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Volume 12 Number 3 Automn 2000 After the Korean
Summit: Chang Noh-soon Introduction
The historic Korean summit was a hot issue covered by the news media around the world. Indeed, the unexpected hospitality of North Korea's National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il's attitude has brightened the future of inter-Korean relations. The inter-Korean summit has opened new avenues to establishing the groundwork for peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula through reconciliation and cooperation. The summit presents significant political and diplomatic implications: First of all, the summit has spurred full-fledged inter-governmental dialogues for the reconciliation and cooperation between the two Koreas. Second, South Korea came stepped forword to take the initiative on the issues of the Korean peninsula among the concerned parties. Third, the two Koreas achieved success in the summit talks, without any direct help or intervention of the great powers surrounding the Korean peninsula, and as a result, the summit validated the Kim Dae-jung administration's engagement policy toward the North. Finally, in accepting the summit proposal by the South, North Korea appears to have shifted its foreign policy from one of "Tongme Bongnam-containing South Korea through the cooperation with the U.S.," to a policy of omnidirectional. While the two Koreas clearly have a direct interest in dismantling the Cold-War structure on the Korean peninsula, those interests are also shared by the United States, China, Japan and other countries.1) The inter-Korean relations after the summit will be changed dramatically, since the change will be greatly affected by the interests of the concerned countries, which consider structural changes on the peninsula as a good chance to extend their influence on each other. Thus, in order to develop the present inter-Korean cooperative mood, it is vital to completely understand the whole situation surrounding the Korean peninsula after the summit. Consequently, the true outcome of the summit will determine future inter-Korean diplomatic efforts. After the summit, the possibility shouldn't be overlooked that the complicated situation surrounding the Korean peninsula could negatively impact inter-Korean relations. Currently, there are doubts as to whether Chairman Kim Jong-il will change, and that is working against the South's engagement policy.2) The South Korean conservatives have often criticized the policy, based on the high cost of implementation compared to the meager benefits, and these criticisms will become more strident as implementation agreements proceed between the two leaders. Internationally, Seoul's North Korean policy may cause tension with its longtime allies, the United States and Japan. It is hardly expected that the policy goals and priorities of the United States coincide with those of South Korea, and the same can be said of Japan. The inter-Korean summit is an excellent opportunity
to change the destiny of the two Koreas, but it is a great challenge as
well. Henceforth, it is important to evaluate the summit as an opportunity
for easing tensions on the Korean peninsula, and to forsee possible
obstacles by evaluating the post-summit situation. First of all, it is
necessary to understand the backdrop of North Korea's acceptance of the
proposal for a summit. Background and Implications
of In the "Berlin Declaration" on March 2000, President Kim Dae-jung raised four issues: (a) dismantling of the Cold-War structure on the Korean peninsula and peaceful coexistence, (b) reunion of separated families between the two Koreas, (c) resumption of inter-governmental talks, and (d) recover of the impoverished North Korean economy through inter-Korean economic cooperation. Provided "the Joint Declation," North Korea seemed to evaluate the outcome of the summit talk proposed by the South. Currently, following four factors are considered key to the North's acceptance. The first factor is South Korea's engagement policy toward the North, the so-called "Sunshine Policy." The news media around the world reported that the engagement policy has greatly contributed to changing North Korea's attitude.3) In accordance with the engagement policy, Kim Dae-jung administration adhered to the principle of separating business from politics, in spite of the North's sporadic provocations which have increased tensions and instability on the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia, including the naval confrontation in the West Sea in 1999, the detention of a South Korean Mt. Kumgang tourist, and the North's submarine infiltration in 1998. Based on that principle, inter-Korean exchanges have increased remarkably. Between 1989 and 1997, South Korean visitors to the North amounted to 2,405, while the number rose to 3,317 in 1998, the first year of the Kim Dae-jung administration, and to 5,599 in 1999.4) The volume of inter-Korean trade in 1999 recorded 330 million dollars, even though there was a temporary decrease in 1998 due to the South's economic crisis. The Kim Dae-jung administration took a lesson from the failure of former President Kim Young-sam's policy toward the North. Specifically, inter-Korean relations deteriorated during the Kim Young-sam presidency, because of the inconsistent foreign policies toward the North, especially, the North