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Volume 12 Number 2 Summer 2000 The Inter-Korean
Summit Park Kun-young
INTRODUCTION
The inter-Korean summit has led to a historic breakthrough in the common pursuit of peace, mutual prosperity and reunification. As of now, President Kim Dae-jung and North Korea's leader Kim Jong-il have concurred on many fundamental issues included in the joint declaration. Specifically, they agreed on the following issues: the independent reunification of the Korean Peninsula; an acknowledgment of the commonality of the respective reunification formulas of the two Koreas; the exchange of separated families and the resolution of the issue of long-confined North Korean prisoners who have refused to convert; promoting balanced development of the national economy; holding a government-level dialogue, and Chairman Kim Jong-il's visit to Seoul. The successful translation of the issues into reality, however, will call for a strenuous, long-term negotiation process that is expected to be anything but trouble-free. Dealing with the unresolved issues could pose an even more formidable challenge. Nevertheless, strong hopes and near-euphoric anticipation of improved inter-Korean relations prevail in view of the fruitful results of the first person-to-person negotiations between the leaders of the two Koreas. The significance of the successful summit talks is not confined to the Korean community. It has sent shock waves to the surrounding four powers, who have national interests on the Korean issues.1) The affirmed principle of "re-Koreanization of the Korean Question," signalling the discontinuation of the status quo on the Korean peninsula, is likely to lead to a shift in the existing power order in Northeast Asia. Subsequently, neighboring countries are seeking policy alternatives to enable them to cope effectively with a scenario that surely involves an enlarged strategic uncertainty. The Korean Question has been essentially international. Since the end of the Cold War, the Korean peninsula has remained one of the few arenas where diverse-and sometimes conflicting-interests of the world's superpowers are played out, due largely to its geo-political conditions. Such conditions have made the cooperation of the global powers necessary and, indeed, a prerequisite in solving Korean issues. Unfortunately, these big powers are neither morally nor legally bound to give their cooperation. Such cooperation may only be secured by offering incentives. It is therefore necessary for the U.S., China, and other concerned major powers to correctly weigh the pros and cons of each Korean solution. In this vein, it is decisively significant in terms of improvements to the quality of life in the Korean community as a whole to understand the repercussions of the inter-Korean summit meetings on the neighboring powers and predict accordingly the policy changes these countries have to make. This paper focuses on the following points: It will assess the results of the concluded summit talks. It will present a prospect of the future of the international politics involving the Korean peninsula, especially North Korea-U.S. relationships, and finally, it will look into the implications of Seoul's policy options.
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE INTER-KOREAN SUMMIT
Obviously, the results of the talks between the heads of states of the two Koreas carry positive notes. The aforementioned six agreements virtually signify the return to the regime defined in the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, the main goal of the South Korea's policies vis-вз-vis its Northern counterpart. In essence, this is a significant step toward breaking the deadlock in the inter-Korean relations of the past. Regularly-held summit meetings, if realized, could herald the virtual launching of the South-North Confederation. Other than the officially-announced results, especially noteworthy is improved understanding by the two leaders of the reality, as opposed to what they were led to believe, and the personal bond of trust they forged, which surfaced during their brief encounter. In an interview with Japan's Tokyo Broadcasting System on February 9, 2000, President Kim said that General Secretary Kim Jong-il had displayed the sense of judgement and insight of a leader. His statement is believed to have been conducive in extending the latitude of establishing policies between open-door policy advocates and the Workers' Party officials. As for trust-building on a personal level, it is a crucial ingredient in forging diplomatic ties with the North, and the two leaders' encounter this time around can be deemed a success. It must be noted, however, that the current inter-Korean agreement is replete with issues-specifically the reunification formula-that may impede a grand reconciliation of the Korean community. As stated in the Declaration, South and North Korea acknowledged the commonality between the two Koreas' proposals, and decided to make joint efforts to achieve a reunification based on that commonality. Although the strategy to emphasize commonality over differences seems to indicate an eventual grand compromise, it intentionally downplays the fundamental disparities of the two formulae, leading to an expectation that the process of convergence of the two reunification policies will be free of impediments. Among the most formidable challenges will be the existence of the unbridgeable gap in social structure as envisioned by the formulae. Whereas