The Emerging Triangle:
Korea Between China and the United States
INTRODUCTION
In his recent book on post-Cold War geopolitics, The Grand Chessboard,
Zbigniew Brzezinski underscores the existing and potential rivalry in
Asia between China and the United States.1) According to Brzezinski,
China regards America as the perpetrator of this rivalry. "Through
its Asian presence and support of Japan," he explains, the United
States "stands in the way of China's external aspirations."2)
He goes on to make the interesting assertion that the focal point of this
Sino-American rivalry will be Korea. Although this assertion may be going
too far, there is much truth in the notion that the two powers are intensifying
their competition. Where will this competition lead?
This article is a review of the changing relations among the two Koreas,
China and the United States. These dynamic and evolving relationships
can often be seen as triangular patterns of varying dimensions. In human
relationships a triangle often means two persons in love with a third
one at the same time, creating tension, jealousy and often trauma. In
diplomacy, though, the term triangle is used to describe a special dynamic
among three nations such that considering only bilateral relations among
them is inadequate.
In recent history, three types of triangular relations stand out. The
first is one that seemed to characterize the relationship among the United
States, the Soviet Union and China in the 1960s and 1970s. During that
period, the three powers alternately competed and cooperated with one
another, all the while maintaining a certain distance from each of the
others. One might picture a sort of equilateral triangle in this case.
A second type of triangle can be found today among the United States,
China and Japan. In this instance, the triangle is an uneven one in that
the United States and Japan are much closer to each other¡ªmilitarily,
economically, and diplomatically¡ªthan either is to China. Yet, certain
elements that link the three powers stop short of creating a relationship
in which the United States and Japan find themselves together pitted against
China. For their respective reasons, both the United States and Japan
find it necessary to maintain close relationships with China.
A third triangular-type relationship could be found during the 1960s and
1970s when Vietnam as a small country was caught between two giants¡ªthe
Soviet Union and China. In fact, this situation was described by Donald
Zagoria as the "Vietnam triangle."3)
In an analogous way, North Korea tried to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet
rivalry of the 1960s by playing one off against the other. In both cases,
a small state got squeezed or tried to maneuver, as the case may be, between
two much larger powers.
The relationship among China, the United States and the two Koreas¡ªNorth
and South¡ªpresents yet another, still evolving, triangular pattern, one
which has seen significant changes particularly in the past decade. Until
the end of the 1980s, China and the United States each had close and exclusive
relationships with separate halves of Korea. Since around 1990, however,
an overlapping pair of triangles has emerged¡ªone between China, North
Korea and South Korea on the one hand, and the other between the United
States and the two Koreas.
However, a closer look at the situation suggests a still newer phenomenon¡ªthe
emergence of a single, more powerful triangular relationship that encompasses
China, the United States and all of the Korean peninsula. This new pattern
is developing as both China and the United States are beginning to see
the Korean peninsula not only as a geographical area which houses the
two Koreas, but also as a place where Korea as a nation is located. The
increasing prospect for Korean unification makes it all the more necessary
for the two powers to begin to adjust their thinking about Korea.
Will this bring the United States head to head with
China over the Korean peninsula? Or will there be a new kind of
relationship in which the three actors maintain a healthy distance from
one another and manage a peaceful and cooperative existence? The jury is
still out on this question. But a good place to start is by understanding
how this triangular relationship has evolved to date.
CHINA-KOREA RELATIONS FROM A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Throughout history, China has always had close ties with Korea¡ªall or
at least a significant part of it. The historical Sino-Korean tributary
relationship was severed after the end of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95.
At this point, under the Treaty of Shimonoseki, China renounced its suzerainty
over Korea and recognized her "full independence."4)
For the next half century, Chinese influence in Korea all but disappeared
as a result of Korea's domination by Japan. The only exception was support
of the Korean independence movement in China.
Between 1945, when
Korea was liberated from Japan, and 1950, when the Korean War broke out,
China played only a minimal role on the divided peninsula. It was the
United States and the Soviet Union that exercised overwhelming influence
on the peninsula, allowing China's two contending forces¡ªthe Kuomintang
(KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)¡ªonly negligible roles there.
The start of the Korean War in 1950 brought China back as a major player,
primarily in North Korea, until the late 1980s.
Consequences of the Korean War
The Korean War had several significant consequences for the China-Korea
and China-U.S. relationships. The first was an enmity between China and
the United States that would last almost two decades, until 1972. Together
with the Soviet Union, China became an object of America's containment
policy and endured an embargo of nearly 20 years.
A second consequence is that the United States became a clear and determined
obstacle to China's desire to "liberate" Taiwan. The United
States signed a security treaty with Taiwan in 1954, and the U.S. Seventh
Fleet was routinely deployed in the area. Even after the Sino-American
rapprochement of 1972, the United States continued to sell arms to Taiwan
and to provide a protective umbrella as demonstrated during the Taiwan
Strait crisis in the fall of 1995.
Another direct consequence of the war was the postponement of China's
admission to the United Nations. During the Korean War, the UN declared
China an aggressor. Thus, until 1972, the People's Republic of China (PRC)
was locked out of that forum, making it impossible to gain Taiwan's seat,
much less become a permanent member of the UN Security Council.
