America's Military Presence in Northeast Asia
after the Cold War:
Winning Without Fighting?

Zhiqun Zhu*

How countries in Northeast Asia interact has been of great concern to the United States. With the growing importance of the region to the economic and security interests of the United States, it is critical for the public to understand the nature of U.S. policy toward Northeast Asia. North Korea's unpredictability and its nuclear capability, continuing tensions between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan, and concerns about the resurgence of Japanese militarism by many people in East Asia all highlight the importance of studying and evaluating current U.S. military policy toward the region. This paper explores why the United States has continued to maintain military forces in Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) since the Cold War.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and China's turn toward market-oriented economic reform, there has been considerable debate over the purpose of continued American military presence in Northeast Asia. Through a critical review of the debate, I attempt to analyze the nature, significance and problems of America"s military policy toward Northeast Asia.

Why did the U.S. station troops in East Asia
during the Cold War?

Americans have long harbored a sense of Manifest Destiny regarding Asia. The official U.S. presence in East Asia can be traced back to Commodore Matthew Perry's visit to Japan in 1853, America"s annexation of the Philippines after the Spanish-American War in 1898, and John Hay's declaration of an "Open Door" policy toward China at the turn of the century.

At the end of World War II, America's major purpose in Japan was to demilitarize and democratize Japan under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. But The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 changed U.S. policy toward East Asia. American troops participated in the Korean War and fought to a stalemate against North Korea and China. Instead of democratization of Japan, the goal of U.S. policy shifted toward using Japan as a forward base for the positioning of supplies and forces. With a divided Korea and the unfinished civil war in China, the presence of American forces in the region seemed necessary for America's global strategy and the safety of its allies.

Military and ideological confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union became the overriding framework of American policy during the Cold War. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all became bulwarks against communism. American military bases and personnel were maintained not only in Northeast Asia, but in the Philippines and elsewhere. Defense alliances were also established with Australia and New Zealand. All these measures indicated the primacy of security, military, and geopolitical considerations in American policy toward East Asia, which remained the key to American-East Asian relations throughout the Cold War.

Why HAS the U.S. maintainED forces in Northeast Asia after the Cold War?

Today East Asia looks quite different, given the striking historical transformations. Led by "four tigers" of Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, East Asia's economies have been developing with unprecedented speed. China continues to open up and is seeking to maintain good relations with the international community. North Korea and South Korea joined the United Nations (UN) simultaneously in 1991, moving from non-recognition of each other to mutual accommodation and coexistence. East Asia has attained peace and prosperity on a scale that would have been difficult to imagine during the Cold War.

American Objectives in the Post-Cold War Era

In 1990, the United States had 135,000 forward deployed forces in the Asia-Pacific area, including 50,000 in Japan and 44,400 in the ROK. By the end of 1994, total U.S. troops in Asia had been reduced to around 100,000, with about 47,000 in Japan and 37,000 in the ROK. Since 1990 the U.S. Defense Department has submitted the East Asian Strategy Report (EASR) to Congress every two or three years. The first EASR argued that, in spite of the reduced Soviet threat, U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region would remain similar to those of the past.

Those interests were identified as being:

? protecting the United States from attack

? supporting U.S. global deterrence policy

?preserving U.S. political and economic access to the region

?maintaining the balance of power to prevent the rise of any regional hegemony

? strengthening the Western orientation of Asian nations

? fostering the growth of democracy and human rights

? deterring nuclear proliferation

? ensuring freedom of navigation

According to the report, "forward deployed forces, overseas bases, and bilateral security arrangements [remain] essential to maintaining regional stability, deterring aggression, and preserving U.S. interests."1) Like previous reports, the November 1998 EASR states that the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific brings stability to the region and promotes the region's constructive development. It confirms that the U.S. will continue to strengthen its alliances and friendly relations with nations in the region, and will maintain the 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia for the foreseeable future.2)

In October 1993, the Clinton administration published The Report on the Bottom-Up Review to assess the threats likely to confront the U.S. in the post-Cold War era. The review continued the Bush administration's strategy of being able to win two major regional conflicts occurring nearly simultaneously. North Korea played prominently in the grand strategy planning, since one of the two simultaneous regional contingencies may well be a second Korean War scenario.3)

In April 1996, Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and U.S. President Bill Clinton confirmed their intention to revise the U.S.-Japan bilateral defense cooperation guidelines. According to President Clinton, the 100,000 U.S. troops are stationed in the Asia-Pacific region "to preserve the peace and uphold U.S. interests in the region."4) Documents signed by the two leaders reaffirmed the importance of defense cooperation and stated that Japan would continue its financial and other support for U.S. troops. The April 1996 summit between President Clinton and ROK President Kim Young-sam also reaffirmed a strong mutual commitment to the defense of South Korea and a stable East Asia.