the North wants to unify the country as "one country, two systems," the South envisages a unified country under a single system, a difference that appears insurmountable at this stage. Despite the similarities in the South's "confederation"-based approach and the North's approach towards a "loose form of federation," they are nonetheless different as the latter envisions a complete reunification. This brings to the fore another difficulty: translating the similar features of the formulae into practice. As a confederation is hardly a state of unification, reunification should be interpreted as a call for a federation system, and the two Koreas should decide on having either a single system or two systems for its federation proposal. If a decision were made in favor of a single system, the "confederate Republic of Koryo" would be the only option for the North to accept. It is believed that Kim Jong-il's regime would refuse the relevant discussions in the first place if the democracy proposed by the Kim Dae-jung administration would be equated with a free democracy. In fact, in the past, Pyongyang refused to participate in a discussion with the Kim Young-sam administration on this account. If the federation-based unification formula assumes two systems, it would be different from the "three-staged reunification" concept, a scenario any South Korean government, including that of Kim Dae-jung, would find hard to accept. It is also highly unrealistic and thus, inconceivable that two disparate social systems could coexist as part of a unified nation. One plausible scenario would be the North preferring the two countries-two systems formula, as opposed to what it has officially been declared. This would hinge upon the two Koreas' tacit agreement to maintain the confederation structure over a long period despite propaganda that they jointly strive for a unification. Even if the North endorses it, however, this idea may be challenged in the South. The situation could be accepted in the South if its citizens settle for peaceful coexistence, free exchanges and cooperation under the confederation system. However, a confederation system can never be equated with a state of unification. Thus, if the government seeks to establish it as a unification formula, it would not be spared from public criticism that would label it a deceptive approach. Another question is whether the North would want to adhere to the two countries-two systems design for a long time. There is a chance that a confederation system could evolve into a virtual unification state, and long-term maintenance of the structure as such, could lead to the smooth dissolution of structural differences between the two Koreas. The logic behind this view has realistic grounds:2) Any selection of a social regime for a reunified nation should be, and can only be, left up to future generations. The assumption is that a peaceful reunification through negotiations can be realized only through long-term joint efforts. Key to the issue is whether the North can accept it. Needless to say, the North has recently been moving closer toward peaceful coexistence rather than independent reunification, its unwavering stance in the past. However, it would not overlook the implication and possibility of "a counter-unified front strategy" in which the societal unification approach would be preferable to national unification. As mentioned above, the common features of both unification approaches contain some inherent problems that the two governments cannot resolve easily. Therefore there is a possibility that the course of the reconciliation process could take a turn for the worse. Accordingly, the South Korean government has to deal with a sensitive yet decisively significant task: how to move from the stage of recognizing the common factors of the two formulae to the stage of drafting a realistic alternative. From the perspective of international politics, let us look at the outcomes of the first summit talks between the two Koreas. One of the most significant developments was the removal of the mechanism of "the exclusion of South Korea in dealing with the North" from the repertoire of the major powers. Ever since the North undertook nuclear development that reduced the South-North Basic Agreements-supported regime to a hand-to-mouth existence, Korean issues have been internationalized via international mechanisms such as the Four-Party talks. With inter-Korean dialogue channels shut down, all efforts to negotiate with its Northern counterpart have centered around the U.S. Even the two Koreas' stances on pending national issues had to be channeled through Washington. The success of the South-North Summit talks has brought about a dramatic turnaround in this distorted picture. The talks show that the two Koreas can engage in successful communication that free of outside distractions, with minimal transaction costs, and which seeks to optimize the interests of the Korean community as a whole. While it is expected that the "exclude South Korea" mechanism will disappear, it is still likely that the superpowers will aggressively intervene in the process of settling Korean issues based on their heightened strategic concerns. In this light, it is incumbent upon the South Korean government to induce the major powers such as the U.S. and China to resist such temptations and instead to join the two Koreans in pursuing the common cause.
THE DYNAMICS OF THE NORTH-U.S. RELATIONSHIPS
The Prospect of North Korea's Policy toward the U.S.
