Volume 11 Number 4 Winter 1999

Intelligence and Warning Systems: Implications for ROK-U.S. Combined Crisis Management

Yoon Taeyoung

INTRODUCTION

     In a crisis situation, the National Command Military Authorities (NCMAs) are involved in the operations of vast military, diplomatic, and intelligence organisations in order to collect information, assess dangerous situations accurately, balance political and military imperatives, consider crisis options wisely, reach and transmit decisions, execute orders, and take action.1) In general, there are five sub-systems or mechanisms for crisis management: (a) the political control and consultation system; (b) the command and control system of the armed forces; (c) the intelligence and warning/reconnaissance systems; (d) the communication channel to the adversary; and (e) crisis action planning procedures. A major task of crisis management is operating the intelligence and warning/reconnaissance systems. In order to manage crises, relevant and timely intelligence is essential for political and military authorities so that they can provide strategic warning, alert military forces and develop courses of crisis action.
     Although the Republic of Korea (ROK) has its own crisis management system, it depends heavily on the U.S. for political control and consultation, command and control of armed forces, intelligence and warning, crisis communication, and planning crisis contingencies procedures within the framework of the ROK-U.S. alliance. In particular, the South Korean military intelligence system is integrated with the intelligence assets of the U.S. Forces in Korea.
     The objective of this study is to examine intelligence and warning/reconnaissance systems and their implications for South Korea-U.S. combined crisis management. In the ROK, intelligence for crisis management comes from various national and military organisations. Moreover, the ROK and the U.S. have maintained highly integrated intelligence infrastructures to collect political and military intelligence, including signals intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery, under the alliance framework. In addition, the ROK and U.S. military have operated a Watch Condition (WATCHCON) system for reconnaissance and strategic/tactical warning in South Korea.

THE ROK INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The Development of a National Intelligence Organisation

