Volume 11 Number 3 Autumn 1999

Recent Changes in North Korean
Agricultural Policies and Projected Impacts
on the Food Shortage

Kim Woon-keun

INTRODUCTION

     In the New Year joint editorial, North Korea declared that 1999 would mark the inaugural year of "Kangsong Taeguk--a militarily powerful and economically prosperous nation." The editorial identified economic woes as the most urgent problem, and in particular, agricultural production was emphasized as the foundation of a socialist superpower. Accordingly, it demanded that state authorities should set as their first priority a solution to the food shortage. State's assistance and agricultural directives have, in fact, been the established practice as proposed in "Thesis on Socialist Rural Questions in Our Country."1)
     North Korea this year explicitly cited the principle of the Party and State's directives role in agricultural matters, pledging itself to solving the food shortage through the central government's strong initiative.
     According to the New Year editorial, the top priority of North Korean agricultural policies for the year 1999 would center around farmland-related policies and agricultural production policies, such as improvement in the agricultural infrastructure, potato production increase, expansion of the double-cropping system, seed improvement, and readjustment of arable land. Although the editorial omits the fact, the policies are also geared to an increase in chemical fertilizer production and farmland improvement projects for the purpose of expanding double-cropping (see Table 1, for a summary of the main contents of the New Year joint editorials, 1995 to 1999).
     Reportedly, North Korea recently enacted the "Agricultural Law," a move which received much attention from abroad because as an extension of the recently revised Socialist Constitution, it could reflect changes in agricultural policies under Kim Jong-il's new leadership. Yet, the Agricultural Law made it clear that North Korea will stick to the centrally-controlled socialist planned economy. That is, the law reflects all the major principles of the former "rural thesis," which were once applied to problems of the socialist agriculture and rural communities, such as the gradual transformation from cooperative management to a state management system (Chapter One); application of business operational principles to agricultural directives and administration (Chapter Six); application of the socialist allocation principles such as the work squad management system (Chapter Six).2)

     Nonetheless, the enactment of the Agricultural Law is significant in that it represents a desperate effort to alleviate the currently worsening food shortage problem by providing a basic legal system that regulates various agriculture-related matters.
     This paper will first review the priorities of the North Korean agricultural policies, as specified in the New Year joint editorial, and in doing so, it will address the policy direction that the North Korea has recently chosen concerning agricultural matters. It will then discuss the international community's assistance to North Korea and its efforts to help relieve the food shortage, for example, the World Food Programme's food assistance; the fertilizer aid from South Korea; and the U.S. food and seed potato assistance, to name a few. Finally, it will present prospects for food production, and supply and demand in North Korea for the year 1999.

