Volume 11 Number 3 Autumn 1999
THE BACKGROUND AND MEANINGS OF
THE WEST
SEA INCIDENT
The visit by President Clinton's
North Korea policy coordinator William Perry to North Korea in May
was a critical opportunity to gauge the possibilities for dismantling
the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula. It was reported
that during the May 25~28 meeting, Perry suggested a "comprehensive
approach," devised jointly by Seoul, Tokyo and Washington,
to North Korea. The joint proposal would require that North Korea
cease both its nuclear and missile development program and the export
thereof, in exchange for expanded economic and diplomatic benefits,
such as the lifting of sanctions on North Korea, diplomatic normalization
with the United States, and a guarantee of the continued existence
of the regime.
After Perry's visit
to Pyongyang, Washington and Seoul expected an affirmative response
from North Korea. Instead, an armed confrontation took place on
June in the West Sea, or Yellow Sea (hereafter, the "West Sea
incident".) It now appears that Perry's visit to North Korea
had a direct bearing on the "West Sea incident." As a
matter of fact, Perry's visit itself represents meaningful progress.
Despite failure to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, Perry,
as the first U.S. presidential special envoy to North Korea, was
able to meet with high-ranking officials of the reclusive North
and to discuss sensitive issues covering the regime's political,
economic, military matters, including nuclear and missile development.
The fact that Pyongyang has not discontinued talks with the U.S.
recognizing Washington's intention and that it then eventually accepted
the special envoy suggests new possibilities for progress in U.S.-North
Korea relations, since the North has pursued economic gains from
the South while trying to gain political and military advantages
from the U.S.
To the contrary,
from the North Korean point of view, Perry's visit forced Pyongyang
into a corner. It had to make some important decisions vis-a-vis
Perry's proposal, and in fact, North Korea was asked to make major
readjustments in its stance toward the U.S., South Korea, and Japan.
The Seoul-Washington-Tokyo policy cooperation will be a threat to
the leverage of the North, forcing it to weigh carefully how its
relations with one nation will affect those with the others. The
question is how North Korea will be able to define its relationship
with the United States, on the one hand, and with South Korea, on
the other, in terms of the trilateral relationship among the U.S.
and the two Koreas.
Trilateral Policy Structure
During the Cold War, South Korea
and the United States maintained a staunch alliance against North
Korea's communist regime. Owing to the very nature of North Korea,
neither ally had any reason to doubt the resolve of the other. But
the demise of the Cold War era has enabled North Korea and the United
States to explore a new relationship very different from the one
that existed during the Cold War. A new environment has emerged,
in which the South Korea-U.S. relationship, as well as inter-Korean
relations, are affected by the changing diplomacy between Pyongyang
and Washington.
A delicate "triangular
relationship" has emerged among North and South Korea and the
United States, as Washington has deeply involved itself in the North
Korean nuclear question as part of its post-Cold War global strategy.
To adapt to a new "game," one must develop fresh ways
of thinking. To grasp the nature of these triangular relations and
prognosticate their most likely outcome, it is important to understand
the interrelationship between two sides of the triangle, namely
U.S.-North Korean and inter-Korean relations, that is, the connection
between U.S.-North Korean relations and inter-Korean relations.
The U.S. policy toward
the Korean peninsula in general and North Korea in particular is
part of a larger framework of global strategic interests. In other
words, the U.S. deals with North Korea in terms of maintaining the
leadership role of the U.S. in the post-Cold War era. In order to
protect its leadership as the sole superpower, the U.S. must prevent
the spread of weapons of mass destruction among the nations which
do not yet possess them.1) Thus, the U.S. policy
toward the North Korean nuclear problem and missile export is based
on this global strategic view. Under this global strategic consideration,
as Table 1 shows, the U.S. has been implementing the engagement
policy to the North.
In
contrast with geopolitical interests of the United States, the primary
task facing North Korea is to maintain its state system. The Kim
Jong-il regime is much more concerned about system maintenance than
before, with the economic situation continuing to deteriorate since
the devastating flood of 1995.2)
Concrete
policies must be implemented to maintain the North Korean socialist
system. Thus, the North Korean authorities have been seeking improvement
in its relations with the U.S. in order to sustain the Kim Jong-
il regime by resolving the current economic difficulties. For these
objectives, North Korea has been observing the Geneva agreement
by freezing its nuclear development program.
As
shown in Table 1, the U.S. has various means to achieve its goals
and objectives of the North Korea policy. Among others, providing
food assistance to North Korea is regarded as a meaningful one.
