Volume 11 Number 4 Winter 1999
After the Perry Report:
The Korean Peninsula Game Enters
the Second Round
ONE HYPOTHESIS: A KOREAN VERSION
OF
THE CAMP DAVID NEGOTIATIONS?
As a journalist
living in a divided nation I find it extremely difficult to maintain
an objective view of the circumstances surrounding the Korean peninsula.
In a nutshell, there are too many variables. Unverified or impossible-to-verify
intelligence reports are constantly in circulation which makes it
almost impossible to develop a reliable outlook.
Among the variables, the most unpredictable is, of course, North
Korea itself. like the "Kremlinology"espoused by the U.S.
during the Cold War, the West's ability to accurately assess "Pyong-yangology"has
developed during the 1990s. Perspective of the West on North Korea's
position, strategy and policy direction, however, has its limitations.
Under such circumstances, developing various possible scenarios
is an effective method of gaining an objective perspective of the
current situation. The methodology is similar to a political-military
game where predictions can be made through examining the interactions
among variables under initial conditions. Let me apply this method
in order to better understand the current situation around the Korean
peninsula in the second half of 1999.
* * *
It is a late summer day in 2000. A press conference is being
held in the garden of the White House in Washington D.C. As the
large crowd of reporters from around the world anxiously watch,
United States President Bill Clinton, smiling brightly, enters with
President of the Republic of Korea, Kim Dae-jung and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea Supreme Commander, Kim Jong-il. After
introducing President Kim on his left and Supreme Commander, Kim
on his right, President Clinton makes the first remark.
"Today will go down in history as the beginning of lasting
stability and peace on the Korean peninsula. For the first time
since the Korean War, the leaders of South and North Korea sat together
and agreed on securing peace on the peninsula. The Democratic People's
Republic of Korea has agreed to permanently terminate its development
of nuclear arms and missiles. The United States of America will
lift all economic sanctions against North Korea and provide aid.
Also, the two countries have agreed to establish official diplomatic
ties in the near future...
There is a burst of applause and the click of cameras is everywhere...
This is the moment of the so-called "Korean version of the
Camp David negotiations." With this breakthrough, President
Clinton adds peace on the Korean peninsula to his list of diplomatic
achievements and is able to leave office with an impressive record,
while North Korea's Supreme Commander Kim Jong-il is guaranteed
political survival.
Then what would be the thoughts of President Kim Dae-jung, who has
consistently promoted the engagement policy toward North Korea since
he took office, as he stands in the White House garden. Could "the
Korean version of the Camp David Negotiations"truly open a
new chapter of peace for the two Koreas and Northeast Asia?1)
* * *
The idea of South and North Korean leaders reaching total agreement
through the mediation of the United States remains only hypothetical
under the current circumstances of November 1999. And it can also
be seen as an extremely unrealistic possibility considering the
relations between the two Koreas, long fraught with distrust and
tension and the complicated bilateral relations that impact the
Korean peninsula, namely those between the U.S. and North Korea,
the U.S. and China, North Korea and China, North Korea and Japan.
But is this truly an unlikely scenario? Isn't this possibility more
plausible than a summit talks between the leaders of South and North
Korea, that the Korean press often raises as a possibility, without
regard to the so-called "surrounding variables,"the United
States, China and Japan?
The reason for discussing this scenario in the preamble of this
article, is that it can shed light on the current November 1999
circumstances surrounding the Korean peninsula. The purpose of this
article is to develop an overall picture of the Korean peninsula
situation in the second half of 1999, by focusing on changes in
United States, Japan and China"s policy toward North Korea.
THE SITUATION IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1999
The Berlin agreement between the United States and
North Korea reached on September 12, 19992) pacified the "North
Korean missile crisis"that has been a threat for over a year
since North Korea test-fired Taepodong missile (or satellite) on
August 31, 1998. The centerpiece of the U.S.-North Korea "Big
Deal"was North Korea's committment to the moratorium of missile
tests and a U.S. pledge to ease economic sanctions against the North.