For the Korean peninsula, the most important consequence of Chinese participation
in the War was that China's influence over North Korea was firmly established.
The Soviet Union, which initially approved the North Korean invasion of
the South, was hesitant to become engaged for fear of confrontation with
the United States. By contrast, the PRC not only contributed troops and
suffered heavy casualties during the conflict, but also continued to provide
support and security by stationing its troops there at least until 1958.
These actions inevitably gave China considerable influence in North Korea.
Indeed, despite the changes in major-power relationships, there was not
much movement for several years in the two triangular relationships of
Beijing-Pyongyang-Seoul and Washington-Seoul-Pyongyang. In fact, there
was a 20-year lag between the thaw among the big powers, and realignment
in the relationship between the major powers on the one hand and the two
Koreas on the other. The effects were not felt in Korea until 1991 and
1992 when the Soviet Union eventually "switched sides," and
China "shifted its ground," as the eminent journalist Don Oberdorfer
described in his book, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History.5)
Diplomatic Normalization
What prompted China to "abandon" North Korea and to recognize
the South? In the larger scheme of things, the end of the Cold War and
Sino-American accommodation made it unnecessary for China to view South
Korea as a member of the enemy camp. Furthermore, a change of priorities
within China made economic considerations more important than either political
or military interests.
But China's economic interest in South Korea went beyond trade and investment.
Beijing was particularly interested in the "South Korean model,"
whose success it attributed to the "developmental authoritarian"
government maintained by Seoul during the earlier stages of its economic
takeoff. China obviously found South Korea a far more attractive partner
in economic development than North Korea.
Still another reason for Beijing's decision to establish full diplomatic
ties with Seoul¡ªa decision that apparently received approval from Deng
Xiaoping¡ªwas the fact that the Soviet Union had already normalized relations
with South Korea. This move compelled China to act in order not to be
left off the South Korea bandwagon.
However, before China could take the sigificant step of formal recognition,
there were two hurdles to overcome. One, of course, was strong objections
from North Korea, and the other was the fear that, by adopting a "two-Korea"
policy, China might be compromising its own "one-China" policy.
Beijing succeeded in overcoming both obstacles. To coax Pyongyang to accept
the inevitable, China sent a high level delegation that included Foreign
Minister Qian Qichen. He argued that China's diplomatic normalization
with South Korea would help the North in establishing diplomatic relations
with both the United States and Japan. At the same time, Beijing was able
to side-step the inherent discrepancy between a two-Korea policy and a
one-China policy by exacting a pledge from the South Korean government
that it would accept and abide by the one-China principle.6)
China and Korea: Approaching a New Century
Since diplomatic normalization in 1992, relations between China and South
Korea, especially in the economic arena, have expanded rapidly. For China,
South Korea's main importance has been economic. But for South Korea,
China is an important country for both economic and political reasons.
As the only country with any real influence over North Korea, China has
played a crucial and constructive role in times of crisis.
China is also important as a signatory of the Armistice Agreement that
ended the Korean War. At present, China finds itself caught between Pyongyang
which insists on terminating the Armistice in favor of a peace treaty
with the United States on the one side, and Washington and Seoul which
argue that the Armistice should be abided by until it is replaced by an
alternative peace structure. China, for its part, has tried to take a
balanced position on this issue. At the request of Pyongyang, China withdrew
from the Armistice Commission to the disappointment of both South Korea
and the United States. On the other hand, China has been a rather enthusiastic
participant in the four-party talks jointly that were proposed by Seoul
and Washington to come up with a satisfactory alternative.
Another graphic example of China's political role in inter-Korea relations
concerns the defection in 1997 of Hwang Jang-yop, secretary for international
affairs of the North Korean Workers' Party. Despite North Korean protests
and entreaties to hand him over, Beijing ultimately allowed Hwang to go
to South Korea, albeit by way of the Philippines. Many other North Koreans,
although less prominent, also use China as their escape route. How China
treats them will have very significant implications, not only for China-South
Korea relations, but also for the future fate of the North Korean regime.
In some ways, the very
survival of the North Korean government depends upon Beijing's generosity.
Already China has been providing large amounts of food to North Korea, and
Beijing is likely to pick up the slack if the assistance of the
international community falls short of the necessary minimum to keep the
North Korean regime alive. At the same time, China accounts for some 70
percent of North Korea's meager oil imports. Thus China is in a position
literally to make or break the North Korean regime, a matter of great
consequence for South Korea as well.
China and the Major Powers
While China's role regarding the Korean peninsula seems fairly comprehensible,
Beijing's relations with the major powers is less transparent. On this
issue, opinions tend to fall into three categories. The suspicious view
regards China as a potential threat to the rest of Asia. Those who hold
this view argue that with growing economic power, China will strengthen
its military capabilities in order to throw its weight around.
The second view is more benign, and regards China as basically a peaceful
nation minding its own business and concentrating on its internal development.
Furthermore, according to this view, those who emphasize the Chinese "threat"
do so because they need an object of containment to replace the Soviet
Union.
