|
Volume 12 Number 3 Automn 2000 The Russia-North Korea Summit and
Beyond: Ko Jae-nam Preface The historic Inter-Korean Summit, held in Pyongyang, was the first of its kind since the division of the Korean peninsula 55 years ago. It did not result in mere formalities and exchanges of views, rather, it resulted in the five-point "Joint Declaration." Furthermore, it has led to tangible progress, for instance, regarding the reunion of separated families and the restoring the Kyongui railway line, an artery linking Seoul to Shinuiju in North Korea. The inter-Korean summit has had a substantial influence not only in terms of the domestic situations of the two Koreas but also of Northeast Asia at large. While South and North Korea hold responsibility for establishing a lasting peace on the Korean peninsula and achieving reunification, given the geo-political and geo-economic aspects in this region, those goals are greatly influenced by the four major powers, namely the U.S., Japan, China and Russia in their policies not only toward North Korea but relations between one another. The four major powers initially expressed the view that the June Inter-Korean Summit would bring stability and peace to Korea and contribute to the prosperity of the Korean people. Yet, they are also concerned with assessing their own national interests regarding its outcome. In recent years, Russia has been stymied by its failure to properly cope with the changes unfolding in Northeast Asia, including the Korean peninsula, unwilling to and was consequently alienated from dealing in issues involving the Korean peninsula and North Korea's suspected nuclear ambitions. However, since the mid-1990s, Moscow has been trying hard to regain its traditional influence in Northeast Asia and the Korean peninsula by seeking ways to reinforce its balanced policies toward the two Koreas while at the same time striving to mend relations with Beijing, Washington and Tokyo. Having completed political transition through the
general elections held last December and the presidential election in
March this year, Russia laid a firm foundation toward normalizing its
internal problems. This in itself is significant as Russia is considered
to have secured a foothold in increasing its international influence.
President Vladimir Putin is committed to rebuilding a powerful Russia and
to recovering its status as a major force in the international arena.
Against this backdrop, much attention is being focused on how the launch
of the Putin administration will affect Russia's policy toward the Korean
peninsula. Russia's standpoint on the inter-Korean summit Active Support for the Inter-Korean
Summit Russia has lent its full support to the inter-Korean summit, nothing that its success would not only improve the two Koreas' relations but would also act as a cornerstone for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and the ultimate goal of peaceful reunification. President Putin said in a phone conversation with President Kim Dae-jung on April 28, "Russia has been backing inter-Korean dialogue and will continue to do so. I hope that the planned summit with North Korea will be a success." Russian Ambassador to South Korea Yevgeny Afanasiev said that "Russia hopes the two Koreas will continue summit talks even after the June summit and we will actively support the two Koreas so as to expedite peace and increase cooperation. We also believe the summit will present an opportunity for the two sides to narrow their differences, and build mutual trust, while reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula." Russia's whole-heated support for the inter-Korean
summit stems from the fact that plans for the summit were reached by the
two Koreas alone without any external influences, especially from the U.S.
and Japan. This is in contrast to the scheduled Inter-Korean Summit talks
of August 1994 which abandoned with the sudden death of North Korean
leader Kim Il-sung. Since then the South has maintained close cooperation
with the U.S. and Japan in devising and implementing its North Korea
policy, believing that cooperation with the four major powers is
imperative for dismantling the lingering Cold War structure and advancing
the reunification process. The two Koreas independently deciding to hold
the June summit, however, is seen as giving Russia some part in the summit
meeting. Russia would not want to pass up the opportunity to boost its
influence in the region by capitalizing on the summit, as it believes it
would have a profound impact on the political landscape on the Korean
peninsula and beyond. As part of that strategy, President Putin made a
rare visit to North Korea on July 19, the first by a Russian leader or
Soviet leader. The Background of Russia's Support for the
Inter-Korean Summit