THE RECENT AGRICULTURAL POLICY DIRECTION

Improvement of the Agricultural Infrastructure

     North Korea is attempting to improve its agricultural infrastructure in two major categories: (a) the implementation of crop diversification and (b) a transformation from chemical to organic farming. Efforts to improve crop diversification techniques are a response to criticism that the Juche farming methods, the principle of cultivating in the right place and the right time, was improperly implemented. In the past, Kim Il-sung ordered that maize be the single major field crop throughout the country in hopes of increasing food production. However, Kim's policy did not consider the ever-present micro-differences in climate and soil fertility within the mountainous North Korean terrains. In fact, but, this year's policy demanded that a variety of crop species as well as maize should be cultivated in order to hasten improvements in the agricultural infrastructure.
     Thus, crop diversification to increase potato cultivation fields while at the same time decreasing maize fields, is a vital part of Kim Jong-il's policy to increase food production. Although a major component of improving the agricultural infrastructure is an increase in potato production fields, this does not mean that potatoes have been selected as the major field crop. Maize is still the major field crop, along with rice. In short, the policy to improve the agricultural infrastructure reflects the leadership's decision to discard the past practice of cultivating maize throughout the country regardless of climate and soil fertility; honoring "the right crop in the right place" principle, adding potatoes as a third major crop to diversify crops now being cultivated. Additionally, the policy suggests that it will expand to some degree the autonomy of individual farmers, and their selection of crops to be grown.
     With regard to the shift from chemical farming to organic farming, North Korea has stressed that this transformation, now a global trend, was essential to avoid further soil acidification caused by the excessive application of chemical fertilizer. While this may be true, it is also a fact that North Korea had run far short of chemical fertilizer. Given this, organic farming can also be seen as an unavoidable measure to overcome the shortage of chemical fertilizer and to maintain agricultural production at least to a minimum level.
     One of the reasons for the food shortage in North Korea is a lack of necessary equipments and resources for farming. In particular, it was the poor supply of chemical fertilizer that severely lowered the level of crop production. Last year North Korea produced 47,000 tons of chemical fertilizer, and the total supply, including commercial imports and foreign aid last year was a meager 124,000 tons. This amount is no more than 62% of the 1996 total and 64% of the 1997 chemical fertilizer used. Realizing that organic farming is necessary for maintaining food production above a minimum level, North Korea has urged its people to produce their own fertilizer supply (soil-mixed organic fertilizer, mineral fertilizer, among others) and complex microbial fertilizer.
     The agricultural reform declared by North Korea this year is not true reform, but a simple improvement in the agricultural production system. Nevertheless, it is a meaningful development in North Korean agricultural planning, and indicates a more flexible attitude in the current leadership. Note that it even criticizes the rigidity of the previous leadership's decision to increase food production by establishing maize as the second major crop, a directive once considered to be the unquestionable authority of Kim Il-sung.

Potato Production Increase

     An increase in potato production is the new solution to the food shortage problem recently introduced by North Korea. As mentioned earlier, Kim Il-sung had promoted maize as the single major field crop. With the slogan, "Maize, the king of field crops," he adopted it as a secondary staple. Despite "cultivating in the right place at the right time" principle, he made maize cultivation a priority, even in the "wrong" areas, locations that were not suitable to maize at all.
     Kim Jong-il's policy change promoting the potato crop is attributed largely to the characteristics of potatoes as an upland crop of North Korean terrains. As a low-temperature crop, not only do they grow well in the high mountain areas, but they are influenced little by climatic factors. Thus, they are perfectly suited to North Korea, 80% of whose territory consists of mountainous areas. In regions such as Yanggang, Jagang, and Hamkyong Provinces, potatoes have been found to hold a marked advantage over other crops. In addition, they need relatively less fertilizer than does maize, an important factor in North Korea, where the supply of chemical fertilizer is very low.
     Potatoes are a high-yield crop, and thus hold high potential for contributing to a production increase in North Korea. Compared with other hardy crops such as sweet potatoes and buckwheat, potatoes are easier to process in a variety of ways, and they are also known to be richer in nutrients. More importantly, potatoes can significantly contribute to the food shortage during the spring, when food supplies are at their lowest. For example, potatoes that are sown in mid-March can be harvested in late June before rice and maize are ripe. Accordingly, a new slogan has recently emerged in North Korea- "The potato, king of field crops," indicating that the potato will very likely become the third staple crop soon, behind rice and maize.
     When Kim Jong-il made an inspection tour in Daeheungdan county, Yanggang Province (October 1, 1998), the biggest potato-growing district in North Korea, he first suggested his new "potato policy." Since then, potatoes have been targeted as the solution to the food problem. Subsequently, his cabinet adopted "solution of the food problem through the potato farming revolution" as one of its six main tasks. Specifically, the Ministry of Agriculture initiated a potato production-increase project, the main goal which was to double potato cropping areas by 1999 and to continually increase it until 2002. It is known that the Ministry of Agriculture's potato production increase project has drawn on the experimental potato cultivation in rice paddies as the first crop of the double-cropping in the South Hamgyong, North Pyongan, and Kangwon regions for the previous two years. Later it urged cultivation of potatoes as the first crop of the double-cropping, especially in the areas where natural conditions were not favorable to grain crops, sandy areas, or in the mountainous rural areas.
     This year the Ministry of Agriculture launched four main projects for potato production: expansion of potato-cropping areas; development and distribution of a superior variety of potato; improvement in cultivation methods; and improvement of soil fertility.
     First, in a number of attempts to expand potato-cropping areas, the Ministry reduced the number of maize fields by planting potatoes instead, planted potatoes as the first or inter-crop of double-cropping, and located new arable land. An indication that the ministry's project to expand the potato-cropping land is being successfully carried out, Rodong Shinmun (March 30) reported that 43,000 hectares of additional land over last year was found suitable for potato cultivation.
     Second, in regard to development of a prolific strain and its nationwide distribution, North Korea established a potato seed collection system applied uniformly to all levels of farming units, from the Potato Research Center of the Academy of Agricultural Science in Daeheungdan County to cooperative farms in provinces, cities, and counties. With the seed collection system, North Korea was able to culture virus-free clean seeds simultaneously in provincial, municipal and county seed factories, and to produce and distribute nationwide the improved potato seeds, especially to Daeheungdan County, the largest potato-growing district.
     Finally, North Korea is also making efforts to introduce improved cultivation methods nationwide; for example, cultivating seed potatoes from the factory, rather than continuing their traditional method of cutting up crop potatoes for planting.