A third view, eclectic and more realistic, is that it is premature to
assume that the future role and policies of China have already been determined.
Those holding this view believe China's future attitude and actions will
depend very much upon the evolution of China's domestic situation¡ªpolitical
and economic¡ªas well as on the response and policies of the outside world
toward China.
One issue on which China has shown a high degree of sensitivity is the
U.S.-Japan Joint Security Declaration of 1996 and the 1997 Guidelines
for Defense Cooperation. China was particularly sensitive to the possibility
of Japan and the United States collaborating on the Theater Missile Defense
(TMD) project in the wake of the North Korean test-firing in August 1998
of the "Taepodong," a multi-stage rocket, over Japanese territory.
Whatever China's concerns, they have not prevented Beijing from seeking
better relations with both the United States and Japan. Such a policy
of good neighborliness is also reflected in China's rapid improvement
of relations with Russia. This trend should be approved and encouraged.
Engaging China with the rest of the world, particularly with the other
major powers, is an effective way of encouraging China to play a constructive
role in regional peace and security. This is especially true when it comes
to Korea. China's outlook, including its relationships with the United
States and Japan as well as with Korea, will have a crucial impact on
the evolution of events on the peninsula. In fact, as a signatory of the
1953 Korean Armistice and participant in the four-party talks, China's
role is critical in Korea's pre-unification, unification, and post-unification
stages. The position that China takes on the issue of a continued U.S.
troop presence in Korea, for example, will certainly be a factor in determining
U.S. policy on that vital issue.7)
THE EMERGING TRIANGLE: THE U.S. AND THE TWO KOREAS
The U.S.-Korea relationship began in earnest only from the 19th century,
but it is every bit as important as the China-Korea relationship. The
relationship was a cordial one when Korea and the United States signed
a Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation in 1882. The Koreans
looked to the United States for protection from the imperialistic ambitions
of such countries as Japan and Russia, while the American envoys became
close friends of Korea and defenders of Korean independence. The year
1905 brought the first rift in relations, however, when, to Korea's great
disappointment, the United States acquiesced to Japan's domination of
the peninsula. In return, through the Taft-Katsura memorandum, the U.S.
gained Japan's acceptance of American domination of the Philippines.
In September 1945 the
first U.S. military contingents landed in Korea as an occupying force.
Over the next decade, the United States became the principal sponsor of
the Republic of Korea, its protector from external military threats, and
the provider of key economic assistance. Above all, the United States
saved the South when communist North Korean troops burst across the 38th
parallel in a quest for domination.
The Post-War Relationship: The U.S. as Protector
During the 20-year period following the signing of the mutual defense
treaty in 1953, Washington allocated to Seoul nearly 8 percent of its
worldwide foreign economic and military assistance. In fact, the United
States had given more aid to South Korea¡ªa total of $11 billion by 1973¡ªthan
to any other country except South Vietnam.
In the post-independence period, power and administration in Korea were
highly centralized under Rhee Syng-man, and this was particularly true
in foreign policy. For Korea's part, President Rhee's chief foreign policy
concerns in the post War period consisted of the following three points:
a) the United States and its European allies were too "soft"
on the communist threat throughout the world; b) the U.S. did not fully
realize the dangers of restoring Japan to major power status in Asia;
and c) American economic aid to Korea was insufficient and inadequately
administered. In addition, Rhee strove to keep the United States from
interfering in Korea's domestic political affairs.
Contrary to the widely-accepted view that the security treaty was a concession
to Rhee, the reality is that the U.S. probably would have concluded such
a treaty with the Republic of Korea anyway. But it was significant that
United States Presidential envoys came to him, asked for his cooperation
in carrying out their policy, and then made it look like a concession
to Rhee in order to lessen his opposition to the armistice.8)
Still, the Rhee government was unhappy about what is known as the "Monroe
Doctrine formula" of the treaty under which, in the case of an armed
attack on the other, each party would take an action "to be determined
in accordance with its constitutional process." South Korea hoped,
somewhat naively, that the United States would instead agree to a "NATO
formula" with its automatic response provision.9)
On the whole, Rhee Syng-man, despite his America-centered foreign policy
and perhaps because of it, proved to be a tough bargainer as far as the
United States was concerned. As a result of his unyielding and often overly-hawkish
attitude, Rhee probably compromised much of his diplomatic effectiveness.10)
The 1960s: Strengthening the Alliance
Even after Rhee Syng-man's departure from the Korean political scene
in 1960, Korea's relationship with the United States remained Seoul's
central concern. There were two diplomatic developments of major significance
for South Korea during the 1960s: first, the diplomatic normalization
between South Korea and Japan in 1965; and second, the dispatch of South
Korean combat troops to Vietnam in the second half of the decade. In fact,
Korea-Japan diplomatic normalization contributed significantly to a reduction
of South Korean economic dependence on the United States. For its security
needs, however, South Korea continued to remain totally dependent on the
United States. Seoul's dispatch of combat troops to Vietnam is directly
related to this point.
