Dismantling the Sole Remaining Cold War
Structure and the Engagement Policy
THE COLD WAR STRUCTURE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA
Under the circumstances in which the hostile confrontation between the East and the West has deepened since 1945, the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula was created out of the tangled relations among the two Koreas and the four powers. This structure has four different frames, inter-linked organically. The first frame is the biggest and within it the two Koreas and the four powers are major actors. However, because this frame has some characteristics of the post-Cold War era, it does not exactly fit into the Cold War structure. In this frame, current issues such as nuclear proliferation, North Korea's test-launch of missiles, and the normalization of the U.S.-North Korea and Japan-North Korea relations, should be resolved. The second frame involves inter-Korean relations, so called "the Cold War belt," the third is the domestic situation of South Korea, and the fourth entails North Korea. These last three frames reveal more characteristics of the Cold War structure than the international community still has. In other words, the frames are relatively far from the worldwide tendency of the post-Cold War era. Of course, the domestic situation of North Korea is the closest to the Cold War structure. Moreover, inter-Korean relations still form "the Cold War belt." On the other hand, the domestic situation in South Korea is contributing to the dismantling of the Cold War structure, corresponding to the direction of the post-Cold War era.
In the Cold War structure, two countries have been divided based on different ideologies, and they have not only confronted each other politically, but militarily as well. Furthermore, enmity, distrust, and exclusion have prevailed in the structure. For instance, in the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula, there exist long-lasting hostility between the two Koreas, the U.S. and North Korea, and Japan and North Korea respectively. Despite the "Inter-Korean Basic Agreement" of 1992, hostility between the two parties caused incessant conflicts and confrontations on the Korean peninsula, and raised nuclear and missile issues in the international community.
What does dismantling the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula mean? It means dissolving mutual enmity and distrust existing among countries. Through this process, a new kind of relationship will be formed among six nations, and in particular, the two Koreas will be able to build an unprecedented structure of mutual trust. Consequently, dismantling the Cold War structure on the peninsula will contribute to assurance of a peace regime on the peninsula, consolidating coexistence of the two Koreas, normalization of the U.S.-North Korea and Japan-North Korea relations, lifting economic sanctions against North Korea, inter-Korean economic cooperation, resolution of the North Korean missile and nuclear issues, and the establishment of a peace treaty through the four party talks.
However, from August to December in 1998, the tension stemming from North Korea's development of weapons of mass destruction was drastically heightened. The incident reveals that the Cold War structure still exists not only on the peninsula but also in the international community, despite the global trend of detente in the post-Cold War era. In late 1998, the U.S.-North Korea and Japan-North Korea relations deteriorated, because they were based on "the mirror image effect." This effect was obvious in the crises of the U.S.-North Korea, and Japan-North Korea relations, caused by the North Korean nuclear and missile issue in August 1998.
During that time, the crisis was triggered by a report from the New York Times (on August 17, 1998), saying that North Korea might be constructing a huge nuclear reactor in the area, 40km northeast of Yongbyun.2) With all the denial from North Korea, this report caused an anti-North Korea mood in the United States. On top of that, North Korea's test-launch of a missile, "Taepodong 1," (on August 31) led the United States and Japan to suspect that North Korea had developed nuclear weapons and that it possessed a long-range missile armed with a nuclear warhead. Therefore, the United States and Japan considered seriously taking harsh action against North Korea and issuing sanctions against it.3) In particular, Japan reacted hysterically to the test-launch. In response, North Korea argued that it had not launched a missile, but a satellite, and it denounced the United States and Japan' suspicions.4)
In this heated standoff, the United States' Department of Defense (DOD) and Japanese Conservatives attempted to deploy the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system. While on September 21 1998, the United States and Japan agreed to begin joint research on the TMD system in 1999 5) which irritated North Korea and China.6)
When a new joint war plan between South Korea and the United States leaked out to the press in November 1998, it once again escalated tensions between the United States and North Korea. The Washington Times reported that both South Korea and the United States were preparing a new military plan, enabling them to preemptively attack North Korea's military bases including its long-range artillery and air forces bases, if they detected a hard evidence that North Korea would wage a war.7) Of course, the plan induced North Korea's wrath, and consequently, on December 2 1998, a spokesman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the People's Army declared that it would take strong military action against South Korea and the United States, blaming the war plan and the "Operational plan 5027."8) Furthermore, the North Korean authorities incited the North Korean people to hold nationwide rallies supporting the declaration. Public opinion in the United States and Japan called for a hard-line stance on the suspected nuclear site in Kumchang-ri and the North Korean missile issue.