Russia's active support for the Korean summit is in line with its long-standing policy toward the Korean peninsula, emphasizing the maintenance of stability on the peninsula and its vested rights. Traditionally, Russia's policy toward Korean peninsula has been centered around "maintaining a nuclear-free Korean peninsula," "maintaining peace and stability by resolving military and political confrontation," "establishing reciprocal economic relations with South and North Korea" and "maintaining the power balance with the three major powers surrounding the Korean peninsula." Based on this foundation, Moscow has worked to maximize its national interests in the region through promoting its equidistant policy toward both Koreas while maintaining the balance of power with the U.S., Japan, and China. The contents of the "Five-point Joint Declaration" in general corresponds with Russia's policy toward the pending issues regarding the Korean peninsula, reflecting Russia's positive view on the inter-Korean talks and its outcome. In other words, Russia has adhered to the stance that outside forces should not actively intervene in the two Koreas' unification process, while it hopes for more robust inter-Korean dialogue. Russia is also preparing itself for an era of a unified Korea. Russia believes that a unified Korea will not be a hostile entity toward it but rather will promote its national interests. There are two focal points to Russia's perception of a unified Korea. First, a unified Korea might emerge as a political stronghold, becoming a major partner with Russia to counter the regional hegemony of China and Japan. Second, a unified Korea might transform itself to become an economic powerhouse, positively affecting Russia's bid to develop the Far East and Siberia and to advance into the Asia Pacific markets. Russia envisions a gradual and peaceful unification through dialogue and cooperation between the two Koreas. Russia considers that the emergence of a unified Korea is a safe bet, a realistic outcome for which it has been drawing up counter-measures. First of all, Russia perceives the need to enhance the similarities of the political and economic systems with a unified Korea, expanding the scope of cooperation to all fields. In addition, Russia expects that a unified Korea will become more independent from the U.S. influence in its diplomacy, which will in turn deepen and expand the cooperative relations between Russia and a unified Korea. Based on this observation, Russia does not want to be involved in the process of reunifying the two Koreas. Yet, Russia has also made it clear that it would have no choice but to intervene in matters if and when the other three major nations become involved. This perception of Russia is reflected in its position on the establishment of a peace regime on the peninsula. Russia has persistently adhered to its stance that the establishment of a peace structure is inherently of a military and security nature which is closely linked with security affairs in Northeast Asia and that it should be handled by a multilateral international conference. Therefore, Russia has been deeply disgruntled by its exclusion from the four-party peace talks. Although Russia has eased its stance somewhat after being persuaded by the South government that issues on the Korean peninsula should be resolved by the parties concerned, it still sticks to the multilateral approach in which Russia hopes to play a specific role. In the South-Russia summit held at the end of May last year in Moscow, President Kim Dae-jung agreed to expand bilateral cooperation, recognizing that Russia could play a role in Northeast Asia. This agreement was in line with the "principle of guaranteeing engagement by the four nations" for stability and peace on the peninsula which President Kim has upheld since the early 1970s. As for North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and missiles, Russia has proposed an eight-party dialogue while supporting the international community's efforts to deter North Korea from pursuing its nuclear ambitions. Specifically, Russia argues that "the missile program of a nation should not threaten other nations or stimulate an arms race," asserting that North Korea's missile issue makes the establishment of a multilateral security consultative body in Northeast Asia. In particular, Russia believes that the North's development of nuclear weapons and medium-and long-range missiles will stimulate the U.S. to build and deploy the Theater Missile Defense systems (TMD), while further destabilizing Northeast Asia and triggering an arms race in the region. Meanwhile, opposing the development and deployment of the TMD, Moscow is resorting to diplomatic channels in a bid to deter North Korea from continuing its missile development. According to a Russian media report, North Korea was ready for a missile test-launch to celebrate the birthday of Kim Jong-il on February 16, but it aborted its plans at the request of Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov who visited the country for the signing of a new treaty. Russia believes that an isolated North Korea will not in the least contribute to ensuring peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. In this context, Moscow is fully backing normalization of relations between North Korea and the U.S. and between North Korea and Japan so that the North may soon gain recognition from the four major powers, and actively supporting the North's efforts to join international organizations. In the past, Russia has felt that the U.S. forces
in the South have contributed to peace and stability of the Korean
peninsula and to the balance of power in Northeast Asia by curbing North
Korea's military provocation and reducing the arms race between China and
Japan. Recently, however, as NATO has expanded its influence over some
East European countries, South Korea-U.S.-Japan alliance is increasingly
being viewed as a military bloc against Russia much like NATO, which was
