Volume 11 Number 4 Winter 1999

The Kim Jong-il Regime:
Structure, Policies, and Perception

Park Young-ho

INTRODUCTION

     The incumbent South Korean government led by President Kim Dae-jung believes that the arrival at a common concept of peaceful co-existence and co-prosperity by the two Koreas is a prerequisite for achieving reunification on the Korean peninsula. Based on that conviction, the government has pursued an engagement policy toward the North aimed at improving inter-Korean relations by promoting peace, reconciliation and cooperation. Seoul's engagement policy is anchored to the following preconceptions regarding North Korea: First, the North Korean regime is a failure and the current system will not last long unless it succeeds in making fundamental changes. Second, despite such a pessimistic view of the North Korean regime, Seoul still doubts whether it will collapse in the near future, considering some of its innate characteristics. Third, while the North has already begun making slow, gradual changes, they are only in response to the urgency of the current circumstances. Finally, notwithstanding all of the above, it is not likely that North Korea will give up on its current military strategy, part of the aim of which is to change the predominant ideologies of the South, before it adopts fundamental systematic reforms.1) Faced with this situation, South Korea must strive to move beyond its sense of victimization by persistent national security threats, while preparing itself against other such possible dangers, and it must become more active in improving inter-Korean relationships by aiding the North in its inevitable transformation. The policy, therefore, is summarized as a "policy with which to forge peace"aiming at paving the way for peaceful reunification.
     Likewise, the North claims that its South Korean policies are designed to ultimately result in facilitating "an autonomous peaceful unification"of the Korean peninsula. However, North Korea continues to say that because the "domination and intervention"by the United States and the "anti-North Korean and confrontational policy"of South Korea stand in the way, national reunification cannot be realized unless its proponents in the South overcome these obstacles.2) North Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paek Nam-sun's speech before the 54th UN General Assembly summarized its standpoint. He criticized South Korea's engagement policy to embrace the North, saying, "If the South tries to change the North with the 'sunshine,'the 'engagement,'or any other policy, while intentionally ignoring the reality of their extreme differences in ideologies and systems, South Korea's actions will only lead to confrontation and collision."3) After all, a fundamental cause for friction and actual confrontations between the South and the North lies in the fact that each side believes that its own policy is the best way to achieve peace and national reunification, while at the same time questioning the other side's intentions and methodologies.
     Despite the fact that each sides maintain a similar skepticism of its counterpart's intentions, inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation have steadily increased since the onset of the 1990's. While inter-Korean economic exchanges and cooperation once consisted primarily of indirect trade, the commissioned processing of domestic and overseas export goods, combining South Korea's raw materials and North Korea's manpower, now constitutes more than 25% of the total trade volume. Economic cooperation in the form of joint-ventures has also been sought. Notably, the Mt. Kumgang Tour and subsequent development project was a turning point in the history of inter-Korean economic cooperation. Since then, tourist exchange between the two sides has significantly risen: While only 183 South Koreans visited the North on three separate occasions in 1990, the corresponding number skyrocketed in 1998 to 3,317 people on 341 occasions. The growth in inter-Korean exchange is not confined to the economic arena. It can also be observed in academia, the arts, culture, religion, the media and sports.
     Inter-Korean relations have now become so diverse and complex in nature that they defy the traditional characterization based on an absolute dichotomy between hostility and appeasement. That being the case, can we say that the North Korean policy toward the South has begun to change under Kim Jong-il? And if so, have the changes been significant enough to contribute to the improvement of inter-Korean relations? Or are they nothing more than short-lived emergency measures taken by the North in a desperate effort to overcome the adversities it currently faces? This paper seeks an answer to these questions.

THE STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REGIME
AND ITS PERCEPTION OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION

Structural characteristics

     A fair discussion of the Kim Jong-il regime's policy toward the South necessitates the understanding of two elements: (a) the structure of the Kim Jong-il regime, which could in turn provide insight into the mechanism he uses to retain political power; and (b) the perception of the current political situation by the North Korean decision-making bodies.
     Let us begin our scrutiny of the structure of the North Korean government with a look at the political career of Kim Jong-il. Kim, who officially debuted on the nation's political stage in 1964 as an official in the Organization and Guidance Department of the Workers'Party Central Committee, was inaugurated as the chairman of the National Defense Commission ¡ª the de facto head of state ¡ª in September 1998. His rise to power was a careful and complex progression spanning more than 30 years.
     Since February of 1974, when Kim Jong-il's efforts to "convert all society to Kimilsungism"began,4) North Koreans have been systematically taught the Juche (self-reliance) ideology and convinced to believe implicitly in his leadership. Following the death of Kim Il-sung, the North Korean regime began to deify the late Kim as the founder of the country, the "Kim Il-sung Choson,"5) and to worship him as their "eternal leader."Acclaiming the younger Kim as "another great leader,"the new regime began transferring Kim Il-sung's charisma to his son. Through extensive propaganda, the regime exercised extensive efforts to render legitimacy to Kim Jong-il as their political and ideological leader, claiming that he had devised a revolutionary philosophy exemplified by the "Red Banner philosophy"and the "Theory of Three Encampments (politics, military, ideology)."
     However, it is clear that Kim Jong-il assumed the position of general secretary and chairman of the National Defense Commission by exploiting the age-old custom of nepotism. Kim Jong-il, the only heir to Kim Il-sung's monolithic control, failed to inherit much of the political leverage which he needed to stabilize his position of power, despite the fact that North Korea fell under the control of the Kim family's private coffers, and that the few elite in power, forming the "noble class"in North Korea's current socialist fabric, have had little choice but to maintain a certain symbiosis with Kim Jong-il in order to protect their vested rights.