Arguments for continued U.S. military presence in Japan and ROK

American government officials and scholars who argue for the maintenance of U.S. military forces in Japan and South Korea in the post-Cold War period often cite regional stability, protection of allies, economic importance, and American national interests in general as major reasons behind the American policy. The Bush administration officials described the role of U.S. military in the post-Cold War Asia as a "regional balancer, honest broker, and ultimate security guarantor." Other phrases used to describe the role of U.S. military included an "irreplaceable balance wheel" and a "central stabilizing role." Richard Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs during the Bush administration used the term "arbiter" to describe the U.S. role.

While emphasizing U.S. economic interests in Asian Pacific, the Clinton administration continues America's military commitment to East Asia. Addressing the Japanese Diet during an April 1996 visit, President Clinton warned that the withdrawal of American forces from Japan and South Korea "could spark a costly arms race" in the region.5) Secretary of Defense William Cohen, while visiting East Asia in January 1998, described the U.S. military presence as "an anchor of stability amidst the storm" that brings regional stability and confidence. He told an audience in Jakarta, "if the U.S. is not here, then another country would fill the vacuum."6)

Joseph Nye, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense, argued in a 1995 Foreign Affairs article that the U.S. presence in East Asia is "a force for stability, reducing the need for arms buildups and deterring the rise of hegemonic forces."7) Acknowledging the changes of international environment in East Asia, Nye contemplated alternative strategies facing the U.S., such as withdrawal from Asia, creating loose regional institutions or NATO-like regional alliance in Asia. He concluded that continued U.S. leadership and U.S. military presence in the region are the critical variable in the East Asia security equation. America's forward-deployed forces in Asia "ensure broad regional stability, help deter aggression against our allies, and contribute to the tremendous political and economic advances made by the nations of the region.

The U.S. military, for its part, has attempted to directly sell its plan in Asian countries. During his visit to Beijing in May 1997, General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told skeptical Chinese officials that any withdrawal of American troops now in Asia could set off a heated arms race.8) He indicated that China is not considered an adversary and that the end of the Cold War marked a fundamental shift in American policy toward "engagement" in Asia. Some people worry that if U.S. forces were withdrawn from Japan, Japan might be forced to rearm and even go nuclear. The U.S. military presence is like "a cap in the bottle" to prevent Japan's military buildup, remarked a U.S. military official.9)

Some government officials and scholars outside the U.S. also favor a continued U.S. military presence in East Asia after the Cold War. Okamoto Yukio, a former Japanese Foreign Ministry official, thinks that though the end of the Cold War has greatly reduced threats to regional peace, how the situation will change in the future is by no means certain. Therefore, the policy of "maintaining forward-deployed forces in Asia...is of vital importance to the United States itself" since it has broad economic and security interests in the region.10) Another Japanese scholar echoes this view and points out that because of various security problems in the region, the U.S.-Japan military alliance is a vital component of the complicated strategic balance in Asia and "a cornerstone that cannot be removed without causing the entire structure to crumble."11)

Those who favor continued American military presence in Japan and South Korea generally agree that the U.S. presence remains crucial to the defense of South Korea and Japan, to balancing the rising power of China and to the protection of sea lanes that are critical to trade throughout East Asia. Most of these arguments reflect the views of the U.S. government, without taking into consideration the negative impact of the policy and how the changed security and economic environments would affect the American strategy in the region.

Arguments Against Continued U.S. Military Presence in Japan and ROK

Those who argue against continued U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea usually cite economic cost, lack of a clear post-Cold War strategy, perpetuation of Japan's political underdevelopment, and prolongation of unfinished civil wars to make their cases.