In addition, the policy means include the easing and lifting of
economic sanctions against North Korea, which may lead to diplomatic
normalization in the end.
On the
other hand, North Korea has made an effort to normalize relations
with the U.S., who has what North Korea wants, while driving a wedge
between the U.S. and South Korea. For North Korea, the primary means
available is to utilize the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) card
and to either observe or to violate the Geneva Agreement. North
Korea may think that it will be rewarded every time it threatens
to test-fire missiles.
Since the
Geneva agreement was made in 1994, North Korea has continued to
show a business-like attitude toward the U.S., while refusing to
enter into a dialogue with Seoul. Thus, North Korea's acceptance
of the inter-Korean dialogue is regarded as a key point that it
can use to its advantage.
As seen in Table 2, North Korea's
top priority in its South Korea policy is regime survival, which
means preventing the deepening economic deterioration from developing
into a political threat to the Kim Jong-il regime. Communization
of the entire Korean peninsula seems to be losing its feasibility
for North Korea, now suffering from severe economic difficulties,
and mass starvation of the people. In order to achieve this goal,
the North Korean regime has been trying to delink South Korea-U.S.
relations by driving a wedge between them. North Korea perceives
the U.S. as the only country with the power to influence the international
community to provide humanitarian assistance to North Korea, and
to guarantee the regime's survival. Thus, it feels the necessity
to place South Korea, who is perceived to be a threat to the North
Korean system, at odds with the U.S. Therefore, it achieves this
by talking mainly to the U.S. North Korea will continue to engage
in provocative actions as a policy mean, using conventional weapons,
although the West Sea incident brought to light the myth of North
Korean military strength. The nuclear option that continues to worry
the international community is another bargaining tool, together
with missiles, and the transportation vehicles for nuclear weapons.
Indeed, the chemical weapons that have been listed in the Pentagon's
Quadrennial Defense Review can probably be included in North Korea's
survival kit.
North
Korea assumes that its most effective tool is the U.S.-North Korean
relationship. The process of U.S.-North Korean discussion itself,
regardless of pace or development, can be regarded as vital for
North Korea, mainly because it is a proof that the U.S. recognizes
North Korea as a negotiating partner in various types of discussion
at the global, regional, and peninsular levels.3)
On the other hand, while South Korea's
ultimate goal in its North Korea policy is to reunify the peninsula
by peaceful means, the current economic hardship has discouraged
optimistic projections and has led to the search for realistic ways
to manage the division on the peninsula. Thus, its North Korean
policy objective comprises further strengthening the Korea-U.S.
alliance in order to deter the North Korean threat and to prepare
for unification through the management of the division of the peninsula.
Overcoming the division certainly requires political as well as
military support from the U.S. Hence, the consolidation of the Korea-U.S.
alliance should be the objective of the North Korea policy.
Then, the first means available to
South Korea is the ROK-U.S. combined forces working as a deterrent
against North Korean miscalculation. The second one includes South
Korea's economic capability, although reduced by the financial crisis.
South Korea is the country that can still provide economic and humanitarian
assistance for North Koreans suffering from starvation. South Korea's
willingness to improve inter-Korean relations, despite North Korea's
reluctance, can be regarded as another means, since the surrounding
countries agree to the necessity of inter-Korean talks and reconciliation.
Implications of the West Sea Incident
William Perry's joint proposal
presents the possible benefits for North Korea, but at the same
time, it also places North Korea in a defensive position, since
it requires North Korea to abandon the development of WMD, a crucial
leverage that guarantees the maintenance of the regime. The U.S.
is the nation most concerned about North Korea's development and
proliferation of WMD, since it is a direct threat to U.S. global
strategic interests. Consequently, it is desirable for North Korea
to target the U.S. as its counterpart in order to reap the most,
while making the least concessions, rather than to negotiate with
all three countries, i.e., the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, simultaneously.
In this context, the West Sea
incident involves three overall implications.
First,
the intrusion of North Korean boats into the waters of the South
in the West Sea, crossing the so-called Northern Limit Line (NLL),
was a tactical provocation aimed at assuming a more aggressive stance
toward the U.S. North Korea was put on the defensive, as Perry's
proposal was suggested through his visit to North Korea. It seems
that North Korea wanted to deliver a message: The essence of the
tension on the Korean peninsula does not lie in North Korea's nuclear
weapons or missiles, but in the instability and irrationality of
the armistice system on the Korean peninsula. Considering all this,
it can be said that the West Sea incident was North Korea's intentional
provocation toward the U.S. It also aimed at gaining an advantage
in relations with South Korea by adding the NLL problem to the existing
list of negotiations.