Korea's nuclear crisis. Far too sensitive to domestic public opinion and to the political situation, the Kim Young-sam administration was inconsistent in its dealings with the North.5) On the contrary, the Kim Dae-jung administration has endeavored to resolve security, diplomatic, and economic inter-Korean issues comprehensively, consulting with the concerned countries including the United States and Japan. In addition, it has tried to create a positive enviornment, domestically and internationally, in order to dismantle the Cold-War structure on the Korean peninsula. The second factor regarding the North's acceptance of the summit could be its intention to secure economic assistance from the South. After all, the North's economic condition made it desperate for aid, especially since its political and economic systems were hardly attractive to foreign investors. Early in 2000, President Kim announced "the Berlin Declaration," clarifying the South's willingness to give economic aid to the North, and conveying its hopes for the North's participation in the international community. The Rajin-Sonbong free trade zone in the North has failed to line up to anticipations, such as attracting foreign investments. In addition, the inter-Korean economic trade and cooperation in private sectors have been exhausted. Since the two Koreas could not easily dismantle the long-lasting hostility and the North's institutions and laws failed guarantee the investments of South Korean companies, it was natural that other foreign companies as well as the South Korean companies would be reluctant to invest in or to trade with North Korea.6) Because of the economic conditions in the North, the South's economic aid and inter-Korean exchanges are very important to the North's survival. That is to say, without capital investment and technologies from South Korea, the North could never recover economically.7) Moreover, considering that South and North Korea were one nation and that one day, they will be unified, the North would not exclude the South as a trade partner. Moreover, South Korea must be an attractive trade partner to the North in that the two Koreas are geographically close, use the same language, and share very similar cultural backgrounds. Thirdly, North Korea seemed to have the intention to use the summit as a "diplomatic card" to put pressure on the United States. North Korea has failed to normalize the relationship with the United States, although the United States has partially lifted the economic sanctions on Pyongyang, still, it has not removed North Korea from the list of terrorist-sponsoring countries.8) Those issues had blocked direct talks between the United States and North Korea, and as a result, North Korea has used the threat of its nuclear development project to resume the talks. However, there has been no tangible progress in lifting economic sanctions.9) Meanwhile, former U.S. Defense Secretary William J. Perry presented a report regarding relations with Pyongyang. In it, Perry recommended that the U.S. government induce North Korea to open up and to stop the development of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD), guaranteeing the maintenance of the Kim Jong-il regime. However, lifting economic sanctions on Pyongyang has not been realized, because the U.S. has continued to add more preconditions. So, while North Korea has suspended test-launching of missiles since Washington's request, the U.S. has not lifted economic sanctions on Pyongyang. As Perry suggested, the United States has implemented a gradual approach in order to normalize its relationship with the North. The U.S. has set up a long-term goal to dismantle the Cold-War structure on the Korean peninsula, in cooperation with both Koreas and Japan. To accomplish the goal, however, Washington should, first of all, resolve the North's nuclear, missile, and WMD issues. In May 2000, soon after the announcement of the inter-Korean summit, the United States and North Korea met in Rome, and this culminated in the agreement on North Korea's suspension of missile development program and the United States' lifting of economic sanctions against Pyongyang. As a result of the summit, if the progress in the inter-Korean relations leads to improved relations between the U.S. and North Korea, the strategy of Pyongyang could be evaluated as successful. However, Pyongyang's intention is not clear. It could be that North Korea really wants to improve inter-Korean relations or it could simply mean that it used the summit to draw some concessions from the U.S., knowing that it was concerned about losing its influence on the Korean peninsula. Fourthly, the confidence of the Kim Jong-il regime
seems to have propelled it to open up to the outside world. In the
post-Cold War era, despite Russia and China establishing diplomatic ties
with South Korea, North Korea has been isolated from those traditionally
friendly countries, as well as from the international community. In
addition, North Korea has faced a severe food shortage due to agricultural
policy failures. As a result, North Korea now fears the collapse of its
regime,10) and has striven to develop nuclear weapons and missiles to
avert that collapse. Recently, North Korea is said to be recovering from
the dire effects of the food shortage and is making slow economic
progress, even though it is still recording minus-economic growth rates.
