Volume 11 Number 3 Autumn 1999

Japan's Legislation
on the New Defense Guidelines:
Building a Normal State?

Yoon Hong-suk

PREFACE

     Three pieces of legislation aimed at securing effectiveness of the new set of "Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation" (NGL: New Guideline) established on September 23, 1997, were approved by the House of Representatives, the Lower House of the Japanese Diet, during its regular session on April 27, 1999. About a month later on May 24, the legislation was also passed in the House of Councillor, the Upper House of Japan. There have been a series of debates since the NGL-related legislation was submitted to the Lower House about a year ago. Nevertheless, the coalition of three political parties (the Liberal Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, the New Komeito), which together hold the majority in the Diet, passed the legislation without any revision, against challenges from the opposition parties, including the Japanese Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party.
     With the enactment of the NGL-related laws, Japan has successfully laid the legal foundation for making itself a strong military power, by consolidation of its alliance with the U.S. and by strengthening the status and role of the Self-Defense Forces. Accordingly, there is a growing interest in whether Japan will seek to become a military power, abandoning the principle of an exclusively defense-oriented policy. The NGL-related developments are evaluated to have huge implications in that Japan's future military actions based on this newly-passed legislation would reshape the security order in Northeast Asia and could directly affect the security of the Korean peninsula. This paper examines the contents of, and problems with the NGL-related laws, as well as their effects on the security order in Northeast Asia.

ENACTMENT OF THE NGL-RELATED LEGISLATION: BACKGROUND

Development of U.S.-Japan Security Relations1)

     The basic framework of the U.S.-Japan security alliance is the "U.S.-Japan Security Treaty," signed and revised in 1952 and 1960, respectively. The Security Treaty, which was established as part of the containment policy toward the former Soviet Union during the Cold War era, enabled mutual cooperation between the U.S. and Japan; the U.S. extended its nuclear umbrella and security to Japan while Japan provided a military base for the U.S. Armed Forces. Since 1970, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty has routinely been extended and revised. When the Soviet Union attacked Afghanistan and increased its military capabilities in the East Asian region in the late 1970s, the U.S. and Japan devised the "Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation" in 1978, in order to counter the military threat from the Soviets. The core aspect of the Guidelines is the specification of the "actions in response to an armed attack against Japan" (Paragraph 1 of Article 5) as stipulated by the Security Treaty; it states that when there is a small-scale armed attack, Japan is to launch a counterattack by itself; when it is large, Japan and the U.S. are to launch coordinated bilateral actions with the dispatch of the U.S. Forces. The purpose of the U.S. Forces stationed in Japan was also limited "to contributing to the maintenance of security in Japan and peace in the Far East." (Article 6) This was a defense mechanism of the Cold War era, established to counter a possible attack on Japan by the former Soviet Union.

The Nye Initiative

     Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the outbreak of the Gulf War, Japan has demonstrated its potential for making contributions to the international community in terms of providing military services. This became apparent when it enacted the so-called PKO laws in order to allow joining U.N. peacekeeping operations and the dispatching of the Self-Defense Forces to the Persian Gulf. These developments prompted Joseph S. Nye Jr., who later became the Assistant Secretary of Defense, to conclude that the U.S.-Japan security relations at the time could not left behind, especially given other issues, such as North Korea's suspected nuclear development and the Taiwan Straits crisis. After taking office in 1994, Nye thus proposed to redefine and facilitate new U.S.-Japan security arrangements. Based on the recognition that the U.S.-Japan security alliance is necessary even in the post-Cold War era, this proposal, dubbed the Nye Initiative, aims at shifting the role of the bilateral security alliance from containing the Soviet Union and defending Japan to establishing peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region, by reflecting the post-Cold War strategic situation. Accordingly, in 1995 the U.S. reviewed the East Asian Strategic Report (EASR), the main strategy of which was to strengthen and expand the U.S.-Japan security alliance in the Asian region. Tokyo's positive reaction to Washington's moves naturally led to bilateral working-level talks between the two countries. Then in November 1995, Japan decided at the cabinet and the security council meetings to set the "National Defense Program Outline" to expand its role as an active architect of the international order.