For its critics, the U.S. military presence, especially the U.S.-Japan military alliance does not make much sense. Why should Japan, a rich and populous country, have to depend on 47,000 foreign military personnel to defend itself when it faces no obvious threats? And on the Korean peninsula, the South's GNP is at least 20 times that of the North. It is North Korea that often feels threatened by the power imbalance.

Chalmers Johnson, a leading Japan scholar, argues that there is no reason for the United States to continue to spend more than $35 billion a year to maintain American troops in Japan and South Korea, both of which have the economic resources to support sufficient forces for their own defense.12) He believes that America's "outdated security policy does not encourage a healthier liberal democracy in Japan but instead strengthens reactionary, narrow-minded political leadership." Thus "only an end to Japan's protectorate status will create the necessary domestic political conditions for Japan to assume a balanced security role in regional and global affairs." To counter the argument that America's military withdrawal will create an arms race and instability in the region, Johnson urges the American people not to forget that the 1992 closing of America's two largest overseas bases, Clark Air Base and Subic Bay in the Philippines, "produced not even a shiver of instability." While some argue that American military protection makes the East Asian economic miracle possible, Johnson claims that East Asia's own invention of state-guided capitalism did more to overcome the communist threat than any military role played by the United States.

Even before the fall of the Berlin Wall, some scholars argued that the fundamental challenge facing the United States was not Soviet military might, but the danger of economic insolvency, an eroding industrial base, and the growing American inability to compete with the newly formidable economic rivals, especially Japan, South Korea and Taiwan-the very allies that the U.S. had spent so much to protect. So the end of the Cold War has become the catalyst for a new American global role keyed to emerging economic and political realities rather than a declining military threat. The United States should focus on the economic dimensions of its security. They also contend that the U.S. military presence encourages a regional arms race and is perpetuating the division of unfinished civil wars between the two Koreas and between the PRC and Taiwan.13)

As evidence of America's lack of a well-defined post-Cold War strategy, many government officials and scholars would or could not clearly name the source of threat. Though some scholars point to North Korea, very few would be willing to clearly identify China as a more dangerous threat, as Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro did in their controversial book.14) In fact, to avoid directly confronting China, the 1998 New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation refrains from clearly defining "situations in areas surrounding Japan" which the U.S.-Japan security system would cover if conflicts were to occur.

To counter the argument that the massive American military presence must remain in East Asia because-among other reasons-it ensures the stability of the region, strengthens alliances and friendships, and even serves America's economic interests by opening foreign markets to U.S. products, one analyst argues out that these are all misleading. First, East Asia is better stabilized by economic interdependencies than by military forces. Second, the claim that huge concentrations of troops in small areas such as Okinawa strengthen friendships is absurd, as the 1995 rape case shows. And third, the American military presence does nothing to open Japanese or any other regional markets.15) Indeed, the United States has trade disputes with almost all the countries in the region and suffers from an unfavorable trade imbalance with almost all of them.

Lack of Consensus

The question of why the United States continues to maintain military forces in Japan and South Korea is more complicated than it appears. Many people often go to extremes in arguing either for or against America's military presence in Japan and South Korea, with little attention being paid to the gray area in between. For example, if the U.S. military presence is necessary in Northeast Asia, how many troops are adequate? It is possible that the United States could downsize the number of forces in the region due to political or economic pressures at home. A reduction in the level of the troops deployed may greatly alter the nature of the debate. Also, how will the changes on the Korean Peninsula affect the American military presence in Japan? When these factors are taken into consideration, people's views on U.S. forces in Northeast Asia will be more diverse.

Those who argue for U.S. military presence in East Asia assume that East Asian nations are not capable of establishing collective security mechanisms. Nye points out that Asia presently lacks a NATO-like web of multilateral security institutions, but he does not explore the possibility that a collective security arrangement might be established at some time in the future, in a similar way to the process by which NATO was formed and expanded. Critics also point out that the concept of a security vacuum in East Asia that has to be filled by the U.S. smacks of the colonial era and the "white man's burden" mentality. It reflects a lingering self-image of the U.S. as a world policeman.16)

On the other hand, those who oppose continued U.S. military presence in East Asia tend to downplay the security issue and focus instead on geoeconomics after the Cold War. They fail to discuss what the consequences might be if the United States completely withdraws its forces from East Asia. And some of them perceive the issue from a narrow nationalistic perspective and oppose any foreign interference in Asian affairs. They ignore the truth that politics and economics are interrelated and that the world has become more interdependent. The global market operates within a political framework: without a secure political environment, there will be no economic development.