The North Korean nuclear issue based on "the mirror image effect" escalated distrust and hostility between the U.S.-North Korea, and Japan-North Korea, and ultimately heightened the tension on the Korean peninsula. Moreover, rumors about an outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula in March and May 1999, negatively impacted South Korea¤£ effort to overcome its economic crisis at that time. Ultimately, the tension was eased by the efforts of South Korea, which proposed a comprehensive approach to dismantling the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula, and by North Korea's agreement to permit the UN inspectors' access to the suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumchang-ri.
Even though peaceful unification is a very difficult task, it is the ultimate goal. Under the current circumstances, it is first necessary to assure peace on the peninsula. Therefore, to consolidate a peace mechanism, the two Koreas should cooperate to establish a framework for coexistence, by ending confrontation and restoring reconciliation. The current engagement policy is what is needed to accomplish such goals.
The Kim Dae-jung administration's engagement policy toward North Korea, based on its strengthened security stance, aims to assure peace on the Korean peninsula by achieving reconciliation between the two Koreas, while pursuing the ultimate goal of unification of the Korean peninsula by means of both security programs and peace talks. In other words, the engagement policy was established, given the changing international environment and the domestic situation of North Korea. Furthermore, it is targeting two goals: the first goal is the status quo, maintaining a peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula, and the other is unification, gradually breaking the status quo. From the outset of his administration, President Kim Dae-jung has implemented an engagement policy toward North Korea, incorporating three principles. First, the administration will never tolerate any armed provocation by the North. Secondly, South Korea has no desire to pursue unification by absorbing the North unilaterally. Thirdly, the administration will do its best to promote inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation.9) The administration also decided to advance the inter-Korean talks and cooperation based on the "principle of separating business from politics" and the "principle of reciprocity." First of all, the Kim Dae-jung administration will maintain a strengthened security stance while implementing the engagement policy. That is to say, the engagement policy focuses on enhancing a self-sufficient security system to deter any armed provocation by the North. Therefore, the administration will avoid making a provocative declaration or organizing a mass rally against the North, which only increases tension on the Korean peninsula. 10)
Secondly, the principle of separating business from politics means that the inter-Korean relations in private sectors will be dealt with separately from inter-governmental relations. Its goal is realizing inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation, and inducing North Korea to change from within, by means of various private-level contacts.
Thirdly, the engagement policy toward North Korea will be carried out on the principle of reciprocity. The rationale is that aid or cooperation from South Korea should be reciprocated with corresponding measures from the North. The principle of reciprocity is important setting the tone for "give and take" in the inter-Korean talks. In other words, the engagement policy aims at promoting reciprocal practices in the inter-Korean talks, not unilaterally seeking practices. Of course, reciprocity does not mean that a strict principle will be applied to every issue on the basis of equivalence. Taking into account the characteristics of inter-Korean relations, reciprocity cannot be compared to trading at a market. It is sometimes necessary to acknowledge a time gap between give and take, by giving first and expecting a return some time later.
The Kim Dae-jung administration's engagement policy toward North Korea has also established a totally different concept for the improvement of inter-Korean relations from those of past administrations.11) In practice, the inter-governmental talks have played an important role in improving the inter-Korean relations. That is why inter-governmental talks have been considered as only tools to improve the inter-Korean relations. However, the Kim Dae-jung administration readjusted the role of the inter-governmental talks, at the same time, understanding how important they are to improve the inter-Korean relations.
First, the Kim Dae-jung administration policies have led to a drastic increase in inter-Korean exchanges, including the inter-governmental talks, and these exchanges will contribute to improving the inter-Korean relations. In other words, even though the inter-governmental talks may be in a stalemate, activated inter-Korean exchanges in private sectors can improve inter-Korean relations.
Secondly, increased inter-Korean social and economic exchanges and cooperation will facilitate confidence-building on the Korean peninsula, lead to resumption of inter-governmental talks, and bring about favorable results in those talks. Thus, even while the inter-governmental talks are stalemated, the increased inter-Korean exchanges can reduce hostility and create a conciliatory atmosphere which will induce the North Korean authorities to resume the talks. Consequently, the increased inter-Korean exchanges will greatly contribute to the tension reduction on the peninsula and bring about inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation.