U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security

     The U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security issued by President Clinton and former Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto is the final result of the above-mentioned series of developments. The U.S. and Japan shared the view that the two countries's security alliance had to be firmly in place, and functioning as a stabilizer of the Asia-Pacific region, even after potential threats from the Soviet Union were eliminated. Accordingly, the two countries moved to reaffirm the legitimacy of the bilateral security alliance. Thus, in Tokyo in April 1996, the leaders of the two countries announced the Joint Declaration for acting jointly in response to the uncertainty and instability in the Asia-Pacific region, including the areas surrounding Japan. They include North Korea's nuclear development and the mounting tension between China and Taiwan.2)
     This Joint Declaration, subtitled "Alliance for the 21st Century," is a statement of the plans to strengthen bilateral defense cooperation based on a common understanding that stability in the Asia-Pacific region is important to the security and national interest of both Japan and the U.S. The centerpiece of the Joint Declaration, which is evaluated to have "redefined" or "reaffirmed" the two countries' security relationship, can be summarized as the following: the signing of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA); reduction of the U.S. base in Okinawa; and the review and revision of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, which had been amended in November 1978.

Objectives and Basic Principles of the Revision of Guidelines

     Accordingly, on June 26, 1996, the U.S. and Japan reconstituted the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) under the auspices of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC)3) to set the objectives and the basic principles for the review of the guidelines. There were three basic objectives: to establish more effective bilateral relation for the two countries' defense cooperation, based on Japan's new National Defense Program Outline and the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security; to provide transparent guidelines for bilateral defense cooperation in consideration of the changes taking place in the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region; and to seek policy guidelines for the facilitation of various programs, including joint research studies aimed at the building of a more effective foundation for cooperation. In addition, with regard the basic principles for the revision, the U.S. and Japan agreed to maintain the rights and obligations specified in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and the basic framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance, as well as to conduct all actions within the limitations of Japan's Constitution.

Content of New Defense Guidelines

     After conducting several rounds of talks amid growing concerns of neighboring countries, the U.S. and Japan announced an interim report in June 1997. At a ministerial-level security consultation in New York, on September 23 of the same year, the two sides finalized and announced the new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.4)
     The new Guidelines specified bilateral cooperation (a) under normal circumstances, (b) when armed attack against Japan (contingency in Japan), and (c) under situations in areas surrounding Japan (contingency in surrounding areas). The two countries agreed to initiate cooperative measures (as shown in Table 1) of 40 items per each event.

New Guidelines and Japan's Domestic Laws

     The most important aspect of the new Guidelines is that, in addition to cases of direct attack on Japan, the U.S. and Japan can launch joint actions in response to a contingency in the areas surrounding Japan, even when peace in Japan is under no direct threat. The question is whether Japan would be able to fully implement the guidelines it reached with the U.S. Japan, which operates under the limitations of its Peace Constitution, cannot implement the joint-defense guidelines under the present judical system and crisis-management system. With regard to the dispatching of the Self-Defense Forces, the "Law on the Establishment of the Defense Agency" and the "Self-Defense Forces Law" are in place. However, these two laws have been enacted and amended based on different interpretations of the Constitution. Thus, under the present system, Japan'S provision of rear area support to the U.S. Forces could not easily be provided; at best, it would be limited.

     Against this backdrop, the Japanese government and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party sought to enact and revise the NGL-related legislations, with an aim to ensure effectiveness of the new Guidelines. Originally devised on April 8, 1998, by the "Security Research Committee" within the Liberal Democratic Party and finalized as the government draft bills following a review by the cabinet on April 28, it was revised jointly - as a political compromise - by the LDP, the Liberal Party, and the New Komeito. With the approval from Lower House of the Japanese Diet in April 19995) and from the Upper House in May, the legislation became law.

