Volume 12 Number 2 Summer 2000

An Unprecedented Shift:
The Summit and the Joint Declaration

Kim Tae-seo

NOTABLE ASPECTS OF THE SUMMIT

For the first time in 55 years of Korea's division, a historic South-North summit was held in Pyongyang from June 13 to 15, 2000, after finalization of a secret agreement by special envoys reached on April 8, 2000. The summit, although postponed one day at the request of Pyongyang for "technical" reasons, was carried out according to schedule through five rounds of deputy minister-level preparatory meetings.

What made the event especially notable was the unexpected presence of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, who came to the airport to greet President Kim Dae-jung. On that occasion, President Kim was allowed to inspect the honor guard, a formality reserved for visiting foreign heads of state. Moreover, Kim Jong-il got into the same limousine with President Kim and they were driven to the Baekhwawon State Guest House. Expressing goodwill and the Confucian ethic of brotherhood, Kim Jong-il strode confidently by the welcoming crowds of North Koreans. The same image of a relaxed, self-assured leader was seen again at the airport when President Kim left for Seoul.

The three-day summit consisted of the two formal talks-the first one was dubbed a "reception meeting" by the North and the second was a face-to-face meeting between the two leaders-and a meeting with North Korean legislative leader Kim Young-nam, as well as several area-specific discussions among the relevant officials.

THE JOINT DECLARATION

After a three-hour long talk on the second day (June 14), the two leaders signed the landmark five-point Joint Declaration. The Joint Communique comprehensively covers the contents of the July 4 Joint Communique of 1972 signed "on behalf of the leadership," as well as the 1992 Basic Agreement which was signed by the prime ministers and took effect in 1992. The Joint Declaration differs from these agreements in that it was agreed to and signed personally by the leaders of the two Koreas. Moreover, it will be effectively and substantively carried out according to the current domestic and international political climate. The two leaders declared as follows:

A. The South and the North have agreed to resolve the question of reunification independently and through the joint efforts of the Korean people, who are the masters of the country.

The word "independently," which was also mentioned in the July 4 Joint Communique of 1972, has been a bone of contention between the two sides, because for North Korea, it means "eliminating the foreign influence," including the withdrawal of the U.S. forces stationed in the South. When North Korean legislative leader Kim Young-nam raised the issue, citing the principles of "independence" and three-way cooperation between the Republic of Korea, the United States, and Japan, President Kim replied that three-way cooperation is a "win-win" policy that is advantageous to both the South and the North. Furthermore, when asked, whether the National Security Law hindered cooperation and exchange between the two Koreas, President Kim responded that a discussion for a revision was under way based on the draft submitted to the National Assembly. In addition, when Kim Jong-il took issue with ROK's National Security Law, President Kim, citing North Korea's laws and the Workers' Party platform, advised the North Korean leader that the two parties should not interfere in each other's domestic affairs.

In that light, the term "independently" is ambiguous because both sides have a different interpretation that serves their own interests, and it is possible that the two sides could find themselves at odds over this issue in the process of implementing the June 15 Joint Declaration. Nonetheless, this issue is less likely to become a stumbling block, since the two sides seem to be more interested in concentrating their efforts on the promotion of understanding, rather than in adhering to those interpretations. In the current political climate surrounding the Korean peninsula, the two Koreas are already independently conducting diplomacy and independent inter-Korean economic cooperation is badly needed for the recovery of the North Korean economy.

With respect to the meaning of the term "independently," at the first cabinet meeting held after the summit, President Kim explained that whereas Pyongyang had interpreted it as "elimination of foreign intervention" in the past, it now views it as "resolving the inter-Korean issues independently while maintaining friendly relations with neighboring countries." He made it clear that while the issues concerning the Korean Peninsula should be resolved by the two Koreas themselves, both Pyongyang and Seoul must acknowledge the importance of maintaining cooperation with the international community.

B. For the achievement of reunification, we have agreed that there is a common element in the South's concept of a confederation and the North's formula for a loose form of federation. The South and the North agreed to promote reunification in that direction.