Of paramount concern to Seoul was the possibility of a decline in U.S.
power and weakening of the U.S. security commitment in Asia. As America's
involvement in Indochina deepened, the South Korean government sought
to make the best of a difficult situation. In several ways they were quite
successful. One significant result of Seoul's participation in the war
was a greater degree of self-assertiveness vis-a-vis the United States.
An example of that's increased bargaining power could be seen in Seoul's
extraordinary success in obtaining large sums of military aid. The government
also succeeded in obtaining from the United States the long-sought status-of-forces
agreement covering U.S. military personnel in Korea.11)
The 1970s: Friction on the Horizon
The issue of U.S. troop presence on the peninsula was more difficult.
In 1971, South Korea reluctantly accepted the U.S. plan to reduce its
troop level in Korea from 63,000 to 43,000, but only after securing a
promise from Washington that it would support a five-year program to modernize
the Korean armed forces at an estimated cost of $1.5 billion. There is
little doubt that the increased U.S. aid and the decision to maintain
the existing troop level in Korea were directly related to the South Korean
decision to dispatch combat troops to Vietnam.
As for Seoul's attempts to exert influence on the Vietnam negotiations,
these efforts fell short. Korea had negligible input in the formulation
of major U.S. policies, as seen in both the 1969 declaration of the Nixon
Doctrine and the signing of the 1973 Vietnam peace accord. Rather, the
Korean contribution was limited to how those basic policies were to be
implemented once adopted.12)
Throughout the 1970s, South Korea's primary concern remained the possibility
of further reductions in the U.S. military presence in Asia, particularly
as a result of American setbacks in Vietnam. President Carter's plan to
withdraw all 33,000 American ground troops from Korea within a four to
five year period was announced at a press conference on March 9, 1977,
less than two months after his inauguration. Although the withdrawal decision
did not come as a complete surprise, the ROK government was disconcerted
by the poor timing of the announcement. At the time, the U.S. Justice
Department was broadening the scope of its investigation of alleged Korean
lobbying activities in Washington, while the new American administration
was stressing the importance of human rights in its foreign policy. There
was concern that the troop withdrawal decision would be construed as an
American rebuke of the ROK government.
As it turned out, many American congressional and military leaders had
serious misgivings about President Carter's troop withdrawal plan. In
response to strong congressional pressure, and in consideration of the
evolving international situation in East Asia, which involved a heavy
military buildup by both the Soviet Union and North Korea, President Carter
decided to postpone the withdrawal indefinitely after an initial pullout
(in 1978) of some 3,500 troops. At the same time, U.S. Air Force strength
in Korea was increased by some 20 percent in manpower and number of aircraft.
It is difficult to determine the extent to which South Korea's "fire-fighting"
diplomacy was responsible for President Carter's change of mind. In all
likelihood, however, U.S. decisions concerning its security commitment
in Korea¡ªwhether to withdraw troops or to postpone the withdrawal¡ªwere
made independently of South Korea's efforts aimed at influencing them.
In addition to the troop withdrawal question, the second major issue that
preoccupied Seoul during the 1970s was the nature of the United States's
relationship with Pyongyang. In the second half of the 1970s, South Korea
was concerned that the United States might directly or through Japan establish
some form of official relationship with North Korea, without reciprocal
recognition of the Republic of Korea by the U.S.S.R. or China.
The Korea-U.S.
relationship in the second half of the 1970s exhibited the strains and
agony of transition from what might be called primarily a patron-client
relationship to more of an equitable partnership. Still, even as relations
achieved more balance, the asymmetry between the partners in perceptions,
power and influence remained.
The 1980s: Toward a More Mature Partnership
The death of South Korean President Park Chung-hee in 1979 and the change
of administrations in both the United States and South Korea at the time
were followed by a drastic improvement in the relationship between the
two countries. Thus, President Reagan's new ambassador to Korea, former
professor of political science at the University of South Carolina Richard
L. Walker, declared on his arrival in Seoul in July, 1981, that relations
between the United States and the Republic of Korea had "never been
closer."13)
Newly-strengthened ties with the United States thus had the effect of
freeing Seoul from its previous preoccupation with bilateral issues, enabling
South Korean policy-makers to divert their diplomatic energy to other
important areas. For example, as the United States had ceased to judge
its security interest in Korea through the "Japanese prism,"
South Korea took a more relaxed and flexible attitude toward Japan. Likewise,
Mr. Chun's highly-publicized trip to the ASEAN countries could also be
seen in this new light of confidence that the U.S.-ROK alliance was secure.
Finally, it was also likely that the Reagan administration was making
an effort on South Korea's behalf for the improvement of relations with
China. So, paradoxically, by maintaining a close and cooperative relationship
with South Korea, the United States enabled Seoul to expand and diversify
its diplomatic activities.
With regard to North Korea, the Reagan administration's attitude was unequivocal.
Soon after taking office it disavowed the Carter-Park proposal of June
1979 for a tripartite conference among the United States and the two Koreas.
Furthermore, at every opportunity, top U.S. officials (in many cases military
officers) called attention to the heavy North Korean military buildup
and emphasized the seriousness of North Korean military threat against
the South.