A DESCRIPTION OF NGL-RELATED LEGISLATION

ACSA and the Self-Defense Forces Law

     The legislation drawn up to ensure effectiveness of the new Guidelines consisted three basic agreements: "Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)" between the U.S. and Japan, the "Self-Defense Forces Law" and the "Measures for Securing Peace and Security of Our Country (Japan) in Situations in Surrounding Areas Act" (hereinafter refer to as the "Contingency in Surrounding Areas Act"). Among these three, the ACSA and the "Self-Defense Forces Law" were amended versions of the existing laws, and the "Contingency in Surrounding Areas Act" was newly enacted.
     The main component of the ACSA, first enacted in April 1996, was that in the event that the U.S. and Japan conducted joint military exercises or worked together in U.N. peacekeeping operations, they would mutually provide food and drink, lodging facilities, fuel, and transport. In the revised ACSA, the clause "in responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan" was added, so that the ACSA could also be applied when contingencies arose in surrounding areas. The previous Self-Defense Forces Law stipulated that when the need arose for Japanese nationals to be evacuated from a third country, for example, in the event of a war overseas, only government-use aircraft and that of the Self-Defense Forces could be used. However, the revised Law allowed that not only aircraft, but also naval ships and seaborne helicopters could be dispatched. It also allowed the use of weapons for the protection of evacuees.

Contingency in Surrounding Areas Act

The "Contingency in Surrounding Areas Act" is the most essential piece among the newly-enacted articles of NGL-related legislation.6)
     It specifies what constitutes a situation in areas surrounding Japan, and possible responses, including Japan's provision of rear-area support to the U.S. Forces, as well as search-and-rescue operations for wounded U.S. soldiers. In addition, for rear-area support to the U.S. troops, the Act lists the cooperative measures in activities initiated not only by the Japanese central government, but also by local governments and private businesses - the use of private ports and airports by the U.S. Forces, repair and maintenances of U.S. naval ships and aircraft, supply of materials such as fuels and water, transport of persons and goods, and the provision of communications facilities. Furthermore, the Act stipulates the activities to be initiated by the cabinet from the time a contingency is anticipated, and establishes the procedure for obtaining approval from the Diet.

Governmental Drafts and Revisions Made by the Lower House

     The government's original draft of the Contingency in Surrounding Areas Act was revised at the Lower House hearing. When the original and revised drafts are compared, the following characteristics can be noted. Firstly, "the situation in surrounding areas" was re-defined as something comparable to an emergency situation. That is, the revised version re-defined the situation in surrounding areas as "a situation that may, if left alone, develop into a direct armed attack on Japan." This means that a situation in surrounding areas is regarded as an emergency (e.g. attack on Japan) and thus, the activities of the Self-Defense Forces can be expanded in such an event. Therefore, the objective of the government's original draft, which aims at "providing rear-support to the U.S. Forces engaged in activities in response to a situation in surrounding areas that would have an important influence on Japan's peace and security," has been altered significantly. Moreover, there is a strong possibility that the nature of operations by the Self-Defense Forces would be changed as well.
     Secondly, a clause that states that the Act should contribute to a more effective implementation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was added, thereby stressing the aspect of "an application based on a bilateral agreement." The original draft had stipulated that ship-inspection activities should be based on a UN resolution; however, this provision was removed in the Lower House draft. Instead, other regulations are to be applied in ship-inspection activities. Thus, the Contingency in Surrounding Areas Act is seen to have eliminated all elements other than those directly involving the U.S. and Japan, and has made it possible for Japan to participate in activities initiated by the U.S., without UN approval.
     Thirdly, the government's original draft required only that "basic plans be reported to the Diet," whereas the revised version also includes requirements for obtaining "approval for basic plans from the Diet" and "ex post facto approval in an emergency situation." Moreover, the revised version also requires a progress report on the implementation of basic plans to be made to the Diet. There may be a number of problems as to what constitutes "an emergency situation," and this point will be elaborated in detail in the latter part of this paper.
     Fourthly, the revised draft expands the scope of the use of arms by the Self-Defense Forces dispatched on a mission according to the Contingency in Surrounding Areas Act, and attempts to base its justification on domestic laws. The original draft enables the use of arms in "search-and-rescue activities in rear areas" and "ship-inspection activities." However, the Lower House draft added a provision to authorize the Self-Defense Forces to use arms in rear-area support activities. Meanwhile, the use of arms in "ship-inspection activities" was eliminated, since the clause on "ship inspection" was taken out altogether. In addition, permission to use arms would be based on domestic laws (criminal law) related to "self-defense" and "emergency evacuation," rather than on international laws.7)
     Considering that it is customary that international laws are applied to military operations in the air and sea, a legal interpretation of this aspect seems necessary. Moreover, the Self-Defense Forces' use of arms is the issue that most concerns neighboring countries.