B. Conditions for Implementing the Engagement Policy
The engagement policy toward North Korea is aimed at reducing the hostility of the North and inducing it to be conciliatory. Besides the efforts of the administration, however, several other prerequisites are required to implement the engagement policy. The prerequisites are a more self-sufficient security system to deter North Korea, and the self-confidence to overpower the North in many areas. In particular, the engagement policy is based on the following objectives and historical analyses of the situation on the Korean peninsula and the prospects for unification.
First of all, if the Korean peninsula is unified peacefully, a unified Korea will operate under a market economy. This prospect is deduced from two facts: one is the collapse of other socialist countries and the other is the fact that North Korea's resources are exhausted. The collapse of other socialist countries means the defeat of socialism and a socialist economy. The world is rapidly being reorganized into a capitalist market economy. Given the situation, North Korea faces a serious problem of resource shortage, and the North has been forced to ask for aid from Western countries for its survival. Thus, there will come a day when North Korea must give up socialism and adopt a market economy. Consequently, it is certain that a unified Korea will adopt a market economic system, as well as employ a democratic political system whose form is quite opposite or at least far from socialism. Based on these prospects, it is recommended that South Korea pursue a peace regime on the Korean peninsula first, not a hurried unification.12)
The prospects for the Kim Jong-il regime are also very important in deciding what kind of foreign policy should be employed toward North Korea. For instance, if there is a good possibility that the regime will collapse or face drastic changes within Kim Dae-jung's presidency (February 2003), South Korea's foreign policy toward North Korea should be readjusted to deal with the changed situation. In the event that the regime remains stable for a while, a basic policy should be established with an emergency contingency plan, on the assumption that the Kim Jong-il regime will endure. In fact, the Kim Jong-il regime does not seem on the verge of collapse, although it is suffering from a deteriorated economic situation. Thus, at least from a short-term perspective, North Korea will muddle through, despite its terrible economic depression.13)
Is North Korea progressing toward peace and openness?14) This question is very important in that the engagement policy toward North Korea was established on the premise that the North would change from within. Even though North Korea intimidated the South, and exhibited a radical and sometimes hostile attitude, the North itself has shown some positive signs of change since the early of 1990s. These include: the establishment of various foreign investment laws including the "Law on the Contractual Joint Venture" the acknowledgment of the right of the North Korean people to sell surplus agricultural products in markets;15) and the persuit of normalization of diplomatic relations with foreign countries. Furthermore, North Korea has adopted market economy concepts in the economic articles of its Constitutional Amendment of September 5, 1998, and enhanced the economic pragmatism separating business from politics.
In fact,
these changes in North Korea resulted from an inevitable strategic choice
for its survival. Whether the Kim Jong-il regime opens its door or not
depends on the structural conditions surrounding the peninsula, not on his
own will. However, Kim Jong-il may not want a change. As for Kim Jong-il's
"Juche (self-reliance) Idea," opening its door could mean submission to
South Korea, and inter-Korean dialogues would mean giving up the North
Korean terms of revolution on the Korean peninsula. The fact is, however,
that Kim Jong-il's choices are severely limited by conditions such as the
collapse of other socialist countries and North Korea's exhausted
resources. It is obvious that even though Kim Jong-il does not favor a
change, he has no power to overrule it. In spite of the fact that he still
has leverage, such as making bellicose threats, it is not only
ineffective, but also dangerous to use the restricted leverage in the
post-Cold War era. Currently, in his efforts to set foreign policy, Kim
Jong-il seems very confused by the conflict between his own will and the
environmental restrictions imposed upon him. However, it is expected that
his policy direction will be clearer as time goes by.
Nowadays, North Korea's development of weapons of mass destruction has become a hot issue which must be resolved in the international level. Especially, to end the Cold War legacy and to assure peace on the Korean peninsula, the North Korean nuclear and missile issue should be resolved as soon as possible. A comprehensive approach, philosophically based on the Kim Dae-jung administration's engagement policy, is believed to be the solution.16)
In order to resolve the North Korean nuclear and missile issue, it is necessary to first of all sort out and analyze crucial factors that have an influence on the issue. The factors are North Korea's strategy for survival, and the United States and China's foreign policies toward North Korea.17) The following four premises can be deduced from the analyses of the factors:
- Premise 1
North Korea will expand its diplomatic relationships with foreign countries. There is little chance for North Korea to continue its closed-door policy and self-imposed isolation as part of its confrontational policy toward South Korea.