Seoul's formula advocates the maintenance of "one people, two states, two systems, and two governments" while forging close cooperation in order to "manage the divided states peacefully and to work toward integration efficiently." The institutional mechanism would consist of negotiating bodies, including those between the chief executives, between cabinet members and between legislatures. This formula is based on the concept that once the two sides build mutual political trust, they can form a confederation and set up institutional mechanisms to promote cooperation that will as a natural consequence, bring about peace and reconciliation.

In contrast, North Korea's federation presupposes "one people, one state, two systems and two governments." Under this system, the central state government would control diplomacy and military affairs while the two regional governments of the South and the North would have autonomy. The "loose form of federation," as proposed by Kim Il-sung in his new year's address in 1991, would be set in place as part of the interim phase prior to finally establishing the above-mentioned federation. It would give the regional governments a mandate over diplomacy and military affairs, while the central state government would be a nominal, symbolic entity. Therefore, based on the acknowledgement that the South-North confederation and loose form of confederation have common factors, both aiming at achieving peaceful co-existence, the two sides appear to have reached a consensus on pursuing reunification along these lines.

Two of the five articles of the Joint Declaration deal with the means for reunification, an indication of its importance to both parties. The two leaders devoted much time to discussing this issue and were very cautious in their approach in reaching a consensus. As a result, they adopted the expression "loose form of" so that the two sides would converge on the idea of establishing a confederation. This indicates the care that will be taken when discussions are in full swing, and yet, some sharply contrasting views are also expected arise as well.

After returning to Seoul from his three-day trip, President Kim advised that "this issue should be discussed in detail by government representatives, scholars, and experts from the two sides" (return speech on June 15). He also added, "Even though discussions on means for reunification may take a while, they should be carried out so that both parties feel secure" (cabinet meeting on June 16).

The South-North confederation is, in essence, a confederate state based on mutual trust built by reconciliation and cooperation. It is a system designed for stable and effective management of the reunification process and for the reunion of the long-separated citizens of the South and the North. Seoul previously suggested, under the Rho Tae-woo administration, "a South-North Confederacy," based on the Korean National Community Unification Formula, as a transitional system of unification. The Kim Young-sam administration which followed also proposed the three-stage reunification process-reconciliation and cooperation to confederation to unified Korean its three-stage National Community Unification Formula.

C. The South and the North have agreed to promptly resolve humanitarian issues: first, exchange visits by separated family members and relatives on the occasion of the August 15 National Liberation Day and second, the question of unconverted Communists serving prison sentences in the South.

Only once in the past was a group of separated family members allowed to meet. In 1985, a group of fifty separated family members (one hundred including the members of a performing arts troupe) visited Seoul and Pyongyang upon agreement between the two governments. The governments planned subsequent visits, but they never materialized. In November 1989, North Korea rejected the plan by taking issue with the contents of the performance. In March 1993, Pyongyang refused resumption of talks between Red Cross officials, a move proposed by Seoul upon the repatriation of Li In-mo, a long-time communist prisoner. Furthermore, at the South-North talks in Beijing in April 1998, North Korea wanted only to discuss Seoul's provision of fertilizer rather that of the issue of reunion of separated families that was on the agenda.

The Joint Declaration specifies the timing of the exchange of family members as August 15, making it appear to be an isolated event. However, President Kim insisted that this would be not the case, saying "Red Cross officials will meet this month." Accordingly, a serious of institutional measures are expected to be enacted, including locating dispersed family members, exchanging letters, and establishing meeting places.

President Kim vowed that if the North took the initiative and demonstrated good faith, the South would resolve the communist prisoner issue through discussion. Kim Jong-il reacted positively, thus increasing hopes that Pyongyang will be more sincere about allowing the reunion of separated family members. The inclusion of the expression humanitarian issues, including the repatriation of communist prisoners leaves room for discussion of other issues, such as the repatriation of South Korean fishermen detained in North Korea.

D. The South and the North have agreed to consolidate mutual trust by promoting balanced development of the national economy through economic cooperation and by stimulating cooperation and exchanges in civic, cultural, sports, health, environmental and all other fields.

In his proposal dubbed the Berlin Declaration on March 10, 2000, President Kim stated, "North Korea's infrastructure, including electricity, railroads, and ports, will be improved." Moreover, at the June 10th cabinet meeting held after the summit, he ordered the ministries to undertake the flood-prevention project on the Imjin River and to construct railroads (reconstruction of the Kyongwon Railroad Line linking Seoul to Wonsan, North Korea's east coast city), as well as to begin a dialogue between government authorities.

