Volume 11 Number 4 Winter 1999
THE WEST SEA NAVAL ENGAGEMENT
On June 15, at 9:28 a.m., south
of the demarcation line, near Yongyong Island, North Korean Navy
boats fired at a South Korean vessel. In response, the South Korean
Navy immediately fired back. After a 10-minute exchange of fire,
a 40-ton North Korean torpedo boat had been sunk, and five others
suffered severe damage. The fate of the crew of the sunken North
Korean boats was not immediately known. As for South Korea, nine
Navy servicemen were injured and two patrol boats were slightly
damaged.
It was the first exchange
of fire between the two forces in a tense nine-day standoff that
had begun on June 7th when the North's patrol boats began daily
incursions across the maritime border, or the Northern Limit Line
(NLL).
In an effort to force a
retreat, the South Korean Navy boats had used sirens, flash signals
and semaphore flags. However, because the North Korean vessels refused
to comply demands, the South was forced to use a collide-and-push
maneuver. On June 11, dozens of South Korean patrol boats tried
bump and ram Northern vessels. While some were damaged, North Korean
vessels continued their showdown along the military demarcation
line.
On June 11, North Korea
announced that South Korea should withdraw its patrol boats at once,
further adding that they were infiltrating the waters of North Korea.
Then, it brazenly demanded an apology from South Korea, adding that
"South Korea could suffer a severe blow if the North was forced
to defend itself." The North also blamed the South's request
to open general level talks between the U.N. Command (UNC) and North
Korea.
North Korean naval boats
crossed the NLL some 2.5km deep into the South Korean waters on
June 15, escorting 20 fishing boats. At around 9 a.m., without opening
fire, South Korean patrol boats again as they did, attempted to
collide three of the intruding boats to force them to return to
the North. Then at 9:28 a.m., while a South Korean boat was ramming
a third North Korean boat, another North Korean patrol boat nearby
abruptly opened fire, and the skirmish (hereafter, the "West
Sea Naval Engagement") began.
The
tense situation in the West Sea reached a climax as North Korean
vessels were defeated. While some question remains as to whether
it was intentional provocation by the North, or whether it was tragic
coincidence, analysis of the evidence shows that North Korean Navy's
infiltration and preemptive attack was an intentional provocation.
To begin with, the intrusion North
Korea crossed the NLL to guard its fleet of crab boats, fishing
in the fertile waters south of the inter-Korean maritime border.
In the past, North Korean fishing boats had frequently crossed the
NLL during crab-fishing season, but had turned back when confronted
by South Korean patrol boats. This time, however, they stayed on,
with full knowledge that it would lead to a confrontation. What
is more, it deployed its military patrol boats south of North Korean
fishing vessels for the first time since the signing of the cease-fire
agreement in 1953. Finally, if Pyongyang's intention had been merely
to protect its fishing vessels, it would not have displayed such
a show of force.
A second consideration
addresses the critical timing of the incident. North Korea's preemptive
attack at 9:28 a.m. came barely 30 minutes before a general level-officers'
meeting was to open at the truce village of Panmunjom. Meanwhile,
at Panmunjom, 10:09 a.m., nine minutes after the meeting convened,
the delegation chief, lieutenant general Lee Chan-bok, charged that
at 9:15 a.m., South Korean forces had opened fired on their forces
off the West Coast, inflicting fatalities. The UNC delegation was
unaware that the incident had even taken place, and in an embarrassed
response, the meeting was adjourned in order to confirm what had
happened. Not only were the North's delegates fully aware of the
incident and the outcome 30 minutes before the talks, but the fact
that it knew of the exact time shows that North Korea had planned
the attack for 9:15.
CIRCUMSTANCES BEHIND THE PROVOCATION
AND
THE INTENTIONs OF NORTH KOREA
The U.S.-South Cooperation
The recent incident is yet another
example of the unpredictability of the Pyongyang regime. However,
it was not aimed at merely protecting crab-fishing boats. It was
a deliberately planned provocation, whose motives and circumstances
are as follows:
It should be noted
that the incident took place not long after the Clinton administration's
North Korea coordinator William Perry had returned from his four-day
visit to Pyongyang in May. After Perry's visit, North Korea began
accusing the United States of preparing an aggressive action against
Pyongyang by the same strategy it had used in Yugoslavia. On June
13, Radio Pyongyang insisted that the "operation plan No. 5027-98"
had been unveiled as the United States was escalating the war in
Yugoslavia which has similar geographic conditions as North Korea.