     Even so, Kim Jong-il does not enjoy the "prophetic"status of his late father, who established new political and economic schemes and founded the North Korean socialist system. He cannot resort to oppression and terror indefinitely in order to maintain his regime, either. It is difficult for Kim Jong-il, as heir to his father's legacy, to escape the yoke of the "Kim Il-sung's Yuhun ¡ª guidelines he presented before his abrupt death"and suggest his own enterprising visions.6) Moreover, there are inherent limits to the power bestowed upon him, as he has no resources or leverage with which to systematically manage the state. Therefore, Kim Jong-il must constantly secure loyalty, cooperation, and support from the small and parasitic group of elites, who have maintained a relationship with him that can be likened to the lord-vassal interdependence of the feudal age.7)
     As a safeguard against the possible disintegration of the system due to the precarious circumstances surrounding the political and social elite, North Korea formed a cadre including the old, the middle-aged, and the young alike.8) The cadre began to crack from within, however, as could be seen from the defections on February 12, 1997 of Hwang Jang-yup, an intellectual architect of the North's Juche ideology, and of North Korean ambassador to Egypt Jang Sung-gil and his wife on August 26, 1997.
     Second, the legacies of the Kim Il-sung era, especially that of economic failure, have worked as a fundamental restraint on the younger Kim's rule. North Korea itself has officially admitted its economic deterioration. In the 21st session of the 6th-term Workers'Party Central Committee in December 1993, the representatives said that the third seven-year plan (1987~93) had failed due to "the collapse of socialist markets and the strengthening of national defense."In 1990, the North Korea's gross domestic product (GDP) recorded a minus 3.7% growth rate. The North Korean economy has since failed to check its own patterns of decline9) and has now shrunk by more than 30% from 1989. North Korea, which once boasted of its painstaking methods for uncovering potential disasters and took pride in its diplomatic skill, has been forced to officially ask the international community for aid. In fact, food aid had been on the agenda in the U.S.-North Korea talks for the past few years.
     Economic failure has also had impacts on the socio-political fabric of the North Korean way of life. North Korea has endeavored to maintain and strengthen social unity with a "carrot and stick"policy since Kim Il-sung's death, but complaints about his successor Kim Jong-il are beginning to be heard.10) It is estimated that up to 3 million North Koreans have died of starvation and hunger-related diseases between 1994 and 1998.11) In the context of such grinding poverty, it is impossible not to complain, despite the unshakable internalized faith in their "impeccable leader,"which people still profess. Moreover, since the collapse of the food-rationing system, an increasing number of North Koreans have been deserting their homeland to solve the food shortage problem on their own.12)
     Another indication of deterioration is the increase in population migrations. In addition, social misdemeanors such as black market commerce, robbery, prostitution, larceny in key state facilities, abandonment of children, robbery of ancient tombs and trafficking in antiques and cultural assets, have been steadily on the rise, thus undermining the efficiency of the traditional methods of policy implementation. Worse yet, despite crackdowns by the North Korean authorities, Hwang Jang-yup's defection to the South sent a tremendous shock to the core class of intellectuals in North Korea. To prevent the unraveling of the social fabric, North Korea has undertaken efforts at nationwide mobilization, as exemplified by events such as the "Arduous March,"the "Desperate March for Socialism,"and the "Second Round of Chollima Movement."While adhering to its principles of Politics of Indok (benevolent virtue), Kwangpok (extensive magnanimity) Politics, North Korea has also emphasized the "belief in and conscientiousness about socialism."However, unless living conditions are fundamentally improved and the public trust in "General Kim Jong-il"is firmly established, the social fabric will continue to unravel, posing threats to the security of the regime, and to the nation as a whole.
     Faced with these circumstances, Kim Jong-il must make way for the total rehabilitation of the North Korean economy. When he officially inaugurated his own era, he established the governing slogan of "Kangsong Taeguk¡ªa militarily powerful and economically prosperous nation."13) The strategy of building "Kangsong Taeguk"based on political and military strength has as its final goal the creation of a true "Socialist power."But Kim maintains that economic rehabilitation should be made within the framework comprised of socialist ideologies and politics, and military strength. In other words, he posits that the building up of ideological and military power should come first, and only then can the leaders of a potential superpower move on to the rehabilitation of the economy. Advocacy of the "leader's"ideologies is the ultimate goal. To that end, the North Koreans argue that they should "create a strong military that can squarely confront imperialistic superpowers represented by the U.S., which is attempting to suffocate the North Koreans."
     Among the elements essential to North Korea's economic development policy is its belief in "economic self-reliance and the perception of foreign capital as opium."14) In short, the fact that Kim Jong-il's ruling power was handed down from his father fundamentally restricts his governing power, and therefore he can hardly pursue his master plan of steering North Korea on toward his socio-economic ambitions. Rather, he has only constructed a system of policies geared toward keeping the country together as it lives down the legacies of the Kim Il-sung era.
     Third, the current international environment is fundamentally different from that of the Kim Il-sung era. The Kim Il-sung era witnessed the ideological confrontation, which turned the Korean peninsula into a battleground. However, the Kim Jong-il era of the 1990's has witnessed the reshaping of new world order. It is a period of great changes for countries that had once tightly embraced socialism. Furthermore, the Stalinist system no longer exists, and even China, the only remaining ally of North Korea, has begun to perceive the North as a burden, not as a "blood-forged ally"or a cooperative partner and friend.15) Moreover, Kim Il-sung played both sides against the middle between China and the former Soviet Union in a confrontational structure, between the northern triangle and southern triangle. However, the changed political situation on and around the Korean peninsula, involving the four surrounding powers, has denied Kim Jong-il such a possibility. Kim Jong-il's decision has been to take advantage of the policy leeway of the surrounding powers concerned about dramatic changes in the North Korean system, resulting in a breakdown of peace and stability in Northeast Asia, and to approach the United States with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and facilities for missile development, which enable it to become a military power, though with limited resources.