     The Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was officially established as a primary national intelligence agency by the Central Intelligence Agency Law on 10 June 1961, immediately after the military coup of General Park Chung-hee, to function as the central source of security information. Based on the KCIA Law, its missions were to "supervise and coordinate both international and domestic intelligence activities and criminal investigation by all government intelligence agencies, including that of the military."2)
     Although information about the intelligence agency regarding its organisational structure, number of personnel, location and budget were classified, based on article V of the KCIA Law, according to several sources, the structure of KCIA can be identified as follows: As of the mid-1970s, it was believed to consist of eight bureaux under two deputy directors for internal and external affairs. The 1st Bureau was responsible for administrative affairs. The 2nd and the 3rd Bureaux dealt with domestic propaganda and counter-intelligence. The 5th Bureau was in charge of domestic political intelligence. The 6th Bureau dealt with special missions. The 7th Bureau was responsible for the collection of foreign intelligence. The 8th and 9th Bureaux were responsible for North Korean affairs, with the former focused on psychological warfare operations and the latter with intelligence collection, analysis, and negotiations with North Korea (When the KCIA was restructured in 1981, the National Unification Board took over the negotiations mission with North Korea from the KCIA's 9th Bureau).3)
     In December 1980, however, one year after the assassination of President Park Chung-hee by KCIA director Kim Jae-kyu, President Chun Doo-hwan's government revised the KCIA law and changed its name to the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP). It was redesignated as the main agency for collecting and processing all domestic and foreign intelligence, and investigating offences involving insurrection and military secrets, among others. Moreover, "the requirement for all other agencies with intelligence-gathering and analysis functions in their charters to coordinate their activities with the ANSP was reaffirmed."4) As for the structure of the ANSP, although it was reorganised several times during the Chun government, these changes were more about form, such as bureau names and numbers, than substance. According to a former U.S. military intelligence officer, James D. Marett, there were seven bureaux under the First Deputy Director (Internal Affairs) and Second Deputy Director (External Affairs), Planning and Co-ordination Office, Inspection and Audit Office, Special City and Provincial Office. The seven bureaux consisted of the 1st Bureau (anti-Communist policy), 2nd Bureau (anti-Communist operations), 3rd Bureau (domestic counter-intelligence), 5th Bureau (research and analysis), 6th Bureau (special operations), 7th Bureau (foreign intelligence), and 8th Bureau (North Korea).5)      In terms of the co-ordination of intelligence among several intelligence agencies the ANSP was the central agency to control and co-ordinate almost all intelligence related to national security. In 1981, a Consultative Council on Intelligence Co-ordination was established within the ANSP by the ANSP Law. The Consultative Council on Intelligence Co-ordination consisted of a Main Council and a Working-Level Council. The Main Council was chaired by the ANSP director and its members included the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Justice, National Defense, and Culture and Information and other members appointed by the chairman. The Working-Level Council was chaired by the deputy director of ANSP and its members included each ministries'director of bureau and the director of the Korea Defense Intelligence Agency (KDIA). Its missions were the planning and implementation of national intelligence policy, intelligence analysis, co-ordination and the oversight of intelligence operations.66))
     Since the inauguration of Kim Dae-jung administration in 1998, the ANSP has initiated a number of reforms. It abolished several units for internal affairs and placed increasing emphasis on gathering overseas information. It also reduced its staff to make the agency leaner and more effective. Then on 22 January 1999, the agency was renamed the National Intelligence Service (NIS). In the NIS, the First Deputy Director is in charge of international affiars and the Second Deputy Director is in charge of domestic affairs.
     Although the NIS is not directly in charge of military intelligence, which is critical for crisis management in South Korea, it can be assumed that it has played an important role in crisis management. Its influence on crisis management is derived from three sources. First, from its inception, it has dominated in intelligence gathering and analysis regarding North Korea, through covert operations, signal intelligence activities, information-gathering in foreign countries and liaison activities. As a result, particularly when dealing with North Korea during a crisis, it is in an important position to provide information, advice, and assessment to the political and military leaders.7) Secondly, the NIS has extensive powers of investigation regarding subversive operations including North Korean activities. Moreover, it is responsible for anti-terror operations. Especially during the 1980s, when North Korea intensified acts of terrorism against South Korea, the ANSP was directly involved in providing information and in investigating the incidents. For example, during the Rangoon bombing incident in 1983 and the KAL bombing incident in 1987, the ANSP dispatched agents to investigate the incidents on the ground. In addition, during the hijacking of a civilian Chinese airliner to South Korea in May 1983, although there was some tension between ANSP and the military, the director of the ANSP, Loh Shin-Young, went to the Ministry of National Defense (MND) and controlled and commanded the MND in order to deal with the incident.8) Finally, due to its direct accountability to the President, the NIS actively participates in crisis management procedures.

Military Intelligence Organisations

     The central organisation of military intelligence under the Minister of National Defense is the Korea Defense Intelligence Agency (KDIA) which was established in October 1981. Until then, there was the Intelligence Bureau in the JCS.9) The KDIA consists of the Planning Security Office, the Foreign Intelligence Office, and the Intelligence Integration Office.10) The major missions of the KDIA are: the collection, analysis, production and distribution of military intelligence, the supervision and control of each service's intelligence units, and the dispatch of military attaches to overseas embassies in order to gather foreign military information, etc. It also co-operates with the intelligence organisations of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces Korea.11) Under the KDIA, there are two functional intelligence units: the 9125th Unit and the Defense Intelligence Command (DIC). The 9125th Unit was established based on the ROK-U.S. agreement of 10 January 1956. It co-operates with the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) and the U.S. 501st Military Intelligence Group to produce signal intelligence (SIGINT).12) The DIC is responsible for North Korean intelligence. In addition, the Defense Security Command (DSC), which merged the Army Security Command, the Navy Security Unit, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, was officially activated in October 1977. The DSC is responsible for counter-intelligence, counter-espionage, internal security responsibilities and military intelligence gathering within the armed forces.13) In addition, there are several military organisations included: the Army Intelligence Command, and intelligence sections in the Headquarters of the Army (G2), the Navy (N2) and the Air Force (A2).