But the Cold War was
ending by the close of the Reagan presidency, bringing a whole new set of
elements and circumstances to bear on U.S.-South Korea relations. The
debate on the desirability of keeping U.S. troops in Korea resumed. As
South Korea's relations with the Soviet Union and China improved,
Washington was beginning to review its policies toward North Korea and to
contemplate changes. There was again the possibility, thus danger, of U.S.
and South Korean interests diverging and the need to coordinate their
policies.
THE WILD CARD: NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE
One of the most notable developments in the post-Cold War period has
been the evolution of North Korean policy toward the United States. Until
the end of the 1980s, the U.S. was depicted as the archenemy not only
of North Korea but also of all of the socialist world. With the end of
the Cold War, however, Pyongyang recognized both the need and opportunity
to improve its relationship with Washington. This became especially important
after South Korea normalized its relations with the Soviet Union and China.
Furthermore, Pyongyang began to see the usefulness of a continued U.S.
troop presence in Korea. In its absence, South Korea, with the economic
capability to expand its own military power and a more aggressive attitude
toward the North, could potentially be even more threatening.
Washington, for its part, was feeling left out of the normalization process.
China and the Soviet Union each had relationships with both Koreas, and
even Japan seemed about ready to jump on the "cross-recognition"
bandwagon. Consequently, the common sentiment of the two erstwhile enemies
was that it was time for a change in their relationship. But the Bush
administration wanted no less than for North Korea to give up the nuclear
option, stop its missile development and sales, join the anti-terrorism
conventions, and resume inter-Korea dialogue.
In an effort to address the U.S. requirements, North Korea took the step
of signing the safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and then ratifying it in the spring of 1992. The series
of "ad hoc inspections" taking place that summer, however, would
prove to be its undoing: a "discrepancy" was uncovered involving
the activities and materials North Korea had declared. So the gesture
of goodwill toward the United States backfired, and served only to magnify
international suspicions about Pyongyang's nuclear program.14)
Next, in an
unprecedented move on March 12, 1993, the North Korean government declared
that "in the supreme interest of the state," it was withdrawing from the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This action represented a major
gamble by North Korea as well as a serious foreign policy challenge to the
United States.
The North Korean Nuclear Crisis of 1993-94
South Korea had three major concerns at the time. The first was the possibility
of North Korea actually developing nuclear weapons, thereby changing the
strategic equation on the Korean peninsula. The second was the possibility
that the international community (i.e., the United States) would react
so strongly that war would break out in Korea. The third was the possibility
that the North Korean nuclear program would touch off a race to develop
nuclear weapons in South Korea and Japan.15)
The United States had similar concerns although the priorities might have
been somewhat different. It was concerned that, if not responded to effectively
and resolutely, the North Korean decision to unilaterally withdraw from
the NPT would be a serious blow to the global non-proliferation regime.
It was also concerned that if the North Korean nuclear program proceeded
unchecked, it would have a very undesirable effect on the nuclear policy
of South Korea and Japan. Furthermore, a North Korea armed with nuclear
weapons and missiles would be a serious threat to peace on the Korean
peninsula and particularly the 35,000 U.S. troops stationed there to keep
that peace.
The first order of business was to devise a strategy that would prevent
an armed conflict on the Korean peninsula while still effectively addressing
the North Korean challenge. At the end of March, I traveled to Washington
to discuss the problem. I found that leading members of the U.S. government
were very receptive to my concerns and to my broad outline on how to respond.
We agreed on a "carrot and stick" approach whereby we would
try the dialogue route first and, if that proved futile, follow with the
"stick."
Another consideration in opting for this approach rather than taking a
harder-line stance was China. Since China as a permanent member of the
United Nations Security Council had veto power, it was necessary to have
Chinese cooperation (either an affirmative vote or at least an abstention)
for the passage of any resolution on the issue.
Securing this cooperation would require convincing China that all peaceful
means to resolve the issue had been exhausted. Therefore, from the point
of view of the United States and South Korea, unless a military option
was pursued from the beginning, taking the dialogue route first was both
preferable and necessary.16)
In a last ditch effort to resolve the problem without military confrontation,
I traveled to Beijing on June 9 to solicit Chinese cooperation. I told
my Chinese counterparts that we (South Korea and the United States) had
sought a negotiated settlement and had exhausted all means of achieving
it. I emphasized that the only way to avoid a vote on a sanctions resolution
in the Security Council, and thus avert a military conflict on the Korean
peninsula, would be for China to tell the North Koreans that they could
not count on a Chinese veto. Subsequently it was learned that the Beijing
government indeed told the North Koreans that China might not be able
to veto the resolution against strong international opinion and that they
had better take action to defuse the situation.
Ultimately, the United States concluded an "Agreed Framework"
with North Korea, one which had both merits and potential weaknesses.
Critics were quick to note that the agreement allowed at least several
years to pass before the IAEA could conduct the "special inspection"
of the undeclared nuclear waste site. What's more, the agreement "rewarded"
North Korea with benefits such as an energy supply and light water reactors
for its defiance of the IAEA. But considering that it was the special
inspection issue that prompted the controversy between Pyongyang and the
IAEA, it was not surprising that the Agreed Framework was faulted for
failing to deal satisfactorily with the IAEA complaints, even at a heavy
financial burden to the international community.