Second,
despite those strategic considerations, the West Sea incident revealed
the weakness of North Korea's conventional weapons. North Korea
did not expect South Korea to respond actively against its provocation,
given the "sunshine policy." The West Sea incident, not
only caused considerable psychological and physical damage to North
Korea, it also shattered the myth of North Korea's superiority in
conventional weapons. Thus, North Korea has no choice but to develop
and proliferate WMD in response to the damage caused by the West
Sea incident. Consequently, the forthcoming negotiations with North
Korea will be rather bumpy.
Finally,
based on these two implications, it can hardly be expected that
the improvement of relations between the two Koreas will be as rapid
as South Korea expects. On the contrary, the South-North relations
will be considered a dependent variable to the U.S.-North Korea
relations. As North Korea virtually lost one of its important policy
means, i.e., conventional fire power, with its defeat in the West
Sea incident, it would rather negotiate with the U.S. by using its
WMD card. In sum, it hopes to perpetuate its regime through direct
negotiations with the U.S., while maintaining minimal relations
with South Korea in order to receive its occasional economic support.
These strategic intentions were apparent
in a series of events. In a show of blatant insincerity, the North
Korean authorities, right after fruitless South-North talks in Beijing
in June, detained a South Korean tourist for allegedly trying to
persuade a guide at Mt. Kumgang to defect to the South. Yet, in
surprising contrast, the North devoted much effort to talks with
the U.S.
In order to avoid the
burden of negotiating with the three countries simultaneously, North
Korea wished to separate South Korea and Japan from the U.S., thus
making the relations between the two Koreas even more vulnerable
to the improvement of U.S.-North Korean relations.
PROSPECTS FOR US-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS
The Perry Report and the Time Limit
It was expected that
the Perry report, the result of a reexamination of U.S. foreign
policy toward North Korea, would be announced immediately after
coordinator Perry's visit to Pyongyang, but it has been delayed
for a number of reasons.4) In a recent speech,
Perry said that he would not write the report for the sake of report,
but complete it with the support and cooperation from North Korea.
It would include the range of North Korea's options by reflecting
the affirmative response from North Korea, the results of cooperation
with Japan and South Korea, as well as the criticism from the U.S.
Congress. The report would place top priority on deterring
North Korea from developing, deploying and proliferating its nuclear
weapons and missiles,5) which is the main concern
of the U.S. Congress. If North Korea addresses Western concerns
over its missile and nuclear programs, the U.S. will suggest a package
of proposals, including the lifting of sanctions on North Korea,
diplomatic recognition and economic exchanges. As long
as North Korea reacts affirmatively, the setting of the "red
line" against the North can be included in the Perry report
indirectly or can be attached as a confidential note.6)
For its long-term survival, North
Korea knows it should open its doors and become a member of the
international community through the diplomatic normalization with
the U.S. The dilemma lies in the fact that it would take a long
time for North Korean leadership to take steps to make this a reality
while preventing domestic instability. The problem is how long the
U.S. and South Korea can wait for the hermit kingdom to change.
South Korea will hold general elections in April 2000, and the U.S.
will hold general and presidential elections in November 2000. The
ruling parties in both countries know that they have to prevent
the North Korean issues from turning out to be a negative factor
during the election campaigns. Furthermore, only after receiving
some affirmative responses from North Korea during the Democratic
party's ruling, the Republican party, when it takes the power, will
be able to maintain the talks with North Korea within the framework
of the comprehensive engagement policy. For this, North Korea should
express its position as soon as possible as to whether to accept
Perry's proposal.
The Gradual Progress of U.S.-North Korean Relations
The relations between the U.S.
and North Korea will progress by stages, depending on the stance
of the three countries.
The South:
The government of South Korea would like to dismantle the Cold War
structure on the Korean peninsula, through the reconciliation and
cooperation with the North, by turning the zero-sum relationship
between the U.S.-North and the South-North dimensions into the positive
sum game. The key is whether Seoul can bear the North's efforts
to drive a wedge between the U.S. and South Korea without losing
its patience.
The U.S.: The Clinton
administration is usually supportive of the comprehensive approach
of the South Korean government, but it faces critics from the Congress.
