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Volume 12 Number 2 Summer 2000 A Twin Resemblance: Suh Dong-man
INTRODUCTION
Relations between Korea and Japan have been shaped by the unfortunate history of Japan's colonization of Korea and by the division of the Korean peninsula, resulting from the Korean War that broke out after liberation from Japanese rule. In 1965, the Republic of Korea and Japan agreed on the normalization of diplomatic ties and have maintained friendly relations ever since, though there still remain a number of issues to be resolved between the two countries. ROK-Japan relations are, however, only half of the equation. Although the Cold War has ended and East-West reconciliation has been achieved, North Korea still remains isolated. Pyongyang is yet to normalize ties with Tokyo and North Korea's animosity towards Japan still prevails. From Japan's point of view, then, the task of coming to terms with its colonialist past is only half-accomplished, and even that half is incomplete. Relations between Japan and the two Koreas in the 21st century will hinge upon how each of the three countries defines its relationship and how they tackle unresolved issues. To be sure, the optimal choice is normalization laying the foundation for new and enhanced relations in the new millennium. A serious barrier to achieving this objective is the difference of opinions on the interpretation of the Treaty on Basic Relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan, signed in 1965. The Treaty also affects the recently resumed "Chosun1)-Japan Talks for the Normalization of Diplomatic Relations." The Rounds, apart from its own issues, can shed light upon the differing interpretations of the Treaty on Basic Relations between the ROK and Japan, and hence, serve as an opportunity to resolve those differences. This paper examines the three countries' contrasting stances over the issues surrounding the Treaty on Basic Relations between the ROK and Japan, how these stances have changed over the past thirty years, and what impact they have on the Chosun-Japan Talks for Normalization of Diplomatic Relations. The main issues covered in this paper; jurisdiction, interpretation of old treaties, and compensation, were chosen because they are the most important matters pursuant to both the Treaty on Basic Relations between the ROK and Japan and The Chosun-Japan Talks for normalization of diplomatic relations.
MAIN ISSUES OF ROK-JAPAN
BASIC RELATIONS
At the time it was signed in 1965, the Treaty on Basic Relations faced strong opposition, and although thirty-five years have passed, the debate still continues. The Treaty between the ROK and Japan took a great deal of time and effort to realize, as the complex history shared by the two countries presented numerous challenges. Among the challenges were the different interpretations of the same treaty. Korea's jurisdiction, effectiveness of the old treaties between two countries, and the legal status of Korean-Japanese people were among the issues that made the treaty vulnerable.
Seoul's Jurisdiction
According to international law, when two countries establish diplomatic relations, the jurisdiction of the parties should not be addressed except in the case of a territorial dispute. This issue between Korea and Japan was problematic, however, as the governments of the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) were both competing for recognition as the legitimate government of Korea. As a consequence, differences over the jurisdiction issue surfaced as a result of the unique situation of a divided country. The issue was covered by Article 3 of the Treaty on Basic Relations, which states, "The ROK government is the only legitimate government on the Korean peninsula, in accordance with what was stated in the 1948 UN General Assembly Resolution 195(III)." This provision defines in essence, the relationship between the ROK and the Korean peninsula. During negotiations, Seoul sought to be recognized as the only legitimate government with its territory covering the entire Korean peninsula, pursuant to a Constitutional provision that stipulate, "the territory of the ROK consists of the Korean peninsula and the annexed islands." Tokyo's interpretation, however, was that no settlement was established with respect to Pyongyang and that the compensation issue did not involve the North. Although the two sides never could agree on the interpretation, the sharp contrast in views has blurred during the thirty-five years of a changing international climate.