Underlying the debate is the lack of consensus among governments, scholars and the public in the United States as well as in East Asia on what missions U.S. forces in Japan and South Korea shall perform, or whether they are even needed after the Cold War.

How do regional governments react
to America's military presence?

Japan

Officially Japan welcomes the U.S. military commitment to the region and calls the presence of U.S. forces a "precious" resource for Asia.17) Japan considers its special relationship with the U.S. including security arrangements under the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation as the foundation of its foreign policy.

However, some Japanese officials have complained that Japan should "grow up" and demonstrate its maturity by assuming the responsibility for its own defense. If Japan remains dependent upon the U.S. for defense and for foreign policy guidance, when and how will it ever "grow up" and become a "normal country?"18)

There is also a gulf separating American and Japanese public perceptions of the U.S. troops in Japan. While many Americans see the deployment of U.S. troops as a favor for Japan, most Japanese do not share this perception and would like to see fewer U.S. troops on their soil. A May 1996 opinion poll found that while 70 percent of Japanese support the alliance with the U.S., 67 percent favor a reduction in the number of U.S. forces stationed in Japan.19)

Some former government officials and scholars argue that the U.S. military presence is not an end in itself, but only a means to achieve regional peace and security. To ensure a long-term security in Northeast Asia, some sort of collective security mechanism needs to be established among regional countries. Former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro argues that the security treaty with the U.S. is a diplomatic instrument, and it is impossible to anticipate what could happen if conditions in either nation should change. Therefore Japan should consider its security situation from a more independent perspective. He further suggests that Japan should help to create a system that can prevent war by working with other countries, and the idea of "collective security" ought to be incorporated into Japan's constitution.20)

Republic Korea

The South views the U.S. military presence south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) as essential to counter challenges from the North. American forces in South Korea are regarded as a deterrent to war on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia as a whole. Since American troops "are still fulfilling their sacred mission of defending the nation against possible North Korean provocations or full-scale invasion," The South stands firm "against any demand for the withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces from Korea under the present circumstances," remarks an editorial in the Korea Times.21)

However, the South is somewhat concerned about the strengthened U.S.-Japan security ties. Having suffered from Japan's colonial occupation in the past, the South will "maintain a close watch on any Japanese moves to become a military power under the pretext of enhancing the collective security of the Asia-Pacific region," warns a Korean analyst.22) Deep in the heart of many Koreans and other Asian peoples, there remains a distrust of Japan and a fear of renewed Japanese militarism.

North Korea

North Korea, for its part, calls the American military presence in South Korea a "crime...that is prolonging the Cold War on the Korean peninsula." It urges the U.S. to end "the military occupation of the South."23) North Korea has proposed a bilateral peace treaty with the U.S. to replace the current armistice agreement under which the DMZ is maintained.

North Korea has repeatedly called on the UN Security Council to dissolve the U.S. forces in South Korea known as United Nations Command (UNC). In a letter to the Security Council, North Korean Ambassador Li Hyong-chol warned that the UN "should not allow the United States to use the United Nations name for provoking the Second Korean War."24) Li reminds people that the UNC in South Korea is not an organ under the UN system or a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, but is under U.S. control.

North Korea also condemns the U.S.-Japan military alliance. An article in the official Rodong Sinmun attacks "Japanese reactionaries" for fully cooperating with the U.S. "in carrying out the latter's Asia-Pacific strategy through the mobilization of all Japanese resources."25) The article adds that Japan may use the U.S.-Japan military alliance as a cover to interfere militarily in other countries, especially on the Korean peninsula.

