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Volume 12 Number 3 Automn 2000 The
Sino-Japan Relationship and Lee Rhee-beom Introduction The landmark inter-Korean summit in June put an end to the 50 year-long of the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula, setting the two Koreas on a path to reconciliation and unification. Until very recently, the Korean peninsula had been marked by tension and animosity caused by likelihood of armed provocation by the North Korean military. However, it is now forecast that the new reconciliatory mood will turn the situation around, dramatically, creating instead an environment conducive to peaceful co-existence between the South and the North. Ongoing bilateral efforts to bring peace on the Korean peninsula are regarded as very meaningful in that South and North Korea themselves are striving to fulfill the important task independently, rather than depending on external forces. It is worth noting, however, that such an "independent" approach will succed only if caution is applied, and that caution must be based on an accurate understanding of relations among nations surrounding the Korean peninsula. To put it another way, the two Koreas should establish strong cooperative ties with surrounding powers to meet the common challenge of establishing peace and reducing tension on the Korean peninsula. It needs to be remembered, however, that at the core of the Korean peninsula's relations with its surrounding powers lies the issue of the presence of U.S. forces, a political hot potato. Naturally, many questions are being raised in regards to changing the status of the U.S. forces stationed in the South, a remnant of the Cold War period. The Seoul authorities, including President Kim Dae-jung, have repeatedly expressed support for the continued presence of American troops even if the two Koreas achieve national unification. It has been also reported, albeit unconfirmed, that National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il recognizes the need for keeping U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula even after national unification. The positions of the South and the North indicate that they agree on pivotal role of the U.S. forces in maintaining the peace and stability of not only the Korean peninsula but also the East Asian region. Therefore, a withdrawal of the U.S. forces from the Korean peninsula is likely to create a power vacuum and trigger competition among neighboring powers to secure predominance in the region. If so, there is a strong possibility that the two Koreas, as well as nations in Northeast Asia, would face a security threat as soon as American troops pull out of the region. In the event that, co-existence between the South and the North is firmly in place and a reunified Korea is finally achieved, what are the potentially destabilizing factors that could may pose a menace to the security of the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia? The past history of the Korean peninsula exemplifies that peace and stability in this region were largely determined by nations such as China and Japan. Over the last 2,000 years, China and Japan have shaped their history in close linkage with that of the Korean peninsula. Throughout history, the Korean peninsula has often been the victim of clashes between the continental power, China, and the maritime force, Japan. The volatile region was of great geographical importance to the two powers in terms of security and national interests. Although internal and external situations of the peninsula have become very different from those of the former times, the Korean peninsula still bears paramount importance to both China and Japan. Under these circumstances, it can be concluded that peace and co-existence of the two Koreas do not directly guarantee immediate and long-lasting peace and stability of the Korean peninsula. Rather, peace and stability on the peninsula will be much more dependent on relations among the four neighboring powers, namely the U.S., Russia, China and Japan; especially the Sino-Japan relationship. In the post Cold War period, it appears that China and Japan hold greater significance to the Korean peninsula in the context of national security than that of the U.S. and Russia. In short, from the perspective of China and Japan,
U.S. forces should be present to insure the peace and security of the
Korean peninsula even after the establishment of a peaceful co-existence
between the two Koreas. First, in order to demonstrate this point, pending
issues facing China and Japan will be discussed: issues which may shape
and influence the future relationship between China and Japan. These
issues include the following: bilateral economic relations, comparison of
military strengths, historical issues, and lastly, the Taiwan issue.
