to the Four Party Talks, expanding U.S. influence in the region even more. As a result, China and Russia came up with measures to curb growing U.S. influence. Meanwhile, the U.S. and Japan agreed to build the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system, which would shield them from North Korea's ballistic missile threats (as well as China's missile threats). However, China and Russia vehemently opposed the TMD program and supported Seoul's decision not to become a member.

NEIGHBORS RESPONSES AFTER THE INTER-KOREAN SUMMIT

Publicly supporting the inter-Korean summit, the Clinton administration assessed that the historic summit was a result of the engagement policy consistently pursued by President Kim Dae-jung since 1998. Immediately after the announcement of the summit on April 10, U.S. Secretary of State Albright remarked that the summit was the outcome of South Korea's engagement policy and its close alliance with the United States and Japan. When the question of whether U.S. forces in Korea would continue to stay on the peninsula was raised, Secretary Albright made it clear that the issue would be dealt with by Seoul and Washington even if inter-Korean relations improved. From the U.S. perspective, the significance of the inter-Korean summit lies in North Korea's attitude towards U.S. forces on the peninsula. If National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il was sincere when he said to President Kim that he recognized the status and role of U.S. forces, the possibility of Washington reconsidering its North Korea policy certainly cannot be ruled out. However, for now, Washington will stand firm in its stance towards North Korea until it obtains solid evidence indicating that Pyongyang wholeheartedly supports the role of U.S. forces on the peninsula.

Japan believes that follow-up measures after the summit will contribute to tension reduction on the peninsula and will positively affect the Japan-North Korea normalization process. Stressing that Japan would cooperate in promoting confidence-building measures on the peninsula, Japanese Foreign Minister Kono mentioned that he expects confidence-building measures to have positive effects on normalizing Japan-North Korea relations. Normalization talks held before and after the inter-Korean summit have backed up his expectations.

China showed a keen interest in the successful inter-Korean summit before and after Chairman Kim Jong-il's visit to Beijing, and

the Chinese media reported the summit as headline news. The *Xinhwa News Agency* reported that the withdrawal of the U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula would contribute to peace on the peninsula, citing a statement made by the North during Kim Jong-il's visit to China. The Chinese mass media pointed out that Pyongyang has continuously demanded the withdrawal of U.S. forces and the abolishment of South Korea's National Security Law, arguing that success of the inter-Korean summit was dependent upon the reconciliation of these issues. Highlighting the fact that public opposition to the National Missile Defense (NMD) system was spreading in the U.S., Beijing assessed that Washington would have less room for maneuvering if military threats posed by the North were drastically reduced. As for Russia, it announced President Putin's visit to North Korea before the inter-Korean summit, while focusing on the resumption of its influence on the peninsula through summit meetings with North Korea and Japan. Officially supporting the inter-Korean summit, Moscow vowed to maintain more balanced Korean peninsula policies.

Neighboring nations, with the U.S. at the center, are likely to pay close attention to developments in inter-Korean relations and to lend support for the improvement of inter-Korean relations while working on policies to maximize their own national interests. They probably have already begun to research future scenarios on the Korean peninsula and prospects for inter-Korean relations, which have entered into a new phase. One can assume that possible issues will include: the future of U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula, North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, the prospects for U.S.-North Korea missile talks, Japan-North Korea normalization talks, and the Russia-North Korea relationship. The neighboring countries are expected to analyze the post-summit, Korean peninsula situation, post-summit from several angles. By mobilizing official and unofficial channels, neighboring nations will collect intelligence information to fully understand the domestic situation of the two Koreas, especially political developments and

the situation in the South. While emphasizing the positive points of the inter-Korean summit, the U.S. should concentrate its efforts on proactively coping with the following situations should they erupt: (1) Controversy over the withdrawal of U.S. forces, the Korean government's position and response to it. (2) The Korean governments stance on the dissolution of the United Nations Command. (3) Growing anti-U.S. sentiment in South Korea and possible countermeasures. (4) The need for bilateral alliances between Korea and the United States, and the United States and Japan, and the need for relations between all three countries. (5) Engagement of South Korea and China in a discussion on closer cooperative diplomatic and security measures. (6) Sounding out North Korea on the possibility of reforms, the opening of its regime, and the promotion of inter-Korean economic cooperation. Neighboring nations should also closely observe both macro- and micro-economic indicators of the South Korean economy, monitoring inter-Korean cooperation directives pursued by the government and major South Korean companies.

The U.S. is expected to thoroughly analyze the Korean peninsula policies of China and Russia, with a focus on military cooperation between China and North Korea and relations between the party and the military in North Korea. In particular, it will examine Chinese and Russian strategies toward the two Koreas from various levels, including President Putin's visit to Pyongyang. If Sino-South Korean relations develop, the U.S. will launch an in-depth examination of the impact these relations will have on the alliance between South Korea, the U.S. and Japan. China, for its part, succeeded in utilizing the inter-Korean summit as an opportunity to highlight the issue of U.S. forces as a major political issue in South Korea. Russia is also expected to take advantage of the summit in its efforts to nurture the argument for the withdrawal of U.S. forces on the peninsula. It is assessed that Russia and China, which have endeavored to block the TMD program through political and diplomatic means will actively pursue an anti-TMD diplomacy based on results of the inter-Korean summit.