On the
positive side, the agreement defused the crisis situation which could have
brought about a destructive military clash. It also succeeded in halting
the North Korean nuclear weapons program. The prospect of receiving heavy
oil and securing light water reactors gave Pyongyang an incentive to
"behave," at least a little better than before. This probably explains why
the North Koreans uncharacteristically apologized for the 1996 incursion
of a submarine vessel into South Korean waters. The possibility of losing
the benefits also helped to restrain North Korean reaction in the
defection case of Hwang Jang-Yop.
ROK and U.S. Views: Different Means to a Common End
During the second half of South Korea's Kim Young-sam government, in
spite of their shared goals, the United States and South Korean views
diverged to greater and lesser degrees. The issues in question included
the idea of a so-called "soft landing" for the North, food aid,
the four-party talks, and a possible U.S. "Two Korea" policy.
"Soft landing" Even after the North Korean nuclear crisis was
averted, there remained several issues of contention between the United
States and South Korea. For one, South Korea was not happy with the U.S.
preference for a "soft landing" of North Korea. Although the
soft landing option was neither clearly defined nor officially proclaimed
as U.S. policy, it was apparent that the United States was hoping for
this sort of outcome. The U.S. government thought that a crash landing,
whether it took the form of an explosion (lashing out), or implosion (collapsing
from within), would present a serious security problem for both the United
States and South Korea. Meanwhile, South Korea worried that perpetuation
of the status quo might result in a permanent division of the country,
while the North viewed the soft landing approach as a prescription for
collapse leading to a German-style reunification. So "soft landing"
was not a particularly well-defined or a widely-accepted concept.
Food aid: The divergence of views between the United States and South
Korea was also reflected in each country's attitude toward food shortages
in the North. The U.S. position on food aid could be summarized in four
points as follows: a) North Korea is like an airplane in trouble. There
is a need to induce a soft landing, lest Pyongyang become desperate or
the system implode; b) If North Korea exhibits good behavior, especially
in connection with the implementation of the Geneva Accord, it needs to
be rewarded; c) Aiding North Korea is a means to induce opening and possibly
change in the regime; d) There is clearly a humanitarian need.
In comparison, the South Korean position could be characterized as follows:
a) Unconditional international (including U.S) aid to North Korea deprives
Pyongyang of the incentive to talk with South Korea; b) North Korea may
divert the food aid to military use; c) The U.S. could be using this issue
as an excuse to establish ties with North Korea, thus moving toward a
two-Korea policy; and d) Any and all aid can be discussed in connection
with the four-party talks. Thus, South Korea's main concern was not so
much that North Korea was receiving the aid, but that South Korea should
not be bypassed in the process. In fact, Seoul's position is that Pyongyang
should recognize the authority of the South Korean government, conduct
dialogue with it, and be told that it can expect international aid only
after improving relations with South Korea.
The Four-Party Talks: South Korea and the United States may also have
different views on the relative importance of the four-party talks versus
North-South Korean dialogue. This issue became even more agonizing after
the inauguration of the new Seoul government in February 1998. Although
Seoul's preference has consistently been to focus on South-North bilateral
talks, South Korea and the United States jointly proposed the four-party
talks in the spring of 1996.
There is no question that the United States coordinated closely with South
Korea regarding the four-party talks. Once again, however, it had to assume
the role of "mediating" between the two Koreas when it came
to the preconditions and terms of the four-party talks. Before participating
in the talks, North Korea wished to have a firm commitment on the part
of the U.S. and South Korean governments regarding at least one million
tons of food aid. Pyongyang further wished to be removed from the U.S.
list of terrorist states, and also wanted for the economic sanctions under
the Trading with Enemies Act to be lifted. Pyongyang wanted to see these
preconditions met up front.
The ROK and U.S. response was that, in addition to the issue of replacing
the Armistice and reducing tensions, all other issues including food aid
and economic sanctions could be discussed within the context of the four-party
talks. The compromise solution, msot likely orchestrated by the United
States, was that the World Food Program, a UN agency, would commit itself
to collecting one million tons of food for North Korea during the months
that followed. After the WFP announcement, Pyongyang agreed to attend
the first plenary meeting.
A "Two-Korea" Policy: Regarding the idea of a two-Korea policy,
there is debate in both the U.S. and South Korea. Those in the U.S. who
favor establishing relations with Pyongyang argue that: the U.S. needs
a handle on North Korea; it is better to have North Korea depend on the
U.S. side than not; South Korea already has a relationship with China
and Russia; and normalization will ultimately contribute to North-South
Korean dialogue. Those who argue against such a relationship point to
the continuing infractions on the part of North Korea regarding its nuclear
program, human rights, missiles, biochemical weapons, and forward military
deployment, as well as to Seoul's objections resulting from Pyongyang's
refusal to talk with South Korea.