Effectiveness of the Old Treaties
The most contentious issue between the two sides concerned the effectiveness of the old treaties. This subject was covered by Article 3 which stated, "All treaties or agreements concluded between the former Empire of Korea and the former Empire of Japan on or before August 22, 1910 are already null and void." The issue must be viewed against the backdrop of Japan's colonization of Korea: The question is how the two sides view the series of treaties and agreements, including the Treaty on Korea Annexation to Japan, that had been signed in the process of colonization. During negotiation talks, the ROK side claimed that Japan's colonial rule had been a result of an invasion, and since the Treaty of Annexation had been forced upon Korea by Japan, it was "null and void." Japan, however, rejected the ROK's claim, saying that colonial rule had been the result of a voluntary agreement between the two parties, and hence, legitimate. Tokyo attempted a compromise, inserting the wording "already," in order to maintain its position that the Treaty of Annexation had been effective but would now be nullified. This difference of opinion remains to this day, and in fact, arose during the Chosun-Japan normalization talks as well.
Compensation
The most tangible consequence of normalization was the compensation to be paid by Tokyo. At the same time that the issue was first settled in the San Francisco Peace Treaty signed in 1951, the ROK government had requested to participate in the San Francisco meeting, but was not invited. In essence, Korea was deprived of the right to claim indemnity from Japan, the defeated country. Thus, the ROK settled for the right to file a claim during normalization talks. Because the country was in dire need of economic assistance, the government agreed to a political settlement, giving up demands for compensation over colonization in exchange for economic cooperation. This issue was settled by The "Agreement on the Settlement of Problem Concerning Property and Claims and on the Economic Cooperation between the Republic of Korea and Japan," (hereinafter Compensation Agreement) which was established simultaneously with the Treaty on Basic Relations. Paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Compensation Agreement stipulate the offer of 300 million dollars in contributions in addition to 200 million dollars in a long-term public loan. In addition, 300 million dollars worth of commercial loans were separately granted. Most importantly, Paragraph 1 of Article 2 stated that "the issues concerning the properties of people of Korea and Japan, and the compensation claims between them are finally and completely settled, including what had been stipulated in Article 4 (1) of San Francisco Peace Treaty of September 1951." During ratification by the National Assembly, the Korean government interpreted Japan's promised compensation as "compensation for its colonization," while the Japanese government interpreted it as "part of economic cooperation to support Korea's economic reconstruction." Controversy raged on as the victims of Japanese colonial rule continued to criticize Seoul as well as Tokyo, arguing that the state had no right to speak for individuals who wished to claim compensation. With regard to the compensation issue involving "comfort women," who were forced to work as sex slaves for the Japanese soldiers, Seoul modified its position to acknowledge individual claims. The Japanese government, although it still denies the state's responsibility to pay compensation, has recently agreed to private cases of compensation. Unfortunately, this modification has exacerbated the rift among both governments and the victims.
ISSUES OF 1991-1992 NORTH
KOREA-JAPAN Negotiations for normalization of diplomatic relations were attempted between the North and Japan, but failed after three rounds of preliminary talks in 1990 and eight rounds of formal talks in 1991 and 1992. As part of those negotiations, the Japanese government had announced four basic principles by which to proceed: (a) The normalization shall be conducted in a manner conducive to the peace and stability of the Korean peninsula. (b) The normalization shall not undermine the friendly relations between Japan and South Korea. (c) Japan will compensate in good faith for the 36-year colonial rule, but not for the 45 years thereafter. (d) Nuclear inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of North Korea is important to the security of Japan.2) This Japan's stance differed sharply from what had been outlined in the 1990 joint statement by North Korean Workers' Party, and Japan's Liberal Democratic Party and Socialist Party3) in which "Peace and stability of the Korean peninsula" had taken precedence over normalization. It also signified that the nuclear issues between the U.S. and North Korea were an important consideration. Compared to Japan, North Korea took a much simpler approach, with its objectives being normalization and the resulting economic compensation. Pyongyang's position was made crystal-clear by the suggestion, in the third round of formal talks, that the two sides establish ties first and discuss other issues later. Although the talks ended without conclusion, they were meaningful in that the two sides clearly revealed their positions and gained fuller understanding of the contentious issues. The agenda for the talks was set at the preliminary meetings, and was limited to four topics: (a) procedural issues, (b) economic issues, (c) international issues, and (d) other issues of bilateral interest (e.g. legal status of Korean-Japanese, and Japanese spouses of North Korean nationals).