To elicit the cooperation of the powerful nations in the process of pursuing the two Koreas' cause for peace and unification, we must understand the implications of the South-North Summit talks. This can be done only by evaluating the North's prospective policies regarding those powers. In so doing, we can develop two contradictory predictions. First, let us assume that the North's capability to improve its external relationships is basically governed by the zero-sum principle. Advocates of this view ask: Can the Kim Jong-il regime handle such a large dose of "sunshine," given the past 50 years of autarchic rule? The North's drastic mending of ties with the South would strain its efforts to improve respective relations with the U.S. and Japan. In other words, if the North opts such measures, it could be interpreted as a policy shift that will discontinue or put on hold for a long time its efforts to improve relationships with the U.S. and Japan, relationships with numerous strings attached. The North would want to improve the living conditions of its people by fully exploiting cooperation with the South, certainly with support from China, and possibly Russia. Undeniably, however, this scenario is developed based on the overestimation of the two Koreas' political trust, which began only recently. It is simply impossible to replace fifty years of strained relationship with one that is only 40 days old. Taking into account the fact that the North's survival hinges on the security which only the U.S. can realistically guarantee, it is highly inconceivable that Pyongyang would unilaterally put on hold its efforts to improve ties with the U.S. Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that the South's limited economic powers and the acute need for the influx of the overseas funds have deprived the North of its latitude to leave negotiations at the current stalemate in order to launch diplomatic ties with Japan. It is also possible to interpret North Korea's dramatic reconciliation with its Southern counterpart as a card the North intentionally chose to play in dealing with the U.S. and Japan. The motivation behind such a choice would be to induce sincere and generous responses from the two countries. Obviously large-scale cooperation with the South, combined with Chinese assistance, can be viewed as weakening the urgent need to improve the North's relationship with Japan. However, this interpretation is plausible if the South's ties with the U.S. and Japan were underestimated. The North would not expect the South to improve ties with the North at the expense of serious conflicts with the two countries. The North must fully understand that the South places much more priority on its ties with these superpowers than on its long-standing hostile relations with the North. This is especially true when it comes to maintaining the existing political power base. Taking into account the stance of the formidable conservative power within South Korean society, it becomes all the more true. Consequently, there is a slim chance that the North will opt for the inter-Korean cooperation as a card it can play at the U.S.-Japan negotiation table. In view of this, a more realistic perspective should build on the positive-sum principle. The view emphasizing the possibility of the positive-sum theory sees the North's self-confidence as the reason behind its aggressive efforts to improve ties with the South. According to this view, Kim Jong-il had successfully consolidated his political power during the three-year mourning period for his father, Kim Il-sung, by forcing most of the first-generation elite to resign, and by securing a firm grip over the military. At the same time, while not having to take full responsibility for the food shortage,3) he directed all of his attention to seeking foreign assistance for the recovery of the sagging economy. As these efforts proved relatively fruitful,4) the Kim Jong-il regime has established itself firmly. As a consequence, it began to feel confident, albeit cautious, in opening up its regime to the outside world. The North's acceptance of the proposal for the South-North summit talks can be partly explained as a temporary tactic to prop up the economy and as a card to use in negotiating with the powerful countries. However, one more dominant reason for granting a green light to the proposal could be a strategic shift keeping with the global trend toward dissipation of the Cold War legacy. The shift would raise concern and precaution within the reclusive society of the North, and Kim Jong-il's sudden visit to China should be understood in this vein. It is highly likely that the Chinese leadership enthusiastically encouraged a hesitant and cautious Kim Jong-il to go along with the trend, guaranteeing that it would take an active role in case of a contingency. Against this backdrop, it is only natural to conclude that the North intended to progressively advance relationships with its neighboring countries, while improving ties with the South. In other words, the Kim Jong-il regime, once having secured econo-political stability, judged that it could gain from reinforced inter-Korean cooperation with Chinese and Russian assistance and support. Furthermore, it stands to get positive feedback and synergy effects, and to achieve momentum in its efforts to improve relations with the U.S. and Japan. However, internal conditions are not all that determine the North's maneuvering space. It is also changed by the gain-and-loss structures of others. As de facto patron and guardian, China would like to prevent the North from making headway in bilateral relationships with the U.S. The break-up of the status quo on the Korean peninsula, reflecting inroads made in the improving relationships between Pyongyang and Washington, would heighten both strategic and national security-related uncertainties. This development will likely delay the implementation of economic growth-oriented policies, the highest priority of China, which have been propped up by the principles of both revolution and an open-door policy. In sum, the North is expected to carefully move together with the U.S. and Japan in putting into practice the specifics included in the Geneva Agreed Framework and the Perry Process, as long as it does not infringe upon Chinese interests and as long as hegemony over the Korean peninsula is not passed on to the U.S.