Discussion will be confined to the bilateral relationship since 1972
normalization of diplomatic ties between China and Japan. Second, a
projection of future Sino-Japan relations will be presented. Third, in an
effort to support the argument that the U.S. forces' presence is vital to
the peace and stability of not only the Korean peninsula but also the
entire East Asian Region, the preconditions for a peaceful and secure
Korean peninsula will be pointed out. This will be accomplished by linking
the issue of establishing peaceful co-existence between the two Koreas
with the issue of Sino-Japan relations. China and Japan after the normalization of
diplomatic relations. Economic Relations Normalization of the diplomatic relationship between China and Japan was made possible thanks to changing aspects of international politics and economy. As the U.S. normalized its relations with China, China and Japan also felt the need to redefine their diplomatic ties, based on a recognition to protect national interests by jointly respond to growing threats posed by the Soviet Union. In addition, China badly wanted Japan's technology and capital in order to end its protracted economic recession caused by the Cultural Revolution of the 1960's. Economic relations between the two countries began to pick up following the Sino-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978. During the period between 1979 and 2000, Japan provided China with four loan packages worth 2.65 trillion yen in total. The conditions for the loans were very favorable to China: low interest rates of 2-3% and repayment within 30 years with a grace period of ten years. Moreover, until 1997, Japan had offered 105 billion yen of untied loans in the forms of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) and 99.1 billion yen for technological aid to help China. The Japanese government's loans and economic aid, provided gratis, are widely seen as a form of compensation for Japan's brutal wartime occupation of much of China during World War II. China has utilized the Japanese economic assistance in constructing much-needed ports, railways, power stations and communication networks, which are key social infrastructure for economic development, while trying to improve living standards of the Chinese people through expansion of sewage systems, forestation and construction of anti-flood facilities. Consequently, China has enjoyed dazzling economic growth rate since the 1980s. In terms of bilateral trade, Japan was China's second biggest export market (16.2%), following the U.S. (20.7%) as of 1998. And, China was the No. 1 importer (20.1%) of Japanese goods during the same period. Meanwhile, China has accelerated its economic
opening by joining the World Trade Organization. It is now receiving more
and more capital and technology from Japan to pursue sustainable economic
growth through expanded economic exchanges. Japan also stands to benefit
from active bilateral exchanges, as it can take advantage of the
opportunity to advance into the huge Chinese market in the process of such
bilateral contacts. Recognition of history Since it became clear that the gap of recognition of history between the two nations remained wide, mistrust has been growing between China and Japan. In the course of normalizing diplomatic relations with China in 1972, Japan acknowledged its war crimes and showed remorse. Unfortunately, since the 1980s, China has been outraged by some Japanese actions, for example, remarks made by Japanese politicians and their refused to allow a revision of language in Japanese school textbooks to honestly address Japanese atrocities in China. Moreover, visits of Japanese cabinet members to Yasukuni Shrine, a Shinto memorial to Japan's war dead, were also the target of criticism. However, in October 1992, during a visit to China to celebrate the 20th anniversary of establishment of diplomatic ties, the Japanese emperor declared, "I feel deep sorrow for inflicting great sufferings on the Chinese people." This gesture was a turning point and thereafter, the two sides were able to narrow their differences on the issue of history to some degree. However, in 1994, when a Japanese minister remarked that the Nanjing Massacre had been a sheer fabrication, antagonism both China and Japan was again sparked. These incident have led to strong doubts in China as to how the Japanese people perceive past history. The tide turned again, however, when in August 1995, then Japanese Prime Minister Murayama showed deep remorse and offered a heartfelt apology, saying "Japanese colonization and invasion have caused immeasurable damages and suffering to the people of many Asian nations." During the Sino-Japan summit talks in November 1998, in a joint declaration to resolve the history issue, the two leaders attempted to clearly state Japan's aggression. The two leaders of China and Japan declared the Joint Declaration regarding "Construction of Friendly and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Development" and discussed ways to include such expressions as "invasion," "deep remorse," and "apology" in the Joint Declaration. At the time, China wanted to settle the history issue with Japan by stating the word "apology" in the Declaration. However, Japan adamantly refused to include the word despite its admission of invasion of China and its deep regret for past wrongdoing. As a result, the two nations failed to reach an agreement on some of the contents of the Declaration and both declaration was not signed. Chinese President Jiang Zemin voiced strong complaints about Japan's attitude, while at the same time, the Japanese government and the media criticized Jiang for playing into the hands of conservatives and the military to steady his shaky power base. In sum, an official apology by the Tokyo
authorities alone is not enough to bridge the gap in the perception of
history. In fact, a majority of the Japanese people are very critical of
its government's continued apologies over historical issues. It seems that
the current divisions between the two nations cannot easily be narrowed at