A few days after the agreement, the so-called "Perry Report,"which
had been anxiously awaited since spring of 1999, was partially disclosed
on September 15, and Washington officially announced that it would
ease economic sanctions on Pyongyang on September 17.3)
In response, on September 21, Pyongyang's state-controlled broadcasting
agency, the Korean Central News Agency, commented that the ease
of restrictions was a "belated but welcomed"development,
and on September 24, Pyongyang declared a moratorium on test-firing
a long-range missile. These developments instantly transformed the
high-tension situation, one which only a few weeks before had been
severely worsened by a series of North Korean provocations: the
naval clash between the two Koreas (June 15); the detainment of
a Mt. Kumgang tourist (June 20); the break off of high-level talks
between the two Koreas (June 22~July 3); and raising suspicion,
among neighboring countries such as the U.S. and Japan, during July
and August when the North was planning to test-fire Taepodong-2
missile.
However, the Berlin agreement, hailed for resolving the missile
crisis, only promises that "the test-firing of missiles will
be deferred during the comprehensive high-level talks between the
United States and North Korea."In other words, it means that
Washington and Pyongyang have "a lot to talk about."
With such rapid and significant developments led by the Clinton
administration, the Republican Party's objections seem only natural.
House International Relations Committee chairman Benjamin Gilman
and Republican hard-liners against the North, criticized Perry's
proposal after a House briefing held on October 13, and the North
Korea Advisory Group released its North Korea policy report (a.k.a.
the NKAG report on November 3). The North Korean Advisory Group
organized at the request of House Speaker Dennis Hastert, proposed
the Republican Party's policy on the North in order to counter Perry's
proposal.4) Nonetheless, the objections of the Republicans were
unsuccessful in the face of prompt counterattacks from Democrats
such as congressman Tony Hall, allowing Washington, the chance to
implement the so-called "Perry process" by early 2000.
The "Perry Report"itself could be another example that
the U.S. and North Korea have "a lot to talk about."The
report proposes a three-stage policy toward the North. (a) Negotiate
a cessation of North Korea's test-firing of missiles to secure peace
on the Korean peninsula by easing economic sanctions (short-term
goal). (b) Negotiate a complete cessation of Pyongyang's nuclear
weapons program and seek to normalize U.S-North Korea relations
(mid-term goal). (c) Through U.S.-North Korea normalization, create
conditions for a more durable and lasting peace on the Korean peninsula
and end the Cold War in East Asia (long-term goal).
In this respect, the recent talks in Berlin can be viewed as a repetition
of the October 1994 Agreed Framework in Geneva that has served as
a turning point in Washington-Pyongyang relations. Given that the
Agreed Framework only froze future development program, postponing
the examination of North Korea'S "Past nuclear development"question
until the completed construction of light water reactors, the Berlin
agreement served only as a compromise measure to prevent the test-firing
of missiles. It thus fell short of addressing the fundamental issue:
North Korea's development, deployment and export of missiles.
Nevertheless, current circumstances are different from that of late
1994 when the Agreed Framework was reached. The most significant
difference is the United States'basic perception toward North Korea.
In 1994, during the talks in Geneva, the prevailing thought among
U.S. delegates was that Pyongyang would soon collapse, so a promise
to build two light-water reactors could be nullified and South Korea,
Japan and the U.S. would end up not having to pay for the expensive
construction.5)
However, the approach toward the North in the second half of 1999
has significantly changed from that of five years ago. The difference
stems from the fact that despite the severe food shortage and a
near-bankrupt economy, the despotic regime shows no sign of demise.
Recently, U.S. experts rarely raise the possibility of North Korea's
imminent collapse. under the circumstances, the U.S. has felt the
need to develop a long-term strategy under the recognition that
North Korea is a substantial entity, and last September's Berlin
agreement was a manifestation of such a policy change. Experts in
and outside the South Korean government believe that with the significant
developments since September, the stagnated U.S.-North Korea relations
will rapidly improve and this will also have, in the long-term,
a positive influence on the relations between the two Koreas.6)
This perspective, however, seems to be based on Seoul's extremely
optimistic expectations toward Pyongyang's future South Korea policy.
At the same time, such optimism is shared by some American experts.