Thus, it seems that the Kim Jong-il regime is enjoying improved economic
conditions and the friendly international environment that was created by
the South's engagement policy.11)Kim Jong-il expressed a change in
attitude about the issues on the Korean peninsula, during a his short
visit to China in late May 2000. According to the several Chinese reports,
when he visited the most advanced information and communication technology
complex in China, he showed a deep interest in computer science and
praised the openness of Chinese society. North Korea has already
established or has tried to establish diplomatic relationships with Italy,
Australia, the Philippines and the European Union (EU), and in fact, it
became a formal member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) at the meeting
held in Bangkok in July 2000. In the ARF meeting, North Korean Foreign
Minister Paek Nam-soon, held talks with his South Korean counterpart, Lee
Joung-binn, and Madeleine Albright, the U.S. Secretary of State, a clear
sign that the North's foreign policy has changed. Issues After the
Summit The two Korean leaders reached a comprehensive
agreement, on the follwing five main points: (a) The two Korea's
autonomous efforts toward unification; (b) Ultimate unification based on
the common recognition of similarities in the two Korea's unification
formulae; (c) The quick resolution of issues regarding separated families
and long-term political prisoners; (d) The achievement of the balanced
economic development of the two Koreas through expanded economic exchanges
and cooperation, (e) The continuation of prompt dialogues and consultation
between the two governmental authorities for speedy implementation of the
agreement. These principles provide a framework for new inter-Korean
relations. To realize it, however, the two Koreas should continue
inter-governmental talks and the countries surrounding the Korean
peninsula must give support and cooperation to both Koreas. Inter-Korean Relations The Kim Dae-jung administration has consistently implemented the engagement policy, based on the principles of "separating business from politics" and "reciprocity" to promote inter-Korean relations.12) However, after the summit, the two Koreas should devote much effort to the following major issues. First, the South's economic aid to the North and inter-Korean economic cooperation should be discussed. The Kim Dae-jung administration considers inter-Korean economic cooperation as a key to tension reduction on the Korean peninsula,13) and, in fact, the Berlin Declaration, President Kim Dae-jung pronounced his willingness to help in the recovery of North Korea's economy. In response to that, Pyongyang accepted the proposal, because it knew it could get the necessary economic aid, without addressing the delicate issues. However, the principle of separating business from politics adopted by both Koreas can positively affect, such as that of separated families. Seoul can help the North through the inter-Korean economic cooperation, in comprehensive areas such as electricity, social overhead capital facilities (SOC), and agriculture. The electricity issue in particular should be resolved immediately, because the electrical supply in the North remains far below the minimum, resulting in a 30% cut in the workday. The South's stockpiled briquettes and its surplus electricity during the night-time hours could be delivered to the North, and it could also establish power plants in North Korea. In addition, the lack of paved roads, and a modrn railway system are considered obstacles to reviving the North's economy. In July, both sides agreed on reconstructing the Seoul-Shinuiju railway line, one of the most positive outcome of the inter-Korean cooperation. Secondly, the separated family issue should be resolved. In 1971, the first inter-Korean Red Cross talks for the reunion of separated families was held. And in subsequent talks in 1972, they agreed to follow through with the necessary information, such as the identifications of addresses and the fate of the families, letter exchanges, meetings, and reunions. However, this bore only meager results. Fourteen years later, in September 1985, groups of South Korean separated families and art performance groups, as well as North Korean groups, visited Pyongyang and Seoul respectively, but those visits would not expanded. Regretfully, the 1992 inter-Korean Basic Agreement regarding the resolution of the separated family issue was not enacted. Moreover, in 1998, even though the Kim Dae-jung administration proposed a discussion of the separated family issue linked with fertilizer aid to the North, North Korea refused. A recent public opinion poll in South Korea shows that most South Koreans think the reunion of separated families should be the first priority at the summit.14) According to a census in 1996, the first generation of separated families in the South totaled approximately 1.2 million, while the number, including second and third generations, reached 7.7 million.15) President Kim Dae-jung, in his inaugural address, said that the two Koreas should resolve the problem of separated families from the humanitarian point of view. Consequently, following the Joint Declaration, historic meetings of separated families were realized on the National Liberation Day, August 15, 2000. Now it is time for the both Koreas to institutionalize regular meetings of separated families, even though it will be a major task for the both governments. Lastly, the transition of the current armistice agreement into a peace regime, including arms control and confidence building measures, should be discussed. While North Korea has emphasized the resolution