U.S. Stance and Strategies
Then how can we define the U.S. stance? Prior to the successful holding of the Inter-Korean summit talks, the U.S., together with the North, was entering the preliminary stage of the Perry Process with a view to coping with the issue of weapons of mass destruction, including the North's nuclear missiles. In the course of moving into a more advanced bilateral relationship, however, a new stumbling block appeared: the designation of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism. Because of this, the U.S.-North Korean relationship lost its momentum. However, this temporary setback was tactics-related rather than fundamental in nature, and the U.S. continued to adhere to its policy bottom-line: engagement. Therefore, an early settlement was expected to be reached in order to save face for both.5) What is important is that the two countries have moved beyond their traditional negative views of the other. In the past, the U.S. had considered North Korea as the cause for regional instability, whereas the latter had deemed the former as the foremost threat to its survival. However, the Perry Report pointed out that each country could be a threat to the other, an idea that was reflected in the concept of the "mutual threat reduction (MTR)."6) The Perry Process had contributed to the dissolution of mutual distrust between the two. As noted above, the North's diplomatic shift and the successful South-North summit talks are expected to offer momentum to the Perry Process and to improve North Korea-U.S. relationships. The U.S. has been elated as well, announcing after the summit that it would partially lift economic sanctions on the North within a week as a follow-up to the successful meetings.7) The North could interprete it as procrastination, since the lift is linked to the North's deferment of its scheduled missile launch. However, taking into account both the time-consuming administrative procedure and the timing of the announcement, it is interpreted as a positive move by the U.S. The North announced on September 12 of last year that "it will defer any missile launching while the meetings with the U.S. are being carried out," and reaffirmed this decision in the meeting with the U.S. in Rome. Therefore, it is believed that the U.S. decision to actually lift its economic sanctions will increase the stability of the bilateral ties. Of course, the issue of removing the North from the list of state-sponsored terrorists will not be addressed in the follow-up measures, as the U.S. has not abandoned its stance that issues should be dealt with consecutively, on the basis of the progress made at forthcoming meetings on terrorism. However, the North has not engaged in terrorist activities in the past dozen years and there is a need to respond to the swelling optimism regarding reconciliation. Considering these factors, therefore, a U.S. decision on that matter may not be far off. Public opinion in both the U.S. and Japan, about which politicians must be sensitive, supports the opening up of North Korea and intergrating it into the international community. It is likely that the internationally-televised TV scenes of the South Korean president, with the reputation as a staunch advocate of democracy and human rights, hugging his North Korean counterpart, plus the improved overall relationship will generate positive public opinion regarding these two countries. This would in turn extend the latitude of the U.S. administration in embracing the North. U.S. aggressiveness in its approach with North Korea since the fall of the Berlin Wall may be viewed from an international geo-political perspective. The two different attitudes of the U.S. toward North Korea and Iraq illustrates that the U.S. has no choice but to embrace the North while not doing the same to Iraq. Unlike Iraq, North Korea neither seeks hegemony in the region nor hampers the transmission of petroleum. Besides, the North's military prowess is well-known; the U.S. fully understands that any military conflict on the Korean peninsula would likely escalate, as opposed to remaining regionally-limited warfare. More significantly, a hard-line policy vis-a-vis North Korea would be met with strong opposition, not only from the South Korean government, a long-time ally, but also from such great powers as China and Russia. In addition, it would probably raise concerns on the part of Japan, wary of possible refugees and involuntary involvement, both of which must be factored into U.S. strategic considerations. What might be all the more significant is that North Korea is strategically important in relation to U.S. strategy involving China. In Washington's view, Beijing is continuously promoting its regional hegemony-related intentions and capabilities. Accordingly, the U.S. would want to be in a position to check China "if necessary" by incorporating North Korea into the U.S.