PROBLEMS WITH THE NGL-RELATED LAWS AND NORTHEAST ASIA

     The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement and the Self-Defense Forces Law do not seem to be problematic. In contrast, the Measures for Securing Peace and Security of Our Country (Japan) in Situations in Surrounding Areas Act, which stipulates the method and scope of rear area support to the U.S. troops provided by the Self-Defense Forces in response to a situation in areas surrounding Japan, has become a source of controversy in that it goes beyond the limit of Japan's defense principle of maintaining of its exclusively defense-oriented policy, i.e., the principle of 'defending the country against emergency situations' (armed attacks).
     First, it is not clear as to what constitutes a "situation in areas surrounding Japan." The Japanese government specifies six types of "situations" as follows: (a) when an armed conflict is taking place, (b) when an armed conflict is imminent, (c) when order is not maintained or restored after conflict has temporarily come to a halt, (d) when subject to economic sanctions by the UN Security Council, (e) when there is a large influx of refugees caused by an unstable political situation in neighboring countries, and (f) when a civil war in a neighboring country expands across the border. However, at a Diet hearing, the Defense Agency made an ambiguous comment, "the scope of the activities of the Self-Defense Forces cannot be geographically specified, but they are not unlimited."
     According to Article 1 of the Contingency in Surrounding Areas Act, "a contingency situation in areas surrounding Japan" is not specified clearly. It just includes situations that could have a critical impact on Japan's peace and security. Japan would be supporting U.S. Forces from "outside the combat zone" in such a "situation." The question lies in the fact that the boundaries of front and rear zones have become increasingly blurred in modern wars. Therefore, military action by U.S. troops could lead to automatic participation by Japan, and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces could become agents conducting direct military actions.
     Secondly, there are uncertainties involving the requirement to obtain approval from the Japanese Diet in the event of a "situation" occurring in surrounding areas. The law stipulates that when a "situation" arises, the Diet's approval is required, in principle, prior to allowing the Self-Defense Forces to engage in activities, including rear-area support, and search-and-rescue activities. However, it is possible to obtain ex post facto approval from the Diet in an "emergency situation." Moreover, details of activities conducted are to be reported to the Diet.
     The problem is that it is unclear what exactly an "emergency situation" entails. One interpretation is that with a strong demand made by the U.S., the Self-Defense Forces can conduct activities at the discretion of the government. In other words, activities of the Self-Defense Forces could be determined by a handful of policy-makers, without necessary and sufficient analysis of the situations in Japan or in neighboring areas. In fact, the Diet's control would be all but eliminated if government authorities ordered dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces based on their judgment of an "emergency situation." 8)
     Thirdly, the Japanese government's ability to secure cooperation from local government organizations is also an issue. In a contingency, providing support to the U.S. Forces in surrounding areas - local airports, ports, warehouses, hospitals, arms and ammunition, and transport of patients - could not be efficiently carried out without assistance from local government organizations and private businesses, let alone by the Self-Defense Forces.9)
     Therefore, the Contingency in Surrounding Areas Act stipulates that "the government can request cooperation from local governments and private individuals."However, it is doubtful to what extent this provision is legally binding. In other words, it is questionable whether providing cooperation at the request of the state is obligatory. The Japanese government explains, "local governments are not obligated to cooperate, but it is their general obligation to cooperate." In addition, although local governments can reject the demands by the central government provided there are legitimate reasons, there are no clear standards for deciphering what the "legitimate reasons" may be. Moreover, no plans are devised for cases in which local governments refuse without any legitimate reasons.10)
     Fourthly, enactment of the Contingency in Surrounding Areas Act is likely to lead to a discussion on amending the Constitution by the government and the ruling LDP, whose party platform supports the amendment. The reason is that Japan's Peace Constitution, which stipulates maintenance of an exclusively defense-oriented policy with the provisions for "perpetual renunciation of war, except in defending its own territories," would become practically meaningless with these newly-passed subordinate laws. Immediately after the legislation was passed in the Lower House, a survey showed by the Sankei Shimbun, 57% in favor of the amendment.11)
     This marks a huge increase over the 32% in a survey done by the Prime Minister“p Office last year. It also indicates that enactment of the NGL-related laws, will provide the atmosphere for conservatives to voice their options more strongly. The Peace Constitution, which acted as an obstacle to these laws, now faces the hawks's demand for amendment.