Expansion of Double-Cropping

     In order to solve the food shortage, North Korea has tried to expand the area of arable land on the one hand, while engaging in intensive use of land for agricultural productivity on the other. Accordingly, it promoted double-cropping and high-density culture in an effort to maximize land use. It proposed various double-cropping techniques, such as:

• grain-to-grain (wheat/barley to rice, wheat/barley to maize, wheat/barley to beans)
• grain-to-vegetable (maize-to-vegetable)
• vegetable-to-vegetable
• potatoes-to-vegetable
• maize-to-feed grain.

     The double-cropping system allows individual farms to choose the most suitable crops for double-cropping in their own areas, depending on climatic conditions, soil fertility, the state of agricultural supplies, and other production conditions.
     With the ever-increasing food shortages of the 1990s, North Korea has placed more emphasis on double-cropping. Especially, in order to solve its food shortage, the North is encouraging the grain-to-grain model. In the case of grain-to-grain double-cropping, weather conditions in North Korea require planting of barley and wheat from late February to middle March, rather than in the fall, followed by rice in the paddy or maize/beans in the field as the second crop. Yet, if double-cropping is implemented in rice paddies, it is often too late for rice transplanting unless the first crop is harvested no later than early June. North Korea is reported to have overcome this by introducing the "60-day large-seedling transplantation method."
     This year double-cropping expansion is linked to the potato increase policy so as to promote double-cropping in areas where it has traditionally not been implemented because of poor natural conditions, such as in Yanggang, Jagang, and Hamkyong Provinces. Potato cultivation is also being encouraged in the traditional double-cropping areas (South of the Anju-Hamhung line), as a first crop, along with such existing first crops as barley and wheat.
     In 1997, North Korea implemented another project, the Double-Cropping Programme, jointly with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) with the U.N. and nongovernmental organizations“pfinancial backing. The program, targeted spring barley production, carried out the planting of 34,200 ha of spring barley to produce 65,000 tons. Last year it diversified crops to include winter wheat and winter barley, simultaneously expanding the size of the double-cropping area to 70,000 ha. This year it is planning to increase the double-cropping area to 100,000 ha and to further diversify the crop variety to include potatoes, bean, and vegetables, as well as barley and wheat.