At the farewell luncheon held on June 15, Kim Jong-il also made a proposal to reconstruct the Kyongui Railroad Line, which had linked Seoul to Shinuijoo, a North Korean city in the far northwestern region, suggesting that it be accomplished by mobilizing, the South and North Korean militaries. The most urgent economic cooperation project requested directly of President Kim by Kim Jong-il himself was support for building electrical power facilities. In a speech upon returning to Seoul, President Kim elaborated, "The South and the North clearly agreed that they will cooperate in all sectors, including culture and sports." Furthermore, at the farewell luncheon, in response to Minister Park Ji-won's request for an invitation to a delegation of South Korean media leaders, Kim Jong-il answered that "Either, personally or in my capacity as North Korea's National Defense Commission Chairman, I will invite Minister Park and the delegation representing of South Korean newspaper and broadcasting companies." All these point to a gradual, but substantial advancement in South-North cooperation and exchange in various sectors.

E. The South and the North have agreed to hold a dialogue between relevant authorities in the near future to expedite the above agreements.

This indicates that, based on an agreement reached between the two leaders, a dialogue between government officials will be held soon, particularly focusing on the third and fourth points of the communique. In response to a June 17 North Korea Red Cross Society proposal for a meeting, the Korean National Red Cross suggested it be held on June 23, 2000. In addition, the South Korean government held a National Security Council meeting to finalize plans for the high-level government talks between two Korea on July 6.

REVIEW OF THE JOINT DECLARATION

The five-point Joint Declaration consists of fundamental issues, such as Article 1 and 2, pending issues and their implementation, Article 3, 4, and 5, as well as the historical significance of the first South-North summit and Kim Jong-il's acceptance of the invitation to visit Seoul extended by President Kim. The communique can be generally evaluated as follows:

First, the idea of "elimination of foreign intervention" based on its "Three Principles of National Reunification" is something North Korea hoped to manifest through the wording independently. This may become a source of contention; however, Seoul's position favoring reunification by the two Koreas themselves, with the support of the international community, is likely to prevail.

The two leaders had a frank discussion on the nuclear and missile issues, as well as on the U.S. forces stationed in ROK. Moreover, Pyongyang acknowledged the need for each side to carry out diplomatic efforts in the midst of the political dynamics surrounding the Korean Peninsula.

Second, acknowledging that Seoul's confederation and Pyongyang's loose form of federation for reunification are based on a common perception, it is desirable to achieve reunification on a gradual basis, taking into account each others position and interest. Reunification is of paramount importance, relevant to national security and thus, requires careful thought in reaching a national consensus. Therefore, the two sides will continue the discussion, and as progress is made, various joint committees could be launched.

Third, some pending issues and their implementation are somewhat abstract compared to those specified in the 1992 Basic Agreement. Considering North Korea's relationship with the outside world, the overall consensus is that the two sides will pursue the matter carefully. Moreover, continued progress and expansion in cooperation in various sectors could be achieved through the establishment of institutional mechanisms and organizations.

Fourth, in view of the historical significance of the first South-North summit and the prospect of Kim Jong-il's official visit to Seoul, the Joint Declaration will be a vital tool for facilitating inter-Korean cooperation and exchange, and ultimately, reunification. However, that will depend largely on the implementation of the agreed provisions, the surrounding political climate, and the possibility of a second summit.

In general, North Korea is focused on maintaining a cause and on acquiring both economic gains and a means by which to resolve its current diplomatic and security difficulties. Meanwhile, the South is interested in establishing a framework to achieve peaceful co-existence, and to that end, Seoul has made efforts to create diplomatic conditions conducive to carrying out an engagement policy toward the North. The Joint Declaration goes beyond serving the interests of either party; it is aimed at achieving co-existence and co-prosperity through compromise and cooperation. Thus, its actual implementation is expected to achieve those goals based on democracy and a market economy, and to ultimately lead to a unified Korea.

UNEXPECTED OUTCOMES OF THE SUMMIT

To be sure, the landmark five-point Joint Declaration signed by the two leaders is one of the greatest achievements of the summit. However, it has shed light on other elements that are of great importance as well.