the private-level, not to mention the government-levele. The Taiwan issue The basic principle of China's policy toward Taiwan is two-fold: It is a part of the Chinese territory, and the issue is an internal affair. China maintains a "three nos" policy on Taiwan: no Taiwanese independence, no recognition of two Chinas, and no Taiwanese membership as a sovereign nation in any international organization. During the first-ever direct presidential election in Taiwan in March 1996, China conducted extensive military exercises, including missile tests, in the Taiwan Strait in an apparent attempt to thwart Taiwan's pro-independence movement. The situation grew intense with America's dispatch of the aircraft carrier Nimitz of the 7th Fleet. However, U.S. President Clinton, well aware of the seriousness of the Taiwan issue, later expressed his support for China's "three nos." When the U.S. forged diplomatic relationship with China, it acknowledged that China was the only legitimate government and that Taiwan is was integral part of China. At the same time, however, the U.S. continues to offer a promise to defend Taiwan by the legal basis of the "Taiwan Relation Act" in 1979, stating that "the future of Taiwan must be decided in a peaceful manner." For its part, Japan also acknowledged in the 1972 Joint Communique that the People's Republic of China is the only legitimate government and that Taiwan is an integral part of the PRC. However, in the 1998 Japan-China Joint Declaration, Japan was unwilling to officially recognize the fact that the issue of Taiwan is China's internal affair and refused to support China's "three nos" policy on Taiwan. In an attempt to twist Japan's arm, China pointed to the fact that U.S. President Bill Clinton had recognized the same "three nos" policy, but to no avail. With regard to the issue of Taiwan, the biggest obstacle to the Sino-Japan relationship is the exact definition of the word "surrounding" contained within the expression, "cooperation in situations in areas surronding Japan," defined in the 1997 "New Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation." The Japanese government said that the concept of "situations in areas surrounding Japan" is not geographically oriented, but is meant to include all conditions in its surrounding areas that may influence the peace and security of Japan. However, it is generally interpreted that the surrounding areas also include the Korean peninsula and Taiwan. If the New Guidelines clearly stated that the surrounding areas include Taiwan, it would have meant that the U.S. and Japan acquiesce Taiwan's independence. Conversely, if Taiwan was excluded from the concept of situations in "surrounding areas," it could give the impression that the two nations permit China's use of armed forces against Taiwan. Therefore, it seems that, in order not to be self-contradictory, the wording of "situations in areas surrounding Japan" was an inevitable yet realistic option for the U.S. and Japan, which officially recognized Taiwan being a part of China. Nonetheless, China has explicitly condemned the New Guidelines by saying that it was aimed at securing hegemony over the East Asian region and that it revealed that the two nations' harbored ambitions to interfere in its internal affairs. Additionally, China asserted that the Guidelines allow the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) to carry out independent military operations on the sea and in the air of the Asia-Pacific region, fuelling Japanese ambition of becoming a militarist state. Japan claimed that the principle of SDF, providing only defense and logistics supports, would be fully respected under the New Guidelines should conflicts arise in its surrounding areas. Yet, China sticks to its argument that in a modern war, where it is very hard to draw a distinction between combat and non-combat areas and between frontline and rear areas, such a principle would be difficult to honor. In summary, China's position on the New Guidelines is that it is only a justification of Japan's military build-up and evidence of the two nations' attempt to wield hegemonic power in the Asia-Pacific Region. As independent air defense role and maritime operations of Japanese SDF are widely recognized, the existing argument that the U.S.-Japan security alliance will prevent Japan from becoming a military superpower cannot be supported. The New Guidelines confine the role of the SDF to supporting the rear area. However, the New Guidelines would enable the two countries to expand U.S.-Japan joint operations and areas of cooperation, making it inevitable for Japan to exercise collective self-defense right, now banned under the Japan's Constitution. This possibility will be a major consideration in the process of revising the Constitution. Meanwhile, the Taiwan issue will serve as a very
significant factor in defining the nature of Sino-Japan relations. For
instance, if Taiwan declares independence and China, in response,
mobilizes military forces, the U.S. would intervene militarily. Given that
scenario, Japan would find it unavoidable to support the U.S. in the rear
area. This explains why the Japanese security experts worry that a
contingency in the Taiwan Strait would be the most threatening factor in
the future relations between China and Japan. Territorial Dispute China and Japan have been engaged in territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands in Chinese). The conflict first erupted in 1970 when the U.S. announced it would return Okinawa to Japan. At the time the U.S. said that Okinawa included the Senkakus. Since 1972, China and Japan have kept on hold the issue in consideration of the negotiations on the normalization of China-Japan relations and meetings on signing the "Treaty of Peace and Friendship" in 1978. Nonetheless, in 1992 China stipulated in its Territorial Waters Law that it held sovereignty over the islands. In 1997 when the two countries concluded the Fishery Agreement, it was clear that both nations would manage the island. It is noteworthy that China has avoided discussion
on the issue, while at the same time proclaiming its right to the islands.
