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Volume 12 Number 3 Automn 2000 Arms Control on the
Korean Peninsula: Lee Seo-hang Introduction The unprecedented inter-Korean summit meeting between President Kim Dae-jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in June 2000 has opened a new chapter in inter-Korean relations based on reconciliation and cooperation. This means that the first step has been taken on the long road toward dismantling the confrontational structure on the Korean peninsula, thereby laying the groundwork for the peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas. The implication of the Joint Declaration issued by the two leaders is profound as it provides a framework for a new South-North relationship. It presents the basic structure for a post-summit order on the Korean peninsula. The inter-Korean summit and the Joint Declaration also has several regional implications. First of all, it is time to seize the opportunity to overcome the so-called "dual structure" of international relations in Northeast Asia. While the international structure surrounding the Korean peninsula has reflected post-Cold War characteristics, inter-Korean relations have continued to be reminiscent of the Cold War. However, the two leaders of South and North Korea have agreed to break the vicious cycle of enmity, and there is a possibility that the Cold War structure on the peninsula could be dismantled soon. Secondly, if inter-Korean relations are improved through reconciliation and cooperation, they would contribute to resolving the North Korean missile issue, a threat that become "regionalized" with Pyongyang's August 1998 test-firing of its long-range Taepodong missile over Japanese territory. The test-firing pushed the United States and Japan to agree on the research and development of a theater missile defence (TMD) system, which has raised very negative Chinese reactions. In this sense, the Korean question has both peninsular and regional dimensions, the resolution of which requires simultaneous consideration of both. Thirdly, inter-Korean summit talks would produce a "normal" triangular relationship between the United States, South and North Korea. Seoul and Pyongyang have had virtually no official contact since the early 1990s, when North Korea's nuclear development program became a hot international issue. Except for the aborted inter-Korean summit talks in 1994 and a few meetings in Beijing regarding the South's economic aid to the North, Pyongyang has largely turned a deaf ear to Seoul's repeated calls for governmental talks. Instead, Pyongyang has concentrated its efforts on negotiations with Washington, which it hoped would provide humanitarian aid, lift economic sanctions, and ultimately normalize its relations with Washington. The June summit meeting ended this awkward situation and opened the door for the two Koreas to tackle Korean issues by themselves.1)Although the inter-Korean summit and the Joint Declaration have many bilateral and regional implications, there has been a noticeable lack of any explicit reference to security issues, without which an inter-Korean accord would be an empty document. So far, follow-up measures have shown that the two sides intend to take advantage of the positive atmosphere created by the summit. A ministerial team from Pyongyang visited Seoul at the end of July, and in the bilateral talks, a joint commitment to the principles of the Joint Declaration was reaffirmed. At their conclusion, the two Koreas announced the reopening of liaison offices at Panmunjom, reinstalling direct communications that had been severed in 1996, and restoring railway links. Further ministerial talks were scheduled for later in the year. If the momentum of this progress is to be
maintained, at some point, security issues must be addressed. Korea is
clearly in need of a permanent peace system. Given the deep divisions
between the two sides, the emphasis should be placed on performance rather
than verbal formulae. Implementation of arms control measures, such as the
military confidence-building measures (CBMs), would be a useful first step
in that direction. This paper will explore the goals and applicable
measures of arms control on the Korean peninsula, examining the lessons of
the European experience which has been developed within the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE, formerly CSCE) framework.