ROK-U.S. INTELLIGENCE CO-OPERATION

     Since the KCIA was established in 1961, the KCIA/ANSP/NIS have maintained close relations with the CIA in order to exchange considerable amounts of information on matters of national security, including information on North Korea. In addition to close co-operation on political intelligence, the ROK and the U.S. co-operate closely to share large amounts of military intelligence focusing on North Korea. Furthermore, similar to the command and control arrangement, both countries maintain a combined intelligence system under the CFC.14) The central organisation of the ROK-U.S. combined military intelligence system is the ROK-U.S. Combined Intelligence Operations Center (CIOC), operated by the Intelligence Division (C2) of CFC. The CIOC consists of the ROK-U.S. Combined Photographic Interpretation Center, the Combined Indications and Warning Center, and the Special Mission Unit. The KDIA and the army, navy and air force's intelligence units are closely linked to CIOC for the exchange of information. Externally, the 2nd U.S. Infantry Division, the 501st U.S. Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade, the U.S. Pacific Air Force (PACAF) Command, the U.S. 9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing under the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and the U.S. NSA are also linked to CIOC.15)
     According to a National Security Archives source acquired through the Freedom of Information Act; "subordinate to the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (ISCOM), the U.S. 501st MI Group exercises administrative control over INSCOM units in Korea and provides intelligence and security support to Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army throughout Korea."16) It is responsible for human intelligence, counter-intelligence, signal intelligence (SIGINT) and communication security (COMSEC) in South Korea. The 501st MI Brigade consists of four battalions: the 3rd MI Battalion, the 524th MI Battalion, the 532nd MI Battalion, and the 751st MI Battalion.17)
     Moreover, the Theater Air Control Center's (TACC), the Korea-Combat Operation Intelligence Center (K-COIC) and the Korea Intelligence Support System (KISS) are linked to CIOC.18) According to U.S. Rear Admiral Jack Barrett and Ronald D. McLaurin, "the hardened Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) at Osan is designed for combined control of ROKAF and USAF aircraft and the Center's OV-10 tactical control aircraft."19) The TACC is the central organisation for the Air Force's C4I system and the Korea Air Defense Ground Environment System (KADGE system). It also operates the Master Control and Reporting Center (MCRC) and office of intelligence collection. Various reconnaissance aircraft has used Osan for SIGINT collection including U-2 and SR-71s.20) The K-COIC, which is linked through an underground tunnel with the TACC, gathers intelligence from the ROK-U.S. Air Force Intelligence Collection Units and two Special Mission Units, and provides intelligence to CFC and operational units. The KISS, which is operated by the main and reserve command posts, provides intelligence to ROK and U.S. forces.21)
     In addition to these organisations, several U.S. military intelligence organisations coordinate with the ROK. There are several air force intelligence organisations in South Korea. The units of Electronic Security Command (ESC) at the U.S. 7th Air Force base at Osan conduct a cryptographic, cryptanalytic and electronic warfare mission. Under the 7th Air Force, there is a counter-intelligence unit, OSI. Detachment 2 of the 9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing under the SAC operates SR-71 and U-2 strategic reconnaissance aircraft from Osan air base. Detachment 32 of the Air Force Special Activities Center (AFSAC) at Yongsan performs the "debriefing of emigres, refugees, and defectors and the collection of intelligence through clandestine HUMINT operations."22) As for the naval intelligence organisation, there is the Naval Security Group Activity which is subordinate to the Naval Security Group Command (NSGC) operated in order to carry out signals intelligence and communications security at Pyongtaek. Moreover, Company G of the Marine Support Battalion at Pyongtaek provides Marine Corps participation in NSGC activities.23)

WARNING/RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEM

Watch Condition (WATCHCON)