Effects on the Security Environment in East Asia

     Japan's defense budget for this year stands at U.S. $49 trillion, second only to that of the U.S. Although Japan does not possess nuclear weapons and aircraft carriers, it has a high-tech early-warning system based on the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). Moreover, it boasts sophisticated military capabilities with a 9000-ton Aegis-class cruiser, dubbed "the shield of God" that can be linked with a theater missile defense system (presently owned only by the U.S. and Japan), fuel supplier aircraft, large transport aircraft, and strong mid-range fire power. It also has the technological capability to independently manufacture state-of-the-art fighter jets which are of better quality than Korea's F16 fighters.
     Furthermore, in response to possible threats of medium to long-range missile launches by North Korea, Japan decided to join the U.S. in research and development of the Theater Missile Defense (TMD). China has shown strong opposition to the moves taken by Japan, claiming that TMD is aimed at undermining its strategic weapons. However, based on the recognition that Pyongyang's missile development poses a serious security threat, Tokyo is resolved to go ahead with the TMD development plan. The country is equipped with enormous economic wealth and the technological prowess to become a strong military power in a very short period of time if it wishes to do so. In short, by laying the legal framework to ensure effectiveness of the new Guidelines, the Self-Defense Forces can now transform itself into the Japanese Armed Forces.
     There are mixed views among neighboring countries over Japan's moves and with the consolidation of defense cooperation between Tokyo and Washington. China and North Korea, in particular, have severely criticized Japan on these points. China, which sees the "U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security" as an aim to increase deterrence against it, has denounced the U.S. and Japan for attempting to check China through the new Guidelines or "NATO of North East Asia."12)
     China is also concerned that the Taiwan straits may be included in the geographical scope of the "situation in surrounding areas." In particular, Beijing is most worried about a possible declaration of independence by Taiwan, which would see its defense capabilities rise thanks to the development of the TMD by the U.S. and Japan. Meanwhile, China has been on the offensive against the U.S. and NATO for their intervention in the Kosovo crisis without a UN resolution, as well as for the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, and for a Congressional report on Beijing's alleged involvement in the theft of the U.S. nuclear technology.
     North Korea, too, has argued that the NGL-related laws "reveal Japan's ambition to invade other countries under the pretext of providing support to the U.S. Forces, and that the laws are part of an invasion scenario by Washington and Tokyo against Asian countries." In a commentary titled "Another Invasion Will Lead to Destruction," North Korea's state-run Rodong Shinmun criticized, "the new Guidelines have restored Japan's right to wage war, a right forfeited after its defeat in World War II, and Japan certainly will seek to wield military influence in the Asia-Pacific region." 13)
     In contrast, South Korea and Southeast Asian countries, including Taiwan, have shown different reactions. On April 29, on behalf of the South Korean government, the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade cautiously commented, "This legislation would contribute to regional stability in that they are aimed at providing rear-area support to the U.S. Forces conducting activities for the promotion of regional peace and stability in case of contingencies in areas surrounding Japan." The spokesman added, "Korea hopes the legislation will be implemented in a transparent manner that would be beneficial to peace and stability in this region." However, while hoping that the new Guidelines will be instrumental in deterring war on the Korean peninsula, the South Korean government is paying close attention to a possible rise in tensions due to strong opposition from China and the North. Taiwan also welcomed the legislation as "Tokyo and Washington's measures to protect democracy and freedom against potential military threats from undemocratic neighboring countries, which will contribute to peace and security of Taiwan and Asia." Meanwhile, Southeast Asian nations, currently in a territorial dispute with China over the South China Sea, appear to welcome the move by the U.S. and Japan.
     However, depending upon neighboring countries'eaction over the new Guidelines, it could cause greater instability in Northeast Asia. Japan's growing military power, which exceeds what is necessary to defend its territories, may trigger an arms competition among neighboring states and subsequently lead to greater tension in the region. For financial reasons, Russia may not be in a position to increase its military budget, but China possesses the capability. North Korea could hasten its own development of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles capable of reaching Japan. Therefore, Japan's strengthened military role and influence will not only lead to wariness, but could lead to expansion of military capabilities in neighboring countries, including China, Russia, and North Korea. This may eventually herald the advent of another Cold War era in Northeast Asia.
     The recent increase of friction between the U.S. and China, and the subsequent rapprochement between China and Russia, coordinated moves by China, Russia, and North Korea to consolidate their ties, and the climbing tension between China and Taiwan are factors that threaten peace and stability in Northeast Asia. In the long term, the situation in Northeast Asia could force the division on the Korean peninsula to become permanent. Considering the dynamics involved, the four major powers surrounding the Korean peninsula, could judge the reunification of the two Koreas, the long-awaited dream of all Korean people, as undesirable.