Beijing must have calculated that its insistence on territorial rights
would have impeded its efforts to induce Japanese assistance and
cooperation needed for its economic development. The issue is expected to
remain a destabilizing factor in bilateral relations, since neither of the
countries would make unilateral concessions over the oil-rich islands. Military rivalry a. China Proactively participating in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), China has supported the ARF bid to restore trust among countries in the region. In addition, Beijing continues to consult such countries as the U.S., Russia, France, Canada and Austria on national security and defense issues through various discussions. China demonstrated that it abided by the principle of non-interference in other countries' internal matters and respected other countries' sovereignty when it participated in U.N. peacekeeping activities on six occasions since 1990. Beijing increased its defense budget by an average of 6.22% annually between 1979 and 1994. Considering that the consumers' price hike reached 7.3% during the same period, China's defense budget has not surged in comparison. Between 1995 and 1997 military spending was raised by an annual average of 13%, but its proportion of the total national budget has decreased. More specifically, that proportion fell down to 8-9% between1995 and 1997. In 1997 the defense expenditures accounted for a mere 1.09% of GDP. Taking into account the fact that China's GDP growth rate recorded an average of 11.6% between 1990 and 1997, the increase in the defense budget is outpaced by the economic growth rate. In 1998 Beijing earmarked $11 billion for its military spending, a mere 4.37% of that of the U.S. ($251.4 billion) and 26.82% of Japan ($41 billion).1)This figure indicates that Beijing concentrates its efforts more on economic growth than on military buildup. There is an argument that Beijing's actual defense budget would exceed its official announcement since it spent money on the military under other budget categories. Even so, the comparison between China's official defense budget and those of other countries indicates how much it spends on its military and whether it has increased its military spending or not. In this vein, the level of China's military
expansion was overestimated. Most military experts held the view that even
if China tried to integrate Taiwan by force, the attempt would end in a
failure because of China's lack of amphibious ability and Taiwan's
outstanding capability to repulse such attack. When U.S. support, Taiwan's
"invisible military power" is taken into account, the possibility of
China's use of force is even slimmer. However, if China succeeds in
achieving stability by maintaining the momentum of its current economic
development and thus, becoming an influential economy in the world, the
military balance in the Taiwan Strait could be toppled at any time. b. Japan Japan has strengthened its defense capability four times according to its plan to improve defense capability since the late 1950s. In the late 1970s its efforts to reinforce its defense capability shifted from quantitative expansion to qualitative improvement amid the economic slowdown following the oil shock and the detente atmosphere in the international political arena. In the 1980s, the status of the SDF, originally expected to deal with small-scale outside attacks, was faced with a change. The tension between the West and the East intensified and Russia boosted its military capability in the Far East by deploying more submarines and state-of-the-art strategic fighters, threatening operational activities of not only the SDF but also U.S. forces near Japan. This development gave rise to the need for Japanese forces to take appropriate measures. On the part of the U.S., it wanted to maintain military supremacy over the Soviet Union at sea in cooperation with Japan and asked Japan to ensure a defense posture over Japan's sea routes. Consequently, the defense budget of Japan exceeded the 1% limit of the GNP set by the cabinet in 1976. For instance, in 1980 the defense budget was 2 trillion 230.2 billion yen, or 0.90% of GNP and 5.24% of the national budget. In 1985 the figure sharply went up to 3 trillion 137.1 billion yen, or 0.997% of GNP and 5.98% of the national budget. Most of the increased budget was channeled into enhancing the SDF, anti-submarine and air defense capabilities against the Soviet Union's maritime and air forces at sea and in the air space Japan. In 1981 the Japanese military set a specific goal of defending sea lanes to a distance of 1,000 nautical miles in the Pacific. In 1985 Japan drew up "Mid-term Defense Build-up Plan" between 1986 and 1990, during which period Japan introduced destroyers, anti-submarine patrol ships, an early warning surveillance system, airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), and new jet fighters. In sum, the bolstered military capabilities of the Self Defense Forces are attributed to the U.S. policy to encourage Japan to reinforce its sea lane defense posture. In the early 1990s when the Cold War came to an
end, the U.S.-Japan security alliance entered a new phase as the Soviet
Union, their virtual enemy, collapsed. Nevertheless, Japan beefed up its
air and maritime defense capabilities and surveillance capabilities under