founded to keep Russia in check. As a result, Russia is somewhat negative
toward the issue of maintaining U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula even
after reunification. The background and
implications of Background From July 19-20, Russian President Putin made a state visit to North Korea for the first time as a Russian leader since the collapse of the Soviet Union. President Putin and North Korean leader Kim held two rounds of summit talks which ended by adopting an 11-point joint declaration on domestic and international issues of mutual concern. Putin's summit diplomacy in Northeast Asia was focused not only on normalization of the Russia-North Korea relations and the annual Russia-China summit, but also in anticipation of the immediate implications on the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia and the wider global repercussions. From an international perspective, Putin visited China and North Korea ahead of a summit of the eight industrialized nations, or G-8 Summit held in Okinawa, Japan, on July 21-23, using it as a stepping stone to further consolidate Russia's position. Putin's trip to China and North Korea was prompted by the need to raise special attention toward the U.S. development of its National Missile Defense System (NMD), a global security issue spurred by North Korea's missile development. Russia also needed to solidify its position by taking the lead in the joint action by Russia, China and North Korea against the NMD. Another reason dates back to the administration of a predecessor. Russia began participating in the G-8 summits in 1997 when U.S. President Clinton invited former Russian President Yeltsin to the G-7 Meeting held in Denver, Colorado, in order to appease the leader who so strongly opposed NATO expansion. Until then, Russia had not been a major player in the G-7 Summit whose agenda was mainly economic. Consequently, the Summit has been held in two separate sessions, the G-7 Economic Meetings and G-8 summits for political matters, with Russia participating only in the latter because of its limited economic power. (The Russian economy accounts for 0.6% of the world economy while the seven countries combined takes up 60%.) Putin finds this summit format unacceptable, as he is pursuing a state policy to rebuild a powerful Russia. Putin successfully rallied the support of China and North Korea for Russia's primary concerns, including creating a multi-polar global order, opposing the amendment of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and the development of the NMD/TMD and the new strategy concept of NATO, and finally expanding the role of the United Nations. And this was well reflected in the Russia-China and Russia-North Korea joint declarations. In the context of Northeast Asia politics, Russia judged that the U.S., China and Japan were moving quickly to maximize their national interests in the rapidly changing post-inter-Korean summit environment. Russia felt a sense of urgency that its national interests, particularly in the areas of diplomacy and security, not to mention economy and trade in Northeast Asia, would be considerably undermined if Russia failed to keep up with the changes unfolding on the Korean peninsula. This assesment was the backdrop for Putin's visit to North Korea aimed at raking in maximum benefits for Russia's diplomacy, security and economy. Exclusion from the four-party talks initiated to resolve North Korea's nuclear issues was a clear signal that Russia had lost most of its clout over the Korean peninsula where it had long exerted an influence. This was largely due to its diminished national power following a decade of economic difficulties. As a result, with the order in Northeast Asia being dictated by the U.S., China and Japan, Russia has been completely marginalized with no say on the issues pertaining to the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia. In its bilateral relations with North Korea, Russia judged that strained relations with North Korea were in no way beneficial to enhancing the national interests of both countries. In particular, it recognized that it was a matter of urgency to recover and further strengthen its influence over the Korean peninsula issues in order to ultimately expand its role in Northeast Asia. Therefore, Russia set out to improve its relations with North Korea from the beginning of this year. As part of his efforts, Putin sent Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to Pyongyang last February for the signing of the Russia-North Korea Treaty of "Triendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation" which had been initialed in March last year. The Putin administration's interest in the Korean
peninsula is evidenced by the "Russian Federation's diplomatic policy
concept" which was newly adopted at the end of June, this year. The first
diplomatic and security policy adopted since the collapse of the Soviet
Union, it features the equal participation of Northeast Asian nations in
the process of addressing the Korean peninsula issues and a balanced
policy toward North and South Korea. Implications of Putin's visit to North