Jurisdiction Issue
North Korea's plan from the beginning was to pursue normalization talks separately from those carried out by Japan and South Korea. Announcements made by North Korea's official press never mentioned anything about the Treaty on Basic Relations between the ROK and Japan nor about the South-Japan normalization talks, because inter-Korean relations at the time had turned favorable with the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement all but signed, and the two Koreas were seriously considering joining the UN at the same time. Pyongyang probably did not want to offend the South or undermine negotiations with Japan by raising the subject. In fact, while the North-Japan talks were going on, the two Koreas garnered UN membership simultaneously, and the reality was that Japan's interpretation of Article 3 of the Treaty had been effective. The jurisdictional issue was raised consistently by the Japanese side from the first round of talks. Tokyo's basic stance was that any deterioration in ROK-Japan relations would not be acceptable, and the normalization of ties with Pyongyang should proceed in a way that would not run counter to the ROK-Japan Basic Relations Treaty. North Korea dismissed Japan's position by claiming that "The North Korean government is the only legitimate government of the Korean peninsula."4) At the second round of talks, a stronger Japan asserted that diplomatic ties established with North Korea would be limited to "the North that, in effect, rules the northern half of the Korean peninsula, and any claims to jurisdiction over the South would not be accepted." The official North Korean press mentioned the jurisdictional issue for the first time during the second round of talks. At the time, Pyongyang declared that according to international norms, when two countries established diplomatic ties, the parties needed only to recognize the other's sovereignty, and that jurisdiction need not be addressed. In an attempt to smooth over the dispute, it argued that if jurisdiction were a precondition to establishment of diplomatic ties, it would be impossible for Japan to form ties with the countries in the case of territorial disputes, since jurisdiction is a domestic issue to be settled between the two Koreas. North Korea again altered its position on jurisdiction at the third round of talks. While on one hand, it declared "Korea is one country and all our efforts are aimed at peaceful unification," on the other, it admitted that "although not desirable, our sovereignty covers only half of the Korean peninsula."5) Nonetheless, Japan did not consider Pyongyang's statement as a clear recognition of the Korean government. It certainly was a pragmatic approach, however, which Japan called the "New Proposal," in that the normalization talks would only cover the territory effectively under the North's rule. Furthermore, at the fifth round of talks, Pyongyang specifically defined its jurisdiction as "north of the military demarcation line."6) However, Pyongyang's remark about territorial limits were never mentioned by the official press. Furthermore, when Japan indicated that the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement acknowledged the existence of two separate states on the Korean peninsula, Pyongyang demanded that Tokyo refrain from the "two state" reference, because in their case, it involved a "special relationship moving toward reunification."7) Even though North Korea did not allow any publicity by the official media and it emphasized the principle of "one Korea," its stance on the jurisdictional issue clearly indicates an attitude change, part of its pragmatic approach to relations with Japan and the ROK.