the "Mid-term Defense Build-up Plan," period from 1991 to 1995. Its
defense budget reached 4 trillion 386 billion yen in 1991 and 4 trillion
723.6 billion yen in 1995. During the "Mid-term Defense Build-up Plan,"
Japan's defense budget continued to rise before being reduced in the wake
of economic downturn. The defense budget in 1991 accounted for 6.23% of
the total national budget but in 2000 it took up only 5.79%, amounting to
4 trillion 921.8 billion yen. Still, the amount of its defense budget is
enough for Japan to secure military capabilities in carrying out its role,
as set forth in U.S.-Japan Security Alliance.2) In fact, weapons and
equipment possessed by the Self Defense Forces are more than enough to
conduct its exclusively defensive role stipulated in its Constitution. On
top of that, the SDF has weapons and equipment to counterattack enemies in
the air and at sea, except assault weapons such as aircraft carriers,
long-range bombers, and inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM). Even
though Japan has been under fire at home and abroad for adding attack
weapons to its inventory, the distinction between weapons for attacks and
defense has blurred in modern warfare. Given that the SDF increased attack
weapons in its arsenal, it is assessed that Japan's military capabilities
have already reached a considerably high level. Japan's weapon's system
thus serves as a yardstick to predict the direction of its national
strategy, rather than its military defense capabilities. PROSPECT OF SINO-JAPAN RELATIONS Marking the 20th anniversary of signing the "Treaty of Peace and Friendship," President Jiang Zemin visited Japan for the first time as Chinese president. At the summit, leaders of the two countries announced "Japan-China Joint Declaration," aimed at establishing friendly partnership for peace and prosperity of the two countries. In the Declaration, they agreed that one of the leaders of the two countries would visit the other country every year and would establish military hot lines both in Tokyo and Beijing. They also discussed ways to expand areas of cooperation, under the principle of equality and reciprocity, in such areas as high-tech, information, environmental protection, agriculture and infrastructure to forge sustainable and stable relations in economic and trade sectors. In particular, the two countries pledged to build a partnership of friendship and cooperation for peace and development, with Japan expressing its willingness to provide support for China's efforts to develop its economy. As mentioned earlier, however, the two countries failed to hammer out their differences regarding the wording of the Declaration, such as "deep remorse" and "apology" for Japan's invasion into China. It turned out later that there were big gaps in expectations of the two countries about the Declaration. China expected the Declaration to be an official announcement, officially announcing friendly and cooperative relations in the 21st century, following the "1972 China-Japan Joint Declaration," and the "1978 Sino-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship." It hoped that the Declaration would develop the Japan-China relations into a "constructive and strategic partnership," as it did with the U.S. On the contrary, Japan judged that if the bilateral relationship was defined as "constructive and strategic partnership," it could be interpreted as a "Japan-China security alliance." Accordingly, the two countries decided to define the bilateral relationship as "partnership of friendship and cooperation for peace and development." As the Declaration forecasts, the deepening of cooperative relations and the easing of conflicts between China and Japan will have positive effects on the security on the Korean peninsula. Yet there remain numerous threats to cooperative bilateral relations. These include territorial disputes involving the Senkakus, the Taiwan issue, and competition to reinforce naval capabilities aimed at securing sea lanes in the South and East China Seas. What concerns China most is that if conservatives and extreme rightists took power, Japan might once again become a military power and militarism could resurface in Japan. In 1984, in an effort to dispel China's concern over possible resurgence of militarism in Japan, then Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone asserted in a speech at Beijing University that Japan would by no means allow restoration of militarism. The "militarism," Nakasone mentioned, championed by the Japanese military during the World War II. Unlike the past, it is almost impossible for the Japanese military to turn back the clock and formulate national policies under the current political system, even if the external and internal situations worsen. However, if the concept of "militarism" is interpreted differently in the modern society to mean regional hegemony that focuses on advancing national interests even by triggering regional disputes, a different conclusion may be drawn. If this is the case, Japanese political leaders should endeavor to carry out Nakasone's promise. The issue here includes both the dismantlement of the firm stance that Japan is not pursuing military power, and not strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance. Many Japanese scholars, however, have agreed that the U.S.