As the situation in Kosovo quieted down, the North
collected intelligence reports on damage caused by aerial bombings
in Yugoslavia. This shows that North Korea review the so-called
"OPLAN 5027" revised at the end of the last year before
examining the comprehensive approach devised jointly by Seoul, Tokyo
and Washington.1)
The
analysis that the OPLAN 5027 and the Kosovo peace talks are tied
to the intrusion of North Korea in the West Sea is supported by
some of the claims by North Korea. The statement of the North Korean
mission to the truce village at Panmunjom on June 1, the letter
of North Korean ambassador to U.N. to the U.N. Secretary General
on June 18, and the statement of the headquarters of North Korea
Navy on July 19, all argued that the military clash in the West
Sea was caused by the offensive actions of South Korea, and that
with the alliance and OPLAN 5027, the U.S. and South Korea are "playing
with fire."
The Sunshine Policy
The fact that North Korea dared
such an incursion and the provocations that followed, only two weeks
before the start of inter-Korean vice-minister level talks in Beijing,
scheduled to be held on June 21, is significant. It might have been
intended to test the "strong security facet of the sunshine
policy" recently pursued by the Kim Dae-jung administration
and the new security members of South Korean cabinet, while at the
same time trying to weaken the South's efforts to induce reform
and openness in North Korea.
While
not accepting the plan, North Korea has nevertheless attempted to
take advantage of the comprehensive policy of the South. It had
already tried to test the patience of South Korea through offensive
actions, such as the submarine incursions into the East Sea just
before South Korea's launch of the Mt. Kumgang tour, and Hyundai's
donation of cattle. It is possible that North Korea decided to adopt
a double approach to maximize its interests, since it regarded the
South Korean policy as appeasement. In addition, the economic difficulties
of North Korea during the last year forced the move.
China's Patronage
It should also be noted that the
intrusion took place on the day when a North Korean delegation,
led by Kim Yong-nam, chief of the presidium of the Supreme People's
Assembly, returned to North Korea after a visit to China. Since
China's diplomatic normalization with South Korea in 1992, there
had been no visits by high-level officials, and the fact that the
visit of North Korean delegation was suddenly decided on May 25
reveals North Korea's need to restore relations with China, especially
considering the recent friction between China and the United States
over several issues, including the alleged theft of key nuclear
technology and the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia
on May 7. Indeed, the North may have seen the soured relations between
the U.S. and China as a favorable opportunity to act.
A
review of the circumstances show that North Korea feels the need
to test the possible threats against its system, i.e., the South
Korean comprehensive approach, the U.S.-South Korea joint defense
system, and Perry's joint proposal. Moreover, by provoking a dispute
around the NLL, it is attempting to improve its negotiating power
with the U.S. It is also hoping to derail the sunshine policy, and
to strengthen its own system, shaken by the comprehensive policy.
THE INTENTIONS AND THE INFLUENCE
OF THE
WEST SEA INCIDENT
North Korea probably never anticipated
its defeat in the West Sea incident. As a matter of fact, since
the conclusion of Armistice Agreement and until the West Sea Naval
Engagement, North Korea has instigated scores of provocations in
the East and West Seas, always managing to gain something from them.
In one example, North Korea kidnapped
several South Korean fishing boats in the East Sea, including a
South Korean Navy vessel in January 1967, and a South Korean patrol
boat in June 1974. Moreover, in the West Sea, North Korean vessels
infiltrated the waters of the South approximately 200 times during
4 months from November 1973 to February 1974. In addition, it has
sunk countless South Korean fishing boats for no apparent reason.
But this time, after it opened fire,
South Korea fired back. A North Korean torpedo boat was sunk and
two patrol boats heavily damaged, leaving scores of North Korean
soldiers dead or injured. Since the conclusion of the armistice
agreement, this was the first armed conflict at sea, and the fact
that it was soundly defeated was a severe blow to the North.
The unexpected turn of events so enraged
the North that it refused to negotiate on pending issues with the
South. In fact, immediately after the incident, North Korea notified
the South that it would not accept visits from South Korean people
for a while and would not receive the support of various South Korean
religious organizations.
The Detention of a Mt. Kumgang Tourist
Of particular note was the detainment
of a South Korean tourist. Min Young-mi, who had embarked on the
Mt. Kumgang sightseeing trip with her son. She was held for six
days for what North Korean authorities claimed was attempting to
entice a North Korean tour guide into defecting to South Korea.