China

During the Cold War, China took a benign view of the American military presence in Asia as an offset to Soviet power, it also considered the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty as a mechanism to prevent a regional arms race by containing Japan.26)

However, China is quite concerned about America's continued military presence in Japan and South Korea after the Cold War. Former Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen told reporters at an ASEAN conference in 1995, "We do not recognize the United States as a power which claims to maintain the peace and stability of Asia."27) Some Chinese have been accusing the United States of pursuing a policy of "containment" towards China. A Chinese official bluntly points out that since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States has needed a new rationale for keeping its huge defense establishment. Maintaining troops in Japan and South Korea helps to justify its enormous defense budget. "Some Americans are creating the myth that a dangerous communist dragon is rising in the East," he complains.28)

China is particularly concerned that the New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation may cover the Taiwan Straits, a sensitive area in which the PRC government does not tolerate any foreign involvement. China views the status of Taiwan as an internal issue and warns that other countries should refrain from interference. In a related issue, America's refusal to exclude Taiwan from its planned Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system will cloud U.S.-China relations in the years ahead.

On the other hand, China is somewhat ambivalent about the forward deployment of U.S. Forces Korea. Some argue that China wants to keep a cushion between itself and South Korea. That means maintaining the status quo and opposing war, since China knows North Korea would lose and the armed border would move north to the Yalu River.29) The U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula can at least delay a military clash between the North and the South. Both the United States and China share a common interest in the stability of the Korean peninsula. Though some Chinese feel threatened by the U.S. presence in South Korea, others feel the U.S.-ROK alliance is a stabilizing force that keeps the South Koreans restrained (against North Korea) and the Japanese reassured.30) Thus for the time being, China seems ready to accept the status quoÇô divided Korea with U.S. troops in the South.

Problems of America's continued military presence
in Northeast Asia

The U.S. presence in Japan and the ROK provides an important degree of stability, deters North Korean adventurism, lessens the likelihood of Japan's remilitarization, and serves as a counterweight to a rising China. However, continued U.S. military presence in Japan and the ROK also creates difficulties.

Japan

For many years, the U.S.-Japan relations have been beset by problems, especially the huge trade imbalance. Some argue that the problems stem primarily from the fact that the existing security alliance has made Japan excessively dependent on the U.S. Because dependence began with those security ties, Japan was cut off from its natural markets and was integrated instead into the North America market, which in turn created the huge trade imbalance. The only viable solution, claims Tetsuya Kataoka of the Hoover Institute, is "devolution of military responsibislity, reduction of U.S. military budgets, greater military autonomy for Japan" and a relationship based on "greater equality."31)

But is this a good solution? For one thing, Japan's rising military power has created grave concern among its neighbors, especially China and Korea. In 1987, Japan breached the budgetary ceiling of one percent of its GNP on its defense expenditures. In the 1990s, Japan began sending Self-Defense Forces overseas to participate in UN peacekeeping activities. The steps to expand Japan's military power and role are deemed as resurgence of militarism by Japan's neighbors and were strongly protested by China and both Koreas.

In addition, both the U.S. and Japan have to address the concerns of the Okinawan people. The strongest dissatisfaction with the presence of U.S. troops in Japan is concentrated precisely where over half of them are located, and where their presence is most strategically vital: Okinawa. The manifestations of that presence are distinctly unpopular with local citizens. In a 1995 Mainichi Shimbun poll, only 7.8 percent of the Okinawa residents viewed U.S. forces in Okinawa as "necessary," while 31 percent grudgingly considered them "unavoidable," 24.9 percent thought them "unnecessary," and 29.4 percent "dangerous." The poll was conducted before the sensational September 1995 rape incident and ensuing mass demonstrations, the largest in Okinawa history, which involved on one climactic day 85,000 people, or 8 percent of the entire local population. In a 1996 non-binding referendum, nearly 90 percent of voters in Okinawa favored downsizing the U.S. military presence. Okinawa governor Masahide Ota's refusal to sign extensions on several base leases in late 1995 provoked a serious political and diplomatic crisis for the Japanese government.32) Though Keiichi Inamine, the new governor, is more willing to compromise with the central government in return for much needed public funds, most Okinawans continue to oppose the U.S. bases.