First, the summit served as a natural, albeit carefully orchestrated, opportunity for Kim Jong-il to improve his image, implying that he will likely expand his diplomatic scope in the international community. It is noteworthy that Kim is now at the helm, publicly leading the way to preserve the stability of the Pyongyang regime.

While Pyongyang had previously insisted on the inclusion of its "Three Principles of National Reunification" in the summit agenda, at the actual meetings, the North Korean delegation was for more interested in participating in frank and substantive discussions than in following the agenda. Clearly, a face-to-face meeting with the North Korean leader Kim Jong-il enabled meaningful substantial communication with tangible results.

In contrast to low-key treatment of the July 4 South-North Joint Communique (1972) and the 1992 Basic Agreement, this time, North Korean press coverage paralleled media coverage by South Korean and the international media. Such unprecedented attention demonstrates that Kim Jong-il expected a great deal from the summit, or at least wished to take advantage of the publicity.

Additionally, the "independent" achievement of reunification through common elements in the unification formulas of both sides, as well as cooperation in various sectors mentioned in the Joint Declaration are based on Pyongyang's understanding that the South has no intention to "absorb" the North, but rather wants to preserve both governments. Based on this belief, Pyongyang agreed to hold inter-Korean dialogues, and will also shift its policies favorably toward the U.S. and Japan.

By the end of the summit there was guarded hope for the future of the Korean peninsula, under the constant shadow of war from the unpredictable North. Both sides confirmed that neither had any intention to invade the territory of the other and vowed to refrain from further threats. After returning to Seoul, President Kim explained that "the two sides came to a mutual understanding on deterring war and establishing peace." He also added that "if we have the will, there will be no war. We have reached a common understanding regarding many issues." Another note of optimism, at the farewell luncheon on June 15, Kim Jong-il proposed, "If the troops of the North and South continue to face each other as before, they will remain enemies. In order to remedy that, we should mobilize them for the reconstruction of the Kyongui Railroad Line." In addition, Cho Myong-rok, first vice-chairman of the National Defense Commission and chief of the General Political Bureau of the People's Army, offered some significant remarks in a speech at a luncheon attended by the two leaders, "In good faith, the two leaders have made a historic decision before the Korean people. We will faithfully carry out the North-South Declaration." Kim Jong-il also ordered that a meeting of the National Defense Commission be convened to stop the slanderous propaganda against the South, including in border areas near the 38th parallel. He further vowed to cancel the June 25 ceremony conducted annually in commemoration of the Korean War.

The above-mentioned characteristics of the Joint Declaration imply that lengthy and careful discussions between relevant government authorities preceded their inclusion. Details were prepared and examined thoroughly by the two sides prior to the summit, and it appears that the two leaders reviewed and finalized it at the face-to-face meeting.

DIPLOMATIC AND SECURITY ISSUES

At the summit, President Kim is said to have made public South Korea's comprehensive and detailed stance on the pending issues that the U.S. and Japan asked Seoul to communicate to Pyongyang (June 15, presidential spokesman Park Jun-young). He spoke to Kim Jong-il extensively about the nuclear and missile issues, urging that the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and Geneva Agreement must be faithfully observed. He also strongly called for successful conducting of the ongoing missile talks between Washington and Pyongyang, maintaining that the missile threat undermined peace on the Korean peninsula. In addition, he advised that the North Korean economy and the stability of its regime would benefit if Pyongyang were to establish friendly relations with the U.S. and Japan, in the same way that Seoul has established ties with China and Russia, while at the same time cooperationing with Washington and Tokyo. He also explained that just as NATO had remained after the collapse of the Soviet Union to sustain stability and balance in Europe, U.S. forces stationed in Korea would be necessary to ease tensions on the Korean peninsula as well as to preserve the balance of power in Northeast Asia. He continued that "the topics covered included the nuclear and missile issues, U.S. forces stationed in ROK, and South Korean National Security Law. A summary of the discussion was documented and given to Chairman Kim Jong-il." According to Kim Jong-il's request, President Kim delivered Kim Jong-il's message to Clinton immediately after return to Seoul. While delivering Japanese Prime Minister Mori's message about "Japan's strong commitment to establishing diplomatic ties with the North," President Kim emphasized the importance of improving ties with the U.S. and Japan, as well as the critical importance of halting nuclear and missile development for the peace of Northeast Asia. Kim Jong-il extended his appreciation for Prime Minister Mori's message.