Before her arrest, Min was quoted by the North Korean Central News
Agency as saying that during a conversation with the guide she said
"North Korean defectors are leading decent lives." Charged
as a trained South Korean spy, she was held by North Korea from
June 20 to 25. It was not unexpected that North Korea would use
the Mt. Kumgang tour to improve its negotiating position, but it
was a mistake to show another bargaining chip too early in the game.
Immediately after her
detention, Seoul took retaliatory actions by suspending the Mt.
Kumgang tour indefinitely, demanding that the Pyongyang government
guarantee the absolute safety of the South's tourists. Hyundai also
announced that it would suspend its monthly 8 million dollar payments
to North Korea until the North returned the tourist and guaranteed
that more comprehensive safeguards were in place.2)
North Korea felt compelled to cooperate
once more. Since it had only received payment from Hyundai for 6
months, it desperately needed the additional funds. After a month-long
tug-of-war in the negotiations in Beijing, Hyundai and its North
Korean counterpart, the (North) Korean Asia-Pacific Peace Committee,
agreed on a new measure guaranteeing the personal safety of South
Koreans, which was subsequently approved by Seoul. Tours to Mt.
Kumgang resumed on August 5, ending a 46-day suspension.
The Inter-Korean High-Level Talks
The West Sea Naval Engagement had
a major impact on the inter-Korean vice-ministerial level talks
in Beijing. North Korea did not present the list of the delegates
by the scheduled day, thus delaying the talks unilaterally.
During the first round of talks on
June 22 and June 26, North Korea refused to discuss the reunion
of separated families, which had been scheduled as a first priority,
instead focusing repeatedly on the West Sea Naval Engagement. At
the second round plenary session and the meeting of delegation chiefs,
North Korea lodged an absurd accusation against exiled former North
Korean high official Hwang Jang-yeop, concerning a phone-call interview
with The Monthly Chosun. Furthermore it demanded delivery
of additional fertilizer, stating that it would discuss the separated
families issue only after South Korea delivered the remaining 100,000
tons of fertilizer.3)
North
Korea's obsession with the fertilizer shipments coupled with their
attitude toward the meetings indicates North Korea's brand of "separation
of politics from economy." That is, they will manage to reap
the benefits provided by the South, while at the same time, sabotaging
the engagement policy.
The U.S.-North High-Level Talks
The West Sea Naval Engagement also
affected the U.S.-North high level talks. It is reported that the
delegations of the two countries discussed issues for more than
10 hours, even taking their meals in the conference room. Two topics
were discussed: the result of the site inspection to the suspected
Kumchang-ri nuclear site and North Korean missiles. At that round,
North Korea showed sincerity and observed protocol, announcing the
schedule of the talks in advance and having a spokesman from North
Korea at the press conference after the meeting.
Following
the site inspection, in which it was cleared of suspicion, North
Korea demanded that the U.S. carry out the Geneva Agreed Framework,
using the West Sea incident to improve its negotiation power with
the U.S. Regardless of its loud assertions, the North did not gain
much from the talks, because the U.S. maintained an unflinching
attitude toward missile development and the West Sea incident.
The Gains of the Provocation
The skirmish revealed the North's
conventional weapons weakness, and added strength to Kim Dae-jung's
engagement policy based on strong security and solidifying the U.S.-South
alliance. While it suffered damage in the clash, however, Pyongyang
was able to achieve some of its intended goals through the naval
skirmish. Specifically, they succeeded in making the NLL a point
of issue.
Some results favorable
to North Korea are as follows: First, the U.S. State Department
described the NLL area as "international waters," with
James Foley, spokesman for the U.S. department saying, "Territorial
jurisdiction there remains in dispute." Second, South Korea
revealed vulnerability with regard to crisis management, announcing
too early that it was ready to negotiate the NLL issue with the
North. Finally, South Korea and the U.S. didn't agree on the contact
channel which would deal the NLL issue.
In
sum, although it gained little and lost a great deal, North Korea
seems to think that the incident will result in changing the NLL
into a "disputed area." From it, the North intends to
take initiatives in further negotiations with the U.S. by reiterating
its position, and using it as leverage in negotiating with the U.S.
and South Korea.
The North's agenda
become obvious during the 9th round of UNC-North Korea general-level
talks, held on July 21. There, North Korea proposed holding a working-level
meeting to discuss the inter-Korean maritime border in the West
Sea. It even suggested that members of the meeting include the delegations
from the North and the U.S., and could include South Korean military
officials, if necessary. To this proposal, the UNC suggested that
the working-level meeting should be held in the realm of the South-North
Joint Military Commission based upon the Basic Agreement, and that
the NLL should be observed until the inter-Korean maritime border
is re-established. The North's response, threatening to end the
general level talk unless the U.S. accepted the working-level contact,
is another indication.