It should enlist Congressional support in carrying out the comprehensive
approach, so that the support would play a great role in the progress
of U.S.-North Korean relations.
Critics in the Congress have made the following points:
first, the Clinton administration should conduct a zero-based review
of its North Korea policy; second, the administration must get serious
about theater and national missile defense and make it a top priority;
third, the Pyongyang must understand that they will not be rewarded
for bellicose or provocative actions.7)
In fact, the "comprehensive approach,"
devised by Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo, is in accord with the above
points suggested by U.S. Congress. William Perry has reviewed the
U.S. policy toward North Korea for more than six months, and the
comprehensive proposal ensures stopping the proliferation of WMD
by stating that the U.S. Japan, and South Korea would provide North
Korea with political and economic support only in exchange for a
halt to the development of nuclear weapons and missiles. As to the
missile issue, it can hardly be said that the comprehensive proposal
is the compensation for North Korea's provocative acts, because
North Korea has not joined the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR) and thus it is not "legally" bound by the international
regime. Rather, the comprehensive approach is a "political"
approach aimed at inducing North Korea to stop the missile program
since it could threaten the regional stability.
The North: North Korea thinks that it would be more advantageous
to focus on the negotiations with the U.S. than to negotiate with
the U.S., South Korea, and Japan concurrently. North Korea's ability
to maintain its system despite the severe economic difficulties
is based on its revolutionary ideology to "liberate" the
South, and thus the North's acceptance of peaceful co-existence
with South Korea could cause a serious internal crisis. Consequently,
it would adopt a "muddling-through" strategy rather than
accept the comprehensive proposal. Specifically, without clearly
expressing its attitude toward the joint proposal, it would certainly
give priority to negotiating issues of less priority such as curbing
the test-firing and the export of missiles than abandonment of the
missile development itself. In negotiations, North Korea would take
"maximin strategy," which will slice the range of its
concession as much as possible, while varying its negotiation lists
as many as possible. Thus it could gradually improve relations with
the U.S. by riding out difficulties.
Limitations set by the U.S. Congress
The core element of
U.S. sanctions to North Korea comprises prohibiting trade, investment,
and assistance, which is stipulated "in a multi-layered way"
in the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA), various acts on international
terrorism,8) and regulations against
the Communist countries.9) Thus, for instance,
even if North Korea is removed by the State Department from the
list of terrorist countries, actually implementing removal of sanctions
would still be impossible. Other related restrictions and sanctions
are also stipulated in the TWEA, and a revision requires congressional
approval. The Republican-controlled Congress would not willingly
agree to these highly political and legal matters with Campaign
2000 approaching.
The question
of whether restrictions on North Korea will be relaxed by revising
the laws depends on the attitude of the North toward the joint proposal.
In addition, the role of Perry's successor, who can heal the rift
between the Administration and Congress is pivotal. In the short
term, Congress will likely take steps such as unfreezing North Korea's
assets in the U.S. and granting partial permission for financial
transactions between the U.S. and North Korea, which can be realized
through executive discretion. Considering the structural limitations
on the drastic lifting of sanctions on North Korea, the U.S. administration
would take gradual steps by reciprocating the progress in the missile
talks, inter-Korean relations, and four-party talks.
PROSPECTS FOR SOUTH-NORTH RELATIONS
Limited Improvement of Inter-Korean Relations
With North Korea's cooperation,
the overall scenario for terminating the Cold War structure on the
Korean peninsula will proceed as shown in Table 3. But Table 3 represents
only wishful thinking, a goal that cannot be achieved without genuine
cooperation of North Korea. As Table 3 shows, to realize each step,
relations between the two Koreas must improve, as negotiations between
the U.S. and North Korea progress further. The West Sea incident
and the detainment of a tourist at Mt. Kumgang indicate, however,
that Seoul's North Korea policy could be changed from a principle
of flexible reciprocity to the one of firm reciprocity. This means
that negotiations between two Koreas would become much more difficult,
causing North Korea to cling further to the hope for normalization
of relations with the U.S. The end result is a perplexing situation
for South Korea, who hardly condones the progress between the U.S.
and North Korea, though it has stated that it will not stand in
the way.
As the U.S. presidential
elections near, North Korea will attempt to gain the lifting of
sanctions and food assistance while making as few concessions as
possible, such as stopping the test-firing of Taepodong II and negotiating
missile exports. At the same time, with regard to relations with
South Korea, it would pursue the barest minimum in improvement,
just enough to assure the U.S. of its willingness to cooperate.