Evaluation of the old treaties
In opening remarks at the first round of talks, North Korea asserted that bilateral relations and issues could be settled only when "Japan makes an official apology and appropriate compensation to the North Korea and its people." In other words, the first and second agenda issues were inseparable. Accordingly, North Korea urged that Japan's head of state must officially extend an apology for past damages and loss brought by Japan upon the people of Korea, and that "the apology should be officially documented at the time diplomatic ties were established." Moreover, "Japan would have to declare illegal and null all the treaties and agreements forced upon Chosun, including the 1910 Treaty of Annexation."8) At the same talks, Japan responded, "it is regrettable that there has been an unfortunate period in the past." Tokyo had already made a similar statement prior to the talks. Former premier Noboru Takeshita expressed "regret and deep remorse" in March 1989, and former prime minister Toshiki Kaifu also had made corresponding remarks at the Diet.9) Since such statements had not been issued before, namely, at the ROK-Japan Basic Relations Treaty, it was considered progress. However, the statement, "The talks will proceed in line with the legal framework set by The Treaty on Basic Relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan" was evidence that Japan did not feel obligated to make an official apology and would stick by its interpretation of the old treaties. At the second round of talks, Japan made clear its position on the old treaties, specifically stating "the 1910 Treaty of Annexation" and other treaties or agreements signed during the colonial period were legitimately established and implemented.10) Pyongyang did not budge on this issue, indeed, at the seventh round of talks, it went even further to include treaties as far back as the 1905 Korean-Japanese Agreement based on South Korean academic studies at the time. At a press conference on May 12, 1992, Lee Tae-jin, professor of Seoul National University, argued that the 1905 Korean-Japanese Agreement and the 1910 Annexation Treaty were null in that due process stipulated by international laws had not been followed, and that in 48 cases, Imperial Japan had forged 48 directives.11) Thus, at least with regard to their shared history, the two Koreas could agree, and in the June 20, 1992 letter to South Korean Prime Minister Chung Won-sik, North Korean Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk suggested discussions at the Subcommittee for the Cooperation and Exchange of the ongoing Inter-Korean High-Level Talks and adoption of a joint statement on this issue. Because suspicion over North Korea's nuclear development were mounting at the time, this suggestion was never follwed through. Nonetheless, at the National Assembly's probe into the government on October 24, 1995, some opposition lawmakers asked the officials if there were any plans for a joint demand by the South and the North for an explanation by Japan regarding the insensitive remarks made by Japanese officials about the past. They also called for a South-North joint resolution declaring null and void the 1910 Annexation Treaty, the 1905 Agreement, and the 1907 Protocol. Meanwhile, at the sixth round of talks, North Korea for the first time brought up the "comfort women" issue and in addition, questioned Japan's grounds for claiming that the Annexation Treaty was just. Japan replied, "We did not say it was just, only that it was legal according to international laws."12) While the statement clearly showed how Japan compartmentalized facts and moral judgement, it nevertheless signified that Tokyo had backed down one step. The comfort women issue was a topic of heated debate in South Korea, with huge implications on ROK-Japan relations. North Korea seems to have raised this issue, as was the case with the old treaties, on the back of the arguments made by South Korea. On the other hand, Japan's change in stance was a small step forward in terms of its historical perception, one that would continue to be reflected in the ROK-Japan relations. Therefore, with regard to the issues surrounding the interpretation of the old treaties, the North-Japan relations progressed in conjunction to the inter-Korean as well as ROK-Japan relations. In addition, it was clear that the ROK-Japan relationship had a definite influence on the North Korea-Japan normalization talks and vice versa.