-Japan alliance has been and will be the cornerstone for continued development and prosperity so far, as well as to national security and peace in the future. Japan upholds "freedom," "democracy" and the "U.S-Japan alliance" as the grand prerequisites for the 21st century, and that the unraveling of the U.S.-Japan alliance would undermine peace and security of Japan. Japanese history in the 20th century is a useful guide for us to understand Japan's reliance on the U.S-Japan alliance. During the last hundred years, Japan was secure and at peace only during the two decades during which it maintained alliance with England and for the five decades during which it had an alliance with the U.S. In this vein, the current U.S.-Japan alliance is, they claim, the only way to ensure Japan's peace and security. Nevertheless, this argument does not necessarily mean that Japan's military capacity and defense capabilities are insufficient to safeguard its security. Japan's history gives credence to the idea that whenever Japan was capable of defending its security independently it was difficult to predict the direction of Japanese military objectives. Therefore, the maintenance of the U.S.-Japan alliance is the best way to block internal demands for armament of Japan. There is a consensus among Japan watchers that dissolution of the U.S.-Japan alliance will trigger Japan to arm itself even with nuclear weapons to become a military power. It already has the economic and technical ability to do so, and it has past experience. Therefore, for the sake of peace on the Korean peninsula, Japan must continue to depend on its military alliance with the U.S. In the meantime, another factor that should be taken into account in predicting whether Japan will become a military power is the progress in the revision of the Japanese Constitution. The current Japanese Constitution stipulates the principles of defense only and the ban on collective self-defense, the two major pillars for Japan's defense policy. Based on the present constitution, in 1967, the Japanese cabinet decided a ban on manufacture, possession, and import of nuclear weapons. In 1967, it also banned the overseas dispatch of self defense forces, introduction of conscription to military service and possession of weapons capable of attacking other nations. However, conservatives in Japan have continued to call for the revision of the constitution since the early 1950s. The following are the two grounds for their argument: First, the constitution was forcibly drawn up by the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers rather than by the Japanese. Second, the present constitution is insufficient to safeguard security of Japan as an independent, sovereign nation. To date, the conservative forces in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party have consistently demanded amendment of the constitution. Even public opinion has backed the argument since the 1990s, as a result of the growing consensus on the need to reflect the shift both in the international order and in Japanese society. Recently, the revision of the constitution is a fait accompli. A Succesful constitutional revision reqires proposals by 2/3 of the upper and lower house of the Diet registered and then approval by more than half of the voters in a referendum. The conservative Liberal Democratic Party, the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party are in favor of the revision of the constituton while the New Komeito Kaikaku Club of the colition supports discussion on the possible revision. Also, 70% of the major opposition Democratic Party headed by Hatoyama Yukio is known to be supportive of the revision. While the japan Communist Party and Social Democratic Party object to any constitutional revisions, they represent only 8.2% and 13.9% of both the houses, respectively. Therefore, if the parties, which support the revision, and at least discussion on the revision, should reach agreement to amend the constitution, it is only a matter of time the revision of the constitution is proposed in the Diet. There is no justification for neighboring countries to intervene in the process of the revision of the constitution for Japan since it is a matter of sovereignty. Nevertheless, neighboring countries have good reson to feel uncomfortable about the revision for the pacifist Constitution; a constitution that represents Japan's intention to rid itself of its imperialist legacy. For China, its national priority for the 21st
century is to achieve sustained economic growth. To this end, it is
significant for China to establish cooperative relations with Japan given
that Japan is China's largest trading partner from which it can expect
capital investment and technology assistance. Having a population of
nearly 1.3 billion and enormous territory, China needs to stabilize its
politics and society if it is to make any economic progress. Like most of
the industrialized countries, China stands to undergo transformation in
the social and national structure when its economic development reaches a
certain level. It is difficult to predict whether Beijing will embrace
democracy or maintain the current system when it reaches that point. Nor
can we foresee the direction of China's foreign policy should that occur.