of military and political issues first, South Korea has focused on economic and cultural issues. Following the 1991 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement on reconciliation and cooperation, the two Koreas specified the necessity to further discuss the transition of the current armistice system into a peace regime through direct dialogues between two Koreas. And in the four-party talks including the two Koreas, the U.S., and China, pursued during the Kim Young-sam administration, several sub-committees were established to discuss consolidation of a peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula. Now, it is time to decide what scenario would be appropriate for future discussions. Several formulae have been suggested, even in the four party talks. However, the inter-governmental talks between the two Koreas should be resumed first, given that the progress of discussing the issue of establishing peace structure on the Korean peninsula could be limited without precedent talks between two Koreas. In the meantime, Seoul regards the 1992 Basic Agreement as vital for regaining mutual trust. The agreement includes exhaustive sections dealing with peaceful unification such as military, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and economic cooperation. However, the agreement can be a serious threat to the regime because it means a total change in inter-Korean relations. Consequently, Pyongyang has not addressed any substaintial move yet. The inter-Korean relation is much improved,
compared to the past situation, in the June Joint Declaration, the two
Koreas reached a common understanding about their proposed means for
unification and have agreed to continue discussion. Both have committed to
peace on the Korean peninsula, while acknowledging that there are partial
similarities and differences between the South's proposal for
"confederation (yon-hap)" and the North's plan for "federation (yon-bang)
in the low level." In short, North Korea has begun to recognize that it
needs assistance from the South to sustain its economy, in exchange for a
stable Korean peninsula. Interests of the Surrounding
Countries The great powers having a strong interest in the Korean peninsula. China, the U.S., Russia, and Japan, are reassessing their positions vis-a -vis the Korean peninsula, as they realize that the summit will have profound implications for their respective interests. Thus, these countries are trying to extend their own influences on the inter-Korean relations. Yoshiro Mori, the new Prime Minister of Japan, visited Seoul in May, 2000 and asked President Kim Dae-jung to convey its willingness to establish diplomatic ties with Pyongyang to North Korea. When President Kim participated in the funeral ceremony of Keizo Obuchi, the late Prime Minister of Japan, he had official talks with Mr. Clinton to affirm cooperation between the U.S. and South Korea and to dismiss the anxiety of the U.S. Chairman Kim Jong-il's secret visit to Beijing, only a few days before the Korean summit, was assessed as an effort to enlist China's support for the scheduled summit talks. In July 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Pyongyang to restore Russia-North Korean relations which had worsened since the end of the Cold-War. For the United States, the diplomatic objectives toward the North are both to prevent Pyongyang's nuclear and missile development program, and to deter the sudden collapse of the regime.16) In the Perry Report, the U.S. clarified its step-by-step plans to lift the economic sanctions on Pyongyang and to admit North Korea's current regime, with the precondition that the North cease military threats.17) Though it is not clearly mentioned in the report, if North Korea does not accept the projects and preconditions proposed by the U.S., the U.S. would take stronger sanctions against Pyongyang. While Washington is taking other measures to ease international apprehension caused by Pyongyang's production and sales of WMD, it is also trying to talk with North Korea, evidenced by the Perry Process. Since the U.S. foreign policy toward the North has supported direct talks between the two Koreas, the June 13-15 summit is in line with Washington's policy orientation. Simply put, Washington's concern is that the issues dealt with between the U.S. and North Korea might be influenced by changed inter-Korean relations. The U.S. maintains U.S.-South Korea cooperation as a diplomatic goal. At the same time it hopes that the two Koreas meet and try to end tensions on the Korean peninsula, and that improved inter-Korean relations after the summit will further the U.S. goal to put an end to the North's nuclear weapons program. Accordingly, President Kim Dae-jung's recent approval for continued stationing of 37,000 U.S. troops in the South is mean to assure U.S.-South Korean cooperation. Meanwhile, China is concerned that the North's nuclear and missile development program could justify the U.S. and Japan's joint development of the missile defense system. Regarding the Korean peninsula, China adheres to the principle of national autonomy and oppose outside intervention. This principle was strongly conveyed when the North's Kim Jong-il secretly visited Beijing, right before the inter-Korean summit. Owing to the Chairman Kim Jong-il's visit, China was back on center stage in Korean affairs, to block against Washington's influence on the peninsula.18) The United States and China share a common goal to
stop the Pyongyang's WMD program. On the other hand, China is against the
stationing of U.S. troops in South Korea, although it has not called for a
pull-out immediately. In response, Washington is arguing that the U.S.