Compensation
The compensation issue was the topic most strongly argued by the North. In the opening speech of the first round, the North Korea demanded "two types of compensation from Japan: indemnity by the defeated country and claims to property." As for the grounds of its argument, the North pointed out, "the North Korea-Japan relationship was not only that of the ruler and the ruled. Korea fought against Japan's invasion, and thus, they can be considered to have been warring parties." The delegation cited the fact that "since the 1930s, under the leadership of Kim Il-sung, Korean revolutionaries had officially been at war with Japan and had achieved victory after a 15-year long battle. With regard to property claims, the North argued that Japan had no right to any claims, and that only Korea had the right to claim compensation for the damage to life and property caused by Japan." The North Korean delegation also demanded compensation for damages and loss incurred by Japan during the 45 years since the war based on the following: "First, Japan is accountable for the division of Korea. Second, Japan served as a military base (for supplies, repairs, and attack) for the American imperialists during the Korean War. Third, Japan continued to implement hostile policies against the North. Finally, compensation is long overdue and interest payments alone would total a huge sum." Such a claim by North Korea was based on the 1990 joint statement by North Korean Workers' Party, and Japan's Liberal Democratic Party and Socialist Party. Japan's position on the compensation issue was clearly conveyed at the first round of talks when it stated that the Annexation Treaty had been legitimate and the principle of the ROK-Japan Basic Relations Treaty would be countered, in other words, since the Annexation Treaty was legitimate, Japan was not liable to the North. However, as in the case of in the Treaty between the ROK and Japan, North Korea would also be compensated according to the claim. In establishing guidelines for the talks, Japan also made it clear that it denied claims of obligation for compensation for the 45-year period after the war, and that it would not be bound by the three-party joint statement. In the second round, Japan supported its argument based on more specific grounds, saying "Indemnity entails war between separate sovereign nations. However, there had been no sovereign government on the Korean peninsula at the time, and the Korean Partisans were not an independent national army, but a unit of the Chinese Revolutionary Army." As for the 45 years after the war, it said "the abnormal relations following the war stemmed from Cold War tension and the policy of North Korea." And for Japan's support of the U.S. and South Korea during the war "had been just and appropriate, because Japan was supporting UN member nations in accordance with the resolution passed by the UN Security Council."3) The two sides contended fiercely over this point which was tied to the issues of old treaty. Then, in the fifth round of talks, rather than arguing for compensation by the defeated country or for the 45-year period thereafter, the North defined compensation "as that for the suffering, material damage, and human loss incurred by Japan upon Korea in the process of forceful invasion and colonization." North Korea claimed therefore, that "Japan must pay compensation on moral and ethical grounds." In response, the Japanese claimed that the North's argument had nothing to do with from "the indemnity and right of claim." At the sixth round, North Korea took up the comfort women issue, asking compensation to "resolve past wrongdoing as well as to fulfill political and material responsibilities."4) As it was mentioned earlier, this demand was largely in response to the claims made in South Korea at the time. Meanwhile, up until the fifth round of talks, Japan maintained its position that only claims would be possible, and that such settlements would require proof by the North. However, when North Korea raised the comfort women issue, Japan maintained consistency, in line with its position toward South Korea when it raised the issue, by denying its responsibility for compensation, maintaining that factual evidence and actual legal grounds were needed. It also added that former prime minister Kiichi Miyazawa's sincere apology had been directed to all comfort women from Korea, including those in the North.15) The new "third approach" suggested by the North was similar to a move by South Korea earlier during talks for normalization of ties with Japan.16) At the sixth round of talks, Japan and North Korea came close to drafting the Chosun-Japan Treaty, thanks to much progress in the discussions of critical issues. This period marked a time when the relations between two Koreas were at their most favorable state since the signing of the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement on December 13, 1991.
RESUMPTION OF NORMALIZATION
TALKS
The 1988 ROK-Japan Joint Declaration and Japan's New Stance Tokyo and Pyongyang had held eight rounds of normalization talks between 1991 and 1992, however, without tangible results, the talks were in a deadlock until the Murayama mission to the North in 1999. Meanwhile, Seoul and Tokyo saw a significant improvement in relations. In October 1998, President Kim Dae-jung visited Japan for a summit meeting with Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, where the two leaders agreed on the "Joint Declaration on the New ROK-Japan Partnership for the 21st Century." The statement included the clause that "Japan humbly accepts the fact and expresses deep remorse and a heartfelt apology for the great pain and suffering it brought upon the people of Korea by its colonization." Seoul commended Prime Minister Obuchi for "his correct perception of history," signifying the advent of a future-oriented relationship: one that would come to terms with history and would move away from the problems of the past. Questions have been raised as to whether the joint statement signed by Kim and Obuchi meant a modification in Japan's interpretation of Article 3 (about old treaties) of the ROK-Japan Basic Relations Treaty. Some experts in Japan have pointed out that the joint statement does signify a shift in Tokyo's position on the legitimacy of the old treaties.17) However, to date, the Japanese government has refrained from mentioning this point, and Seoul has not demanded an explanation. The old treaties issue is still ambiguous, and the two sides may still hold different interpretation of the joint statement as they did about The Treaty on Basic Relations.