     The process of changing the reconnaissance posture for strategic and tactical warning of attack operated by ROK and U.S. military forces is called the WATCHCON system. There are about 180 unusual North Korean military movements on the "Identity and Warning Lists"which are intensively monitored, based on the WATCHCON levels. The Watch Condition hierarchy is characterised by four stages: WATCHCON 4 (normal peacetime position), WATCHCON 3 (important indications of threat), WATCHCON 2 (vital indications of threat), and WATCHCON 1 (wartime situation). The WATCHCON is normally raised by the agreement of ROK and U.S. military intelligence authorities.24)
     Increasing the WATCHCON status of ROK-U.S. forces would obviously depend on the nature of threats determined by changes in the 'Identity and Warning Lists' During a condition of increased South and North Korean confrontation, "intelligence-collection resources such as COMINT and ELINT would be shifted from long-range general information to an early warning function, either strategic or tactical depending on the particular collection system."25) To be precise, when WATCHCON is raised in a time of crisis, intelligence-collection activities are intensively increased through the operation of spy satellites and aircraft reconnaissance, radio listening ports, signal interception around North Korea and near the DMZ. At the same time, collected information is analysed and distributed to the NCMAs and operational commanders who needed it. In this sense, there is a direct relationship between the reconnaissance/ warning system (WATCHCON) on the one hand, and the alerting procedure (DEFCON) on the other.
     For example, the ROK-U.S. issued WATCHCON 1 from 19 February to 17 March 1982, in response to North Korean Air Force training and bombers deployment. WATCHCON 3 was issued respectively in the wake of North Korean nuclear problem in the spring of 1994, and Air Force training and aircraft deployment in October-November 1995. WATCHCON 2 was issued on 5 April 1996 after repeated intrusions by the North Korean army into the Panmunjom area. A WATCHCON was also issued 15 June 1999 at the time of the naval conflict in the West Sea.26)

Reconnaissance Capabilities of the ROK-U.S. Combined Intelligence System

     There are three main sources of intelligence collection: Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) (which can be divided into Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)), imagery and Human Intelligence (HUMINT). Except HUMINT, the ROK relies heavily on the U.S. SIGINT and imaging collection systems during peacetime and crisis-time on the Korean peninsula. The air reconnaissance systems that operate in peacetime represent 40% of all U.S. world-wide systems and 70% of the assets of Pacific Command (PACOM), flying 10,000 hours per year around the Korean peninsula. Using these intelligence systems, ROK and U.S. intelligence agencies monitor the North Korean area and operate an early warning system on a twenty-four hour basis.27)
     As far as the capability of ground-based signal intelligence (SIGINT) collection is concerned, "the Taegu facility, run for the NSA by the Bendix Field Engineering Group, is equipped with a Pusher HF antenna and targeted against communications in China, North Korea, and Vietnam."28) In addition, the 751st Military Intelligence Battalion (formerly the U.S. Army Field Station Korea, also known as a Zoeckler Station) which is located at Camp Humphreys, An Jung Ri, Pyongtaek, is responsible for providing strategic intelligence support to national-level agencies throughout the Asia-Pacific region including North Korea. It operates Detachment C (a remote unmanned TRD-15 antenna array) and three forward SIGINT collection Detachments (J, K, L) which are remote Tracechain sites situated near the DMZ. The three forward collection sites are situated as follows: Detachment J (at Koryo Mountain on the island of Gangwha, 75 kilometres northwest of Seoul and 5 kilometres from the Han Estuary Neutral Zone), Detachment K (on Ganak Mountain, 10 kilometres from the DMZ), and Detachment L (on Yaweol Mountain, 108 kilometres north of Seoul and within 1,500 meters of the DMZ). These installations focus on surveillance, observation and the interception of North Korean COMINT and ELINT.29)
     With respect to airborne SIGINT collection, the SR-71 and U-2 aircraft reconnaissance systems are operated around the world and on the Korean peninsula. From Osan air base, SENIOR SPEAR U-2Rs carries out OLYMPIC GAME missions for the collection of North Korean and Chinese COMINT, "with the intercepted communica-tions being downlinked to an Electronic Security Command unit at Osan."30) It also provides photographic intelligence on North Korea. The ROK also operates the RF-4C reconnaissance aircraft, but it covers an area of only 40 km north of the DMZ.31)
     As regards naval sources for SIGINT in PACOM, the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific (JICPAC) was established on 3 July 1991 and merged the Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC); the 548th Reconnaissance Technical Group; Task Force 168's Pacific Forward Area Support Team (PACFAST); the Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Center (FOSIC), Pacific; and the Fleet Intelligence Center, Pacific (FICPAC). Whereas the FOSIC was responsible for providing intelligence on naval movements in the PACOM region including North Korea, the FICPAC carried out intelligence collection on naval forces.32) The 548 Reconnaissance Technical Group, which had subordinate Technical Squadrons at Yokota AB, Japan, (and possibly at Yongsan AB, South Korea), carried out photo interpretation of SR-71 missions for PACOM, Pacific Air Forces, and national agencies.33)
     As to imagery collection, the U.S. has operated several imaging satellites KH 8, KH-9, KH-11, LACROSSE‘što collect imagery and monitor a large number of activities and facilities around the world since 1960.34) The U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) operates a ground-based electro-optical satellite tracking system (GEODSS) to track high attitude satellites at Pulmosan, Daegu. The U.S. PACOM also has Ground Station and Tactical Early Warning (EW) assets in South Korea: 14 air defence radar/missile sites across South Korea, which are integrated with AWACS, naval E-2Cs, and Japan/Okinawa systems, namely the OV-10 observation aircraft controlled from Osan Air Base. Major PACOM's Radio Communication Systems in South Korea includes 3 High Frequency (HF) sites for Voice at the UN Command at Seoul; Super High Frequency (SHF), Defense Satellite Communication System (DSCS) Ground Stations at Yongsan AB, Song So; and AUTODIN (AD) and AUTOSEVCOM (AS) (manual or automatic) Switching Devices at Daegu.35)