- Premise 2
North Korea will pursue a double-spearhead strategy of militarism and economic pragmatism. This strategy is to maintain the Kim Jong-il regime by means of its military power, the sole leverage left to the regime. At the same time, it will improve its economic situation through allowing a partial market economy. Under the double-spearhead strategy, while the North will continue using military threats to maintain the regime, it will cooperate to resolve the nuclear or missile issues in return for certain economic rewards, as long as the maintenance of the regime is guaranteed.
- Premise 3
The United States will continue to block North Korea¤£ development of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles. On the contrary, if the North shows a cooperative attitude to resolving the issue, the U.S. will help the North to participate in the international community. Moreover, the U.S. will play an active role to ensure that the North receives more international aid so it can pull itself out of economic depression.
- Premise 4
China will make various efforts to prevent the collapse of North Korea, and it will induce the North to participate in the international community. China is against North Korea¤£ development of weapons of mass destruction. However, even if the North insists on developing them, China will not agree to take sanctions against North Korea, and instead will try to resolve the issue in a peaceful way.
Considering the four premises, the U.S.-North Korea hostility relating to the North Korean nuclear issue is not necessarily serious enough to cause an inevitable confrontation. While the U.S. made it clear that Washington will never permit North Korea's development of weapons of mass destruction, Pyongyang is in a position that the North could cooperate to resolve the issue. They can be compensated with an economic reward, as long as the maintenance of the regime is guaranteed. This shows that the outlook of the resolution of the issue is not so pessimistic.
Currently, North Korea and the United States are in discord on setting the priority between guaranteeing the maintenance of the Kim Jong-il regime (by establishing a U.S.-North Korea treaty) and giving up the development of weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, they also have different views on the nature of the financial reward. For instance, the U.S. insists that North Korea stop developing weapons of mass destruction first, in order to receive a guarantee of the maintenance of the regime. Furthermore, it argues that the financial reward can be given to the North, only from a humanitarian standpoint, not from a moral or political perspective.
However, North Korea argues that it already gave up developing nuclear weapons following the "Geneva Agreed Framework" of 1994, and that, in response to the North giving up missile development, the U.S. should guarantee the maintenance of the Kim Jong-il regime, according to the U.S.-North Korea peace treaty. Furthermore, the North asks the U.S. to provide it with political and military rewards for giving up its missile industry, a part of its sovereign defense system. Besides that, Pyongyang proposes that it would stop exporting missiles if the U.S. provides compensation, and insists that the UN inspectors should pay an entrance fee for access to the suspected underground nuclear facility, since the North has nothing to hide.
In considering
the arguments of both sides, the necessity of the comprehensive approach
is raised. The fundamental purpose of the approach aims at dismantling the
Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula, and resolving the issue by
comprehensively addressing every related areas including the military,
politics, diplomacy, and the economy. Finally, the comprehensive approach,
based on the engagement policy, has been accepted as a common policy by
South Korea, the U.S., and Japan in the name of the comprehensive
engagement policy. In September 1999, the "Review of United States Policy
toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations," better known as the
Perry report, was released. The report recommends a comprehensive and
integrated approach based on the comprehensive engagement policy in order
to reduce tension and resolve the North Korean issues.
North Korea has fiercely denounced the Kim Dae-jung administration's engagement policy. However, a close look into North Korea's foreign policies toward South Korea, tracking not only its official dialogues but also its foreign policies, reveals that the North's responses to the South's engagement policy have undergone three stages.
The first stage corresponds to the early days of the Kim Dae-Jung administration in March and April of 1998. During this period, North Korea seemed to interpret the South's engagement policy in its own terms. At first, the North took a wait-and-see attitude, naturally, expressing several times its concerns, as well as its desires for improving inter-Korean relations.18) At this stage, it seemed that Pyongyang mistook the Kim Dae-jung administration's engagement policy as simply an aid channel line to the North. In fact, Pyongyang felt that it had done the South a big favor just by attending the inter-governmental talks, and expected to receive 200,000 tons of fertilizer from the South without conditions. However, at the vice-ministerial talks between the two Koreas held in Beijing, when Seoul suggested that Pyongyang agree to cooperate in reuniting separated families in return for the fertilizer aid, the North must have been quite surprised.