     In light of these developments, Kim Jong-il has treated the military well, and has managed the nation as if he were managing a barracks. To take full control of the military and enlist absolute loyalty from them, Kim Jong-il has promoted over 1,000 generals since he became the supreme commander of the People's Army in 1992. "On-site instructions"or "on-site guidance"which became a major governing method of North Korean leaders, take place mostly in the form of military troop inspection.16) It is typical of an autocratic dictator, ill at ease about the security of his office, to strengthen aspects of a barracks system in the politically theocratic structure. In this context, Kim Jong-il is expected to keep a close eye on his key staff members and politically influential elite, astutely manipulating their interrelationships. Kim's strategy of maintaining power is to enlist unconditional loyalty, cooperation and support from the few people in the ruling class by winning their trust in his military and tactical genius.

The North's perception of the political situation

     The Juche ideology has been a tool for rationalizing the many harsh realities that North Korea has suffered, and at the same time it has been an ideological system regulating the lifestyles of its people. It is characteristically monolithic, in that no matter how much change it may accept, it cannot break out of its self-imposed shackles. North Korea has idolized Kim Jong-il through the image of Kim Il-sung, saying, for example, "Kim Jong-il is Kim Il-sung,"but this philosophy reveals that the North Korean civilization is nothing but a cult that has hidden itself deep within a cave. Kim Jong-il's perception of the political situation in this post-Cold War era is no broader than the Juche ideology.
     The North Korean leaders's perception of the political situation is based on the paranoia of having been besieged by imperialists since the Korean War,17) which ended in 1953, and the greatest imperialist threat comes from the U.S. In the Cold War era, North Korea argued that "there is no place on the earth that is not affected by the evil influence of the U.S. and there is no country that does not feel the menace of aggression [from the U.S.],"18) and it has maintained that the United States, which had once threatened the North with military assault, is interfering with national reunification. In fact, North Korea has also forecast the collapse of the U.S. empire, representing the fall of imperialism as an objective law of historical development.
     As things turned out, the "law of historical development"has applied only to socialism. Interpreting it as a "peaceful transitional strategy [of imperialists] to completely eradicate socialism, revive colonialism, and take the control of the entire world,"Kim Il-sung called upon North Koreans to hold on steadfastly to their own socialism.19) Kim Jong-il, too, analyzed the debacle of the Soviet Union and socialist countries in Eastern Europe as a temporary "turn of events"in the process of the development of socialism, caused by the capitalist countries'"peaceful transitional strategy."20) He stressed the importance of "strengthening the Juche ideology in constructing socialism,"saying that "the frustration of socialism and the revival of capitalism in some countries are nothing but temporary phenomena, if seen in the big picture of historical development."21)
     North Korea's serious economic crisis and the expansion of U.S. hegemonic influence, as seen from its attack on Iraq, have made Pyongyang more concerned about the possible impact of "imperialism"on North Korea. In an informal speech to the Workers'Party on December 7, 1996, Kim Jong-il expressed his fears about the urgent circumstances besetting the economy and security.22) He said, "The raging imperialistic wind has brought to dust many socialist countries around the world and is now gaining momentum to target Chosun (North Korea), a small country in East Asia."23) He continued to say, "It is attempting to squeeze our Republic to death by force of arms."24)
     In an editorial carried jointly by the organs of the Workers'Party, the People's Army and the League of the Socialist Working Youth on January 1, 1999, Pyongyang argued that international tensions are mounting due to imperialist aggression, and that "neither national independence nor world peace can be protected unless the high-handed exercise of power by U.S. imperialists is contained."25) In other words, Kim Jong-il regarded the development of weapons of mass-destruction as a strategic response to the U.S. strategy to "suffocate"North Korea.26)
     As explained above, the North Korean leaders'perception of the political situation has been based on the traditional perception of the U.S. as a menace. Paradoxically they also claim that North Koreans can solve their own problems, but through the intervention of the United States. In fact, North Korea, on the one hand, argues that "the United States should fundamentally change its anachronistic policy toward North Korea.On the other hand, it expresses hope of improving relations with the U.S., saying that "it does not regard the U.S. as a 100-year-old foe and wants to stabilize the relations with it."
     In addition, while emphasizing the independence of the government, Kim Jong-il has shown signs of changing his perception of external economic relations since the late 1980's, when North Korea's revolutionary strength began to falter. He stated that the "demise of socialism could not have been caused only by external factors,"an admission of the inherent problems of the socialist system. It is also in this context that Kim Jong-il has rallied the people's support for the introduction of more modern scientific and technological equipment and education since the beginning of the 1990's.27)
     He argued that trade, not only with socialist countries but also with capitalist ones, should be expanded, and that external trade and economic independence are not contradictory to each other. Kim Jong-il also seems to have taken a pragmatic stance, when he emphasized that "the nation's resources and funds should be effectively mobilized to meet the demands of both the state and its people, and economic projects should be conducted in a flexible way befitting the changing environment and living conditions."28) However, the pursuit of economic interests must be within the limit of North Korea's "national economic construction line,"designed to cope with the U.S. strategy to unify the global economy.