A leading U.S. expert on Korea, Bruce Cummings at the University
of Chicago, predicted, "Within two years, the inter-Korean
relationship will be the best it has been since the Korean War."7)
Overall, there is no doubt that the situation surrounding the Korean
peninsula is undergoing a rapid change since the September 12 agreement
between the U.S. and North Korea. And such changes hint that the
fundamental nature of the Korean peninsula issue which surfaced
as an international concern after North Korea withdrew from the
Non-Proliferation Treaty in March 1993, is changing with the dawn
of the new millenium. In the 1990s, in particular after the Geneva
Agreement in October 1994, the surrounding powers took a passive
approach toward the North or only focused on maintaining the status
quo, under the belief it would soon collapse. Recently, in contrast,
they are beginning to accept the possibility of Pyongyang's survival
and take a more proactive approach in coming up with a solution.
The recent changes will be examined with a closer look at the variables
presented by surrounding counties.
THE UNITED STATES
The two principal strategy goals of the U.S. regarding the Korean
peninsula are to maintain peace and stability in the Korean peninsula
and Northeast Asia, and to ensure nonproliferation of weapons of
mass destruction including nuclear weapons and missiles. Additional
goals are to secure and maintain its strong influence on issues
concerning the Korean peninsula, to keep U.S. armed forces in Korea
and to utilize it as an forward-deployed military base, to keep
China in check, and to provide military protection to Japan. Maintaining
South Korea as a successful showcase of democracy and a free market
economy is also desirable.
An obstacle to its policy goals that emerged in the 1990s is North
Korea's development of nuclear weapons and missiles, which has imposed
a significant threat not only to the stability of Northeast Asia
but also to the global strategy of the United States. Under the
Agreed Framework, North Korea froze further development, but kept
its nuclear program despite severe economic difficulties. Indeed,
it has clearly reminded the world of its existence by test-firing
a long-range missile.
As discussed earlier, the U.S. was not convinced that the North
Korean regime would survive, and this became the foundation of the
"North Korean Collapse"theory and "Softlanding"policy
often cited in the mid-1990s by U.S. and South Korean experts. In
contrast, Perry's proposal, which came shortly after the U.S.-North
Korea agreement in Berlin, can be viewed as the outcome of a fundamental
change in Washington's approach toward Pyongyang. The proposal indicates
that the U.S. has begun to accept North Korea at face value and
has decided to deal with it without any preconceived notions. In
sum, if the basic attitude toward one's counterpart in the negotiations
changes, then the negotiations are also likely to change.
As agreed in the Berlin negotiations, the U.S. and North Korea will
hold a high-level meeting for comprehensive improvement of bilateral
ties, and talks were resumed in Berlin on November 15 to agree on
the agenda and the schedule of the meeting. The two countries are
expected to seek ways to comprehensively improve relations, including
the easing of economic sanctions, a guarantee of the continued existence
of the North Korean regime and the establishment of liaison offices.
In parallel to government-level efforts, interactions with the North
on a private-level are also increasing. The most significant movement
is that of the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea which plans
to send a special trade mission to the North before the end of the
year. Companies that have expressed interest in taking part in the
mission include Coca-Cola, AT&T and Motorola. It appears that
U.S. companies are using last September's agreement as an opportunity
to resume the trade ties that began after the Agreed framework,
but which have been stalled since 1995. As proposed in the report
by William Perry, the United States is likely to push ahead with
the so-called "comprehensive approach"to improve U.S.-North
Korea relations. Thus the issue is focusing on what North Korea's
policy will be. It can reinforce its policy, issued in 1994 "Tongme
Bongnam,"to exclude South Korea from discussion regarding issues
on the Korean peninsula. Depending on the U.S. response, serious
talks on a peace agreement to replace the current Armistice Agreement
could get underway in 2000. A definite proponent of current developments
is the South Korean government which has, unlike former governments
has, encouraged and promoted the improvement of ties between Washington
and Pyongyang.
An indication of how U.S.-North Korea relations could progress,
is the U.S.-proposed "Road Map"used as a guide to normalize
relations between the U.S. and Vietnam in the early 1990s. (See
Table above.)
Viewed from a broader perspective, the U.S. policy toward the North
is actually a sub-policy under its policy toward China. In other
words, from the viewpoint of the U.S., North Korea is only a part
of its long-term strategy toward China, which has the greatest potential
for catching up to the United States in the next millenium.
The long-term outlook on U.S.-China ties is that unsettled relations
of limited cooperation and competition will continue.8) The two
countries will be able to cooperate in areas that create mutual
benefit, but conflicting interests and different systems will lead
to tensions and complications which will keep the two countries
at odds for a long time to come. The United States' accidental bombing
of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia and the alleged Chinese spy-ing
at a U.S. nuclear weapons laboratory are recent manifestations of
such unstable relations. On the other hand, China's entry into the
World Trade Organization last November is a example of cooperation
between the two countries.