IMPLICATIONS FOR ROK-U.S. COMBINED CRSIS MANAGEMENT

     With respect to the intelligence and warning systems, there are four functions of intelligence during crises: "(1) pre-crisis information; (2) advance warning of imminent attack, drastic adverse developments, or foreign policy opportunities; (3) traditional intelligence support during a crisis; and (4) postcrisis evaluations of crisis policy and behavior."36) Within the ROK-U.S. alliance, there are mechanisms for sharing intelligence in times of peace and crisis, including information on North Korean military movements and readiness and strategic and tactical warning. In respect of pre-crisis intelligence and advance warning, in the 1968 and 1976 crises, the ROK and the U.S. intelligence officials failed both to assess North Korea's pre-warning and to anticipate its provocations. In the 1983 Rangoon incident, it was reported that although an intelligence official of the ANSP raised the issue of North Korea's warning against President Chun's visit to non-aligned countries in Asia, South Korean intelligence services failed to anticipate the North Korean terrorist attack in Rangoon. As regards traditional intelligence support during crises, intelligence "to provide timely, reliable information about the onset of a crisis and its development"37) are crucial to effective crisis management. There are several principal targets of intelligence collection in order to assess indications of an impending North Korean attack. It includes elements such as the movement of North Korean troops near the DMZ, "increased radio traffic among combat units, establishment of new headquarters close to potential conflict areas, unusual changes in the pattern or amount of railroad or shipping traffic, reinforcement of understrength military units, . . . or variations in the pattern of radar usage."38) However, although South Korean intelligence organisations make an effort to collect relevant information, a substantial amount of high-resolution intelligence about North Korea's military movements, which could be used for strategic warning, is collected by the U.S. intelligence resources or U.S.-led combined ROK-U.S. intelligence units.
     There are several other problems related to the activities of the intelligence services in crisis management. First of all, South Korea's lack of independent intelligence collection capabilities, especially in signal intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery, is among the critical problems in assessing North Korean military movements, in providing strategic warning intelligence, and in evaluating a situation during crises. Secondly, given these conditions, South Korea is almost totally dependent on U.S. military intelligence assets during crises. Based on information from the KDIA, Yim Bok-Jin, a member of the ROK National Assembly, revealed that 99% of SIGINT and 98% of imagery came from U.S. intelligence activities.39) Thirdly, although South Korea and the U.S. have established regular and systematic intelligence exchanges and crisis-time intelligence collaboration, South Korean policy makers are not allowed total access to the kinds of information available in Washington to American policy makers during crises. Fourthly, owing to different perceptions of threat and crisis, South Korean and American intelligence officials interpret data somewhat differently, and they also differ in their threat assessments and requirements for decisions on the alert measures (DEFCON) and reconnaissance/warning posture (WATCHCON) during crises. As a result, these differences and the respective information analyses can result in friction in deciding appropriate DEFCON and WATCHCON levels during crises within the joint alert and warning system.40) Disagreement about specific DEFCON and WATCHCON levels can harm the credibility of crisis resolution and the use of military forces. To summarise, these problems can undermine efforts of crisis management, including consistent assessments of the situation and co-ordinated and appropriate military measures within the context of the ROK-U.S. alliance.