     North Korea has viewed South Korea from the perspective of its linkage with the United States. South Korea has been characterized as "a colony of the U.S. imperialists"and the South Korean government is defined as "a puppet regime"or "an inhuman, reactionary regime."29)
     The North has suggested that South Korea create a revolutionary democratic base in order to turn the entire Korean peninsula to a communist country,30) suggesting two different unification schemes: (a) unification by sheer military force and (b) unification by enlisting the aid of South Korean anti-government activists in revolutionizing the South. The North has also begun to implement double-edged unification tactics; intermittent military provocation, and the pursuance of the "united front"strategy toward unification.
     Since the latter half of the 1980's, especially in the wake of the unification of Germany, the North Korean view of national unification has been defensive, rather than offensive. In his New Year message in 1991, Kim Il-sung emphatically stated that he opposed the "way of eating and being eaten"-that is to say, unification by means of absorption¡ªcalling for national unification under the so-called Koryo Confederation System. In his New Year message of 1992, however, he said, "it is anachronistic to try to deal with Korean problems from the viewpoint that prevailed during the Cold War era."North Korea, which called for national unification under the communist banner during the Cold War era, has now shifted to a policy of co-existence in order to maintain "Socialism of Our Own Style."The shift is reflected in the "Five-point Guidelines for the Reunification of the Fatherland"(May 1990) and the "Ten-point Guiding principle for All-Korea Unity"(April 1993). Even so, it is difficult to say that North Korea has totally given up the idea of unifying Korea by force of arms. Incessant military aggression, the upgrading of military forces by both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il,31) and Kim Jong-il's propaganda calling for transformation of North Korea into a military giant, all point to a continuation of past hopes. As with the previous South Korean governments, North Korea has defined the current Kim Dae-jung government as "a fascist colonial regime"of U.S. imperialists or " subordinate, fascist and anti-unification regime."

KIM JONG-IL REGIME'S SOUTH KOREA POLICY

     Kim Jong-il may want to move out of the ominous shadows of his father's legacies to stand in the limelight within the North Korean political arena, and to set up his own agenda in ruling the country. However, he is basically weighed down by the following three restrictive elements:
     First, a monolithic ideology has further limited the North Koreans'perspective of the whole political situation. Monolithic ideology is the most basic element in maintaining the legitimacy of the current North Korean regime. In other words, decision-making can proceed only within rigidly defined frameworks, in which varying interpretations of events or circumstances are not permitted.32) Accordingly, North Korea's attitude toward South Korea is strictly controlled by the dominant perception and guidelines of Kim Jong-il, the "omnipotent leader."
     Second, Kim Jong-il's political leadership has been strictly limited from the beginning. Kim Jong-il became a "king of a feudal nation"by right of descent. As can be expected from such a regal succession, the new king will be forced to tie up the loose ends that his predecessor had left behind for him. The influences of his father's era pervade every facet of Kim Jong-il's political management, from his ruling ideologies, to the composition of his own politically powerful elite, to the daily lives of the common folk. Under such circumstances, if he really wants to change the way the nation is ruled, and set up his own agenda, he should completely change the existing rules and regulations of his own political games. The same goes for his approaches in dealing with changes in international politics. However, Kim Jong-il does not have the proper capacity for leadership that would allow him to adapt to very drastic changes. Kim Jong-il can never become North Korea's Deng Xiaoping, or its Mikhail Gorbachev.
     Third, a severe shortage of resources has plagued the North. Currently, North Korea's industrial activities, not the least of which is food production, are stalled at rock bottom. The nation is running out of human and material resources. In addition, political and military leaders have failed to come up with strategies to establish vertical and horizontal networks within which the country's limited resources can be effectively utilized. The nation's governing entities are unsystematically fragmented, leading to the squandering waste of resources during the process.
     Thus, as Kim Jong-il works to formulate his country's policies toward South Korea, his hands are fettered by a rigid political system and an utter lack of resources. According to North Korea's political ideology, as long as the South Korean government is not pro-communist, it should be overthrown by any means. Until now, for the ultimate goal of reunifying the nation by turning the government of the South to communism, North Korea has used a multi-pronged approach. It once pursued the liberation of the South with the use of armed forces, insisted on the establishment of Koryo Confederation after revolutionizing the South, and, when these two methods became difficult to carry out, it resorted to North-South dialogues and the pretense of agreement to peace treaties in order to earn some time to restabilize their political system. On the other hand, when its armed power became superior, the North began to commit provocations against the South.
     As economic development emerged as the nation's most urgent task in a mood of rapprochement in international politics, North Korea turned toward dialogues with South Korea (in the early 1970's, and in the late 1980's). However, when South Korea was caught up in political unrest (in the mid-1960's and in the early 1980's), it quickly shifted back to its own reunification strategies.33)
     In sum, North Korea has adjusted its attitude toward South Korea according to the changing domestic political, economic and military situations of the two Koreas, as well as the various elements of international politics, particularly those of Northeast Asia. In this sense, North Korea's policies toward South Korea are not dependent upon South Korea's policy toward North Korea. Rather, they have been formulated and operated according to the regime's own agenda.