CONCLUSION

     This paper has examined the NGL-related legislation passed in both Houses of the Japanese Diet, and has discussed the problems related with those laws. The legislation can be evaluated as having raised the U.S.-Japan security arrangements to a new level, in that the Self-Defense Forces could be dispatched in the name of providing rear-area support to the U.S. Forces in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan. The Self-Defense Forces so far have been limited by Japan's Peace Constitution which prohibits it from engaging in war. The area to which the Contingency in Surrounding Areas Act would most likely be applied is on the Korean peninsula. Nonetheless, compared to other countries, the Korean government is extremely cautious in expressing its views. To be sure, Seoul is in a delicate position given its relations with the U.S. and Japan, and its alliance with the three countries. However, it must be realized that the NGL-related legislation is not only of concern to the U.S. and Japan.
     Some have given positive reviews, saying that the Contingency in Surrounding Areas Act would enhance the operation capability of the U.S. Forces in Northeast Asia, and thus could work as a deterrent against North Korea military adventurism. The strengthening of the U.S.-Japan military cooperation could successfully prevent Pyongyang's military threat or provocation. However, considering recent events, including the armed confrontation in the West Sea, between naval ships of the two Koreas, the Contingency in Surrounding Areas Act would have limited means to effectively deter the North and ease the tension on the Korean peninsula.
     For its part, Korea needs to adopt a new frame of mind, regarding this as a challenging opportunity, instead of thinking negatively that the NGL-related legislations would undermine Korea's diplomatic position in the event of a regional dispute. Since it may have no choice but to cooperate, it should make the most of the developments by assuming a proactive role.
     On several occasions, strained situations in Northeast Asia and on the Korean peninsula served as opportunities for Japan to increase its military strength. In the early 1990s, North Korea's suspected nuclear development pushed the U.S. to demand cooperation from Japan, and it laid the foundation for the 1995 U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security. In addition, North Korea's launch of long-range missiles in August 1998 triggered Japanese public support for the new Guidelines. The March 1999 infiltration of a North Korean spy ship streamlined the passage of the NGL-related legislation in the Lower House of the Japanese Diet. In this regard, Korea should, above all, be more prudent in its relations with the North. Furthermore, the geographical future of Northeast Asia eventually depends upon relations with China and Japan, rather than with North Korea. Therefore, Korea should focus on the promotion of cooperation among Korea, the U.S. and Japan, as well as confidence-building and military exchanges with Japan. Korea should also play a leading role in establishing a multilateral security mechanism participated in by all countries in the region to address wide-ranging issues of regional security. Korea is the most suitable candidate for leading such an initiative, one that could create a security cooperative body consisting of the four powers surrounding the Korean peninsula, and the two Koreas.