The 2000 North Korea-Japan Normalization
Talks
After the North Korea-Japan normalization talks ended in a failure in 1992, the two sides tried to resume the talks in 1995 and again in 1997, following the Geneva Agreed Framework between Washington and Pyongyang, but they never materialized. The bilateral relations, strained in the wake of North Korea's launch of a rocket in August 1998, entered a new phase as the U.S.-North Korea missile talks accomplished partial settlement in 1999, thanks partly to Seoul's implementation of an engagement policy toward the North. In December 1999, a Japanese delegation led by former Prime Minster Murayama made a visit to Pyongyang and agreed on the resumption of normalization talks. Accordingly, a Red Cross meeting and a preliminary round of governmental talks were held at which the two sides settled on the issues of kidnapping and missile development, both considered barriers to the normalization talks. As a result, the ninth round of the normalization talks, resuming where talks left off in 1992, was held in Pyongyang in April 2000. At the ninth round, the North demanded an apology and compensation for colonization as a precondition to normalization. The four items included a legally-binding written apology extended by the head of the Japanese government: compensation for material damage and loss of life; the return of, or compensation for cultural artifacts; and assurance of the legal status of Koreans living in Japan. Japan replied that indemnity was impossible since the two countries had not been at war, but that it was willing to discuss claims by the North. Moreover, Japan argued that in order to successfully establish diplomatic ties, the issues involving kidnapping and Pyongyang's missile talks with Washington had to be resolved. Meanwhile, Japan did not make any comment about the jurisdiction issue. There was no need to mention this issue again, because during the fifth round of talks the North had already defined its jurisdiction to be limited to the "northern demarcation line." As North Korea had already compromised during the talks in 1991-1992, it did not demand indemnity or compensation for the 45-year period after the war, but rather asked for compensation for the suffering caused by colonization in a broad sense. Moreover, as shown in the first round, the North wished to establish ties based on Japan's apology first, and then, to talk about other pending issues, including compensation.18) The remarks made by Murayama, led to settlement of the apology issue and Japan appeared to maintain that the ROK-Japan joint statement of 1998 was in keeping with Murayama's comment, at the same time intending to apply the joint statement to North Korea.19) It also appeared to be an attempt to resolve the compensation issue through economic cooperation, as it had done with the ROK.20) Agreeing to economic cooperation could be a workable compromise since the North could interpret it as "compensation for damages" while Japan could see it as economic cooperation. The position of North Korea seems to have changed little since the normalization talks in 1991-1992. Other than the additional demand for the return of cultural artifacts, all the claims remain intact. At the ninth round of talks, Pyongyang took an aggressive stance toward establishing ties, making it a priority over the settlement of other issues, a stance similar to that of China. Japan may apply the joint statement of 1998 to the North, and thus, the possibility of reaching an agreement on apology and compensation issues is greater than before.21)
CONCLUSION
Over the course of more than 30 years, the two Koreas have moved closer on issues related to the ROK-Japan Basic Relations Treaty. First, with regard to the interpretation of the old treaties, claims for revision or abrogation spread even to the public domain, and the stances of the South and North differ little. As for compensation, there was a significant convergence when North Korea decided to press claims for victims, rather than demanding indemnity. Moreover, Japan, who had already made an official apology to the South in the ROK-Japan Joint Declaration of October 1998, would feel no additional political burden in extending the apology to the North. Thus, once the issue of legitimacy of the old treaties, including the Treaty on Korea Annexation to Japan, is resolved, most pending issues could be considered settled. In addition, jurisdiction has been mostly defined by the two Koreas since signing of