Realigning Cultivated Land

     The New Year joint editorial set forth many agricultural policies to be enforced this year, including a nationwide land-realigning project, including Kangwon Province. The Rodong Shinmun reported on July 28, 1998 that the land-realigning project, which originated from Kim Jong-il's "Natural Remodeling Policy," would be an important alternative to increase agricultural production. In fact, land-realigning was already identified in October 1976, in the 5th term, the 12th plenary session of the Central Committee of Worker's Party, as one of the "Five Lines of Nature Remodeling," along with irrigation, construction of terrace fields on hillsides, tideland reclamation, and anti-flood afforestation. The plenary session then set goals to search and discover new farmland of over 200 ha for each county, a total of 100,000 ha nationwide. The main focus of the land-realigning project was on combining many small, parcelled paddies or fields into large ones, and on developing unused land adjacent to railroads, waterways, and rivers.
     Reflecting Kim Jong-il's policy, a model for the land realignment in Kangwon Province has been in progress since last October, with support from all over the country, and recently readjusted 30,000 ha of land. Kim Jong-il is known to have made an guidance tour of Kangwon Province twice. This indicates that North Korea was highly motivated to carry out the policy, with Kangwon Province project being the showcase example. Following Kangwon Province, South Hwanghae Province this year reallocated 6,500 ha of land and completed improvement of 17,000 ha of farmland.
     North Korea regards land fertility improvement as a prerequisite to its intensive agricultural methods. Although soil fertility can be maintained by a crop rotation system that prevents the soil depletion caused by single crop cultivation, the North decided not to adopt the system because of its limited arable farmland. Instead, it chose intensive agricultural methods, emphasizing the importance of soil fertility as a precondition to intensive agricultural methods. As long ago as 1958, North Korea had conducted a nationwide investigation of land fertility, which resulted in creation of a pedological map four years later. Every individual farm was then provided with the map so that it could improve its own soil fertility efficiently. North Korea encouraged the use of soil improvement materials such as slaked lime and carbide, while simultaneously taking advantage of the traditional methods for soil improvement such as applying organic fertilizer, transporting soil from more fertile areas, and deep plowing.
     North Korea desperately needs to improve soil fertility to ensure success of its policy to expand double-cropping and increase potato production. Given the lack of chemical fertilizer, North Korea is emphasizing an increase of self-produced fertilizer in the spirit of self-reliance, and is also turning more to organic fertilizer and microbial fertilizers to improve its soil fertility.

PROSPECTS FOR FOOD SUPPLY-DEMAND
AND PRODUCTION IN NORTH KOREA

Prospects for Food Supply and Demand

     Various organizations, domestic and abroad, presented contrasting estimates of North Korean food production last year. For example, the FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to North Korea estimated that the North produced 3,480,000 tons of grains in 1998 (2,660,000 tons in 1997). The estimate of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) was 3,400,000 tons, and the UNDP's figure was 3,000,000 tons (2,240,000 tons in 1997). According to the South Korea's Rural Development Administration (KRDA), North Korea produced 3,890,000 tons (3,480,000 tons in 1997). Finally, the Korea Rural Economic Institute (KREI) provided an estimate of 3,140.000 tons of food production Korea last year. The differences are attributable to variations in estimates of planted areas and productivity (per unit) of each institution.
     Despite the differences, it is agreed that because of favorable weather conditions, 1998 food production in North Korea sharply increased from that of 1997. Although the North Korea authorities announced that their food production totaled only 2,830,000 tons in 1998, it is still a marked increase from their 1997 official figure, 2,150,000 tons.
     Note, however, that the production increase fell far short of the total food demand. According to the FAO/WFP, North Korea was short by 1,350,000 tons of food in the 1998/99 year. The Rural Development Administration estimated that the food deficit in 1998/99 was 1,630,000 tons. On the other hand, the Korea Rural Economic Institute estimated that the total food demand was 6,310,000 tons including 5,120,000 tons for human consumption, thus the North Korean food shortage was 3,170,000 tons in 1998/99. This means that last year's food production, estimated to be 3,140,000 tons, could only feed the North Korean people for six months. In other words, the 1998/1999 food production could last only until this April. Even if that production was used entirely for human consumption, it could still have lasted only until this June (refer to Table 2, for various organizations's estimates of the North Korean food production and demand).