The Legitimacy of the NLL
To add further clarification, it
is necessary to review related articles in the armistice agreement
and the Basic Agreement regarding the NLL. Since the NLL was established
on August 30, 1953 by the commander of the UNC. it has been respected
by both sides for 46 years. This was a measure designed to comply
with Article 2, Paragraph 13 of the Armistice Agreement.
Article
2, Paragraph 15 of the Armistice Agreement provides, ". . .
Naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the Demilitarized
Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of
the opposing side, and shall not engage in a blockade of any kind,
of Korea."
Furthermore,
NLL is a maritime demarcation line under the Basic Agreement, and
the Protocol on the Implementation and Observance of Chapter II,
Nonaggression, of the Basic Agreement.
Article
11 of the Basic Agreement, entered into in 1992, provides, "The
South-North demarcation line and the areas for nonaggression shall
be identical with the Military Demarcation Line provided in the
Military Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953, and the areas that
each side has exercised jurisdiction over until the present time."
Article 10 of the Protocol on
the Implementation and Observance of Chapter II, Nonaggression,
of the Basic Agreement provides, "Discussions regarding the
South-North sea demarcation line of nonaggression shall continue.
Until the decision on the maritime demarcation line
is final, the nonaggression areas of the sea shall be those that
have been followed by each side until the present time." Given
this fact, a clear demarcation line has been observed by both sides,4) without a problem international law.
However,
North Korea now claims that it cannot recognize the Northern Limit
Line because it was established unilaterally. In 1973, it intentionally
violated the NLL 43 times in what was called the Western Islands
Crisis. The South firmly responded to put an end to the crisis,
and the NLL continued to exist. Now, after patiently watching for
another opportunity, North Korea provoked the recent incident. Even
though the skirmish didn't proceed as well as hoped, North Korea
feels that it has established a bridgehead for making the NLL a
point of issue.
THE NORTH KOREAN STRATEGY AND TACTICS
In a word, the provocation in the West Sea is the North's new bargaining chip. In the past, North Korea, without changing its fundamental strategy, had managed to preserve its regime and to gain economic support from the outside with its flexible tactics, i.e., nuclear development, the launch of ballistic missiles, and exchanges with the South, to name a few. Now, it must deal with the comprehensive approach, U.S.-Japanese new military cooperation, and the still-desperate economic situation. It needs more leverage, so along with the existing missile option, it will continue to use the West Sea incident.
Containing South Korea Through the Cooperation with the U.S.
The West Sea Naval Engagement can
be regarded as North Korea's first response to the joint proposal
of U.S., Japan and South Korea, delivered during William Perry's
visit to North Korea. It was an offensive provocation and an expression
of North Korea's will to pursue changes in the existing armistice
system, transforming it into a peace agreement with the U.S. It
was also a move to make the NLL a point of issue and to test the
reactions of the U.S. and South Korea.
This
interpretation is obvious if one relates the current problems of
the North with its strategy since the early 1990s. This strategy
should be reviewed first. It first used the Basic Agreement between
the South and North as a stepping stone to achieve direct talks
with the U.S. Since the start of the high-level talks between the
U.S. and the North (June 1993) to deal with the North Korean nuclear
issues, North Korea has continuously tried to establish a policy
of "U.S.-North relations first, and South-North relations second,"
or "Tongme Bongnam--containing South Korea through cooperation
with the U.S." North Korea has pursued the strategy of distancing
South Korea from the process of the meetings with the U.S. regarding
with the 1994 Geneva Agreement, the four-party peace talks and missile
talks. Though it has consistently cooperated with the U.S., South
Korea has been forced to assume an inferior role: it is helpless
solve the issue of the North's past nuclear development; it is unsatisfied
with the improvement of South-North relations did not follow improved
US-North relations; and it must accept the situation in which the
U.S. and the North took the initiative. The Geneva Agreement and
the four-party talks neither reflected the promises between the
South and the U.S., nor public pledges of former President Kim Young-sam.
Under the strategy of "the U.S.-North relations first, and
South-North relations second," South Korea was unable to open
and develop South-North talks because of North Korea's tactics.
The North's brinkmanship policy with
regard to nuclear development is clear: It withdrew from the Non-Proliferation
Treaty in March 1993, and during the first and third rounds of U.S.-North
high level talks, it threatened to engulf Seoul in a sheet of flames
by deploying its 240mm canons near the DMZ.