The Kim Dae-jung
government has taken a much more flexible position than its predecessor
government regarding North Korea's normalization of relations with the
United States and Japan. As new issues with North Korea emerged, such as
the underground facilities at Kumchang-ri (thought to be for nuclear
purposes and for development of long-range missiles) the South Korean
government proposed a "comprehensive engagement" strategy intended to
resolve the Korean issue once and for all. Thus, the establishment of
diplomatic relations between the United States and North Korea as well as
the lifting of U.S. economic sanctions on North Korea became a centerpiece
in a big "package deal" advocated by South Korean President Kim Dae-jung.
KOREA AND THE MAJOR POWERS
The Triangle Takes Shape: Korean Attitudes toward the U.S. and China
With regard to the changing attitudes of Koreans, North and South, toward
China and the United States, the first observation that comes to mind
is that old adage: Familiarity breeds contempt. For North Korea, China
has been a close ally for the past half century, while the U.S. has been
the enemy. Similarly, for South Korea, the United States has been closely
aligned, while China was seen as a foe. It is ironic, then, that today,
China seems to rate more favorably in South Korea than in the North. It
is possible, although difficult to verify, that China ranks even above
the United States in South Korean sentiment. During the 1988 Olympics
in Seoul, for example, the Korean spectators cheered more enthusiastically
for both the Russian and Chinese players than for the American athletes.
Is the level of anti-American sentiment in South Korea in fact rising?
Negative attitudes toward the United States can be found particularly
among people who belong to the two opposite ends of the ideological spectrum.
There are those on the left who have been critical of the United States
all along. They blame the United States for the continued division of
the country, meddling in domestic politics, failing to prevent the Kwangju
massacre in 1980, and "dependency" of the Korean economy on
the world (particularly the U.S.) economy as demonstrated in the recent
foreign currency crisis. On the other hand, those on the right, who until
recent years had been generally "pro-American," are concerned
that the United States is too soft in dealing with North Korea. They fear
the United States may seek accommodation with the North, bypassing South
Korea and perhaps working against its best interests.
In spite of these rather strident attitudes on the part of some, I would
not go so far as to say that anti-American sentiment in South Korea is
either pervasive or rising. One hears anti-American slogans on university
campuses much less frequently. Moreover, the South Korean people (including
the media) are beginning to realize that nations do indeed act in their
self-interest most of the time, and that sometimes this is compatible
with another country's interest, and sometimes it is not. As for China,
South Koreans consider Chinese domination of centuries past a distant
memory. They find the new relationship that was recently established with
China gratifying and generally satisfactory. Not having experienced Chinese
domination in the way North Korea has in recent decades, there is no reason
for them to be resentful of an "overbearing" China.
One may find a symmetrical attitude among North Koreans vis-a-vis the
United States. Although it is impossible to distinguish between the attitudes
of government officials and the general public in North Korea, it is possible
to conclude that, despite the anti-American propaganda of the past, North
Koreans essentially have a favorable attitude toward the United States,
as exhibited by the attitudes of those North Koreans who have had contact
with the outside world.
By contrast, China must be looked upon in North Korea with mixed feelings.
North Korea was particularly disappointed with China when it reached rapprochement
with the United States in 1972. But even that disappointment paled in
comparison to the anger and sense of betrayal that North Korea felt when,
in 1992, China followed the Soviet Union in recognizing South Korea. Also,
although settlement of territorial and boundary issues was reached in
1963, because of the geographical proximity of the two countries, there
have always been border troubles, mostly minor but occasionally major
ones.
This is not to
say that a strong or rising wind of anti-Chinese sentiment is detected
among the North Koreans. The important point, however, is that the
previous alignments¡ªChina and North Korea on one side and the United
States and South Korea on the other¡ªare shifting, at least in terms of the
prevailing sentiments in the North and South. This is another dimension of
factors that makes the triangular relationship among Korea, China and the
United States complex and fluid.
The Unification Question
This brings us to the all important question of unification¡ª whether,
when and how? Will the power base of the North Korean leadership be strong
enough to maintain the stability of the regime? Will this leadership recognize
that it is in its own interest to engage in the regional and global order?
More immediately and urgently, will the leadership be able to cope with
the serious economic difficulties and severe shortages in food and energy?
What are the implications of all of these factors for North Korea's relationship
with South Korea and the rest of the world?
There are two main tasks which appear to be key to the North Korean leadership's
success: first, tackling the country's economic problems; and second,
breaking out of diplomatic isolation. These challenges pose a difficult
dilemma for North Korea. To be sure, a policy of openness and reform is
the only choice for relieving North Korea's economic problems. But unlike
China and Vietnam, North Korea still exhibits a considerable degree of
resistance to the introduction of a market economy. It remains to be seen
whether the leadership in Pyongyang has the courage, wisdom, and ability
to embark upon the needed reforms.
In order to escape its diplomatic isolation, North Korea has placed top
policy priority on the improvement of its relations with the United States.
Once progress has been made in U.S.-North Korea relations, Pyongyang is
likely to move quickly towards Japan for diplomatic recognition and economic
assistance. Increased contacts and exchanges with the outside world, particularly
the United States, could pose a potential threat to North Korea, since
such exposure will inevitably change the chemistry of North Korean society.