Republic of Korea

Some South Koreans view the presence of U.S. troops in the ROK as necessary for the protection of America's own national interests. South Korea's failure to retain the right to detain U.S. personnel and investigate crimes committed by them during negotiations with the U.S. in 1992 to amend the ROK-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) wounded the national pride of many Koreans. Crimes by U.S. soldiers against Koreans naturally cause a strong reaction by Koreans. U.S. soldiers should be informed that "when they commit crime in the ROK, they will be strictly punished according to ROK law," says an editorial in a Seoul newspaper.33) Some civic organizations state that they want their government to "search and investigate all kinds of crimes by U.S. troops committed against Koreans" and "to work for the revision of the SOFA that guarantees equal rights."34)

Establishing a multilateral cooperative mechanism

The bilateral security relations between the U.S. and Japan and between the U.S. and the ROK have been strengthened after the Cold War. But both the Chinese and Russians are left out of America's alliance structure. Both China and Russia wonder if the new military ties are aimed at them. How to alleviate the concerns of China, North Korea and Russia need to be furthered addressed. "Should the U.S. fail to help build a regional dialogue on security and should East Asians fail to take up the challenge of multilateralism, the region may become the most important zone of conflict in the twenty-first century," warns two Asia experts.35) The current U.S. policy aims to maintain the status quo; it does not envision a way to resolve the problems in Northeast Asia. As "the least hated, most trusted country" in the region,36) the United States can play a more constructive role. Strategies based solely on balance of power are too focused on military considerations and not sufficiently attuned to the economic, political, and cultural aspects of national influence, factors that are becoming more important in the post-Cold War era. Bilateral and security issues often dominate the U.S. policy agenda toward Asia. Northeast Asia lacks a multilateral system of security guarantees. It has become vital for the U.S. to have a regional strategy toward Northeast Asia.

Multilateral regimes and forums are designed to increase transparency and build confidence. In Southeast Asia, the ASEAN Regional Forum has gathered together regional governments to discuss security issues, including the dispute over the Spratly Islands. Some scholars have proposed the creation of a similar regional forum in Northeast Asia to address security issues collectively. For example, Joseph Nye proposed a Northeast Asia Security and Cooperation Conference for Japan, China, Russia, the U.S., and the two Koreas in 1992.37) David Hitchcock, another veteran Asia hand and a retired U.S. Foreign Service officer, also supported East Asian regional security cooperation to meet "multiple threats and opportunities."38) America's official 1995 EASR also outlined a four-part plan for U.S. policy towards East Asia, one of which is to "gradually build multilateral regional institutions."39)

There have been positive developments in multilateral cooperation in recent years. Officials from both Japan and South Korea have called for multilateral talks among regional powers. Koichi Kato, Secretary-general of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party, points out that "with [regional] problems unresolved, it is important for Japan, the U.S. and China to maintain healthy three-way relations," and "the tripartite relationship should operate in such a way as to hold each other's unacceptable behavior in check."40) South Korean Deputy Prime Minister Kwon Oh-kie also believes that it is imperative for the countries of the region to develop a "regional security framework" that seeks peace and prosperity through close dialogue and cooperation.

Significantly, both North and South Korea have participated in several rounds of the four-way talks, also involving China and the U.S. which started in Geneva in December 1997. Japan has been supportive of the talks from the beginning okay; and Russia, though it complained at first about being excluded from the talks, has now expressed support for such talks.41)

In the early 1990s, China viewed multilateral confidence building with some suspicion. Many Chinese analysts emphasized that the increased transparency called for by such institutions could reduce China's deterrent capabilities, particularly its ability to deter Taiwanese moves toward independence or foreign intervention in cross-strait relations. But China has not shunned multilateral forums. In recent years, China has shown an increased interest in multilateral forums. In 1997 Beijing hosted an ASEAN Regional Forum intersessional conference on confidence-building measures. China has signed multilateral agreements on border demarcation and confidence-building measures with Russia and several central Asian countries. In 1998 Beijing agreed to trilateral security talks with the U.S. and Japan.42) And in November 1999, leaders from China, Japan and the ROK held their first trilateral summit meeting, ahead of the ȸSEAN plus three (China, Japan and the ROK) summit" in Manila, to discuss economic cooperation and other related issues.43) Through gradual confidence building, a security dialogue system involving the two Koreas, China, Japan, the U.S. and possibly Russia could be established in Northeast Asia to address the concerns of all parties and lay a foundation for solving the problems of the region.