     These projections were confirmed by UN officials who recently visited North Korea. The UN Department of Humanitarian Aid warned in its February and March reports of the North Korean situation (April 20, 1999) that North Korea would likely suspend food distribution again in most provinces in April. Special attention was focused on the severe problem in North and South Hamkyong Provinces. According to the report, the authorities distributed about 150 grams of grain per capita per day in most provinces in March. North Korea suffers most severely from food shortage during the springtime lean period, when no food is available, and summer potatoes and vegetables have not yet produced a crop, i.e., from May to June in the southern regions, and from May to August in the northern regions. David Morton, the chief of the Pyongyang Office of the WFP and also the U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator in North Korea, directed attention to the seriousness of the food shortage in North Korea in an international NGO conference on humanitarian aid to North Korea, held in Beijing on May 3, 1999. According to his account, the death toll had steadily increased in the eastern and northern regions; children were showing symptoms of atrophy due to malnutrition and they were being stricken by new diseases. He also pointed out that because of the dire situation, in addition to the existing farmers' markets, roadside venders had begun to sell foods in several cities. He stated, however, that the majority of the people were still dependent on wild edible vegetables or on the partially-processed alternative foods distributed through the Public Distribution System (PDS) network. Finally, he predicted that North Korea will have no choice but to rely on WFP food assistance until its own food distribution resumes in late June.
     As discussed above, North Korea has suffered from a severe chronic food shortage, for its food production has been too low to meet the demand for food. The international community including South Korea has provided food aid to North Korea since 1995, to significantly alleviate its chronic food shortage problem. South Korea assisted with a total of 315.93 million dollars worth of food to North Korea during the 1995~98 period; Food assistance from the rest of the international community to North Korea amounts to 720.50 million dollars for the same period.
     This year's prospects are brighter for North Korea. Food aid and the agricultural development assistance from the international community will be conducted on a larger scale. For example, the South Korean government donated 5,000 tons of chemical fertilizer to the South Korean Red Cross drive for fertilizer assistance to North Korea. South Korean civilians had also donated two million dollars worth of flour, maize, and seed potatoes to North Korea by the end of March (see Table 3, for a summary of the international assistance to North Korea).

Prospects for Food Production

     As noted earlier, North Korea in the New Year joint editorial, expressed its determination to solve the food shortage. It is now trying to expand double-cropping with potatoes as the principal crop, while diligently carrying out land readjustment and improvement projects. In addition, the international community is now responding positively to North Korean efforts to cope with the problem by providing assistance to its agricultural development, which aims to increase agricultural productivity and to strengthen the agricultural infrastructure. It is also supplying chemical fertilizer to North Korea and in addition there are joint research projects with North Korea on potato production in progress. All this points to brighter prospects for food production in North Korea this year.

     Following Kim Jong-il's guidance tour in Daeheungdan County last year, increased potato production is now a major policy. As such, the Ministry of Agriculture reportedly decided to allocate 43,000 ha more than last year for potato fields. This means that potatoes will be sown on 86,000ha of land this year. According to the Ministry of Unification of South Korea, North Korea produced 154,000 tons of potatoes last year. Assuming that the same level of productivity is maintained for potatoes this year, we may expect that North Korea will harvest 120,000 tons more potatoes than last year. To be sure, this will considerably contribute to alleviating the food shortage. Taking it into consideration that North Korea has urged farmers to cultivate potatoes as the first crop in double-cropping, the production increase expected this year will relieve distress during the spring hardship period when shortages are most severe.
     Depending on the result of the U.S.-North Korea nuclear negotiations in Kumchang-ri this year, the U.S. will provide assistance of 1,000 tons of seed potatoes, chemical fertilizer, farm machines, and farming technologies. According to South Korean standards, the 1,000 tons of seed potatoes can be sown on 667 ha of land. Judging from last year's potato harvest in North Korea, the 1,000 tons of seed potatoes would produce 1,800 tons of potatoes. Given the U.S. assistance of fertilizer, farm machinery, and farming technology, however, the 1,000 tons of seed potatoes could yield as much as 3,400 (when applying the South Korean productivity per unit) to 5,200 tons (U.S. productivity per unit). In short, U.S. assistance could considerably alleviate the food shortage.
     The North Korean policy to expand double-cropping is also a positive factor regarding food production. Emphasis on double-cropping in recent years, triggered by the worsened food shortage in the 1990s, yielded 375,000 tons of double-cropping production last year, according to the FAO/WFP report. This is also expected to significantly alleviate the food shortage during the springtime hardship period. North Korea has also run the double-cropping program since 1997 with financial backing from UN-affiliated organizations and other NGOs. The double-cropping program, would also help increase food production. North Korea alloted 100,000 ha for the double-cropping program this year, anticipating 200,000 tons of grain production and the program will be expanded to 300,000 ha in the final stage. All this is evidence that double-cropping can provide a major solution to the food shortage.
     The low agricultural productivity in North Korea can be attributed to a lack of soil fertility. This being so, fertilizer assistance from the international community, along with South Korea, would contribute greatly to a food production increase in North Korea. When appropriately applied, the 100,000 tons of fertilizer to be shipped would sharply increase food production. To be specific, if 50,000 tons of fertilizer are applied to rice paddies, and the remaining 50,000 tons are applied to maize fields, it could result in an increase of 218,000 tons of food. (rice production increase by 88,000 tons and maize production increase by 130,000 tons)