-led international order of Northeast Asia.8) If the North refuses to respect the U.S. design and instead further strengthens its bonds with China, Northeast Asia would become the first region in which the U.S. international strategy would face substantial obstacles in the course of implementation. Against this backdrop, the U.S. wants to accommodate the North and to integrate it into the international community under U.S. leadership. However, the U.S. is not completely free from worries concerning North Korea. It worries that the North can promote the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. strategy to maintain its military hegemony is two-fold: first to enhance stability and reliability of nuclear weapons in its possession, and second, to minimize any threats to its security that might result from nuclear proliferation. Accordingly, the U.S. seeks to reduce the strategic nuclear arsenal by negotiating with Russia and other nuclear-armed countries.9) At the same time, it strives to prevent non-nuclear countries from going nuclear by exploiting the existing conventions such as the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). One of the significant challenges to U.S. nuclear strategy is North Korea's program. The reason that the U.S. stubbornly struck a nuclear agreement with the North in 1994, despite harsh criticism from within and without and at the expense of enormous political and economic costs, is that it thinks the North would exert a negative influence on its efforts to extend the NPT permanently and conclude the CTBT. Although it is in the national interest of the U.S. to block the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the significance of this issue is slightly exaggerated. Let us be reminded that for over five decades, the U.S. has maintained a peaceful and stable relationship with the former Soviet Union, an archrival that possessed tens of thousands of nuclear warheads as well as sophisticated ICBMs that could strike the U.S. mainland. While it can be said that North Korea, as a "rogue state," cannot be subject to the same nuclear containment scheme that applies to normal countries and that only the complete elimination of threat factors can guarantee security, on the other hand, it should be remembered that President Ronald Reagan once dubbed the Soviet Union as the "evil empire" when he initiated a new Cold War. Then what is the source of U.S. worries? The answer lies in the possibility that the two Koreas would begin to talk about the withdrawal of U.S. Forces in Korea. The U.S. thinks that such a development would lead to China's expansion as an even more powerful country with regional hegemony, leading to an arms race between China and Japan to fill in the power vacuum created in the wake of a withdrawal, heightened pressure demanding the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces in Korea, and the possibility of Japan seeking military control as a consequence. All these developments would go against the fundamental national interests of the U.S. If the principle of uniform competition were to prevail in Northeast Asia in particular, it is possible that a coalition would be formed between the Republic of Korea (and a reunified Korea in particular) and China, based on their closer ties, which would surely not be in the interest of either the U.S. or Japan. The presence of U.S. Forces in Korea is therefore essential as a preventive measure. The U.S. is not in a position to lightly dismiss the possibility that its armed forces in Korea will be included in the negotiation agenda as a result of the complex interaction of many factors. Among them: the Inter-Korean summit talks were made possible thanks to indirect assistance from China, President Kim Dae-jung's strong desire for reunification, and rising anti-American sentiment in the South. A U.S. source reported that the South-North summit talks are brandishing a sharpened blade in the presence of U.S. Forces in Korea.10) Taking into account the timing of US Joint Chiefs of Staff's release of "Joint Vision 2000," a basic document of the report, the level of U.S. concern over a possible withdrawal of the U.S. Forces in Korea is not mere hypothesis. In this regard, the U.S. is expected to respond aggressively and could seek efforts to block the development of inter-Korean relationships if it judges that the outcome of the South-North summit talks is that it promotes the regional hegemony of China, and if the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from the Korean peninsula is raised for public discussion. However, the chances of U.S. worries being realized are not that high, considering that the South has distanced itself from the revisionist course. Also, the stances of other concerned countries are flexible. Then what constitutes the basis of this claim? It seems that the North has begun to take a more positive stance on the issue pertaining to the presence of the U.S. Forces in the South. This shift is obviously related to its recognition of the need to station U.S. Forces in the South to maintain the power equilibrium in Northeast Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. What is more significant, however, is that the presence of American soldiers in Korea would help block any attempts by the South to reunify the entire Korean community through absorption of the North. It is clear that inter-Korean reconciliation increases the likelihood for peace on the Korean peninsula, while also lowering the chance for military-backed absorptive unification. On the other hand, as noted previously, the North would never think that decades-old distrust could be dissipated with the newly-introduced