North Korea will take concessive steps
only in the field of the reunion of separated families and the re-implementation
of the Supervisory Commission of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement,
but would hesitate to embark on the second stage: that of fulfilling
the inter-Korean Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression,
Exchange and Cooperation, signed on December 13, 1991. For North
Korea, whether to enter into the second stage depends upon the next
U.S. administration's policy directions toward it. That is the only
means to avoid the pressure of the comprehensive package deal mentioned
above.
Against this backdrop,
the relations between the two Koreas would proceed in a limited
manner. North Korea would continue to drive a wedge between the
South and the U.S. and to discuss the problems of the Korean peninsula
only with the U.S. Then, it would allow limited improvement in its
relations with South Korea, only when its relations with the U.S.
came to a standstill.
On the other
hand, it is expected that the North would show good faith on the
issue of the reunion of separated families. This would serve to
demonstrate its benevolence without recognizing the legitimacy of
the South Korean government.
The
most plausible process for improvement of relations between two
Koreas is that Pyongyang would adopt its own methods of "separation
of politics from economics," which aims to negotiate political-security
issues only with Washington, while pursuing gradual economic cooperation
with Seoul. It would try to gain from the Seoul's engagement policy
as much as possible, while making minimum concessions to keep the
policy alive.
Synergy Effect of the Three-level Approach
Dismantling the Cold War structure
on the Korean peninsula will be a long process. The objectives should
be pursued on three levels--the South-North and the U.S.-North Korea
high-level talks and the four-party talks--so that a synergistic
effect may be achieved among the three channels. Thus, the three-level
approach should be utilized.
At
the inter-Korean high-level talks, economic assistance and cooperation,
the reunion of separated families, fulfillment of the Basic Agreement
aiming at implementing the Exchange-Cooperation Commission, Joint
Military Commission, Joint Reconciliation Commission, and the Declaration
of Denuclearization can be discussed. To acquire satisfactory results
from the comprehensive approach, concrete steps, such as normalizing
U.S.-North Korean relations, easing sanctions, providing the food
aid, and solving the nuclear and missile problems should be discussed
at the U.S.-North Korea high-level talks. As a result, talks between
the U.S. and North Korea should proceed together with the talks
between the two Koreas. And the efforts to build a peace regime
on the Korean peninsula should continue to be made through the four-party
talks.
It is strategically recommended
that the South Korean government avoid showing its impatience to
improve the relations with the North. If South Korea clings to the
improvement of relations with the North, it could give North Korea
the opportunity to pursue its strategy to drive a wedge between
South Korea and the U.S. The three dialogue channels do not have
to keep pace with each other. Rather, the variation in the pace
of the three talks could create more synergy leading up to the terminus,
the normalization of relations among the U.S. and two Koreas. In
any event, Seoul must show patience, and must convince the North
that the South is the only true source of help and cooperation.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The comprehensive approach aims
to induce North Korea to cooperate with South Korea, Japan, and
the U.S. to create the situation which is favorable to all three
nations. But as mentioned above, North Korea would work to gradually
improve relations with and to make minimum concessions to the U.S.
while sticking to the development of WMD, its only means for survival.
As a result, the improvement of relations between two Koreas depends
upon the steps of improvement between the U.S. and North Korea.
Against this backdrop, the following
policy considerations are needed. First, an active diplomacy toward
the U.S. Congress is necessary, since it is skeptical about the
comprehensive approach. One of the main characteristics of the November
1994 mid-term elections in the U.S. was the inclusion of young congressmen,
born after the Korean War, into both Houses and this tendency continued
in the 1996 and 1998 elections. This generational shift means that
there are new congressmen, who have no military service experience
and who don't understand the peculiar reality on the Korean peninsula.
Inasmuch as they regard Korea only as an economic and trade counterpart,
it is hardly expected that these congressmen would support Seoul's
North Korea policy. So it is recommended that South Korea strengthen
its diplomacy toward leading U.S. congressmen, and also develop
lines of communication with the young congressmen.
Second,
South Korea should welcome Russia and China in helping to work out
problems on the Korean peninsula. While the recent movement of Russia
and China toward the North is closely related with their strained
relations with the U.S., their new approach toward the North could
play a positive role in North Korea's reform and openness, and in
diluting its hostile attitude toward South Korea. Thus, it is recommended
that South Korea take advantage of the strategic cooperation between
Russia and China in the direction of changing the North Korean system,
and in gaining its cooperation. Such help could remove barriers
to the comprehensive approach of the U.S., Japan, and South Korea.