     The U.S. has been central in determining North Korea's attitude toward South Korea. For the past several years, North Korea has striven to mend its fences with the U.S. while excluding South Korea from the dialogues. Such a strategy is expected to continue for some time, as can be seen from Kim Jong-il's declaration that he would inherit the unification policies of Kim Il-sung's era. In his so-called "August 4th Declaration,"Kim Jong-il re-emphasized the "Three Charters for the Reunification of the Fatherland,"which includes the "Three-point Principle for Reunification,"the "Ten-point Guiding Principle for All-Korea Unity,"and the scenario establishing the Democratic Confederate Republic of Koryo.34) He also reiterated his determination to inherit his father's unification policies in his declaration of the "April 18 Memorandum"in 1998, which stipulated the "Five-point Principle for All-Korea Unity."35))
     OOUnder this basic framework, North Korea is likely to continue adopting multi-faceted approaches toward reunification. In other words, the North will stick to its policy principle of separating business from politics in order to overcome the economic difficulties it now faces, in particular to address its need for more food, trade exchanges, and modern technological advancements. The variable nature of its strategies is well represented by its recent success at accommodating the Mt. Kumgang Tour Project and the hosting of the "Basketball Games for Reunification."Let us identify the North's current policies with regard to South Korea and predict their future courses.
     First, Pyongyang will most likely persistent in its efforts to draw Seoul away from confrontational, anti-Pyongyang policies, and through diplomatic exchanges, entice it to consider adopting a reconciliatory stance.36) Upon closer examination, we can see that certain events in the recent past would support this possibility.
     Hoping to provoke a response from the South Korean government, Kim Il-sung announced his "Ten-point Guiding Principle"on April 7, 1993, right after the inauguration of the Kim Young-sam administration on February 25. In an equally challenging move, Kim Jong-il announced his the "Five-point Principle"on April 8, 1998 right after the launch of the Kim Dae-jung government on February 25 of the same year. The focus of the announcement was that a transformation of confrontational policies to reconciliatory policies would warrant a new phase of interdependence primarily involving mutual trust and reconciliation. This initiative of the North is analyzed to be reflective of its anticipation of an engagement policy being drafted by the Kim government.
     Another instance that revealed such presumptions of the North was the docility it displayed during the vice-ministerial governmental talks in Beijing (April 11~17, 1998). However, since then the North has proven itself unable to outgrow its old familiar ways of attaching strings to its acquiescence. In the case of the aforementioned governmental talks, such strings include the abolition of the National Security Act, the dismantling of the National Intelligence Service, and the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) from the South among others. The North's logic for these actions is that inter-Korean relationships can improve if, and only if the South Korean government would adopt a so-called "autonomous"stance, basically meaning that the South ought to respond positively to the North's proposals for policy changes. Since the futility of the inter-Korean talks in Beijing became apparent, the North began to be vocal about its dissatisfaction with the South's engagement policy, criticizing it as "another absorption-oriented unification policy."At the same time, the North has been increasingly vigorous in pressing the South to implement its proposed policy shifts.
     However, this attitude does not portend the total severance of beneficial inter-Korean ties. After focusing on improving its external relationships and tackling the domestic problems that have beleaguered the country since the demise of Kim Il-sung, the North has realized the significance of a better relationship with the South, which will lead to improved ties with Japan and the U.S., and will attract technological innovations and capital from foreign investors. Accordingly, Seoul has come to expect Pyongyang to reciprocate its efforts to step up the improvement of inter-Korean relationships, since the cooperation of the North in this department can lead to better U.S.-North Korean exchanges and facilitate the recovery of its staggering economy.
     Taking this into consideration, we can safely say that Pyongyang is likely to propose an inter-Korean dialogue, motivated to induce Seoul to help its economic recovery. Moreover, the North is likely to employ strategic, albeit underhanded, measures with which to probe the South's openness to its proposed policy changes. It is highly possible that such dialogues would be tediously slow in making any tangible progress, unless Kim Jong-il's determination to make policy shifts is strong enough to induce a swift resolution. It is also possible that the regime would exploit the improvement in inter-Korean relationships as leverage with which to induce progress in its ties with the U.S. It is also expected that the North will stick to its old tactic of proposing diplomatic exchanges such as a South-North political negotiation talks, in order to continue promoting its unification strategy.
     Second, the North will attempt to entice economic assistance from the South by increasing the opportunities for trade and cooperation for the South's private sector, taking advantage of the South's principle of separating business from politics. The North has been criticizing the South's aforementioned principle as "a logic typically found among cheap merchants,"as well as "a logic motivated to divide the Korean people while precipitating confrontation."It goes further to say that the South should be motivated by the noble intention of reunifying the Korean people and should work to become less aggressive and more conciliatory toward the North. It further stated that the South should not ask the North to reciprocate, since the concept of "reciprocity"is applicable only in international relations, not to intra-national relations, the inter-Korean relationships belonging to the latter. It advocates that any resumption of inter-Korean dialogues will remain fruitless as long as the South continues to ask for reciprocity.37) Such an attitude reflects the North's perception that the reciprocity principle is part of the South's "absorption-oriented unification strategy."However, the North is likely to accept the reciprocity principle, lured by the prospect of practical gains, providing that the South Korean government does not demand a "literal equivalence,"meaning immediate reciprocity.
     However, it is also likely that Pyongyang will sit through discussions with Seoul only for the sake of formality. It is likely that it will confine its dialogues with Seoul to a level on which it can extend exchanges and cooperation with South Korean businesses and private sector organizations, represented by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and religious organs. It would again be plausible for it to engage in dialogues to a degree, just enough to meet the requirement imposed by both Washington and Tokyo in relation to respective better bilateral ties. In light of Kim Jong-il's August 4th Declaration and the April 18 Memorandum, it could also happen that the North will come up with proposals for the creation of both multilateral and bilateral agreements regarding certain issues, which was proven effective in a few successful negotiations with the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and the Tumen River Area Development Program (TRADP). Included in the list of such issues are; (a) entry of South Korean firms into the Rajin-Sonbong Free Economic and Trade Zone, (b) the use of routes in the Northern territory in transporting native South Korean export goods to such areas as China, and (c) projects to develop special tourism districts.