Without doubt, obstacles exist in forming a truly multilateral mechanism. For example, if Taiwan wishes to join the multilateral security talks, it will be strongly opposed by the PRC. This will create a dilemma for other parties. One solution is that Taiwan could be invited to participate in the informal, non-governmental "track II" security consultations.

By 1992, South Korea had established diplomatic relations with both Russia and China, but North Korea remains isolated, without formal relations with either the United States or Japan. If both the United States and Japan speed up normalization talks with North Korea and grant diplomatic recognition to it in due course, Pyongyang is expected to be more willing to enter multilateral talks.

Concluding remarks

The end of the Cold War does not mean an end to potential security challenges in Northeast Asia, and serious questions remain regarding long-term stability in this politically dynamic, economically vibrant region. Despite its economic momentum and relative peaceful security environment now, East Asia is full of seeds of future uncertainty and instability. The maintenance of the currently benign security environment is an essential precondition to sustained economic growth and regional stability. Given that the region lacks a multilateral security mechanism and that mistrust still exists among countries in Northeast Asia, the United States will continue to play an important role in East Asia. America's active engagement in East Asia is not only in America's interests but contributes positively to regional stability and prosperity.

An adequate U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia remains crucial, but security in East Asia must not be defined exclusively in military terms. Though many obstacles exist, Northeast Asia must work out measures that guarantee long-term stability. Efforts designed only to prolong the status quo, without a larger vision of the arrangements required to construct a peaceful long-range future, will soon face difficulties. Having been involved in East Asian affairs for decades, the United States is in a position to promote dialogues between conflicting parties in the region. Helping to establish a multilateral security mechanism should become the priority of America's strategic interests in Northeast Asia now. While maintaining its troops in Northeast Asia, the U.S. government is advised to shift its strategic focus from its current bilateral approach and short-term objectives to multilateral and long-term cooperation with regional governments. Only when a cooperative security framework involving all players is formed, can long-term peace and stability be guaranteed in Northeast Asia.

* I wish to thank Professor Jerel Rosati and my colleagues at the "advanced Seminar in U.S. Foreign Policy" at the University of South Carolina for their critical comments.

1) Cited in Martin L. Lasater, The New Pacific Community: U.S. Strategic Options in Asia (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), p.18.

2) See East Asian Strategic Review 1998-1999 (Tokyo: The National Institute for Defense Studies, 1999), pp. 195-196.

3) Peter L. Hahn's "Grand Strategy" in Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay (eds.), U.S. Foreign Policy After the Cold War (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997).

4) Shin Hee-Suk, "U.S.-Japan Security Relations and the Politics of Northeast Asia," Asian Perspective, Vol. 20 No. 2 (Fall-Winter 1996), p. 334.

5) "U.S. Soldiers Ensure Peace in Asia, Clinton Tells Japan," The Toronto Star, April 18, 1996, p. A18.

6) "American Military Presence in Asia 'Serve U.S. Interests,'" (Singapore), The Straits Times, January 15, 1998, p. 44.

7) Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "The Case for Deep Engagement," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77 No.4 (July/August 1995), pp. 91-103.

8) "Top Brass Tries to Sell China on U.S. Military Role in Asia," Christian Science Monitor, May 16, 1997, p. 1.

9) Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Henry C. Stackpole III made this comment in 1990, cited in Mike Millard's "Presence of Bases Erodes Japan-U.S. Alliance," Asahi News Service, October 20, 1995.

10) Okamoto Yukio, "Why We Still Need the Security Treaty" Japan Echo, Vol.22, No.4 (Winter 1995), p. 11.

11) Nakanishi Terumasa, "Saying Yes to the Japan-U.S. Partnership," Japan Echo, Vol. 17 No. 1 (Spring 1990), p. 41.

12) Chalmers Johnson and E.B. Keehn, "The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74 No. 4 (July/August 1995), pp.103-114.

13) Selig S. Harrison and Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr., Asia after the "Miracle" Defining U.S. Economic and Security Priorities (Washington, D.C.: The Economic Strategic Institute, 1998), pp. 28-29. Also see Doug Bandow's "Leaving Korea" in Foreign Policy, No. 77 (Winter 1989-90), pp. 77-93.

14) See Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Vintage Books, 1998).