<notes>

1. The summary of the development of the U.S.-Japan security relations is as follows: *September/1951: the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty established *July/1954: Japan establishes the Defense Agency and the Self-Defense Forces (army, navy, air force) *January/1960: the U.S.-Japan New Security Treaty signed *May/1972: U.S. returns Okinawa to Japan *November/1978: the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation established *November/1995: Japan's National Defense Program Outline established *April/1996: the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security issued *April/1996:the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) established *June/1996: revision of the guidelines for the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) initiated *September/1997: the new U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines established *May/1999: Japan enacts three NGL-related legislations.
2. As North Korea's suspected nuclear development heightened tension on the Korean peninsula in 1994, Japan began conducting studies on contingencies arising in the surrounding areas. At the time, the U.S. suggested that Japan should share the responsibility by reshaping the U.S.-Japan security arrangements. This constituted Japan's sharing the expenses of the U.S. Forces and playing a bigger role in the alliance. As a result, starting with (a) a "contingency on the Korean peninsula," followed by (b) a "contingency in the Far East" the discussions went on to (c) "situations in areas surrounding Japan" with no boundaries. Accordingly, as the Korean War served as an opportunity for the creation of the National Police Reserve, predecessor of the Self-Defense Forces, Japan increases its military capabilities and strengthened its alliance with the U.S. whenever situations developed in surrounding areas. In short, the rising tension on the Korean peninsula since early 1990s was a triggering factor of the revision of the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines.
3. The SCC is the so-called "2+2 meeting" in which the foreign and defense ministers of the U.S. and Japan participate. From the U.S. side, the Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and the Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen participated, while from the Japanese side, the Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi and the Defense Agency Director-General Fumino Kyuma participated in the meeting.
4. During the civil war in Cambodia in July 1997, a transport aircraft was dispatched intentionally to Thailand for the purpose of evacuating Japanese nationals. (The aircraft came back with no one aboard, because the war was all but over at the time.) Then, the Japanese Prime Minister and Defence Agency Director-General made public their commitment to revising the relevant laws in order to enable the dispatch of combatants including warships.
5. The Japanese Diet spent 93 hours on the hearing of the NGL-related legislations, the third-longest in the history of Lower House hearings. The longest time spent was in a hearing on legislation related to the new Security Treaty in 1960, which took 136 hours. The second-longest hearing, on legislation related to the return of Okinawa, took 127 hours. The Asahi Shimbun, April 28, 1999.
6. The Contingency in Surrounding Areas Act consists of 12 articles and rules, including the objectives, basic principles for responding to situations in areas surrounding Japan, activities and basic plans, cooperation between administrative bodies and the private sector, means for holding hearings on basic plans by the Diet, and use of weapons in operations.
7. Article 36 of Japan's criminal law stipulates that "a) unavoidable acts committed to protect oneself or others from illicit acts will not be punished and (b) the punishments for acts over the legitimate extent of self defense can be reduced or exempted according to circumstantial factors. According to Article 37 of the criminal law (avoidance in emergency)," a) inevitable acts committed to avoid an emergency situation involving life, limb, freedom, or property of oneself or others, are exempt from punishment if the damage done thereof is not greater than the damage that otherwise would have been done. However, punishments for acts in excess of the extent of damage may be reduced or exempted according to circumstantial factors, and (b) the above-mentioned provision is not applied to those on special duties." Refer to Kou Shiono, Rotpouzenshyo II (The Compendium of Laws) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1996).
8. There have been complaints at the Defense Agency that "the requirement of obtaining prior approval from the Diet reduces the effectiveness of defense cooperation."
9. With regard to this, in 1994 when tension was mounting on the Korean peninsula due to North Korea's suspected nuclear development, the U.S. requested cooperation from Japan for 1,059 items. Among them, ports, airports, warehouses, etc. owned by local governments and private businesses were included.
10. The number of local government organizations resolved to reject the central government's demands reached 92 in 17 regions as of February 1999; it in-creased to 177 in 32 regions by April. Most of these are located in regions where major airports and ports are situated. The Asahi Shimbun, February 19, 1999 and April 14, 1999.
11. The Sankei Shimbun, May 3, 1999.
12. For example, in August 1997, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Seroku Kajiyama said, "Taiwan is included in situations in surrounding areas." In January 1999, Ichiro Ozawa, the president of the Liberal Party, stated, "the concept of situations in areas surrounding Japan is geographical, and the scope includes Russia, the Korean peninsula, China and Taiwan."
13. Rodong Shinmun, May 27, 1999.

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