In the second stage, North Korea became suspicious about the engagement policy toward the North (from May to August 1998). In May 1998, immediately after the vice-ministerial talks in Beijing were stalemated by the Kim Dae-jung administration's principle of reciprocity, North Korea began to criticize the engagement policy. The North denounced the principle of reciprocity as a tactic to aggravate the inter-Korean division and confrontation,19) claiming, "President Kim Dae-jung is following the misguided footsteps of the former President Kim Young-sam."20) Moreover, the North argued that the engagement policy was anti-national, aggressive, and cunning, and that it aimed at destroying North Korea.21) In answer to Seoul's remark inducing North Korea's openness, Pyongyang claimed that the remark was meant to undermine the socialist system and to stab the North Korean people in the back.22) Moreover, the North saw the principle of separating business from politics as simply deceitful rhetoric.23) It seemed that North Korea had no interest in improving inter-Korean relations.
The third stage of Pyongyang's response to the engagement policy, covers the period from September 1998 when Kim Jong-il formally assumed the regime, to the present. The major characteristic of this stage is that Pyongyang began taking advantage of the favorable parts of the engagement policy, instead of rejecting it altogether. The change was caused by a combination of the following three factors: Pyongyang's internal change to allow economic pragmatism in order to pull itself out of economic depression; its partial acceptance of the Kim Dae-jung government's engagement policy; and its response to United States' hard-liners.
North Korea appears to accept the sincerity of the Kim Dae-jung administration's anti-confrontational policy because despite the harsh criticism of the South Korean people, following North Korea's infiltration of submarines and armed spies, and launch of a satellite, the administration has consistently implemented its engagement policy toward the North. Moreover, it seems to realize that the Kim Dae-jung administration's engagement policy is quite different from those of past administrations. They have observed the constant support for the "Mt. Kumgang Tourism Project," based on the principle of separating business from politics, despite all the difficulties and unfavorable public opinion. Finally, North Korea has come to accept the Kim Dae-jung administration's determination to stick to the principle of separating business from politics, as proof that the administration really wants to improve the inter-Korean relations, and that it is not a hostile strategy.24)
Even as North Korea issues propaganda against the South, it promotes private-level inter-Korean economic exchanges because it wants to earn hard currencies. Hyundai Group's honorary chairman Chung Ju-young's successful visit to North Korea, and Kim Jong-il's remarks expressing interest in economic cooperation with the South, show that there have been changes in Pyongyang's attitude.
Nevertheless, North Korea did cause the naval confrontation between the two Koreas in the West Sea, crossing the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in June 1999. The confrontation cast doubt on Pyongyang's intentions to engage in dialogue with Seoul, and alerted the South Korean people on the North's provocation. It seems, however, that North Korea did not want to wage a war, but that it had caused the confrontation on purpose. It can be inferred that the North contrived to make the NLL a disputed issue through continuous military confrontation in the buffer zone, until the general-level talks on June 15, 1999. The North must have judged that there would be no chance for military collision once the talks began. Furthermore, it took into account that if both sides withdrew from the disputed area through mediation by the U.S., the North would be able to make the NLL a disputed zone where the South could not maintain sole territorial jurisdiction. However, threatened by the South Korean Navy's persistent ramming operation, the North Korean patrol boats fired first, spurring a naval confrontation.
In the end, North Korea lost the battle and failed to carry out its original plan. Due to the South Korean Navy's counteraction, North Korea not only failed to make the NLL a disputed zone, but also experienced a bitter defeat in the first battle since the Korean War of 1950. The North was equally shocked by the gap between the military capability of the two Koreas. Despite Kim Jong-il's propaganda about the North's "great military power," the North Korean Navy was totally overwhelmed by the South, a puppet of the U.S. This stunned North Korean political and military leaders. Naturally, the hard-liners in the North Korean military could have insisted on revenge, because the defeat was so fatal to them who vowed to become "guns and bombs" for Kim Jong-il and promoted the Kamikaze spirit, a suicidal attack. Consequently, for a while, the naval confrontation in the West Sea was good reason for the North to reject the engagement policy officially. In particular, it caused a disruption of the vice-ministerial talks in Beijing held right after the confrontation. However, from the mid- and long-term perspectives, the doves among the North Korean authorities will take power again, bringing the military leaders to account for the defeat. For example, North Korea has allowed the South Korean people's visit to the North since August 1999, and Hyundai Group's honorary chairman Chung Ju-young was permitted to meet Kim Jong-il again in the early October, showing that despite the defeat in the naval confrontation in the West Sea, the North finds it difficult to reject the engagement policy.