Goals and Conditions of Arms
Control
In general, arms control seeks to reduce the risk of war by limiting or reducing the threat from conflicting adversaries rather than relying solely on unilateral military responses to perceived or anticipated changes in the military threat.2) The objectives of arms control are: (a) to reduce the risk of war; (b) to reduce destructive-ness when war occurs; (c) to reduce the cost of providing an adequate military defense.3) If two conflicting adversaries control the operational and structural aspects of military power under mutual agreements, the danger of an all-out war, as well as a surprise attack that could occur as a result of misjudgment, would be considerably reduced. The term "arms control" thus deals with seeking stable and peaceful coexistence, based on two major aspects: the operational and structural control of military forces. History shows that political leaders tend to wage war largely because of misperception and mistrust as well as through misinformation and miscalculation with respect to the adversary's military intentions and capability.4) If accurate military information were provided by each side on the basis of mutual confidence, the risk of war could be reduced or totally removed, thereby securing stability and security. In the initial stage, this objective could be achieved by controlling the operations of military forces, referred to as "Operational arms control." The purpose of operational arms control is to deal primarily with a reduction or limitation of risks posed by the possibility of accident, misperception, or intended surprise attack. The expectation of operational arms control is that a greater openness of military operations will deter a surprise attack. Morever, providing predictability and transparency about military activities will reduce the possibility of misinterpreting the intention of military operations. In this way, confidence can be built between conflicting adversaries and the risks of war will be reduced. Hence, such measures for operational arms control are called "military confidence-building measures (CBMs)." After establishing a certain level of mutual confidence-building, it is possible to introduce procedures to control the structure of military forces in order to achieve military parity. The major goals of arms control include the prevention of war, decreases in the potential consequences of conflict and reduction in the cost of military preparedness. It is desirable, therefore, neither to maintain excessive military stockpiles nor an offensive force structure. It is extremely important for the prevention of war to achieve military parity between conflicting adversaries. The structural control of military forces normally turns out to be a much more difficult task than the operational arms-control measures because it involves the actual reduction of troops and weapons. It would be naive to expect a nation to reduce its troop strength and its levels of armaments unless it is confident that its actions will be reciprocated by potential adversaries. Measures to control the structure and size of military forces are manifold. Among others, special importance should be given to reductions, by which offensive capability is eliminated, together with a transition to a purely defensive posture through the restructuring of armed forces. Military stability and peace can be secured by maintaining a purely defensive force structure. These are the operational and structural controls of military powers. The ultimate goals of arms control, then, are to ensure common security instead of absolute security, mutual trust instead of mutual distrust, military parity instead of disparity, and defensive force structure instead of offensive capability. In a word, arms control is an attempt to transform a relationship of military confrontation into one of cooperation by enhancing stability and security. Arms control obviously involves continual changes
in the political and military environments. Hence, the dynamic
psychological transformation of political leaders is at the heart of the
arms-control process; the political will to establish peaceful coexistence
is the most important factor. If the political leaders in the
participating parties are not ready and able to question existing security
assumptions, at least partially, then the exercise will almost certainly
amount to little more than a number of arms-control measures without any
internal dynamics.5)Based upon this general premise, what is most
important is for South and North Korea to recognize each other and to
normalize their relationship in terms of political confidence-building. As
long as one side views the other a regime to be overthrown or liberated,
arms control between the two Koreas is absolutely unthinkable. The
inter-Korean summit of June 2000 has mitigated this situation and laid the
foundation for arms control. Lessons of THE European