Korea Putin's recent visit to North Korea served as an opportunity to end the abnormal and estranged bilateral relations of the last ten years while restoring the relationship marked by "friendship, good neighborliness and cooperation." The meeting of the two leaders of Russia and North Korea laid the foundation for expanding cooperation between the two Koreas and increasing Russia's influence over the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia. North Korea has made vigorous efforts to improve its relations with foreign countries in the past two years in order to overcome the economic crisis and to pull itself out of isolation in the international community. Notably, National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il greatly promoted his image as the leader of the nation by successfully holding the summit talks with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, South Korea President Kim Dae-jung and Russian President Vladimir Putin. In the context of Northeast Asia politics, Putin's
successful summit diplomacy with China and North Korea greatly
strengthened Russia's position in the region, raising the possibility that
Russia would be included in the regional power struggle over the Korean
peninsula again ending the three-way dominance by the U.S., China and
Japan. In addition, Russia opened the possibility that it would play a
moderating role between China and the U.S. and between the two Koreas. The
strengthened position of Russia will potentially accelerate negotiations
between the U.S. and North Korea and between Japan and North Korea for
normalization of their relations. Outlook for Relations between
Russia Maintaining Close Cooperation in Terms of
International Security
Through a joint declaration adopted after the July summit, Russia and North Korea declared establishment of multilateral international order, observance of principles set forth in the U.N. Charter and exclusion of interference on the humanitarian grounds, while agreeing to cooperate with each other to maintain independence and territorial integrity. In addition, the two countries, also through the joint declaration, stressed the need to abide by the ABM treaty, the cornerstone of strategic and regional stability, while calling for speedy implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II and early signing of the START III. In the meantime, Moscow and Pyongyang expressed their opinions that it was not desirable to modify the ABM treaty to develop and deploy the NMD, although they did not explicitly point to the U.S. They also opposed the development and deployment of the TMD which may pose a grave threat to regional stability and security. This demonstrates that the two countries are likely to cooperate closely in their endeavor to deter the U.S. from modifying the ABM treaty and its development and deployment of the NMD, and to block the TMD scheme being jointly researched and developed by the U.S. and Japan. Meanwhile, Russian President Putin succeeded in
persuading North Korea's National Defense Commission Chairman, Kim
Jong-il, to accept a conditional moratorium on another missile launch.
Although the truth has yet to be confirmed, Kim Jong-il allegedly said to
Putin that North Korea may abandon its missile program if a third country
such as the U.S. or Russia cooperates in its efforts to use missile
development for peaceful purposes, including launching satellites for
space exploration. Expanding Limited Bilateral Military and
Security Cooperation
Moscow and Pyongyang reaffirmed their close security cooperation by repeating the phrase of the Russia-North Korea Friendship, Good neighborliness and Cooperation Treaty that if one signatory is exposed to threat of invasion or if circumstances threatening its peace and safety arise, it would make immediate contact with the other signatory. The treaty was signed between Moscow and Pyongyang on February 9, 2000 and ratified by Russian and North Korean parliaments on July 19 and April 6 respectively. Military and security cooperation between the two
countries is likely to be significantly affected by how inter-Korean
relations unfold in the future. However, both countries are poised to
forge a military and security partnership, albeit at a limited level,
given the fact that the North Korean weapons system depends on Russia and
that North Korea has failed to procure Russian supplies and modernize its
weapons over the past years due to the estranged relations. In fact,
during President Putin's visit to Pyongyang, the reclusive country
allegedly proposed bilateral military cooperation measures, including that
Russia provide North Korea with 100 armored vehicles, MIG fighters and
equipment parts for ground operations. Maintaining Cooperation to Achieve
Independent Unification of the Korean Peninsula
In the Joint Declaration adopted by Russia and North Korea, Russian President Putin welcomed the principle of independent unification set forth at the June 15 South-North Joint Declaration and made it clear that external intervention should be ruled out in the process of unification on the Korean peninsula. This can be construed as meaning that if the three powers surrounding the Korean peninsula were to intervene in the unification process, Russia would also follow suit. Moscow has consistently supported the principle that reunification of the Korean Peninsula should be pursued by the two Koreas and reaffirmed such a position in the Russia-North Korea joint declaration. Therefore, Russia is expected to actively support the two Koreas' efforts to achieve independent unification unless it judges that a unified Korea would take a belligerent attitude toward it.