What we can expect at this moment is that rapid economic growth in China
will deepen its dependency on foreign countries, affecting the secutiety
environment for neighboring countries both positively and negatively. The
positive aspect in all of this is that increased economic cooperation and
contacts with neighboring nations will contribute to improving relations
with them. The negative side, however, is that frictions might take place
concerning resources needed for China's economic development. China, being
an oil importer, has set as one of its national goals the exploration of
oil wells to secure its needed oil resources. In the case of future
territorial disputes with neighboring nations, China might resort to
force. Furthermore, China will inevitably seek sea lanes for the
transportation of resources thus saddling some neighboring countries with
the burden of sharing the sea routes with them, which, in the process,
might pose a threat to their national security. CONCLUSION: The buffering role of USFK
In the wake of the Pyongyang summit, reconciliation and cooperation between North and South Korea have been expedited. With the proliferation of the perception that a United Korea can be realized in the near future, some cite the need to withdraw of U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK), calling it, a vestige of the Cold War. Their argument is that since the purpose of the USFK is to deter North Korean invasion, the forces should, as a matter of course, leave the ROK when reunification is realized. However, from the U.S. military and strategic perspective, the role of the USFK has not been confined to the prevention of internal conflicts on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Rather, the USFK has been playing a role to prevent Japan from becoming a military power. In addition to deterring a North Korean invasion and suppressing Japan's military, there are also other significant viewpoints regarding the USFK being presence in the ROK. First, China acknowledges that the USFK put a lid on possible North-South conflict, thereby ensuring stability on the Korean Peninsula. This, in turn, stabilizes the situation in the region which is essential to the sustained economic growth of China. Second, Japan also acknowledges that the USFK has primarily been deterrent against North Korean invasion of South Korea, and has contributed to the enhancement of democracy and capitalism in the ROK. In addition, Japan also recognizes that the stable development of the ROK also protects Japan from the threats posed by socialism, while enabling Japan to continue its economic development and ensure national security. It is undisputed that it is the U.S.-Japan alliance which fundamentally safeguards security and peace in Japan. Against this background, should the confrontation between South and North Korea be replaced with peaceful and coexistence, the Japanese viewpoint on the Korean peninsula will undoubtedly change. Among other things, Japan is worried about a possible joint policy action by the two Koreas toward Japan. Strong anti-Japanese sentiment still lingers on the Korean peninsula. Also the territorial dispute surrounding the Tokdo Island remains unsolved, putting Japan in a rather awkward position in establishing relations with the Koreas. It is in this regard that Japan wants the USFK to continue to remain on the Korean peninsula even after unification, for Japan believes that the USFK will be able to prevent a United Korea from adopting a hostile policy toward it. Third, the role of the USFK can have the same implications for Sino-Japan relations as for ROK-Japan relations. Should the Sino-Japan relations worsen, the Korean peninsula with USFK stationing would serve as a buffer zone between China and Japan. Fourth, this perspective of Japan on the USFK implies a great deal for the national interest of China. As China is mustering all its resources to develop its economy, the last thing it wants is for Japan to seek military superiority. Understandably, China would not want to be involved in an arms race with Japan at a time when it should concentrate on its economic development. To ensure continued economic progress, China desperately needs capital inflow and technology from Japan. Under this circumstance, a new arms race between China and Japan would hamper China's economic development. In actuality, a blow to the economic advancement would be far more detrimental to Chinese political leaders than the burden imposed by an arms race itself. In this light, if relations between Japan and the two Koreas and between Japan and China sour, the presence of the USFK would essentially negate Japan's argument for an arms build-up. To sum up, the continued presence of the USFK will not only keep Japan from reinforcing its military capabilities but also lessen the possibility of potential conflicts between China and Japan, while expediting China's economic advancement. In this vein, the role of the USFK should be considered in a broader context than the prevention of South-North conflicts. Thus, the argument that the USFK will not be needed any more once the Cold War architecture on the Korean peninsula collapses, lacks prudence. It is far from an easy task to forecast
developments in the relations between Korea and its neighboring nations.
What is certain is that with increased economic and human exchanges among
them, geo-politics on the Korean peninsula have seeds of conflict, as
evidenced by its past history. In this regard, it is assessed that the
USFK plays the role of preventing a military build-up and conflicts among
the countries in the region. The best way to put a brake on Japan's
potential pursuit of becoming a military power, the biggest menace to the
Korean peninsula, is to solidify the U.S.-Japan alliance and continue the
presence of the USFK. It is expected that Japan will revise its
constitution, reshaping the state management system and the Self-Defense
Forces for the 21st century. China will witness the political and social
destabilizing factors grow in proportion to its economic development for
some time. Establishing a system for peace and co-existence on the Korean
peninsula has been a five-decade-long aspiration of the Korean people. The
very new structure should, therefore, not be the source of new frictions
among neighboring countries. The withdrawal of the USFK is highly likely
to trigger factions. In this sense, the USFK needs to stay on the Korean
peninsula even after unification because it will establish the peninsula
as a buffer zone rather than a military flashpoint, and will prevent any
security dilemma in Northeast Asia. 1) Japan Defense Agency, Japan's Defense Almanac,
1999. 2) Japan Defense Agency, Japan's Defense White Paper, 2000. |