Even though North Korea continues to take exception to the term, "engagement," it has in fact moved toward acceptance of the policy. For example, the North will more actively participate in the inter-Korean economic exchanges, then, it will prove the validity of the principle of separating business from politics, aiming at activating private-level inter-Korean exchanges and using the increased exchanges as leverage to improve inter-Korean relations. Therefore, it seems desirable for the Kim Dae-jung administration to continue to implement the engagement policy.
Currently, the engagement policy proven effective in the relations with North Korea, is gaining wide support from the international community. However, the opposition parties and the conservative hard-liners in South Korea are still casting doubts on its effectiveness. Therefore, the most important task is to obtain a nation-wide consensus on the policy. In fact, to implement the engagement policy rather fitting to the post-Cold War era, a nation-wide consensus is inevitable in South Korea, where there is little tolerance on different ideologies. Consequently, it is a priority to draw the very consensus on the engagement policy to which everyone agrees, not a consensus formed only by a political leader or a political party. If the success of the engagement policy is seen as a victory by all political and social organizations, it will be more consistently implemented based on the national consensus.
- Dismantling the Cold War structure on the Korean
peninsula was officially proposed by President Kim Dae-jung at a
National Security Council meeting on January 4, 1999. Dong-a
Ilbo, January 5, 1999.
- Dong-a Ilbo, August 18, 1998.
- The hard-liners in the U.S. and Japan raised
their distrust against North Korea, interpreting the Constitutional
Amendment on September 5, changing the Presidential system into a system
led by the National Defense Commissioner, and even the slogan "Kangsong
Taeguk" reflecting its will to resuscitate the economy, as North Korea's
strengthening military adventurism.
- Rodong Shinmun, September 18, 1998.
- Dong-a Ilbo, September 22, 1998.
- Dong-a Ilbo, September 25, November 7,
December 2, 1998.
- Chosun Ilbo, November 20, 1998.
- Rodong Shinmun, December 3, 1998.
- Ministry of Unification, The Government of
the People: a Keynote on Foreign Policy toward North Korea, March
26, 1998.
- Paek Hak-soon, "How should we appraise the
recent events related with North Korea and do we stand by the Engagement
Policy?" Current Issues and Policy, Sejong Institute, July
1999, pp.6-7.
- Lee Jong-seok, "Inter-Korean Talks; Present
Situations and Future Tasks," Forum on Reunification of Korea,
Chongmyong Culture Foundation, Spring 1999, pp.71-73.
- Lee Jong-seok, Study on Unification in the
Age of National Division, pp.12-14.
- Lee Jong-seok, "The Prospects for Change in the
North Korean Regime and the Strategy to Manage the National Crisis,"
The National Security Forum, National Security Council of
Korea, Vol. 24, 1997.
- Lee Jong-seok, "Restructuring the North Korean
Power System and Its Policy Toward South Korea," National
Strategy, Sejong Institute, Vol. 5, No.1 (1999).
- Chosun Shinbo, October 24, 1996.
- Lee Jong-seok, "The Resolution of the Nuclear
and Missile Problems: Why a Comprehensive Approach?" Trend and
Policy, Sejong Institute, May 1999.
- Lee Jong-seok, "International Issues of the
North Korean Problems: Cause, Progress, and Prospect." in Paek Hak-soon
and Jin Chang-soo, International Issues of North Korea
Problems, (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1999).
- Rodong Shinmun, March 28, 1998.
- Pyongyang Broadcasting Station, April 28,1998.
- Rodong Shinmun, July 6, 1998.
- Pyongyang Broadcasting Station, July 6, 1998.
- Pyongyang Broadcasting Station, June 17, 1998.
- Rodong Sinmun, July 22, 1998.
- North Korea, of course, will not easily change its attitude to denounce the engagement policy as a strategy to overturn the Kim Jong-il regime.
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