atmosphere of reconciliation. What merits our attention at this juncture is the extreme uncertainty of the policy that the next U.S. and ROK administrations would have on the North. Against this backdrop, North Korea has no reason to stubbornly demand a withdrawal of the U.S. forces except that it could be a useful card at the negotiation table with the U.S. Rather, it must consider that it is more beneficial to secure U.S. assurance of its survival through the improvement of ties. In the process, U.S. Forces in the South would help guarantee the stability in the Korean peninsula and the Northeast Asia region by preventing a power vacuum. The stance of China, a country believed to exert a considerable influence upon North Korea, is just as significant. In short, China does not think that a withdrawal of U.S. Forces is in its national interest due to the "Japanese threat." A large number of Chinese experts agree that U.S.-Japan security cooperation has prevented Japan from being a military expansionist. They believe that by offering Japan national security at low cost, the U.S. has fostered public opinion in Japan to oppose further armament and has caused the right-wing elite to lose ground.11) However, the picture would be different if U.S. Forces withdrew from Korea. In that case, Japan would be the only Asian country where a large number of U.S. armed forces were stationed, a situation which would in turn reinforce a demand for withdrawal of the foreign forces,12) and would eventually lead the U.S.-Japanese security alliance to lose much of its legitimacy. From the Chinese perspective, this would heighten the probability of Japan seeking military independence. To the regional hegemony-conscious China, the presence of U.S. Forces in one of its neighboring countries is obviously unwelcome both in theory and in practice.13) This is even truer when viewed with relation to the U.S.-Japanese New Defense Guidelines, which is deemed as pressure against China.14) On the other hand, it is unlikely that the U.S.-Japanese alliance will be reinforced to the extent that would undermine the stability of Northeast Asia. Therefore, based on a calculation of the overall costs versus benefits, China might think it in its economic interest to have the U.S. foot the whole bill to maintain the stability in Northeast Asia, including the Korean peninsula. As neither of the two Koreas, the U.S., or China seem to want U.S. Forces to be withdrawn from the Korean peninsula, the U.S. military presence in Korea would be maintained unless the U.S. fundamentally revises its national security policies. To summarize, North Korea would think it could reap practical gains by endorsing the alternative: establishing official diplomatic ties with the U.S. reflecting the progress of the U.S.-North Korea relationships and meanwhile not stubbornly opposing the military presence of the U.S. in the South, a critical interest concern for the U.S. On the other hand, the U.S. is likely to continuously engage North Korea while controlling the issue of weapons of mass destruction by resorting to diplomatic leverages. At the same time, it will strive to maintain the status quo in Northeast Asia on the basis of its forward-deployed military forces. As the likelihood increases that the North Korean threats will diminish, it has also become likely that the U.S. might rewrite its security strategy applicable to the Asia-Pacific region in order to maintain the legitimacy of the military presence of its armed forces in Korea. One plausible direction of such a shift would include reducing of the size of the U.S. Forces in Korea, or emphasizing its function as a stabilizer in the region. However, it is not probable that such changes would become reality. The redefinition of the role of the U.S. Forces in Korea entails the revision or even abolishment of the core U.S.-ROK mutual defense pact, which might trigger heated national security- and ideology-related debates in the South Korean community and lead to the collapse of the U.S.-Japanese military alliance. On the other hand, the possibility cannot be totally excluded that the military strategic axis of the U.S. might move to the coastal areas of both mainland China and Taiwan, or to the Middle East, if the U.S. seeks to forcibly implement the national missile defense (NMD) or the theater missile defense (TMD) systems for non-strategic considerations. The U.S. is expected to complete the cross-recognition of the two Koreas by the Four Parties by eventually establishing diplomatic ties with North Korea on the condition that both issues of weapons of mass destruction of the North and the presence of the U.S. Forces in Korea are managed in a stable manner. A new issue concerning who should be the signatories to a peace pact that would bring to an end the Korean War can surface in the course of launching diplomatic ties by the U.S. and North Korea. Considering the North's current attitude, however, a peace pact in which only Pyongyang and Washington participate at the exclusion of the South is unlikely. Seoul will be included among the signatories to the pact, regardless of the format of the pact: either between the two Koreas only, or in the forms of two plus two, or two plus four. The worst scenario envisages that diplomatic ties would be