troops issue will not and cannot be a subject of discussion, except
between the United States and South Korea. Furthermore, it stresses the
necessity of the troops, even after the reunification of the Korean
peninsula. Consequently, it cannot be ignored that the autonomous efforts
of two Koreas might be restricted by the interests of surrounding
countries, as long as there still exist many problems between the United
States and China, such as the Taiwan issue, the National Missile Defense
system (NMD), and the Chinese human rights issue. Limiting Factors of Inter-Korean
Cooperation Internal Factors between the Two
Koreas The summit talks provided great momentum for tension reduction and the establishment of a peace structure on the Korean peninsula. However, a few summit talks are hardly enough to resolve all the issues and to result in unification. The task ahead then, is to fully utilize this momentum and to realize the agreements reached at the summit. For the Kim Dae-jung administration to implement the engagement policy consistently, the Joint Declaration must be addressed. In that regard, there are two difficulties. The first difficulty is to raise funds necessary to implement inter-Korean economic cooperation. In such cooperation, Pyongyang can provide nothing but a large low-cost labor force. Therefore, a huge amount of capital from the South is necessary. The capital necessary, Pyongyang has requested it from foreign countries in recent few years amounts to 8 billion dollars, while a South Korean report estimates it will cost more than ten billion dollars for ten years.19) According to other statistics, the cost is estimated at 83 billion dollars per year to raise the North's productivity to half of the South's level in ten years. There are two pending issues in raising funds. One is "the security threat" which might be caused by the South's investment in the North. The money could help the Kim Jong-il regime to enforce its military power against the South. Some experts doubt whether Pyongyang can succeed in economic restructuring through Western-style inter-Korean economic cooperation.20) Therefore, it is very important for the South Korean government to garner positive public support and to persuade the opposition parties and conservative mass media of the necessity of inter-Korean economic cooperation. The other issue is how to raise the funds. Until now, two ways have been discussed. One is to allow North Korea to join international financial organizations and to raise funds from those organizations. The other is that South Korean government or financial institutions would act as financial guarantors for the North. Nobody can be optimistic either way. First of all, it is difficult for Seoul to guarantee Pyongyang, considering that the South has recently recovered from its own economic crisis. And South Korean private companies are reluctant to invest in the North. Moreover, it is hard for the Kim Jong-il regime to raise foreign loans by joining international financial institutions, because of lack of support from the United States or Japan. However, recently, Washington hinted that it could allow North Korea to join financial institutions, with the precondition that the North completely abandon its WMD program.21)After the summit, the second difficulty in implementing the engagement policy toward the North is related to the South Korean people's thought in accordance with the changed inter-Korean relations. When President Kim Dae-jung evaluated the North's Chairman Kim Jong-il as ΘΏ leader of great ideas," South Korean conservatives severely criticized the President's view. The Kim Dae-jung administration is hard pressed to produce tangible results sufficient to overcome such attacks.22) Moreover, faced with the widening gap between the rich and the poor after the economic crisis in South Korea, some South Koreans may oppose economic aid to the North. North Korea also faces several domestic obstacles
in attaining peaceful coexistence with the South. Since the end of
Cold-War, North Korean foreign policies have been concentrated on the
maintenance of the Kim Jong-il regime. Henceforth, Pyongyang will most
likely try to minimize the shock caused by improved inter-Korean
relations. For instance, Seoul should be satisfied with even a limited
number of separated family members meetings, since the North, fearing
negative fallout, would not allow full-fledged meetings. North Korea fears
that if its separated families were permitted to contact and meet freely
with the South Korean, they would realize the North's deficiencies.
Therefore, only limited meetings of separated families will be possible,
and the places, times and people involved will be tightly monitored.