Expanding Cooperation in the Field of
Economy, Science and Technology
In the Russia-North Korea joint declaration, the two leaders agreed to take steps to expand economic cooperation. More specifically, the two countries reached an agreement to cooperate in such areas as production, energy, transportation, forestry, crude oil, gas and light industries as well as to work together to rebuild industrial facilities jointly constructed by the two nations. Considering the two countries' lack of capital, little progress is likely to be made in pursing bilateral economic cooperation between Russia and North Korea unless South Korea participates in the bilateral economic cooperation projects. It is notable that President Putin is reviewing the possibility that Russia, in cooperation with South Korea and Japan, will modernize 70 North Korean companies built by the old Soviet Union, which are presently idle. Ultimately, Russia and North Korea are expected to
vigorously promote "trilateral economic cooperation" which combines
Russia's raw materials and technology, North Korea's labor force and
facilities and South Korea's capital and market demand. Implications of the
Russia-North Korea Summit
Implications of the summit regarding inter-Korean
relations A. Positive Aspects In their new friendship treaty and the joint declaration, Russia and North Korea stipulate that the two countries come up with countermeasures through immediate contacts in case one country is exposed to security threats such as invasion by other countries. Nevertheless, the normalization of relations between Moscow and Pyongyang may increase the possibility of a positive impact on stability, peace and peaceful reunification on the Korean peninsula. Until now, Russia has maintained similar positions with South Korea on issues regarding the Korean peninsula, including inter-Korean dialogues, reunification of the two Koreas, establishing peace by dismantling the Cold War structure on the Korean Peninsula, weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons and missiles and the Kim Dae-jung government's engagement policy toward Pyongyang. Furthermore, North Korea's recent policy improving inter-Korean relations, evidenced by its acceptance of the South-North summit, is narrowing the difference between Moscow and Pyongyang on issues regarding the Korean peninsula. The North's change in attitude is also bridging the gap between Russia, South and North Koreas on Korean affairs, while acting as a catalyst to expand trilateral cooperation aimed at ensuring stability, peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula. Moreover, Russia's pressure on the North to freeze its missile program, aimed at deterring the U.S. from developing and deploying the NMD, will either dampen Pyongyang's ambitions to develop missiles or heighten the possibility of a peaceful and diplomatic resolution of the missile issue. In addition, normalization of Russia-North Korea relations is expected to expand and deepen bilateral cooperation overall. Combined with South Korea's policy towards Russia, characterized by its efforts to develop a constructive and mutually complementary partnership with Russia, and Seoul's North Korea policy, aimed at improvement of inter-Korean relations through establishment of inter-Korean economic cooperative body, such developments are assessed to contribute not only to bilateral relations between Moscow and Pyongyang, but also to trilateral cooperation among the three countries. Russia has a keen interest in connecting the Trans-Siberia Railway with inter-Korean railways and in building a pipeline through North Korea for deliveries of Siberian gas such as Irkutsk gas to South Korea. On July 19, in his first round of meeting in Pyongyang with his North Korean counterpart, Kim Jong-il, Russia President Putin proposed to link the Trans-Siberia Railroad with the Korean railway network. The linkage between the Trans-Siberia Railroad and
the Korean railway will definitely lead to vigorous advance into North
Korea by South Korea and Russia and greatly help North Korea recover its
shattered economy. Economic cooperation between the two Koreas and Russia
will contribute not only to joint advance into the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) by two Koreas, but also to developing the Korean
peninsula into a logistics hub of Northeast Asia. B. Negative aspects Normalization of Russia-North Korea relations is
not likely to have much negative impact. However, the article set forth in
the new friendship treaty and the joint declaration, which reads "if
either Russia or North Korea is exposed to security threats, the two
nations will make immediate contacts," harbors a possibility of aggravated
inter-Korean relations following worsening of U.S.-Russia relations and
U.S.-North Korea relations. In the long term, it may have a negative
impact on stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore,
Moscow, which is discontent with the progress of the past Russia-South
Korea relations, may use the normalization ofrelations between Moscow and
Pyongyang and the bilateral military and security cooperation as a
leverage to increase its influence over South Korea. Implications over the Situation in Northeast Asia
A. Fiercer competition to expand influence among four neighboring powers surrounding the Korean Peninsula With the emergence of trilateral cooperative regime
following Putin's visits to China and North Korea, there is concern that
regional order in Northeast Asia may develop into a new Cold War structure
bipolarized by Russia-China-North Korea vs. the U.S.-Japan-South Korea.
Although such a concern has some grounds, the emergence of a new Cold War
structure producing acute confrontation and conflict in the region is
unlikely. Russia and China hope that North Korea's missile issue will be
resolved and will resulted in the suspension of the NMD and TMD schemes of
the U.S. Moreover, Russia, China and North Korea feel the urgent need for
economic cooperation with Western countries, particularly with the U.S.