CONCLUSION

     In a time of crisis, significantly-enhanced intelligence capabilities are the most vital means for the ROK to assess North Korea's intentions and military movements, to provide early strategic warning and to prepare counter-postures in a crisis. Although the ROK operates several intelligence organisations, due to a lack of independent intelligence assets and capabilities, the ROK has depended entirely on the U.S. for the provision of intelligence and warning/reconnaissance systems including various SIGINT and imagery intelligence assets both in peacetime and crisis-time. While several intelligence and warning systems are jointly operated by the ROK and the U.S. and are tightly integrated into a ROK-U.S. C4I system, the ROK still needs U.S. agreement in order to increase a WATCHCON level. On the whole, as for South Korea, consultation and co-ordination with the U.S. for intelligence and warning activities in crisis management are indispensable.41)

1. Lynn Rusten and Paul C. Stern, Crisis Management in the Nuclear Age (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1987), p.8; Kurt Gottfried and Bruce G. Blair (eds.), Crisis Stability and Nuclear War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp.4 and 226.
2. Quoted in Rodney P. Katz, "National Security,"in Andre Matles Savada and William Shaw (eds.), South Korea: A Country Study , (3rd Edition) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1992), p. 312.
3. Melinda W. Cooke, "National Security,"in Frederica M. Bunge (ed.), South Korea: A Country Study , (3rd Edition) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1982), p. 243.
4. Katz, p. 312.
5. James Douglas Marett, "South Korean Foreign Policy Decision-Making,"unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1991, p. 97.
6. Kim In-sang, "Study on the Improvement of the ROK-U.S. Joint Crisis Management Capability," Gunsa Pyeongron , No. 286, Supplement, (1990), pp. 19-20; Cooke, p. 244.
7. Marett, p. 98. According to a member of the National Assembly, Nam Gung-jin, as of 1994, members of ANSP stationed at embassies amounted to some 180 personnel. This was 21 per cent of all foreign service officers. An Young-Bae, "Interview with a member of the National Assembly, Nam Gung-jin," Wolgan Mal , (March 1994), p. 64.
8. Park Bo-kyun, Chong Wa Dae Secretariat , 3, (Seoul: Joongang Ilbo, 1994), pp. 366-372.
9. Kim In-sang, p. 18.
10. Ministry of National Defense, National Defense Reform to Prepare for the 21st Century (1998-2002), (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1998), pp. 45-46.
11. Yoo Young-ok and Lee Seon-ho, International Security Environment and National-Military Strategy, (Seoul: Palbokwon, 1994), pp. 530-531; The director of the KDIA concurrently holds post of the director of the Intelligence Headquarter of the JCS. Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper , 1995-1996 (Seoul: MND, 1996), p. 91.
12. Oh Yeon-ho, Unveiling Hidden Pictures of Our Contemporary History, (Seoul: Wolgan Mal, 1994), pp. 234-237; Yoo and Lee, pp. 531-532; Chong Wa Dae, Homepage Library, "Defense Posture and Defense Reform,"(http:// www.cwd.go.kr), Hwang Yoo-seong, "Dancing North Korean Information,"Sin Dong-a , October 1994, p. 131.
13. Katz, pp. 315-316; Donald Stone Macdonald, The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society , (2nd Edition) (Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 143-144; Cooke, p. 244.
14. Ronald D. McLaurin and Chung-in Moon, The United States and the Defense of the Pacific (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p. 155. Pacific (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p. 155..
15. Kim In-sang, p. 28; Jeffrey T. Richelson, U.S. Intelligence Community, (2nd Edition) (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1989), p. 118; Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between the UKUSA Countries - the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), p. 328.