Experience A series of procedures that finally led to arms reduction in Europe provide many valuable lessons for Korea. Although its security environment is quite different from that on the peninsula, we could learn many lessons from the European experience on arms control, especially in relation to exploring specific measures, institutional arrangements and negotiating technique. The European arms control process demonstrates the importance of first making institutional arrangements for political and military confidence building for peace and security. The negotiations for arms reduction took place parallel with political and military confidence-building measures. However, the meaningful progress of negotiations for arms reduction was possible only after the establishment of a certain level of political and military confidence building. In essence, the European arms control process underwent a step-by-step development.6)In the first stage, political confidence-building measures were initiated in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).7) Some 35 European states (including the United States and Canada) participated in the CSCE, signing the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 and agreeing to cooperate for peace and security in Europe, while also accepting the territorial and political status quo drawn up at the end of World War II. The Helsinki Final Act, the first substantive document to emerge from the "CSCE process," consisted of three baskets stipulating cooperative relationships between states in political, economic, social and security areas. Basket I contained a "Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States" and arms control measures, while Basket II addressed efforts to develop cooperation in the fields of trade, industry, science and technology, the environ-ment and other areas of economic activity. Basket III included many declarations calling for human contacts, improved information exchanges, improved working conditions for journalists, more extensive cultural exchanges and improved educational exchanges. The latter half of Basket I, dealing with confidence-building measures, recognized the need to reduce the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities that could give rise to apprehension, particularly in situations where the participating states lack clear and timely information about the nature of such activities. Two measures were central to the security provisions. One called for notification twenty-one days in advance of large military maneuvers involving more than 25,000 troops; the other for voluntary invitation of observers to those maneuvers. Without doubt, the Helsinki Final Act contributed significantly to securing peace in Europe as well as to bringing about changes in the former Soviet Union and its satellite states. The second generation of European military confidence-building measures were put into effect with the adoption of the Stockholm Document in 1986. The Document not only stressed the confirmation and reinforcement of the Helsinki Final Act, but improved, expanded and enlarged military confidence-building measures. Reaffirming the principle of the avoidance of the use or threat of force in both mutual and international relations of the participating states, the Stockholm Document includes the following mandatory measures: Prior notification-42 days advance notification of military activities involving a division equivalent (13,000 troops or 300 tanks), 3,000 troops in a parachute exercise, 200 fixed-wing aircraft sorties, or transfers of a division equivalent; Observation-two observers per state to be invited to any exercise of a transfer involving 17,000 personnel, or 5,000 troops involved in a parachute of amphibious exercise; Calendar-specified information about notifiable activities to be communicated one year in advance; Constraints-notifiable activities involving over 40,000 troops must be forecasted two years in advance (no activities over 75,000 permitted without a two-year calendar forecasted and none over 40,000 permitted without a one-year calendar forecast); and Verfication-on-site inspection within 36 hours using four inspectors; no state need accept more than three inspections per year. The third generation of European military CBMs were put into effect with the adoption of the Vienna Document in 1990 and 1992 respectively. The Vienna Document of 1992, in particular, encompasses all the CBMs agreed upon since the beginning of the Helsinki process and, for the first time, addresses the real limitations on military activities as it includes new measures to enhance transparency such as the exchange of information on military structures and defense budgets of member states.8) It also establishes several standing institutions of the CSCE designed to enhance conflict prevention and conflict resolution. The final stage of the European arms control process is the engagement of bloc-to-bloc negotiations for arms reduction. Since early 1989, NATO and the former Warsaw Pact have engaged in talks on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), finally signing a treaty in November 1990 that will reduce the major conventional arms of the both alliances to lower equal levels, eliminating the large numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact signatories. The difficulties involved in arms reduction are amply demonstrated by the unsuccessful conclusion of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations, which opened in October 1973 to discuss reducing non-nuclear forces and troops primarily in central Europe. The MBFR negotiations foundered, however, as NATO and the Warsaw Pact differed on the size of existing forces and the monitoring measures to verify each side's forces. After 46 rounds of negotiations and 472 plenary meetings over a period of more than 15 years, the MBFR talks closed in February 1989, and were replaced by a new, more broadly construed negotiating forum, the CFE talks.9) In looking at the arms reduction process in Europe, it should be noted that Gorbachev's "new thinking" has provided significant momentum to the negotiations.10) In April 1986, he announced the outlines of a plan intended to "break the stalemate" at the conventional force negotiations. The details of his proposal were revealed two months later at a Warsaw Pact