     Third, the North will reinforce its unification efforts while strengthening its ties with the private sectors of the South. The North takes advantage of a number of activities in order to spread its propaganda. For example, it published reports on the massive unemployment and rising cost of living in the South, amidst Seoul's efforts to manage the International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout crisis, with a view to attracting pro-North Korea sympathizers and anti-government dissidents from the South. It has also spread the rumor that the root of the nation's problems is the U.S., which has a master plan to exploit the Korean people. The current regime has thus been preserved through maximization of practical gains, both political and economic, and through contacting private yet influential individuals who are relatively sympathetic toward the North. In this regard, the North's propaganda is not based on social classes but on the concept of a people united by their nationality.
     Since the launch of the Kim Dae-jung administration, Kim Jong-il has argued that "all-Korea unity and the nation's reunification will remain elusive as long as the South emphasizes the extreme disparity in systems and ideologies between the two Koreas, and seeks to promote the interest of a certain class or social stratum while disregarding the common roots and interests of the Korean people as a whole."He has further added that "each and every member of the Korean community ¡ª workers and farmers, academicians and young students, petit bourgeois and national capitalists, as well as politicians and cultural figures, religious leaders, and soldiers should unite in the struggle."He also notes that "in the quest for national reunification under the banner of patriotism and devotion, Koreans should not be hindered by their trivial differences in thought and systems, political opinions and religion."38) We can understand in the same context the North's recent movement, represented by the launching of the Korean Council for National Reconciliation and Cooperation in June 8, comprised of influential figures in political, sociocultural, and religious sectors, which led to a general conference in June 10 in Pyongyang, and the proposal of the annual pro-unification rally timed with the nation's Liberation Day, August 15 at Panmunjom, allegedly for all Koreans either on both sides of the Korean peninsula or those living overseas. The North recently revealed that all of this was intended to help implement the Five-point Principle, a brainchild of Kim Jong-il.39) Pyongyang's recent efforts to invite and implement cooperation projects with South Koreans in diverse fields, including media, academia, religion, culture, and sports, can be seen as indications of a hidden agenda to justify and dissipate their unification-related position, as well as to seek practical gains.
     On the other hand, the North has utilized the annual pro-unification rally to strengthen the legitimacy of the Kim Jong-il regime. By opening the event to civilians, while denying the South Korean government any involvement, it has been exploiting the event as a tactic to distance themselves from the South Korean government. In light of this, any South Korean approaches that are more aggressive than now will surely be utilized by the North in order to strengthen its promotion of the Confederation idea, to launch political negotiation conferences, and invite religious and anti-government figures. The end result of this will be to maximize dissent among South Koreans and to disseminate pro-Pyongyang opinions in the South.
     Fourth, on the military front, the North will continue to maintain a certain level of tension on the Korean peninsula by doggedly pursuing development of WMD. Pyongyang believes that the only other significant body in the negotiations involving military issues on the peninsula is Washington, not Seoul. This recognition will prompt intense efforts to engage in bilateral negotiations with the U.S. It will focus on the non-proliferation of WMD and missiles, but at the same time, it will lay down issues such as the withdrawal of the USFK and the signing of the U.S.-North Korean Peace Pact to tilt the negotiations in its favor. The North is also likely to stage limited demonstrations of its military power that may include deployment of its forces in the demilitarized zone and repeated infringements of the Northern Limit Line, in order to foster an atmosphere that can help strengthen its bargaining power in the negotiations. A demonstration of its military might is a double-edged sword: it would promote differences in opinions in the South but at the same time facilitate the internal solidarity of the North Korean regime, which is showing some signs of slackening. An alternative possibility, however, is for the North to repackage the old proposal for disarmament made in May 1990, to include opening a peace zone in the demilitarized zone and a reduction of military forces to 100,000 soldiers or less. This projection is based on the understanding of the North's intention to move beyond its currently grinding economic adversities and to create and promote the division of South Koreans in an attempt to block the formation of a national consensus.
     Fifth, Pyongyang is expected to continue to stick to its typical provocative behaviors, utilizing from time to time diverse issues such as the following: (a) supporting Hanchongnyon ¡ª the South Korean Federation of University Students Councils; (b) withdrawal of the USFK from the Korean peninsula; (c) signing the U.S.-North Korean Peace Pact; (d) the repeal of the National Security Act; (e) deactivating counter-communism investigation agencies represented by the National Intelligence Service; (f) releasing prisoners of conscience. In doing so, it has encouraged anti-government and reunification-conscious civic groups including Hanchongnyon, and the South Korean headquarters of Bomminryon ¡ª the National Alliance for the Country's Reunification. The North is also expected to employ tactics to foster social chaos and to rally anti-U.S. campaigns by capitalizing on the economic and labor relations-related conditions in the South, and likewise create a gap in the relationship between Washington and Seoul. By doing so, the North is likely to realize its policy to improve bilateral ties, "the U.S. first and the South later."If it finds that the Kim Dae-jung administration's North Korean policies do not differ from those pursued under the past administrations, it will raise the level of criticism against the South, saying that the incumbent government is no different from the previous governments of the South. At the same time, it will return to the typical cliches it has repeatedly employed in verbally attacking the South, as well as exhibiting bellicosity, raising tension, slandering the North, and stifling inter-Korean relationships.