REMAINING TASKS

The first priority is economic assistance for North Korea, after which Pyongyang may express the wish for reconciliation hoping for further easing of economic sanctions from Washington. The issue may also cause confusion and raise doubts among the South Korean public about their long-held perceptions of the North. Such drastic changes in diplomacy and increased exchanges with Seoul do have some negative implications. Since the Geneva Agreed Framework, Seoul, rather than Washington, has been branded North Korea's major enemy. Thus, Pyongyang's about-face at the summit may cause confusion internally, and even Kim Jong-il cannot be certain how the North Korean military and the power elite will react.

Although Seoul will have to bear some economic burden, its status is secure and is recognized by the North as such. This was confirmed by the plan to hold dialogues between government authorities as well as to forge government-level economic cooperation. Clearly, it would contribute to the establishment of a framework for peaceful co-existence and co-prosperity. The most important task, however, is to reach a national consensus on the Joint Declaration based on full support from South Koreans so that the efforts to secure peace will be effective.

With the hope that the historic South-North summit will contribute substantially to the easing of tension on the Korean peninsula and the facilitation of inter-Korean cooperation and exchange, the international community, including the four neighboring powers, has expressed positive reactions to the inter-Korean development. Given the fact that South-North economic cooperation needs to be carried out in line with nuclear and missile issues, forging close cooperation with Washington and Tokyo, as well as improving relations with Pyongyang, is imperative. Improved relations coupled with the successful resolution of the nuclear and missile issues will have huge implications on the development of South-North relations. Moreover, the ravaged North Korean economy needs international assistance, including that from the U.S. and Japan.

Both Kim Jong-il's unofficial visit to China some 10 days before the summit-the first ever since his official ascendance to power--and Russian President Vladimir Putin's scheduled visit to North Korea for the first time in Korea's history are expected to have a positive effect on the issues surrounding the Korean peninsula. However, it is important to guard against the possibility of South-North relations leading to diplomatic competition among neighboring powers.

Furthermore, we must not jump to any hasty conclusions that North Korea's recent change in attitude, embracing dialogue and exchange with other countries, including the South, signifies a shift in its basic position, from "controlled liberalization" to a Chinese-style reform and market opening. Rather, Seoul should remain cool while rigorously and thoroughly examining the implementations and the follow-up of the five-point Joint Declaration.

In response to President Kim's argument that "the abrogation of Seoul's National Security Law should be considered in line with revision of the Workers' Party platform," Kim Jong-il is said to have remarked boldly, "we will take the initiative and convene the 7th Party Congress to revise the party platform." Here, it is expected that issues will be examined, such as diplomacy, development of weapons of mass destruction, the unique military-industrial complex economic structure, resolution of social and economic conflicts, and the military strategies used against Seoul. Another question is how Pyongyang will conduct this year's 11th "Pan-national Rally"-a unified front strategy against the South-held every year since 1990.

Moreover, it must not be overlooked that despite the publicity blitz regarding the inter-Korean summit, Pyongyang emphasized "the need to lay a solid economic foundation and to increase its ability to survive since the inflow of foreign capital and aid could eventually lead to the enslavement of our country by imperialists." (Rodong Shinmun, Editorial, April 22, 2000).

All of the above-mentioned factors, including North Korea's seemingly contradictory claims, the friendly attitude shown by Kim Jong-il at the summit, expanded cooperation and exchange between the two Koreas and their relations with the U.S. and Japan, will cause a either gradual or a dramatic change in North Korea, regardless of the will of its regime, and this development needs to be carefully observed.

In order to open a new era of reconciliation and cooperation by resolving age-old confrontations and conflicts, and to establish stability on the Korean Peninsula and peace in Northeast Asia, appropriate measures must be drawn up to assure the success of the Joint Declaration. At the same time, we must ensure security and military readiness. Finally, the South should avoid trifling with the meanings of the terms and contents of the declaration, all of which have been mutually agreed upon, in order to suit its own needs.