During
that period, not only did Kim Il-sung pass away, but the North faced
even more serious economic difficulties. Yet, it continued strategic
preparations for the conclusion of a peace agreement with the U.S.
by concentrating its energies on intensifying its military powers,
specifically, building long-range missiles and establishing a military
emergency system.
All in all,
North Korea has made good use of its ability to produce nuclear
weapons as its most powerful leverage in negotiating with the US.
It acquired U.S. support of the light water reactors in exchange
for stopping nuclear development. But it left conclusion of a peace
agreement and diplomatic normalization with the U.S. as a future
goal, to be pursued in exchange for its freeze of nuclear development.
Efforts to Avoid being Cornered
But the situation began to change
in the end of 1990s. North Korea's suspected Kumchang-ri nuclear
site and the launch of Daepodong I aggravated the confrontation
between the North and the U.S., South Korea and Japan. As a result,
North Korea was forced to respond to the comprehensive policy of
South Korea. Now it is faced with the problem of whether to follow
the requirements of the South.
In
addition, North Korea's decision, either to give up the development
of missiles or not, will dictate the responses of its counterparts.
At the same time, the North is attempting to predict when and in
what situation they would confirm the "red line" and to
take advantage of the possible rifts caused by the different strategic
positions of those three countries.
North
Korea is also concerned about the so-called "new guideline-related
laws," a newly enacted law in May 1999 which reflects the new
defense guidelines of cooperation of the U.S. and Japan. The act
gives much more importance to the missiles of the North than to
its nuclear development, meaning that possible leverage of the North
is encountering a new stage. North Korea may regard this as a threat
to its system, because U.S.-Japanese response to its missiles could
be much stronger than it was in the past to nuclear development
programs. Thus, North Korea feels an urgent need to build a means
for checking the U.S. and Japan.
Regarding
its relations with the U.S. coming to a standstill, North Korea
feels the need to deter the U.S. from taking resolute actions against
it. It also wishes to induce differing opinions as reflected in
the policies of the U.S., Japan and South Korea, by suggesting the
resumption of the South-North governmental talks and expanding the
range of South-North economic cooperation. In this way, it can continue
to look for ways to change the existing armistice system into a
peace agreement with the US. It seems clear then, that the North
Korean decision to resume the vice-minister level talks after a
series of secret contacts with the South from the end of April until
June 3, while trying to gain more aid from the South, was a step
to implement its strategy of the 1990s.
When
the impact of the West Sea Naval Engagement is taken into consideration,
the present tactics of the North can be seen in the following signs.
North Korea intentionally broke up
the vice-ministerial level talks in Beijing because of the incident.
But the fact that it stressed several times that the vice-ministerial-level
talks were the only channel between the two Koreas shows that it
needs to sustain a dialogue channel with the South in order to check
the U.S. In doing so, it might also estimate the efficiency and
dangerousness of its possible policy measures such as missiles to
cope with the "comprehensive policy" of its counterpart.
Although the discussions may be strained,
North Korea intends to keep its promise to deal with the issue of
reunion of separated families. But it can be discussed only after
a cooling-off period, and it will be limited to specific issues.
And it also proves that they had no choice but to delay the vice-ministerial
level talks after the West Sea Naval Engagement. Since the breakdown
of vice-ministerial level talks in Beijing, North Korea has tried
to reiterate its need for fertilizer through various means, and
this indirectly supports the analysis mentioned above.
North
Korean official Central News Agency, at a special announcement for
the joint preparatory committee for the grand pan-national reunification
festival, noted that the unconditional release of unconverted long-term
prisoners would be a chance to open the way to reconciliation and
talks between the South and North. This is significant, in that
it mentioned its readiness to open the way to talks. The response
to the argument of the South that South Korean people are the only
ones that can cooperate to lessen its economic difficulties shows
that it still desperately need to exploit the South through the
Mt. Kumgang project and other economic cooperation.
Actually,
North Korea's internal difficulties have forced its hand. While
Kim Jong-il has succeeded in establishing absolute rule, the accumulated
economic woes during the reign of Kim Il-song and changes in public
opinion are threatening the system, and making him more dependent
upon the military. Since last year, Kim Jong-il began guidance tour
in economic areas, rare in former days, indicating an urgent economic
situation. Indeed, the internal and external situation of North
Korea has forced the North to pursue the economic cooperation with
the South to some extent.