the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, but there is not yet an agreement as to how this will be applied in their relations with Japan. Pyongyang seems to have accepted Japan's interpretation in the North Korea-Japan normalization talks. Nonetheless, by joining the UN with South Korea, yet still refusing to recognize the existence of two countries on the Korean peninsula, the ambiguity could be viewed as its commitment toward the domestic mobilization. Until now, South Korea's position has been flexible as well, sometimes even more ambiguous than that of the North. However, the new government led by President Kim is pursuing a different policy toward Noth Korea, unification by reconciliation and cooperation based on peaceful coexistence. Moreover, the Kim administration declared that the normalization of North Korea-Japan relations would be more conductive to inter-Korean dialogue. Now that the South-North summit meeting is scheduled for June 2000, it would not be too difficult to reach a consensus with regard to the jurisdiction issue in relation to ROK-Japan and North Korea-Japan ties. In the future, it will be important to see how the two Koreas apply the terms of the Basic Agreement in their relations with other countries, to the U.S. and Japan in particular. In order for the North and Japan to establish diplomatic ties, the three countries must carry out in-depth discussions both separately and together. When these discussions lead to a settlement of issues involving the ROK-Japan Basic Relations Treaty, the relations between the three countries could move away from the unfortunate past of colonization and Cold War confrontation to one that is more future-oriented. A new and promising future in the 21st century can be achieved, and the two Koreas will be able to co-exist peacefully based on cooperation and reconciliation. The key to a new future, settlement of the ROK-Japan Basic Treaty issues, is all but realized.22)
1) A unique term, "Chosun" refers to North Korea. Since the term is used by Japan and North Korea, this paper will adopt that term. 2) Asahi Shimbun, January 26, 1991. 3) The three-party joint statement, signed on September 28, 1990, settled a new normalization atmosphere between the North and Japan. The main provisions related to the ROK-Japan Treaty on Basic Relations include: Japan's expression of deep regret and remorse; making an official apology and sufficient compensation for the colonial rule; resolving the abnormal conditions that existed between Chosun and Japan; and an announcement that Korea is one, and the North and South must achieve unification through peaceful dialogue. 4) Asahi shimbun, Januauy 31, 1991 5) Asahi Shimbun, May 22, 1991. 6) Asahi Shimbun, December 14, 1991. 7) Asahi Shimbun, February 1, 1992. 8) The (North) Korean Central News Agency, January 30-31, 1991; The Monthly Chosun Bulletin, April 1991. 9) Asahi Shimbun, January 31 and February 2, 1991. 10) Asahi Shimbun, March 12-13, 1991. 11) Dong-A Ilbo, May 12, 1992. 12) Asahi Shimbun, February 1, 1992; The Korean Central News Agency, January 30 and February 1, 1992; The Monthly Chosun Bulletin, March 1992, p.18. 13) Asahi Shimbun, January 31 and February 2, 1991. 14) The Korean Central News Agency, January 30 and February 1, 1992; The Monthly Chosun Bulletin, March 1992. 15) Asahi Shimbun, February 1, 1992. 16) Kim Bong-jin, "Japan-North Korea Normalization Talks and Japan's response," The Korean Journal of Unification Studies, Vol.2, No.2 (1993),p.116. 17) Haruki Wada, honorary professor of the University of Tokyo, and Masao Okonogi, professor of Keio University took a position that the 1910 Treaty of Annexation should be considered as null. 18) Japan viewed such a proactive stance taken by the North as the intension to avoid discussing the kidnapping and missile issues. 19) Rather than including this as a part of the treaty, it was handled as a separate document. Tokyo Shimbun, March 31, 2000. 20) Japan seemed to have been concerned about having to make compensation not only to South Korea but also to other countries that had been invaded, if it were to make compensation to North Korea. Tokyo Shimbun, March 24, 2000. 21) Putting aside the kidnapping and missile issues, the apology and compensation issues seem likely to be settled at the North Korea-Japan normalization talks. 22) The missile and kidnapping issues, which are of different nature, are emerging as new obstacles to normalization, and new efforts are called for to resolve them. |