SOUTH KOREA'S MID- AND LONG-TERM STRATEGY

Security in the region is dependent on the following four factors: (1) Continued U.S. guarantee of security in South Korea and Japan; (2) Japan's recognition of its restricted military rights; (3) China's acceptance of the United States role on the peninsula; and (4) South Korea's supportive stance on the issue of maintaining U.S. military capabilities. To analyze South Korea's future strategy, the issue of Korean peninsula unification should be factored in. A unified peninsula would certainly result in freedom from the influences of China and Japan. Considering this point, South Korea may opt for nationalism, championing stronger national power. It is, however, very important for Korea to face the strategic reality after unification. Since other countries' stakes on the peninsula are different, a unified Korea may encounter obstacles if it adopts nationalism tinted with romanticism and a De Gaullist security posture. Misdirected nationalism may become a huge stumbling block, preventing the establishment of security on the peninsula. Taking into account the past history in which neighboring countries attempted to place the Korean peninsula under their control, Korea should assure its neighbors that a unified peninsula would not adversely affect or damage regional security. At the same time, it needs to shoulder the burden of developing independent capabilities. This explains why South Korea should consider the following points.

First, after unification, conflicts may arise due to contradictory circumstances under which Korea should assume independence from, as well as depend on the superpowers, albeit partly, for security reasons. A unified Korea should not adopt a strategy that might pose threats to regional order. In this vein, a unified Korea should make clear its stance on the issue of weapons of mass destruction. It should emphasize the fact that the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization on the Korean peninsula signed in 1991 is still in effect even after unification, and that a unified Korea is obliged to

observe the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and allow IAEA inspections. On the other hand, a unified Korea will also have to retain both ballistic missile capabilities within the MTCR boundary and minimal deterrence. Second, a unified Korea should step up its efforts to promote open-minded international and regional economic orders. Third, a strong alliance with the U.S. should be maintained, an essential element for assuring the regional power balance. The presence of U.S. forces should be realigned under the new environment. More importantly, it is necessary for Korea to have negotiate on resumption of operational command authority.

U.S. senior officials have reiterated the need U.S. forces to stay on the peninsula even after the unification. Since 1950, the U.S. has maintained the presence of its military forces on the peninsula, which has been the foremost front line in Asia. Intense debate over whether the current level of U.S. forces should be sustained after unification will continue for some time. Given that threats from North Korea will disappear after unification, the rationale for a necessary U.S. presence on the peninsula will lose some ground. As stated above, even though a unified Korea and the U.S. may agree on the proper level of U.S. forces to be stationed on the peninsula, the current operational chain of command will not be sustainable. The operational chain of command was first established on the peninsula during the Korean War. In December 1994, peacetime command was transferred to the Korean government. Still, Korea's expectations for more autonomy have not been met. It may prove to be advantageous to the Korean government to regain complete command control before unification, but since it is practically impossible, the cooperative military body should be reformed on an equal footing.

Discussions between the ROK and the U.S. over security matters should not exclusively focus on structural, but should stress conceptual and strategic aspects. A flexible alliance is called for amid rapid political shifts. If and when the unification process is started, the ROK and the U.S. will need to reaffirm their respective positions

on security; even more so if China and Russia want an increased role in the unification process. The major powers will focus on political maneuver, strategic choices and the direction of military modernization on the Korean peninsula. It can be assessed that since the establishment of diplomatic relations with the ROK in August 1992, China has virtually acknowledged the unification process led by the ROK. Yet, this acquiescence can be seen as preemptive diplomacy aimed at splitting South Korea and the U.S. On the other hand, a unified Korea's leaning on China may cause concern for Japan. Could the unified Korea and China form a new "strategic entente," triggered a new arms race in Northeast Asia.

Considering these hypothetical situations, the U.S. and a unified Korean peninsula should seek a new alliance based on a strategic choice, serving both countries, rather than on necessity, the basis on which existing ROK-U.S. alliance was established and maintained. A common strategic alliance formed between the U.S. and the ROK for the purpose of joint defense would be helpful in the handling of issues under the unification process. Political consultations are expected to gradually take on a multilateral nature. The ROK and the U.S. need to broaden their alliance, pro-actively dealing with the following issues: nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental protection, international crimes, regional proliferation of specific threats, and globalization. In order to forge a new paradigm, the two countries need to establish a conceptual identity and provide political justification for the existence of a bilateral alliance. Finally, a unified Korea will need to come up with appropriate defense strategies in the absence of a North Korean threat of war.