     It is clear that North Korea will continue to minimize South Korea's influence, while constructing an environment on the peninsula optimal for the reunification under the communist banner. Furthermore, it will work toward its goal to stabilize and maintain the Kim Jong-il regime. Accordingly, fundamental policy shifts towards the South are unlikely to occur. There is no doubt, however, that the North will continue to exert strategic efforts to improve its bilateral ties with the South in terms of economic, social, and cultural benefits, among many others.

CONCLUSION

Exchanges and cooperative programs between the two Koreas have been actively pursued on both sides of the 38th Parallel. The momentum found in such activities, despite the deadlock in the political and military relationships, reflect the converging interests of both sides in seeking economic and socio-cultural benefits for themselves. However, it remains unlikely for such exchanges and cooperation in areas other than political and national security-related fields to yield very significant progress.
The Kim Dae-jung administration has maintained both the four-party talks and the general-level talks held between the United Nations Command (UNC) and the People's Army of the North Korea as dialogue channels essential to national security, while the North has deemed the talks as a significant medium for approaching the U.S. As noted earlier, the North recently disclosed the plan to construct "Kangsong Taeguk"supported up by the nation's solid ideological, political, and military power under the leadership of the National Defence Commission Chairman, Kim Jong-il. Concurrently, it has also pursued another goal to build an autonomous national economy for the North Korean people and has specifically emphasized heavy industry as a major instrument in realizing that goal. This latter goal can be characterized as a tool to implement the former goal. The combined pursuit of these two policy goals suggests that the North will utilize its formidable military power as the core ingredient of its policies vis-a-vis the South. A noteable example is the controversial launch of the Taepodong I missile, which attests to the North's determination to pursue its goal to construct "Kangsong Taeguk."
In this context, special attention should be rendered to an evaluation of the South government's principle of separating business from politics. The assessment that "It had been effective in that it could bring about certain economic changes to the inter-Korean relationships irrespective of the current deadlock in the politico-military situations,"40) must be given serious consideration at least in relation to future exchanges and cooperation efforts between the two Koreas. The assessment goes further to say "However, its influence upon the military arena, including the disarmament issue on the Korean peninsula, seems limited in inducing meaningful changes in the field."It should be noted that the ongoing U.S.-North Korean negotiations based on the framework laid out in the William Perry report do not guarantee the dissolution of the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula.
North Korea's aggressive pursuit of cooperation with South Korean firms and its acceptance of the Mt. Kumgang Tour Project can work for the South as a long-term strategy to improve inter-Korean ties. However, we should not overlook the possibility that from the North's perspective, it may be nothing more than a business-oriented project.41) As we cannot expect any fundamental changes in the North's policies towards the South, it is both safe and reasonable for the U.S. to guard against a claim that aggressive economic and socio-economic cooperation automatically leads to improved inter-Korean ties in terms of stronger political and national security concerns.
The goal of the South's policies toward the North is likely to remain futile unless it is pursued in an rational way within a comprehensive and systematic framework: improving inter-Korean relations by promoting peace, reconciliation, and cooperation. Such a framework should take into account factors including different objective levels, plausibility, mutual connection and linkability, policy means, and the ability to mobilize necessary resources. Otherwise, conflicts might emerge due to a possible chasm between the inter-Korean relationship in the political and national security arenas on the one hand, and the relationship in non-political and non-security arenas, such as social and economic issues, on the other. It is true that the four powers surrounding the Korean peninsula have indicated their preference for the status quo of the Korean peninsula. The North's approaches to the U.S. have focused on tackling such political and security-related issues as reflecting its own priority judgments: the successful conclusion of the U.S.-North Korean Peace Pact, dismantling of the UNC, and withdrawal of the USFK. Therefore, if the South cannot actively devise and implement alternatives to the North's approaches to political and national security-related issues, the inter-Korean relationships with regard to other aspects cannot remain immune to such a development initiated by the North. The overall status of inter-Korean relationships can experience a fundamental turnaround only if inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation are given heightened credibility, and not relegated to a mere dependent variable of the North's South Korean policies. Finally, efforts geared at realizing fundamental goals should be equally pursued in all possible areas where the interdependency of the two Koreas can be enhanced.

1. Ministry of Unification, South Korea's Policies Towards the North Aimed at Promoting Peace, Reconciliation, and Cooperation, and Its Stances on Pending Inter-Korean Issues , July 30, 1999, pp.5-7.
2. Kim Jong-il, "Let U.S. achieve the nation's autonomous and peaceful reunification with the great solidarity of all Koreans,"North Korean Central Broadcasting Station, April 29, 1998.
3. Hankyoreh Shinmun , September 27, 1999.
4. Kim Jong-il, "On Some Problems of the Party's Task to Convert All Society into a Kimilsungism-oriented One,"February 19, 1974, in Kim Jong-il, For Completing the Juche-based Revolutionary Work 3 (Pyoungyang: North Korean Workers'Party Publisher, 1987), pp. 2-3.
5. North Korean Central Radio Station report, August 25, 1997. As part of the deification of Kim Il-sung, North Korea has designated his birth year of 1912 as "Juche Calendar,"and his birthday of April 15 as the "Taeyang-jol or Sun's Day,"July 9, 1997.
6. Radio Pyongyang, "The Kim Jong-il line will not deviate from Kim Il-sung line by 0.001 millimeter,"October 4, 1997.
7. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), pp. 77-82.
8. Kim Sung-chol, Continuation and Changes in North Korea's Cadre Policy (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 1997), pp. 42-62.
9. According to the Bank of Korea's Estimates of the North Korean GDP in 1998 (August 1999, p. 2), North Korea's GDP growth rates stood at -5.1% in 1991, -7.7% in 1992, -4.2% in 1993, -1.8% in 1994, -4.6% in 1995, -3.7% in 1996, -6.8% in 1996, and -1.1% in 1998.