initiated between the North and the U.S. without first successfully concluding a peace pact. This was the case with Japan and the former Soviet Union. One surefire prediction is that the conclusion of a peace pact would not stand in the way of the establishment of diplomatic ties by the U.S. and the North. The basic U.S. stance on the issue of reunifying the Korean peninsula can be characterized as its preference for maintaining the status quo in the region. The U.S. clearly understands that the instability posed by the North has caused it to swallow some costs. However, it judges that any disturbance of the current equilibrium could result in serious political/military outcomes in the currently fluid and tense international security environment. Therefore, it does not want any change to the current matter of state, whether it is due to a sudden collapse of a regime or to absorptive or a peaceful reunification. Rather, it prefers to maintain the current state of affairs by embracing the North, reducing North Korean threats, lowering "North Korea-related costs," and securing the regional stability. At the same time, it wants to continuously exercise its political/ economic/ military influences upon the Korean. Testimony of a U.S. high-ranking official before a U.S. Senate hearing hints at the stance summarized above15): "The goal of the U.S. policy vis-a-vis the Korean peninsula is not reunifying it; rather it aims at supporting a reunification in the case that all Koreans want it. "However, the U.S. will not stubbornly seek to maintain the status quo on the Korean Peninsula. A reunified Korean peninsula can serve the national interest of the U.S. in many ways: as a market-oriented economy, democracy, and the presence of the U.S. forces there can be guaranteed. A possible problem is that the launching of a reunited nation might not guarantee that. If the reunification process threatens vital national interests of the U.S., it is highly likely that the U.S. might want to exercise its influence over the Korean peninsula, as it is motivated to protect its national security-related strategic interests. CONCLUSION
Despite some reservations, the successful summit talks should be viewed as an epoch-making achievement in the history of the entire Korean community. Furthermore, it is believed that inter-Korean reconciliation will have a positive influence on the advancement of stability in Northeast Asia. The holding of a summit talks independent of foreign forces and the building of political trust between the two Koreas neatly illustrate the fact the two Koreas are the main actors tackling their own issues. They have proven themselves effective in leading the U.S. and China to realize that a coalition or confrontation exclusively among the major powers, without involving the two Koreas, would not serve the "individual interests" of the two superpowers. One point that should not be overlooked in relations to the historic breakthrough in inter-Korean relation is the fact that the confidence demonstrated by the Kim Jong-il regime made a great contribution. At the same time, it should be noted that the driving force offering the essential momentum to the North and which boosted its self-confidence is undoubtedly the South Korea-initiated engagement policy embracing the North, and its subsequent implementation. This policy merits our attention in another way; in the course of implementing the policy, the South has led the U.S. and Japan for the first time in their cooperation history. Now is the time for the South to devise follow-up measures to the agreement reached on the reunification formula so that it can be translated into practice. At the same time, it should direct its energies to developing and refining the issues left in rather abstract terms. Prudence and a sense of balance should guide the South in those efforts. The South Korean government should not be carried away by sentimentalism and idealism in the process. It should not lead its citizens to develop unrealistic expectations regarding the inter-Korean agreements. At the same time, it should not exploit the agreements to satisfy its exclusive political interests. It should funnel its energy into carefully coordinating and managing all the conditions, both internal and external, with a view to creating a more stable inter-Korean relationship. More importantly, the South Korean government should make active diplomatic efforts aimed at the superpowers, including the U.S. and China, the countries that have an essential national interest in Korean issues. If the South judges that the goal of achieving peace and reunification of the Korean peninsula remains elusive as long as the gains-and-losses structures of the neighboring countries remain fixed, it must devise and implement policies that are best and most effective in leading the structures to move closer to the interest of the Korean nation and of the entire Korean community. At the same time, it should aggressively expand its existing diplomatic advantages and strategically mobilize them in the course of moving toward the ultimate goal: bringing peace and reunification on the Korean peninsula.
1) Oliver August, "North Koreans Open the Door to a New Era," The Times, June 10, 2000.
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