Despite conflicts in other areas since the late 1990s, the two countries
have maintained a relatively amicable relationship in issues concerning
the Korean peninsula, but that does not mean that such a relationship
will remain unchanged. Depending on the speed and scope of improvement
in bilateral ties between the U.S. and North Korea, China may feel
somewhat threatened and decide to take a more proactive approach
toward the North. In this light, Chairman of the Presidium of the
Supreme People's Assembly, Kim Young-nam's visit to China last June
and Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan's visit to North Korea
last October is noteworthy, especially in the fact that it was the
first time in eight years that top-level government officials had
visited North Korea and China.
JAPAN
Japan has several policy goals toward North Korea: (a) peace
and stability on the Korean peninsula and maintenance of the status
quo, (b) utilizing the Korean peninsula as a buffer zone between
Japan and China (keeping U.S. forces in Korea and Japan), (c) denuclearization
on the Korean peninsula. In the long-term Japan fears China's increased
influence on the Korean peninsula and it considers inter-Korean
issues under the context of Japan-China hegemony in the region.
Ever since official diplomatic negotiations with North Korea ended
unsuccessfully in 1992, Japan has taken a passive position in issues
concerning the two Koreas. while it wants to improve relations with
the North, evidenced by the fact that it has been a permanent member
of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) since
1995, it has been reluctant to provide food aid. It appears that
while Japan is unwilling to take undertake a significant burden
in issues concerning the North, it does not want to fall behind
South Korea or the U.S. in the bid to improve relations.
Following the release of the Perry Report, the result of so-called
cooperation among the U.S., Japan and South Korea, Japan seems set
to resume ties with North Korea. In fact, it had been considering
sending a high-level political delegation to the North as early
as last June, but it postponed plans after North Korea's second
test-firing of a Taepodong missile.
Former Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama is reportedly leading
the delegation and former Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka,
thought to have a private channel to the North, has expressed his
willingness to join the team, illustrating the strong support of
the Japanese government and its ruling party. It is said that Japan
feels a strong need to reestablish top-level ties which were suspended
after the visit to the North in the early 1990s by the late Shin
Kanemaru, the Liberal Democratic Party kingmaker.9)
Ever since official negotiations between Japan and the North ended in November
1992, with alleged kidnapping of a Japanese national, Japan has
been considered as a dependent variable in light of U.S. North Korea
strategy. Despite its committment to contribute 1 billion dollars
for the construction of two light-water reactors in North Korea,
it has had no independent leverage toward the North. Indeed, when
the North test-fired the Taepodong missile over its territory on
September 31, 1998, it had neither a means to respond nor a direct
channel of communications with Pyongyang. Therefore, in a series
of cooperative efforts with South Korea and the U.S. to prompt North
Korea to take a more active part in the international community,
Japan will concentrate on building leverage with the North.10) Considering
recent Japan's willingness to resume diplomatic ties with the North,
the progress will be steadier and more rapid than the early 1990s.
Meanwhile, North Korea presented three premises for establishing
diplomatic ties; (a) Japan's relinquishment of its crushing policy
toward the North, (b) an apology by Japan to the Korean people for
past crimes, as well as provision of full compensation, (c) In the
event that Japan would use force, North Korea would respond accordingly.11)
Even for North Korea it is preferable that Japan-North Korea relations
improve as soon as possible, considering the indemnities to be paid,
which are expected to be around 5 to 10 billion dollars, not to
mention the new opportunities for economic cooperation. With this
in mind, Japanese companies have continued to conduct surveys for
potential investments in North Korea since the mid-1990s. For the
North, perhaps the most attractive reward for agreeing to a comprehensive
engagement policy with South Korea, the United States and Japan,
will be the compensation to be paid by Japan, funds that could revive
the moribund economy.12)
CHINA
Like the United States and Japan, China has a strong interest
in peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and wants to maintain
the status quo. In recent years it has unofficially provided a significant
amount of aid to the North, primarily in fear that millions of North
Korean refugees would migrate to China in the event of the country's
demise.