Lastly, the role of the U.S. armed
forces on the Korean peninsula should be readjusted. The role of
NATO has been expanded in Europe even though the Cold War has ended.
Likewise, the elimination of the North Korean threat in the future
should not cause the end of the alliance of the U.S. and South Korea.
As relations between the two Koreas improve, the role and the status
of the U.S. armed forces on the Korean peninsula would come to the
fore. Thus, it is necessary to discuss the U.S.-South Korea alliance
system to readjust its contribution to the regional security of
Northeast Asia. To adjust the South Korea-U.S. alliance
to a regional strategic approach means reaffirming the fact that
the efforts designed to deter war on the Korean peninsula will ultimately
contribute to stability in Northeast Asia as well; emphasizing that
even if the threat from North Korea dissipates, the South Korea-U.S.
alliance can continue to contribute to regional stability; and creating
a crisis management system between South Korea and United States
in preparation for any unexpected change in the situation in North
Korea. At the same time, to ensure the South Korea-U.S. alliance
can move in such a direction, both countries should promote closer
relations with China in an effort to minimize any negative influence
that Beijing may exert at the time of unification of the Korean
peninsula, and to ensure China's constructive role in the interests
of regional security.10)
<notes>
- The 1998 EASR has newly included the concept
of "counter-proliferation," which means that the U.S.
will consider military actions in addition to political and
diplomatic approaches, in order to counter the spread of weapons
of mass destruction.
- After the death of Kim Il-sung, and the rising
economic difficulties, the Kim Jong-il regime has depended heavily
upon the military, as the only support for his regime. Guy Arrigoni,
"Political and Economic Change in North and South Korea:
Implications for Inter-Korean Conflict Resolution," CSIS-RIPS Conference on Korean Peninsula Developments:
Implications for Regime Stability, Washington D.C., (March 4-5, 1999); Yun Duk-min, "Political
Dynamics of North Korea," IFANS Review vol.6, (Seoul: The Institute of Foreign Affairs &
National Security, December, 1998), pp.1-15. But some argue
that, after years of stagnation, the North Korean economy may
have at least stabilized. Unofficial farmers" markets are
becoming more open and active. Truck traffic on North Korean
roads has increased. Last year's total food production increased
more than 11% form the year before by South Korean estimates.
"Is North Korea's Free Fall Finally Ending?" The Wall Street Journal (May
28, 1999), A15.
- Concerning the U.S. policy toward the Korean
peninsula at global, regional, and peninsular levels, see Kim
Sung-han, "U.S. Policy toward the Korean Peninsula and
ROK-U.S. Relations," The Korean Journal
of Defense Analysis, Vol.IX, No.1, Summer
1997, pp.135-158.
- The Clinton administration had little time to
handle the problems on the Korean peninsula since it faced the
Kosovo issue, the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia
and the Cox report. It seems that the Clinton administration's
North Korea policy coordinator William Perry decided that it
would take more time to handle the West Sea incident and to
dilute Congressional opposition on Clinton's North Korean policy.
- With regard to the missile problems, the top
concern of the U.S. is to deter North Korea from test-firing
of mid-range and long-range missiles and their export. And the
U.S. finally aims to make North Korea join the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR). Richard Armitage, "A Comprehensive
Approach to North Korea," Strategic
Forum, no. 159, National Defense University
(March 1999), p.5.
- It seems that there's no agreement among the
U.S., South Korea and Japan on whether to regard the test-firing
of Daepodong II as one within the red line. But if the nuclear
development of North Korea is revealed, the comprehensive approach
toward the North would be canceled.
- Benjamin Gilman, "Put North Korea on Notice,"
Defense News, September
21-27, 1998.
- They include Arms Control Act, Foreign Assistance
Act (1961), Trade Act (1974), Bretto Woods Agreements Act Amendments
(1978), Export Administration Act (1979), Foreign Operations,
Export Financing & Related Programs Appropriations Act (1991)
etc.
- They include Trade Act (1974), Foreign Assistance
Act (1961), International Security and Development Cooperation
Act (1981), Ex-Im Bank Act (1945, 1986), etc.
- Kim Sung-han, "U.S. Military Presence
in a Unified Korea," presented at the Conference on Stability
and Security on the Korean Peninsula: Developing a Research
Agenda, University of California at San Diego, May 26-27, 1999.
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