meeting in Budapest. Known as the "Budapest Appeal," the Warsaw Pact adopted a new defense-oriented military doctrine. Based on the concept of "common security" and "reasonable sufficiency," it focused on the need to maintain the necessary level of national security through a minimally sufficient means while not imposing serious threat to the security of neighboring states. It was this Copernican thinking on Gorbachev's part that provided an impetus for the progress of conventional force negotiations. The area of application was extended to include the region "from the Atlantic to the Urals," and verification would contain "international procedures, including on-site inspection. Furthermore, he promised to back his words with more actions. In a major speech before the United Nations General Assembly on December 7, 1988, Gorbachev said that by the end of 1990, the Soviet Union would reduce its armed forces by 500,000 men and withdraw six tank divisions from East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, disbanding them. In January 1989, He elaborated on his plans, promising, among other things, to cut the Soviet military budget by a significant rate and to publish information regarding force composition. His follow-up on those promises affected CFE negotiations and ultimately led to the conclusion of the treaty at the CSCE summit meeting in Paris. The main functions of the new CFE Treaty were the reduction of major conventional armaments of the NATO-former Warsaw Pact states to a new and equal level, enduring limitations on these reduced levels of arms, restrictions on force concentration inside the reduction area, and a far-reaching system of verification of these commitments. The major benefit of the agreement on CFE was to eliminate, for both sides, any realistic fear of surprise attack or inability to retaliate, thereby strengthening stability and security. This was achieved by cutting the former Warsaw Pact states' large numerical superiority in major conventional armaments to a lower equal level-below that of the numerically smaller NATO allies-by placing remaining arms of the type reduced under a residual ceiling and by checking compliance with that ceiling by means of an extensive verification system. The result was two-fold: to block the upward spiral of the arms race in Europe and to dispel the mutual fear that had poisoned political relations in Europe for forty years.11) What lessons can we learn from the European experiences of arms control? We may learn the following three lessons: The first is that while the spectrum of arms control possibilities is quite broad, Europe's experience suggests that the subset of measures likely to prove useful or negotiable between adversaries is rather limited, at least at the outset of the negotiating process. A full menu of CBMs and arms control was available in East-West negotiations, but relatively few items were chosen in the early stage. If the European experience is any guide, therefore, its teaching may be that the development of arms control and CBM initiatives is inevitably a highly selective, evolutionary process.12) The second lesson is that the European experience followed a step-by-step progression, suggesting a clear linkage between political developments and successful negotiations. The pattern suggested by arms control negotiations in Europe was that of a graduated, building-block approach which involved relatively simple steps initially and more complicated arrangements later on. In Europe, a long process of CBM negotiations preceded force reductions. A third lesson, in the European context, is that
breaching the wall of secrecy that adversaries tend to erect around their
military establishments and activities was the single most important
contribution made by initial CBM agreements. European arms control
measures, at the initial stage in particular, had the objectives of
reducing misunderstanding, inhibiting the use of force for political
intimidation, and lessening the chances of a surprise attack. The first
order of business of East-West CBMs, however, was reducing military
secrecy.13) Framework of Arms Control on
the Korean Peninsula
In view of the successful European experience in
establishing military CBMs in the 1970s and 1980s, the types of arms
control measures that can be introduced on the Korean peninsula are
open-ended. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the two Koreas have once
negotiated an extremely ambitious arms control agenda including security,
political, and trade-related measures, and the "Inter Korean Basic
Agreement" and the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the
Korean peninsula," both of which were adopted in 1991, provide import37ant
guidelines. The agreement in particular, as a road map towards peaceful
coexistence, requires the two Koreas to work together to transform the
present state of armistice into a solid state of peace. Furthermore, it
contains specific measures of confidence- and security-building and arms
control with the goal of ending the costly arms race and confrontation
between the two Koreas (see Table 1). For instance, Article 12 of the
agreement stipulates provides that the two sides shall discuss and carry
out steps "to build military confidence and realize arms reduction,
including mutual notification and control of major movements of military
units and major military exercises, peaceful utilization of the
demilitarized zone, exchanges of military personnel and information, and
phased reductions of armaments, including the elimination of weapons of
mass destruction and attack capabilities, and verifications thereof."