One can only presume that North Korea will attempt a controlled opening
to the extent that it will not undermine the stability of the regime itself.
No one knows if this course of action will be possible.
Meanwhile, there is
widespread suspicion, in both Koreas, that the major powers may actually
prefer the status quo of a divided state. The powers may fear that a
reunified Korea would fall under the dominance of one of the other major
powers. Or they may fear that a reunified Korea could be a threat in
itself. But the major concern is probably that the actual process of
reunification could be highly destabilizing and possibly violent. That
said, if the main current is toward reunification, either by the decisions
of the Koreans themselves or by force of international events, it will be
difficult or unlikely that any one or more of the big powers will go out
of its way to prevent reunification from taking place.
CONCLUSION
In sum, we started our discussion with the possibility that in a global
chess game of the major powers, the United States and China are in competition
if not conflict with each other for domination of Korea. While Korea is
divided, divided domination can exist. Once Korea is unified, however,
the question arises as to who if anyone will dominate, and indeed any
outcome is possible.
Ordinarily, when we talk about the "Korean triangle," we think
of Korea squeezed between China and Japan. Indeed, like Poland which suffered
between Germany and Russia, Korea through the centuries had to deal with
the contending ambitions and influences of China and Japan. For that reason,
a Korea-Japan-China triangle portends dangers for Korea. It will be difficult
for Korea to stay aloof in the Sino-Japanese competition.
Neither will it be desirable for her to align with either of the two neighboring
powers. In the absence of a multilateral structure for regional peace
and cooperation such as those found in Europe, therefore, the Korea-China-U.S.
triangle presents both hope and opportunity for Korea. It can hope to
stay clear of potential rivalry and conflict between China and Japan.
It is an opportunity because close involvement of the United States in
this region will give Korea room to maneuver among and between the powers.
It is fortuitous that a careful look at the policies and aspirations of
the two major powers¡ªChina and the United States¡ªsuggests that the picture
is much more complex than a simple chess game of a zero sum nature. Even
as both powers prefer the stability of the status quo on the Korean peninsula,
they have to be prepared for a major change. The new situation will require
both competition and cooperation. At the same time, this expected Sino-American
competition will provide a challenge to Korea, divided or unified. Surely
it will require close consultation and coordination, especially between
Korea and the United States, whether Korea is two nations or one.
For the moment, common interests between China and the United States seem
to outweigh conflicting interests. New elements in the equation could
be the ability of the Koreans to run their own affairs, including unification
and governance; the capacity of international and regional regimes to
regulate relations among nations; and evolution of the Chinese society
and changes in U.S. policy. There is no indication that China's policies
toward North Korea have been directly affected by the status of its relations
with the United States.
Nevertheless, the United
States (and South Korea) needs Chinese cooperation in key areas including
the North Korean nuclear program and missile development. It is important
that the Unites States and China maintain a healthy and cooperative
relationship for peace and stability, non-proliferation, and a relatively
smooth transition to unification. There is no question that as North and
South Korea are evolving into one entity in Chinese and American thinking,
the three powers will form a triangle. It remains to be seen whether these
three elements¡ªKorea, China and the United States¡ªwill bring more
amicability than hostility, and greater flexibility than rigidity in their
relationships with one another.
- Zbigniew
Brzezinski, The Grand chessboard (New York: Basic Books, 1997), pp. 158-165.
- Ibid., pp. 165-173.
- Donald S.
Zagoria, Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking and Hanoi (New York: Pegasus, 1967).
- Carter J.
Eckert, et. al., Korea Old and New: A History (Seoul: Ilchokak for Korea Institute, Harvard University, 1990), pp. 211-214.
- Donald
Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997).
- Ibid., p. 247.
- Han Sung-Joo,
Korea in a Changing World: Democracy, and Furure Developments (Seoul: Oreum Publishing House, 1995), pp.131-141.
- Mark W. Clark,
From the Danube to the Yalu (New York: Harper and Row, 1954), pp.287-288.
- U.S. Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, "Mutual Defense Treaty with Korea,"
Executive Report A, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954), p.28.
- Sungjoo Han,
The Failure of Democracy in South Korea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), pp.46-54.
- Young-Sun Ha,
"American-Korean Military Relations: Continuity and Change," in Youngnok
Koo and Dae-Sook Suh, eds., Korea and the United States: A Century
of Cooperation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984), pp. 110-130.
- Sungjoo Han,
"South Korea's Participation in the Vietnam Conflict: An Analysis of the
U.S.-Korean Alliance," Orbis Vol. 21, No. 4 (Winter, 1978), pp. 893-912.
- Sungjoo Han,
"South Korea and the United States: The Alliance Survives," Asian
Survey (November 1980), pp. 1075-1086.
- Oberdorfer,
op.cit ., pp.249-280.
- Ibid., pp. 281-282.
- Oknim Chung,
"U.S. Policy Toward the North Korean Nuclear Issue, March 1993-October
1994: A Case Study in Multi-Level Bargaining," IRI Review , Vol.1, No.3 (Fall, 1996), pp. 125-155.
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