Whether or not Pyongyang can expand inter-Korean exchanges without feeling
a threat against its regime is the key to carrying out the plans of the
summit and inter-governmental talks. External Factors: the Countries
Surrounding the Korean Peninsula
The summit is an epochal turning point on the divided peninsula, meant to overcome the enmity of a half-century. However, the two Koreas and the countries surrounding the Korean peninsula have different concerns. That is, each country has a different priority for easing tensions and for establishing a peace regime on the Korean peninsula. South Korea is focusing on the resolution of separated family and inter-Korean economic cooperation issues primarily, after which it will attempt to resolve the North's nuclear and missile development programs for the establishment peace system on the peninsula. North Korea, on the contrary, hopes to discuss arms control first, transfer of the armistice agreement into a peace regime, and the U.S. troops stationed in the South, and finally the inter-Korean economic cooperation and the separated family issue, excluding the discussion on nuclear and missile issues. However, North Korea could change its priorities and accept the discussion on the inter-Korean economic cooperation first, because the North desperately needs economic aid. The United States is focusing on resolving the North's nuclear and missile development programs, while at the same time, deflecting calls for the withdrawal of U.S. troops.23) The same may be said of Japan. China wants a stable Korean peninsula, achieved without intervention from the U.S. or Japan, but through the autonomous efforts of the two Koreas. The United States fears South Korea's large-scale economic aid to the North, because if Seoul plays a leading role to restore North Korea's economy, the United States might lose negotiating strength with North Korea. Pyongyang definitely needs foreign loans from the international financial institutions, because the funds provided by the South are not sufficient. However, since most international financial institutions are controlled by the United States, North Korea will find it difficult to borrow from these institutions without Washington's support. Nevertheless, the United States could not object to lending the funds to the North, since South Korea is sending economic aid in order to encourage the North's reform and openness. Hence, both South Korea and the United States need to cooperate in terms of economic aid to the North. If South Korea rushes the withdrawal of the U.S. troops stationing in the South, U.S. foreign policy on the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia would be seriously undermined. Presently, President Kim Dae-jung would never consider it, as it could totally destroy U.S.-South Korean cooperation. Washington is probably anxious that Seoul would try to take the initiative on the inter-Korean issues, however, it is depending on South Korea's diplomatic ability to deal with the North Korean issues successfully, maintaining U.S.-South Korean cooperation in spite of the delicate situation. The speed of contact and cooperation between the two Koreas seems to have affected relations between the United States and North Korea. If there is no sign of improvement in the U.S.-North Korean relations, Seoul's policy options will be limited. Unfortunately, after the "1994 Agreed Frame work," U.S.-North Korean relations have not been improved as quickly as had been expected. Since it succeeded in curtailing the North Korean nuclear program, the United States should have lifted economic sanctions on Pyongyang. However, it has delayed the lifting, citing additional reasons, such as missile and terrorism issues.24) Since North Korea has not agreed to those requests, no improvements have been made. In the meantime, in July 2000, North Korea pledged to suspend its missile test-launches, and the U.S. partially lifted the economic sanctions on Pyongyang. Currently, both countries seem intent on maintaining the conciliatory atmosphere created by the inter-Korean summit. China and Russia are opposed to the national
missile defense (NMD) system established by the United States. Russian
President Vladimir Putin's sudden visit to Pyongyang can be seen as a plan
to cooperate with Pyongyang against the NMD system.25) Even though the
recent missile test-firing failed, the United States has vowed to continue
developing it, and in fact, the U.S. Republican Party is especially strong
in its support. Therefore, the NMD system has become a hot issue which
could cause conflicts between the U.S. and China, or Russia. Even though
North Korea promised to end its missile program, the circumstances
surrounding the Korean peninsula seems to becomes more complicated in that
the U.S. is arguing the necessity of the NMD system against the threat of
missile attack from North Korea.26) During the summit process, China has
shown increased influence on the korean peninsula. In consequence, the
possible confrontation between the U.S. and China could restrict the
autonomy of the two Koreas on inter-Korean issues. Conclusion In general, the summit has greatly contributed to confidence building between two Koreas and to tension reduction on the Korean peninsula. The inter-Korean economic cooperation has increased and the issue of separated families is being resolved, albeit gradually. The ministerial-level inter-Korean talks were already held to discuss several current agendas and agreed to formalize inter-governmental talks. At present, no one can be sure whether Chairman Kim Jung-il has really altered his thinking. However, one thing is apparent- North Korea is changing. Thus, South Korea's careful response and the support of surrounding countries are solely needed to induce real progress in the North. The Kim Dae-jung administration could be faced with
certain obstacles, unless it institutuonalizes the separated family issue.