The agreement and the subsidiary protocol also indicate that a telephone hotline shall be installed between the military authorities of the two sides to prevent accidental armed clashes and their escalation, and a joint military commission shall be established in order to discuss concrete measures to prevent military confrontation. For its part, the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization includes a range of CBMs specifically designed to address the nuclear issue. The two Koreas agreed, among others, not to test, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, nor use nuclear weapons; not to possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment; and to ensure implementation through the establishment and regular meetings of a joint nuclear control commission. In addition to the Basic Agreement and the Joint Denuclearization Declaration, the existing international arrangements and institutions could be also utilized to facilitate arms control on the Korean peninsula. Currently, various efforts to stop the arms proliferation are being employed at both global and regional levels. For instance, the coordinated participation in the UN. Register of Conventional Arms, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) may be useful for the Korean peninsula. The UN. Register of Conventional Arms, in particular, asks the member states of the UN. to provide data on seven categories of armaments on an annual basis in respect of import into and export from their territories during the previous calendar year. The Register could perform such a confidence-building function if the requested data were provided with in the stipulated time-frame by both the South and the North.14)Over the past few years, a wide range of ideas on arms control has been proliferated and the list of arms control measures applicable to the Korean peninsula is clearly open-ended.15) To initiate arms control on the peninsula, however, such measures as listed above should be implemented in good faith as soon as possible. On the basis of implementation of these confidence-building measures, further steps for effective arms control may be explored. For effective arms reduction between the two Koreas, the following working principles and objectives need to be considered. First, the final objective of arms reduction should be the strengthening of stability and security on the Korean peninsula through the establishment of a balance of defensive forces at appropriately lower levels. Second, the initial stage of the phased reduction should eliminate disparities on the militarily superior part of Korea so that parity at levels substantially below present levels of the militarily inferior part of Korea could subsequently be established. Third, in mutually agreeing on the appropriate level of military strength to be maintained in the subsequent stages, the need for self-defense as an independent unified nation should be satisfied, taking into consideration the geo-strategic location of the Korean peninsula, the history of foreign intervention, and the changes in the Northeast Asian region. Fourth, and as a matter of high priority, the capability for launching a surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action should be eliminated together with the reduction of weapons for mass destruction. Fifth, the overall levels of offensive equipment such as tanks, artillery and armored personnel carriers, which are verifiable and central to the seizing and holding of territory, must be radically reduced in the first stage of reductions. Sixth, the number of military personnel may be reduced in accordance with reductions in armament and equipment. Seventh, the reserve forces may be reduced in parallel with the reduction of regular forces. Eighth, foreign military forces may be gradually reduced and withdrawn in accordance with the progress made in structural arms control between the two Koreas. Ninth, compliance with all the agreed measures of arms reduction should be verified through an effective and strict verification regime which, among other things, would include on-site inspection rights and the exchange of information. Appropriate sanctions should be applied to non-compliance and violations of agreements. Tenth, to this end, it is desirable to form and
operate an international supervisory group that includes the two
Koreas.16) Conclusion The historical inter-Korean summit meeting of June 2000 and its adoption of the Joint Declaration have opened a new chapter in inter-Korean relations based on reconciliation and cooperation. Nevertheless, some may criticize the Joint Declaration on the grounds that there is no reference to the development of military CBMs that would directly contribute to tension reduction between the two Koreas, where arms control is badly needed to reduce military tension. However, military CBMs are highly sensitive, potentially contentious issues which can best be discussed once an atmosphere of cooperation and reconciliation has been established. There is an old Korean proverb, saying that "a journey of a thousand miles must begin with the first step." The Joint Declaration is significant, but it is just the first step toward peaceful coexistence. Military CBMs can be discussed at the later stage through ministerial-level talks, which the two Koreas have decided to continue. President Kim Dae-jung, at the ceremony marking the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War in June 2000, stated that South Korea will form a joint military committee with North Korea to discuss tension reduction and non-aggression. If the two Koreas undertake discussion on military CBMs, it will not take long to agree on concrete measures, since they once adopted a wide range of CBMs regarding the peninsula through high-level talks in 1991. In this sense,the prospect is bright for arms control on the Korean peninsula. However, there is skepticism about prospects for arms control because the two sides have had very different approaches and perceptions toward arms