Unification of the two Koreas will have a profound impact on regional security. The most significant result will be the resurrection of a new maritime theater in East Asia. In reality, neighboring countries in the region heed the importance of navy and air force capabilities regardless of the situation on the Korean peninsula. However, should unification place the peninsula, such importance

will increase. In the long term, traditional continental powers such as Russia and China are likely to move away from their strategies ground forces. Still, the significance of ground forces will continue to be stressed for border patrol and internal control. Nevertheless, since a unified Korea will ultimately eliminate the threat of ground forces, the U.S., mindful of China, will focus on naval operations and Japan's Self Defense Force will likely modernize its navy and air force. Though it is unclear which form of military will surface in East Asia in the next 20 or 30 years, various powers will make enormous efforts to strengthen their weapons system based on the revolutions in military affairs (RMA) and various levels of anti-air capabilities.

After unification, it is expected that Korea's military will be faced with a weakened strategic base to maintain a ground force-centered military structure. The military need to develop new operational necessities. It is very unlikely that China will decrease the importance of ground forces as long as cross-strait tensions remain, and it is forecasted that the People's Liberation Army will continue to attach importance to the build-up of amphibious war capabilities. Efforts to deal with the possible declining chances of ground combat in North Asia and to overcome the geographical limitations can be regarded as *sine quo non* for securing the ability to project ability.

At the threshold of the 21st century, the long-term objective of the ROK military should be focus on preemptive deterrence. Specifically, the following elements should be stressed. First, the basic ROK defense plan and military maneuvers should be in the framework of ROK-U.S. combined operations. However, the ROK military should partially break away from the combined defense strategies and develop an independent military doctrine and strategies as well. It would be desirable to maintain military cooperation between the ROK and the U.S. with the consent of the two countries even after unification, but only if initiated by the ROK. As long as there exist real military threats from North Korea, defense strategies by the ROK-U.S. combined forces remain vital. After unification it will be necessary to redefine the ROK-U.S. military

cooperation plan and the stationing of U.S. forces in Korea. The ultimate goal of the ROK military should be to restore its command and rights within its own arena.

Second, in preparation for unification on the Korean Peninsula, the basic military strategies of the ROK should be based on maintaining active deterrence. In this vein, the ROK military needs to obtain ballistic missiles, comprehensive air force capabilities, active naval war capabilities and comprehensive intelligence capacity. The 21st century will definitely require the ROK to maintain military power based on state-of-the-art intelligence capabilities. A unified Korea should not be perceived as a new threat to neighboring countries, but as a presence strong enough to control and protect the Korean peninsula. The biggest challenge to this is modifying the ROK military in the face of the threats from North Korea. A *bona fide* "balanced military" structure requires a transfer to an expanded combat space, thus the ROK should focus on the development of cutting edge technology-intensive military capabilities and Korean-style military strategies and doctrine.

In conclusion, as domestic and overseas expectations on the Korea peninsula have risen since the inter-Korean summit, ROK diplomacy and security will no doubt be seriously considered and reconsidered many times. Neighboring countries have evaluated the results of the inter-Korean summit and will continue to analyze developments on the Korean peninsula until 2001, continuously seeking new strategies for the peninsula. Though there are limitations in accurately forecasting possible events that may unfold on the Korean peninsula in the wake of the Pyongyang summit, we can expect four possible changes: (1) Active development of inter-Korean relations; (2) Limited development of inter-Korean relations; (3) Mixed inter-Korean relations; and (4) Negative inter-Korean relations. North Korea is expected to uphold positive inter-Korean relations considering its negotiations with the U.S. and Japan, but in the medium- and long-term, it may fluctuate in implementing the agreed points of the June 15 Joint Declaration. North Korea is

expected to introduce to the agenda of future negotiations the following security-related issues: the USFK, modernization of the ROK military, and the ROK-U.S.-Japan alliance. Neighboring countries are likely to pursue their strategies toward the Korean peninsula under the framework of a unified Korea. Regardless of whether inter-Korean relations take a positive or a negative course, the ROK government will face pressure from domestic political circles. In diplomacy, the ROK government may face various pressures from outside, so it should nurture far-reaching crisis management capabilities while exploring the following political alternatives. First, it should appoint a presidential envoy in charge of unification and diplomacy. Just as the four major powers have prepared themselves for dramatic developments in inter-Korean relations, so the ROK government should come up with active diplomatic security strategies. As the Clinton administration is nearing its end, a new administration will take over, causing a partial shift in U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula some time in the spring or summer of 2001. Thus, preemptive diplomatic strategies leading to a Korean-style unification process should be worked out. Second, a "Presidential Intelligence Evaluation Committee" should be created. The ROK government should obtain and analyze various forms of foreign intelligence. In particular, in response to the increasing need to elaborately identify movements, intentions, and capabilities of neighboring countries, it is necessary to efficiently manage information collected by the national agencies of the ROK. Furthermore, the ROK may want to consider establishing something similar to the United States Presidential Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFLAB). A committee such as this could objectively analyze in a bipartisan way strategies of neighboring countries by capitalizing on its exclusive expertise.