While
North Korea may wish to change its tactical strategies to get what
it wants, its brinkmanship will persist. And it will decisively
continue the provocation on NLL, along with other tactical leverages,
as useful in maintaining the regime.
CONCLUSION
South Korean people have recognized
through the West Sea Naval Engagement how difficult it is to establish
the conditions to enable North Korea to open itself through reconciliation
and cooperation, while still maintain security in the South. Though
the naval engagement has raised many controversies about the policy
of South Korea toward the North, the engagement policy toward the
North should be maintained. The most important factor in preventing
war and inducing meaningful changes of North Korea is to correctly
analyze the situation of the North and to cope with it.
First,
it is important to understand the present condition of North Korea.
Kim Jong-il cannot overcome the self-contradictory aspects of the
North Korean system. There are limitations inherent in the origins
and ideology of his system, no matter how much he concentrates his
efforts on building a "Kangsong Taeguk" through solidifying
its power structure.
North Korea
did introduce some elements of a socialist economic system as the
result of its recognizing the limits of its own self-sufficiency,
but instead of following the Chinese or Vietnamese model, pursuing
socio-economic principle under the rule of one party, it adheres
to principles such as "our way of socialist economic policy."
Furthermore, though North Korea is concentrating its efforts on
acquiring economic interests through diplomacy, its goal is not
to join the international community, but to gain economic support
that will ensure the maintenance of the Kim Jong-il regime.
Though North Korea recognizes the
need to cooperate with the South in order to rebuild its economy,
it has chosen to defend its ideology against foreign ideas, and
to pursue a strategy of separating the U.S. from the South. Next,
it is also necessary to estimate the present policy of North Korea
toward the South. Basically, it will maintain the framework of "the
U.S.-North relations first, and South-North relations second,"
while tactical changes are possible, changes will fall within its
basic strategy.
In conclusion,
if the governmental-level talks begin again after a cooling-off
period, South Korea should be wary to avoid being exploited by North
Korea. South Korea should induce the North Korea's tactics, "improving
the relations with the South within a limited range," into
its comprehensive approach. In particular, South Korea should take
resolute action against Northern military provocations, to deter
it from pursuing the military adventurism. South Korea should maintain
its basic principles in the policy toward the North with some flexibility,
and should work to change the attitude of North Korea.
When
the situation mentioned above is realized, North Korea will accept
the comprehensive policy of the South, give up its goal of "the
U.S.-North relations first, and South-North relations second,"
and call a halt to the reckless military provocations meant to incapacitate
the existing armistice system. This is a difficult task, requiring
a great deal of wisdom. In conclusion, the intentions, tactics and
strategies of the North must be closely analyzed, to determine the
socio-economic influences of its actions, and how it determines
diplomacy and military policies toward the U.S., Japan and South
Korea.
<notes>
- North Korea has continued blasting the "5027-98"
strategy plan, charging that it was a war scenario for the invasion
of North Korea and that the sunshine policy was "a confrontation
policy" aimed at the North since 1998. Pyongyang further,
blamed Seoul for the revision of operations plan 5027 and argued
through the North Korean Army spokesman's statement on December
2 in 1998, that they also had the right to take a containment
offensive while holding mass rallies of military units and various
social organizations to criticize the OPLAN 5027. Such incidents
illustrate North Korea's sensitive reaction to the OPLAN 5027.
- The $8 million payment is the first of nine
installments, with the same amount to be given to the North
in return for granting Hyundai the exclusive right to develop
Mt. Kumgang. Having already paid the North $150 million in six
$25 million monthly installments, beginning in March next year,
it will pay North Korea $12 million per month for 57 months
to complete the agreed-on payment of $924 million by the end
of 2004.
- Under a deal on June 3, South Korea promised
to provide 200,000 tons of fertilizer aid to the North by the
end of July in return for its agreement to hold the first governmental
talks with the South in 14 months. Both sides concluded in the
so-called "inside agreement" that they would discuss
the separated families issue prior to the completion of fertilizer
delivery. The delivery of 100,000 tons of fertilizer was completed
on June 22, and Seoul officials reaffirmed their position that
shipments to the North would not resume unless the two sides
made "tangible" progress in reuniting families separated
between South and North Korea.
- There is ample proof that North Korea has recognized
and observed the NLL. For example, in May, 1963, a North Korean
vessel carrying spies was sunk in the West Sea. In defending
its action, it stated to the UNC that the spy vessel had never
crossed the "NLL." without a problem regarding the
international law.
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