control itself. As disclosed in the early stages of the high-level talks in 1991, North Korea's basic posture on arms control was threefold: withdrawal of U.S. forces from the South; denuclearization of the Korean peninsula; and reduction of standing armed forces on each side to a specific ceiling, such as 100,000 troops. In the past North Korea has tried to use these measures as a propaganda ploy with no real intention to improve relations with the South. In addition, Pyongyang has seen arms control as an end, paying less attention to confidence building and openness on exchanging military data.17) In contrast, South Korea has viewed arms control and its related confidence-building measures as a process of building peace and establishing national partnership with North Korea towards the goal of unification. At the heart of Seoul's approach is the belief that arms control and unification cannot be achieved without going through a step-by-step process. As such, South Korea has emphasized the importance of transforming offensive force structures into defensive ones, the reduction of offensive equipment and forces to parity levels, and the elimination of other military asymmetries. These outstanding differences between Seoul and Pyongyang could be an obstacle in reaching and implementing a further comprehensive agreement on arms control. In addition, as long as North Korea does not have a genuine political will for peaceful coexistence, the negotiations on arms control cannot begin. To initiate arms control on the Korean peninsula, the measures envisaged in the agreements adopted by the South and the North and in international arrangements should be implemented in good faith as early as possible. On the basis of sincere and gradual implementation of such confidence-building measures, in view of the European experience, further steps for effective arms control, including arms reduction, may be explored. At this moment, what is needed by the two sides is a solid political will to overcome the barriers of mutual distrust and to investigate mutual interests based on reconciliation and cooperation. Finally, emphasizing the importance of bilateral
negotiations between the two Koreas does not necessarily mean excluding
external powers from playing a role in the region. Given the political
conditions surrounding the Korean peninsula, any fundamental change in the
inter-Korean situation would, in the long run, require the support of the
international community, particularly the United States, Japan, China and
Russia. The external powers in the region could support the South-North
dialogue as seen in the Four-Party Talks, helping to ease tensions,
facilitating discussion of common security concerns and possibly
guaranting the outcomes negotiated between the two Koreas. 1) Kim Sung-han, "Inter-Korean Summit and Its
Regional Implications," IFANS Review, Vol. 8 (June 2000), pp. 13-15. 2) Arms Control and National Security: An
Introduction (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control Association, 1989), p. 10;
For other useful definitions of arms control, see Emanuel Adier, ed., The
International Practice of Arms Control (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1992), and Stuart Croft, Strategies of Arms Control: A
History and Typology (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996). 3) Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1991), pp. 171-72. 4) Robert McNamara, Out of the Cold War: New Thinking for American Foreign and Defense Policy in the 21st Century (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), p. 100. 5) James Macintosh, "Confidence and Security Building Measures: A Skeptical Look," in Disarmament: Confidence and Security Building Measures in Asia (New York: United Nations, 1990), p. 84. 6)This explanation of European arms control process is largely based upon Dong-won Lim, "An Urgent Need for Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula: A Framework for Implementation," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. 56-60. 7) CSCE changed its name to OSCE in January 1995. 8) For further details on the CBM s stipulated in the Vienna Document, see Sergey Koulik and Richard Kokosik, Conventional Arms Control: Perspectives on Verification (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 144-155. 9)For a short history of MBFR, see Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control: A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements (London: Sage Publications, 1994), pp. 171-173. 10)Seweryn Bialer, "New Thinking and Soviet Foreign Policy," Survival, Vol. 30 (July-August 1988), p. 298. 11) For more details on the CFE treaty and its implications for European security regime, see Arms Control Today (January-February 1991), a special issue on European security. 12) Richard E. Darlek, "East-West Confidence-Building: Defusing the Cold War in Europe," in Michael Krepon (ed.), A Handbook of Confidence-Building Measures for Regional Security, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1995), p. 20. 13) Ibid, p. 21. 14) South Korea has provided information to the UN. Register of Conventional Arms since its first exercise in 1993. 15) For further comprehensive lists of the inter-Korean arms control measures, see Thomas J. Hirschfeld, "Building Confidence in Korea: The Arms Control Dimensions," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis , Vol. 4 (Summer 1992), pp. 23-55. and Kang Choi, "Inter-Korean Confidence-Building," Asian Perspective (Fall-Winter 1996), pp. 91-116. 16)Lim Dong-won, "Peace and Security on the Korean Peninsula: Seoul's Perspective," Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations, Vol. 15, No. 3, (1992), pp. 63-64. 17)Ahn Byong-joon, "Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula: Its Prospects and International Context," in Gerrit W. Gong and Richard L. Grant (eds.), Security and Economics in the Asia-Pacific Region (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strtegic and Inernational Studies, 1991), pp. 100-102. |