16. U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, "ISCOM and Its Heritage: An Organizational History of the Command and Its Units,"Microfiche Number: 62-64, Fiche Item Number: 00193, Date: 1985/00/00, in The U.S. Intelligence Community: Organization, Operations and Management, 1947-1989 , The Making of U.S. Policy Series (Alexandria, Virginia: Chadwyck-Healey Inc., 1990), p. 53.
17. Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community ,(3rd Edition) (Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 64-65, and 72; http://www.501mibde. korea.army.mil.
18. Kim In-sang, p. 28.
19. Jack Barrett and Ronald D. McLaurin, U.S. Defense Posture in the Pacific , United States Information Agency (September 1987), p. 28; McLaurin and Moon, p. 94.
20. McLaurin and Moon, p. 156; Richelson and Ball, p. 328; Ha Joon-woo, "Vanguard of the High Technology Weapon, U.S. Forces Korea," Sin Dong-A, June 1994, pp. 460-463; Dong-A Ilbo Special Reporting Team, Through Study of the U.S. Forces Korea (Seoul: Dong-a Ilbo, 1990), pp. 62-66. In January 1990, the SR-71 aircraft for SIGINT collection retired.
21. Kim In-sang, p. 28; Ha Joon-woo, p. 462; Dong-A Ilbo Special Reporting Team, pp. 64.
22. Richelson, (2nd Edition), p. 82. For air force intelligence organisations, Richelson, (2nd Edition), pp. 83, 87, 118 and 222; Richelson, (3rd Edition), p. 159.
23. Richelson, (2nd Edition), p. 75; Richelson, (3rd Edition), pp. 95-96.
24. Jugan Chosun, 18 April 1996, p. 10; Jugan Chosun, 21 December 1995, pp. 36-37; Kookmin Ilbo, 25 December 1995; Sisa Journal, 17 October 1996, p. 36; Chosun Ilbo , 2 December 1995.
25. Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 28-29.
26. Jugan Chosun, 18 April 1996 and 21 December 1995; Sisa Journal, 17 October 1996; Chosun Ilbo, 16 June 1999; Gukbang Ilbo , 16 June 1999.
27. Kim In-sang, p. 29.
28. Richelson, (2nd Edition), p. 185,
29. United States Field Army Station Korea, "Fiscal Year 1986, Annual Historical Report," Microfiche Number: 184, Fiche Item Number: 00527, Date: 1987/05/01, in the U.S. Intelligence Community , pp. 3-4 and 13; Richelson, (2nd Edition), pp. 185-186. See Richelson, (3rd Edition), p. 190; Richelson and Ball, p. 328.
30. Richelson, (2nd Edition), p. 180. The U-2R covered the 40-100 kilometres of North Korean area from the DMZ. Its special system can monitor about 200 kilometres of North Korean area from the DMZ. See Yoo, "The Nature of Intelligence Collection against North Korea in the wake of North Korean Withdrawal of NPT," Jugan Chosun , 1 April 1993, p.35.
31. Yoo, p. 26; Ha, p. 463.
32. Richelson, (3rd Edition), pp. 114-115.
33. Richelson, (3rd Edition), p. 116. See Richelson, (2nd Edition), p. 105.
34. Richelson, (3rd Edition), pp. 151-158.
35. Peter Hayes, Lyuba Zarsky, and Walden Bello, American Lake: Nuclear Peril in the Pacific (Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin Books, 1986), Appendix C, pp. 439-447.
36. Stan A. Taylor and Theodore J. Ralston, "The Role of Intelligence in Crisis Management,"in Alexander L. George (ed.), Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 396
37. Alexander L. George, "Findings and Recommendations,"in George (ed.), p. 554.
38. Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces , p. 30
39. Sisa Journal , 17 October 1996, p. 26.
40. William J. Taylor, Jr, Young Koo Cha, Changsu Kim, Gyu Yeol Lee, Michael J. Mazarr. et al., Managing Crises: U.S.-ROK Security Ties, The Results of a Crisis Simulation, Significant Issues Series, Vol. XI, No. 6 (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1989), pp. 24 and 26. On 9 July 1994, in the wake of the death of Kim Il-Sung, South Korea requested the U.S. Forces, Korea, to increase WATCHCON level from 3 to 2, but the USFK rejected Korean demand. Sisa Journal , 11 August 1994, p. 18.
41. Interview with Dr. Baek Jong-Chun, Senior Fellow of the Sejong Institute (former Professor of the Korean Military Academy), Seongnam, 17 October 1995; Interview with a retired ROK Army Major General, Hyun Kwang-Eon, former Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff of the Operations Division (C-3), CFC, Seoul, 22 October 1995; Interview with Kim In-Sang, Professor of the ROK Army College, Daejeon, 16 January 1996.