However, if the U.S. presses ahead with the development of the NMD and the
TMD despite opposition from Russia and China, it will certainly aggravate
relations between the U.S.-Japan and Russia-China as well as create a
negative impact on stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula and
Northeast Asia. Also, Russia's expanded influence not only on the Korean
Peninsula but also in Northeast Asia, enhanced by improved relations with
North Korea will serve as an opportunity to develop the existing
trilateral power struggle among the U.S., China and Japan in the region
into a quadrilateral race, as Russia joins the structure. B. Contributing to stability on the Korean
Peninsula and in Northeast Asia by resolving North Korea's missile issue
As Russia's influence on North Korea has increased with normalization of the bilateral relations, Moscow's mediating role in resolving Pyongyang's missile issue has expanded. That aim, to deter the U.S. from developing the NMD, has emerged as a key security concern on both the regional and global levels. Moscow's expanded role is likely to have a positive effect on North Korea's scrapping its missile program, which will lead to Pyongyang's greatly improved relations with the U.S. and Japan as well as Pyongyang's improved ties with Russia and China. Such developments will greatly contribute to the recognition of the two Koreas by the four powers surrounding the Korean Peninsula and the disintegration of the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula. However, if relations among the four powers sour over their disagreements on regional or global issues such as the North's missile development, the U.S. NMD scheme, development and deployment of the TMD by the U.S. and Japan, and Cross-straits issue, it may cause instability on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia.
Conclusion The future direction of the relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang following the inter-Korean summit will depend on North Korea's policy towards South Korea and its policy direction on key Korean issues. Substantial improvement in bilateral ties between Moscow and Pyongyang is limited, unless the North initiates a dramatic change on key Korean issues, and furthermore since Russia's existing policy objectives on the Korean peninsula and its position on key Korean issues are expected to remain mostly unchanged under the Putin government. While it was part of the North's changed tactics aimed at overcoming its dire economic difficulties and bringing itself out of international isolation, Pyongyang's agreement to hold the Inter-Korean Summit demonstrates that its position on major Korean issues is showing signs of gradual change. The North's changed attitude will bring about improved relations not only between the two Koreas, but also between Russia and North Korea. With President Putin's visit to Pyongyang and the signing of a friendship treaty replacing the 1961 military alliance pact between the two countries, Russia has normalized its relations with Pyongyang, which have floundered since the fall of the Soviet Union, Moscow-Pyongyang relations are not likely to improve dramatically, given the two countries dire economic crises, the widening gap between the two nations' political and economic systems, North Korea's priority on improving relations with the West and Russia's inevitable choice to keep closer ties with South Korea. However, bilateral relations will be better than in the past, thanks to several reasons: Putin government's active engagement policy on the Korean Peninsula, NATO expansion, U.S. air strikes against Iraq and North Korea's subsequent increased fear of threat from the U.S., disagreement between the U.S. and North Korea on issues such as missile development, U.S.- Japan plan to develop and deploy TMD and Kim Jong-il's keen interest in restoring ties with Russia. If inter-Korean relations make substantial progress upon implementation of agreements reached at the inter-Korean summit, it will result in improved Moscow-Pyongyang relations both in scope and depth. In conclusion, the inter-Korean summit indicates North Korea's changed attitude toward Korean peninsula issues, including South Korean President Kim Dae-jung's engagement policy toward the North. It will serve to narrow the differences in opinion between Russia and North Korea over major Korean issues. As Russia's active support for President Kim Dae-jung's engagement policy indicates, Russian policy on the Korean peninsula is almost identical with that of the South Korean government. In this vein, Pyongyang's changed attitude and subsequent improvement of relations between Moscow and Pyongyang will have a positive impact on stability on the Korean peninsula and creation of an atmosphere conducive to peaceful unification of the two Koreas. What is notable, however, is that the Putin government's Korea policy will rely on the broader framework of Russia's global strategy and Northeast Asia policy, rather than the bilateral dimensions of Russia's relations with the two Koreas. Therefore, unless Russia-U.S. relations worsen, Russia's Korea policy is not likely to undergo substantial changes. In other words, in a bid to restore its traditional influence over the Korean peninsula, the Putin government will stick to the past years' policy line: support for stability on the Korean peninsula, peaceful reunification of the two Koreas through inter-Korean dialogue, establishment of peaceful regime on the Korean peninsula through multilateral security dialogue and expansion of reciprocal economic cooperation. Yet, it is worth mentioning that Russia is highly likely to adopt a Korea policy that emphasizes practical and substantial cooperation rather than cause and rhetoric, since Russia pointed out that over the past ten years, practical cooperation between Russia and South Korea was much to be desired considering bilateral potential for further cooperation. |