CONCLUSION

     North Korea pledged itself to solving the food shortage in the New Year joint editorial. To this end, it presented four specific policies: potato production increase, improvement in the agricultural infrastructure, expansion of double-cropping, and land reclamation and improvement. In particular, the potato production increase represents a significant shift from Kim Il-sung's past policy for solving food shortages. Although the Agricultural Law enacted recently in North Korea maintains a socialist centralized economy in the agriculture domain, a move to improve the agricultural infrastructure hints at changes in the direction of the North Korean agricultural policy as well.
     It has already been noted that North Korea has spared no efforts to increase food production. It is steadily expanding its potato fields and is working to improve soil fertility. It also plans to expand a double-cropping program, jointly run by North Korea, the UN, and other international NGOs, to a much larger-scale project. Moreover, several types international aid to North Korea are either now being carried out or are scheduled: food assistance, assistance to the project for potato production increase, and agricultural development assistance, to list a few. In sum, this year's prospects are much brighter than those of previous years.
     However, the brighter prospects should not blind us to several potential barriers to the food production increase. For one thing, despite international fertilizer assistance, North Korea still lacks chemical fertilizer. It is not likely that it will be able to completely make up for the lack of chemical fertilizer with domestic organic fertilizer and complex microbial fertilizer that it is eagerly attempting to produce by mobilizing the entire nation. For another, whether North Korea will succeed in increasing food production as planned this year is heavily contingent upon weather conditions. A North Korean paper, The Chosun Shinbo, reported on May 17 that a drought had continued to affect most North Korean regions until May 10. Specifically, South Pyongan Province registered precipitation 33 to 56 mm lower than the average from January 1 to May 10. For the same period, Hwanghae Province had 51 to 110 mm less rain than the average; Hamkyong Province was 21 to 91 mm below the average precipitation; Yanggang Province had 4 to 21 mm less than average. Most severely affected, Chongjin and Hamhung had no rain for 92 days and 119 days respectively. There is no doubt that the crops will suffer in those regions, another indication that weather conditions will influence the food production in North Korea this year.

<notes>

1. This thesis was presented by Kim Il-sung, on February 25, 1964. Its fundamental concept was designed to convert everyone, especially in rural areas, into members of the working-class. Despite 30-year efforts to realize the people's (state) ownership system on farms, it succeeded in only 9% of some 3,000 cooperative farms
2. North Korea publicized the enactment of the Agricultural Law, but did not publish its specific contents. Yet, commentaries on the law, appearing three times in Minjoochosun (January 28, 31, and February 3, 1999), painted a broad picture of its main contents. According to the commentaries, the law consists of Chapter One (the basics of the Agricultural Law), Chapter Two (agricultural production), Chapter Three (the material and technological foundations of agriculture), Chapter Four (conservation of agricultural resources), Chapter Five (management of crop production) and Chapter Six (guidance to and control over agriculture).

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