Denuclearization on the Korean peninsula is also a key
interest to the country because it also does not want the Northeast
Asian region to detonate a nuclear arms race. This is why China,
which wants to avoid being encircled by the allied forces of South
Korea, the U.S. and Japan, has kept pace with Japan and the U.S.
and took part in four-party talks. On the other hand, it strongly
objected to the U.S.-Japan "Theater Missile Defense"plan,
a proposed countermeasure against North Korea's missile development,
because it would likely impose a military threat to the country.
in summary, it can be said that regionally, China does not want
Japan to re-arm and to expand its role in Northeast Asia, and globally
it does not want the U.S. to increase its influence in the region
and succeed in encircling China.
Nonetheless, 1999 has made a difference in China's approach toward
issues related to the Korean peninsula. As mentioned earlier, the
most significant example of such a change is the exchange of high-ranking
officials. Such exchange visits between the two countries drew keen
interest not only because they are being resumed for the first time
since 1991, but because of the possibility that North Korean leader
Kim Jong-il's potential visit to China was discussed in the talks.
In addition to such visits, it is reported that in 1999 alone, the
two countries exchanged a total of over 20 missions composed of
government, political party and military officials.13)
China's policy change stems in part from its intent to keep the
U.S. in check. While it supports increased stability through increased
U.S.-North Korea channels enabling the North to be brought out into
the network of the international community, it is cautious of the
U.S. having too much influence on the North. As illustrated above,
it fears being encircled by the allied forces of South Korea (or
the unified Korea), the U.S. and Japan before U.S.-China relations
develop a firm foundation for cooperation.
It is obvious that the main concern underlying China's policies
on issues concerning the two Koreas is its relations with the U.S.
the country views North Korea from a broader perspective of its
relations or rivalry with the U.S. In this regard, China has lost
initiatives to the U.S. ever since North Korea nuclear program emerged
as an international concern, so it would be fair to say that in
1999, it has decided to actively improve relations with the North.
The U.S.-China rivalry surrounding the Korean peninsula is also
described in the following report:
China's former displeasure with its stubborn and unruly partner, Pyongyang, has been largely put aside. The leadership is instead gradually moving to the conclusion that the main threat to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula now emanates from the United States. As Chinese officials point out, Washington is putting pressure on the DPRK that is "provoking"it to take countermeasures, including missile development. As a result of these American policies, according to the Chinese, the arms race on the Korean Peninsula and in the Far East at large is intensifying, while the current peace is becoming increasingly fragile. Chinese officials believe that the prospect of the U.S. unleashing aggression against the DPRK in a scenario similar to the Yugoslavian events is even more threatening.
Such aggression, argue Chinese officials, would pose grave problems for China. First of all, it would create "a hot spot"right on China's borders. Second, Beijing's non-interference in the conflict would mean that it would be surrendering to American "dictatorship"in Asia. Third, in case the United States were to win such a war and impose its control over the North, the outcome would mean that the U.S. military would be gaining a foothold in the direct vicinity of Chinese territory.Source: "The DPRK Report,"The Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, No.19 (July-August 1999).
CONCLUSION
The "Korean peninsula game"between the surrounding
powers and North Korea, ended its first round in the 1990s and is
entering the second round. If the first round included players,
i.e. surrounding countries, that tried to avoid or pass on responsibility
for North Korea, then the second round will, most likely be described
as characterized one in which the countries actively try to increase
their influence on the North.
For the North Korean regime, which has successfully strived to maintain
its Stalinist regime throughout the extremely devastating economic
situation of the 1990s, current developments are likely to be significantly
advantageous. Unlike the past, when South Korea held the only card
to the North's survival, now those cards are distributed among the
surrounding countries, giving it the opportunity to use the power
dynamics in the region to its advantage.
For the Republic of Korea, the U.S.-China rivalry will definitely
be the key challenge in issues concerning the Korean peninsula,
so it is extremely important that the two countries maintain a strong
cooperative relationship.14) It is important for South Korea to
develop the capability to control its relations with the U.S., China.
Japan and Russia by effectively combining cooperation and competition,
and to be able to intelligently handle inter-Korean relations toward
reunification on its own. Nonetheless, strong cooperation and consultation
with the United States will remain a key factor in the next millenium's
Korean peninsula game.