10. The following remark by a North Korean defector, who fled from North Korea in 1997, is highly suggestive: "Today people in Choson (North Korea) might not have belief in them...They talk about their loyalty to Kim Jong-il, but have less reverence for him."Interview with the Latest North Korean Defectors (not published yet, 1998).
11. Andrew Natsios, The Politics of Famine in North Korea , USIP Special Report, August 2, 1999, p.1.
12. A private research organization's field survey of 2,479 villages in the northeastern China from November 1998 through April 1999 estimated the number of North Korean defectors in the area at more than 300,000. Bupryun, "Report on the Current Status and Human Rights of North Korean Refugees for Food,"Good Friends'Report, August 30, 1999, p. 3.
13. Rodong Shinmun , August 22, 1998.
14. Rodong Shinmun , "Stick to the line of independent national economic construction until the final moment," September 17, 1998.
15. Shin Sang-jin, China's Policy toward North Korea: with Special Reference to the Analysis of its Position on Major Issues, Korea Institute for National Unification, Inter-Korean Relations and Four Surrounding Countries' Policy toward the Korean Peninsula , (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 1998), pp. 24-28.
16. North Korean Central Radio Station report on September 23, 1997, "Since the visit to the People's Army Unit 214 on January 1, 1995, Kim Jong-il has visited more than 2,000 military units and posts up until the autumn of 1997."
17. Han Ho-sok, Discussion of North Korea's Recent Perception of and Response to the Political Situation , July 1997, pp. 2-4.
    (http://www.pond.com/~cka/9707.html)
18. Kim Il-sung, "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the banner of our people's liberty and independence and a strong tool for the creation of communism,"September 8, 1968.
19. Rodong Shinmun , Kim Il-sung's New Year message, January 1, 1991, January 1, 1992.
20. Kim Jong-il, "Socialism of Our Own Style Based on Masses Is Always Victorious and Invincible,"May 5, 1991.
21. Kim Jong-il, "Historical Lessons of Construction of Socialism and Our Party Line,"January 3, 1992.
22. Chosun Ilbo , March 19, 1997.
23. Rodong Shinmun , April 4, 1997.
24. Rodong Shinmun , "Let's create greater prosperity in our country under the great party's leadership,"January 1, 1997.
25. Rodong Shinmun , January 1, 1999.
26. Han Ho-sok, "'Revolution Led by Military-Oriented'and 'the Second Round of Chollima Movement': Focus of North Korea's Perception of the Political Situation in the Late 1990's,"Research of Unification Studies 26, May 10, 1999, p.5. http://www.onekorea.org/research/t26.html.
27. Kim Jong-il, "Let's find a new turning point in the development of science and technology," Dear Leader and Comrade Kim Jong-il's Collection , p. 419.
28. Rodong Shinmun , "Rodong Shinmun's Joint Editorial with Workers,"September 19, 1998.
29. Huh Jong-ho, Juche Ideology-based Revolution in South Korea and Theory of National Unification (Pyongyang: Social Science Publishing Co., 1975).
30. Kim Il-sung Collection 4 (Pyongyang: North Korean Workers'Party Publisher, 1972), p.286, Kim Il-sung Collection 1 (Pyongyang: North Korean Workers'Party Publisher, 1979), pp. 309, 327.
31. Kim Jong-il, Let's Honor the Great Leader for Good and Complete the Leader's Great Work (October 16, 1994), (Pyongyang: North Korean Workers'sParty Publisher, 1997), pp. 25-29
32. Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz and Alfred Wayne Penn, Politics of Ideocracy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), p.26.
33. Huh Mun-yong, "North Korea's South Korean Strategies and Military Provocation: Characteristics and Patterns Found in Different Times," Report on Measures Taken with Relation to North Korea (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 1994), pp.81-108.
34. Kim Jong-il, "Let us thoroughly fulfill the Great Leader Kim Il-sung's will set to achieve the nation's reunification (August 4, 1997)," Rodong Shinmun , August, 1997.
35. The core consists of (1) establishing a common principle for the Korean People's autonomy (2) uniting the Korean people with patriotism (3) improving inter-Korean relations (4) opposing external and anti-unification forces, and (5) strengthening mutual visitations, and contacts, holding dialogues, and joining all forces. Kim Jong-il, "Let us achieve the nation's autonomous and peaceful reunification with the great solidarity of all Koreans,"North Korean Central Broadcasting Station, April 29, 1998.
36. North Korea has emphasized the necessary shift since the August 4th Declaration delivered by Kim Jong-il in 1997. Supra note 35.
37. Rodong Shinmun , May 23, 1995
38. Kim Jong-il, "Let us achieve the nation's autonomous and peaceful reunification with the great unity of all Koreans,"April 18, 1998.
39. Since the 1990's, the pattern found in this proposal has been seen repeatedly in many other proposals aimed at the South. For instance, the North proposed a Conference for the Nation's Unification-oriented political negotiations on January 1, 1991 in order to implement the Five-Point Guideline for Reunification it disclosed on May 24, 1990, and proposed the Greater Korean People's Conference on January 1, 1994 in an effort to seek ways to promote the unification after declaring the Ten-Point Guiding Principle for All-Korea Unity on April 7, 1993.
40. Segye Ilbo , October 22, 1998.
41. Han Ho-sok, "A Critical Review of a Policy Report on the Korean Peninsula disclosed by the U.S. External Relations Conference,"p.23. (http://www. onekorea.org/research/t23.html).