As for economic aid to the North, there are many difficulties, such as how
to raise funds and how much to raise. Chairman Kim Jong-il's reciprocal
visit to Seoul would address such anxieties. The countries surrounding the
Korean peninsula are anxious about the changed inter-Korean relations
after the summit. North Korea recognizes that its regime's survival
greatly depends on Washington, and is endeavoring to normalize relations
with the United States. With China's increasing influence on the Korean
peninsula, Washington is trying to improve its relations with Pyongyang.
Meanwhile, the tripartite cooperation among South Korea, the United
States, and Japan, could be impacted negatively by the post-summit
situation. A crack in tripartite cooperation would definitely influence
South Korea's engagement policy. All are vital tasks facing the Kim
Dae-jung administration. 1) Philip Bowring, "Differing Goals for Korean Summit," International Herald Tribune, June 10, 2000. 2) David E. Sanger, "Puzzling Out Summit: A Ray of Hope, At Least," The New York Times, June 16, 2000; Tim Larimer, "The Remarking of Kim Jong-il," Time, June 26, 2000, pp. 34-35. 3)"Breaking the Ice in Korea," New York Times, editorial, April 11, 2000; "Appointment in Pyongyang," Washington Post, editorial, April 11, 2000; "First Step for the Koreas," Los Angeles Times, editorial, April 11, 2000. 4)Ministry of Unification, Monthly report on the inter-Korean Exchange and Humanitarian Isseus. Vol. 105 (May, 2000). 5)Choi Wan-kyu, "The Tragedy of Icarus: Analysis of the Failure in Kim Young-sam Administrations's Foreign Policy Toward North Korea," Korea and World Politics, Vol. 14 (1998). 6)Moon Ihl-wan, "Investior Won't Exactly Be Rushing To Pyongyang," Business Week (June 26, 2000), p. 25. 7)Youn Duk-ryong, Analysis on the Recovery of North Korea's Economy and Investment Inducement," Unification Economy, vol. 65 (May, 2000), pp. 46-48. 8) "Kimaraderie, at last," The Economist (June 17, 2000), p. 27. 9) Chang Noh-soon, "The United States' Foreign Policy Toward North Korea and the Military Threat by North Korea," Policy Review, Vol. 131 (Spring, 1999), pp. 131-172. 10) Lee Jong-suk, New Approach on the Current North Korea (History Critics Press, 2000), pp. 539-542. 11) Howard W. French, "Suddenly, Reclusive North Korea Reaches Out to the Rest of the World," New York Times, March 17, 2000. 12) Chang Noh-soon, "The Stucture and Change of the Engagement Policy toward North Korea," Social Science, Vol. 38 (1999), pp. 1-31. 13) Nicholas Eberstadt, The End of North Korea (The AEI Press, 1999), pp. 71-74. 14) Donga- ilbo, June 2, 2000; Munwha- ilbo, May 11, 2000. 15) Ministry of Unification, Year 2000 White Paper on Unification (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 2000), p. 115. 16) Joel Wit, "Clinton and North Korea: Past, Present and Future," Policy Forum Online (The Nautilus Institute, March 1, 2000) 17)William J. Perry (Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State), Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations (U.S. Depatment of State, October 12, 1999). 18) Lorin Holland and Shim Jae-hoon, "China's Korea Game," Far Eastern Economic Review (June 15, 2000), pp. 16-18. 19) Cho Myoung-chul, "no Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation without Lifting U.S. Sanctions on North Korea," Hangyoreh Shinmun, May 23, 2000. 20) Nicholas Eberstadt, Ibid., pp. 75-78. 21) Munwha-ilbo, July 31, 2000. 22) Almost South Korean people are reported to believe that the South's support to the North must be continued with conditions. "Survey on Public Opinion about Unification" (KBS, December 1999). 23) Stephen Bosworth, "the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea," Monthly Joongang, June 2000, p. 54. 24) USA Today, June 7, 2000. 25) New York Times, June 9, 2000. 26) Washington Post, August 4, 2000. |