- William Perry, U.S. policy coordinator to the North, commented
on this in an interview with the Voice of America on October
27, 1999. When asked on the possibility of President Clinton
inviting President Kim Dae Jung and Supreme Commander Kim Jong-il
to Washington for a summit, he said, "It's an interesting
possibility, but is a distant possibility considering the current
stage. However, such a possibility shall remain open for sometime
in the future."The "Korean version of the Camp David
negotiations"idea is known as one of the scenarios developed
since 1997 between some Korean and U.S. experts.
- All dates in this article are Korean dates.
- Washington announced that restrictions against North Korea
will be eased on: (a) U.S. imports of raw materials and most
goods made in North Korea, (b) sales of most U.S. consumer goods
and financial services to North Korea, (c) U.S. investment in
agriculture, mining, petroleum, timber, transportation, roadbuilding,
travel and tourism, (d) direct financial help from U.S. citizens
to relatives or other individual North Koreans, (e) U.S. transport
of ordinary cargo to and from North Korea by ship and plane,
and (f) commercial flights between the United States and North
Korea.
- House Speaker Dennis Hastert said in a press conference
held on November 3, after the release of the NKAG report, "North
Korea has neither suspended nor frozen its nuclear program and
its ballistic missile program has a direct effect on Americans."He
also said, "the humanitarian relief, provided by the U.S.
to help the impoverished North Koreans, is being used to maintain
North Korea's authoritarian despotism."Benjamin Gilman,
House International Relations Committee Chairman added, "a
bill that will enable the U.S. to take a more rational approach
toward North Korea will be introduced by April 2000."Such
remarks indicate that disagreements between the two parties
on the North Korea policy will only worsen.
- The approach of U.S. policy makers during the Geneva talks
is outlined in an article "U.S. Policy toward North Korea:
The Collapse Theory and Its Influence"(presented at a seminar
held by the Korea Graduate School of Defense in August 1996)
by Larry A. Niksch, a specialist in Asian affairs at the Congressional
Research Service.
- In an interview with a high-ranked Chong Wa Dae official
last October, he said, "The common goal of the Republic
of Korea, Japan and the United States is for North Korea to
change. But the Korean government always has and still believes
that before trying to change the North it is necessary for the
United States and Japan to change their policies toward North
Korea in advance. Since the only country that can stimulate
North Korea's change under the current circumstances is its
counterpart in the Berlin talks, the U.S., we believe that only
after the U.S. changes its attitude will North Korea begin to
change. And this hopefully will also enable improvements between
the two Korean relations. This is the basic outline of Perry's
proposal."
- In an
interview with Chosun Shinbo , a bulletin published
by Chongryun, the pro-Pyongyang Federation of Korean Residents
in Japan, Dr. Cummings said, "North Korea Policy Coordinator,
William Perry has successfully convinced the White House that
U.S.-North Korea relations will drastically improve before President
Clinton leaves office in January 2001."He also added, "The
Perry report indicates that Washington has begun an extensive
re-evaluation of its policy toward North Korea."
- A local
example of such a view is Ahn Byung-joon, "U.S.-China Relations after
the Fall of the Former-Soviet Union and Outlook," Strategic
studies
, the Korea Research Institute for Strategy, vol.4, no.1
(1997).
- Sisa
Journal , October 4, 1999.
- Masao
Okonogi, "The North Korean Crisis and Japan's Political and Diplomatic
Responses,"in Young-Sun Lee and Masao Okonogi (eds.), Japan and
Korean Unification
(Seoul: Yonsei
University Press, 1999).
- The
Ashai Shimbun , August 10, 1999.
- The
Sisa Journal , September 30/October 7, 1999.
- The
Yonhap News , November 15, 1999.
- Professor
Han Sung-ju of Korea University, who handled the North Korean nuclear
program as a foreign minister in the Kim Young-sam government, wrote in
a recent article, "The triangular relations of the U.S.-China-North
Korea and U.S.-China-South Korea is transforming into a single
triangular relationship of the U.S.-China-Korea. The U.S. and China is
starting to recognize the two Koreas as a single entity,"reaching a
somewhat positive conclusion, "it does not seem unavoidable for the U.S.
and China to conflict on issues concerning Korea."Han Sung-ju,
"Indications of a Trianguar Relationship: the U.S., China and the Korean
peninsula," Quarterly SaSang
,
Fall 1999.