15) These arguments are elaborated by Mike Millard in his "Presence of Bases Erodes Japan-U.S. Alliance," Asahi News Service, October 20, 1995.

16)Selig S. Harrison and Clyde V. Prestowitz, "Pacific Agenda: Defense or Economics?" Foreign Policy, No. 79 (Summer 1990), p. 68.

17) Shin, op. cit., p. 334.

18)For more details on this, see Millard, "Presence of Bases Erodes Japan-U.S. Alliance," Asahi News Service, October 20, 1995.

19) Cited in Morihiro Hosokawa, "Are U.S. Troops in Japan Needed?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77 No.4 (July/August 1998), pp.2-5.

20)Nakasone Yasuhiro," Rethinking the Constitution," Japan Quarterly, Vol.44 No.3 (July-September 1997), p. 5.

21) "U.S. Defense Commitment to ROK," The Korea Times (Internet version), April 15, 1999. FBIS-EAS-1999-0415, same date.

22) Shin, op. cit., 341.

23) "The United States Should Seek Peace on the Korean Peninsula," Rodong Sinmun, March 29, 1997. FBIS-EAS-97-119, April 29, 1997.

24)"ROK Daily Reports on DPRK Request for UN to Dissolve UNC," The Korea Times (Internet version), February 23, 1999. FBIS-EAS-1999-0223, same date.

25)"What Is the Japanese Aim in Supporting U.S. Military?" Rodong Sinmun. FBIS-EAS-97-201, July 20, 1997.

26) Aurelia George Mulgan,"The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship in a New Era," in Denny Roy (ed.), The New Security Agenda in the Asia-Pacific Region (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1997), pp. 140-169.

27) See ȸ Confident China No Longer Wants America's Military Muscle in Asia," Los Angeles Times, August 7, 1995, p. A5.

28) Roy (ed.), op. cit., pp. 140-169.

29) See "Compromise Increases the Risk of War," Forbes, March 24, 1997, p. 152.

30)C. S. Eliot Kang, "Managing Change: Korea and U.S. Security Strategy in Northeast Asia," paper delivered at the Conference on East Asian Security, Charleston, South Carolina, November 5-7, 1999, p. 29.

31) Tetsuya Kataoka. The Price of a Constitution (New York: Taylor & Francis Inc., 1991), p. 220.

32) The information about the polls and the referendum is based on Kent E. Calder's Pacific Defense: Arms, Energy, and America's Future in Asia (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1996), pp. 92-93.

33)"Strict Punishment Should Be Dealt Against Crimes by U.S. Soldiers," Kyonghyang Sinmun, May 21, 1995, p. 3. FBIS-EAS-95-099, same date.

34)"Civic Campaign Group Calls for ust and Equal RevisionO of SOFA," Seoul Yonhap, News, Agency, June 9, 1995. FBIS-EAS-95-112, same date.

35) Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, "Rethinking East Asian Security," Survival, Vol.36 No. 2 (Summer 1994), p. 20.

36)This is a comment made by a Korean scholar, reported in David I. Hitchcock, Jr.'s "East Asia's New Security Agenda," The Washington Quarterly, Vol.17 No.1 (Winter 1994), p. 94.

37) Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Coping with Japan," Foreign Policy, No. 89 (Winter 1992-93), p. 101.

38)David I. Hitchcock, Jr., "East Asia's New Security Agenda," The Washington Quarterly, Vol.17 No.1 (Winter 1994), pp. 91-105.

39)The other plans are to "reinforce existing alliances, maintain about 100,000 troops in the region, and constructively engage China," cited in Joseph S. Nye Jr.'s "Alliance Still Vital to Both Countries," The Christian Science Monitor, February 6, 1998, p.22.

40) "Keynote Speeches," Asahi News Service, April 10, 1997.

41)Kim Kook-chin, "The Task of the Four-Way Talks, and the Positions of the Countries Involved," East Asian Review, Vol.10 No.2 (Summer 1998), p. 4.

42) Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," International Security, Vol.23 No.4 (Spring 1999), pp. 71-73.

45)CNN News Online, "China, South Korea, Japan hold groundbreaking talks" at http://cnn.com/ASIANOW/east/9911/28/asean.east.asia.ap.