Volume 11 Number 3 Autumn 1999
Challenge and
Response:
The South Korean Policy Toward North Korea
INTRODUCTION
The Kim Dae-jung administration
has demonstrated consistency in pursuing its engagement policy toward
North Korea. Recently, however, doubts have been raised over its
effectiveness and sustainability. Not only has the North shown a
lukewarm reaction but it has provoked the international community.
Both inter-Korean economic cooperation, now in its incipient stage,
and the reunion of separated family members are in jeopardy due
to several occurrences--the naval clash between the two Koreas over
the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea, the detention of
a Mt. Kumgang tourist and a planned second test-firing of a new
Taepodong ballistic missile.
The
engagement policy toward North Korea faces several challenges. There
are questions as to whether it can induce North Korea to undertake
positive and constructive reforms as a member of the international
community, promote peace in East Asia, and work toward the unification
of the Korean peninsula. Moreover there is the question of whether
there is currently an alternative to the engagement policy; what
kind of steps the engagement policy should follow; what the limits
are and what kinds of long-term or short-term strategies the engagement
policy can use. Those issues cannot be resolved easily or quickly.
Even though North Korea, a hermit kingdom whose doors had been closed
to the outside world for the past fifty years, has begun to ease
them open a little, there seems to be no clear way to push them
wide open. Having spent a good deal of my life studying North Korea,
and as former Unification Minister, charged with dealing with the
issue, I would like to evaluate the engagement policy briefly in
this paper.
First of all, it is
important to note that the engagement policy is the result of long
and serious consideration by President Kim Dae-jung, and is superior
to any of the past administrations? policies toward North Korea.
The essential principles of the policy will be examined, and it
will be shown that the policy should not be implemented for the
short-term. The only way to achieve the ultimate goal of the engagement
policy is to implement it consistently over time, and in close cooperation
with neighboring countries.
BACKGROUND OF THE ENGAGEMENT POLICY
There are many experts on the North Korean issue who are predicting the collapse of the one-and-a-half-year-old engagement policy. The June 1999 naval confrontation between the two Koreas in the West Sea, plans for a second test-firing of North Korea's new Taepodong ballistic missile, and the North Korean authorities' detention of a South Korean tourist have hastened the gloomy outlook. However, this paper will show that after examining the current inter-Korean relations, the environment surrounding the Korean peninsula, and the determination of the President, the only possible stance toward North Korea is to continue implementing the Kim Dae-jung administration's engagement policy, the so-called "sunshine policy."
Four Reasons Supporting the Engagement Policy
First, a review of past governments'
unification policies reveals that they lacked strength of resolve
mainly due to their lack of consistency and cooperation. The current
engagement policy toward North Korea, however, demonstrates the
President's determined efforts toward unification and national security
over a period of more than twenty-eight years. Hence, there is little
chance that the foundation of the engagement policy will be shaken.
For a long time, President Kim has researched the security and unification
of the Korean peninsula, and has maintained his belief in the inevitability
of the engagement policy. In April 1971, representing the opposition
New Democratic Party (NDP), Kim Dae-jung ran for the presidency
against Park chung-hee, to be defeated by only 940 thousand votes.
Park had already established a dictatorial rule through a military
coup on May 16, 1961, and even at that time, Kim was proposing progressive
policies regarding security and unification on the Korean peninsula.
The ruling Democratic Republican
Party (DRP) and the opposition NDP had very different ideas regarding
unification and security on the Korean peninsula. As a presidential
candidate, Park Chung-hee had insisted that security preparedness
was vital for creating an environment for peaceful unification.
While Kim Dae-jung shared Park Chung-hee's anti-Communist views,
his strategies differed. He suggested the following: the establishment
of a South Korean national institute to plan an appropriate unification
policy; open discussion of unification based on liberal theories,
and the encouragement of academic and political studies of Communism;
tension reduction between the two Koreas; non-political exchanges
of journalists and athletes, free letter exchanges; and the guarantee
of the surrounding four powers--the United States, the Soviet Union,
Japan, and China--to deter a major war on the Korean peninsula.
Both Parties, the DRP and the
NDP, shared a positive opinion on the continued presence of the
U.S. Army on the Korean peninsula and on the observance of the U.S.-South
Korea Mutual Defense Treaty. However, the DRP proposed that military
forces, 600 thousand regular soldiers and 2.5 million reserve soldiers,
should be deployed and the defense industry expanded to achieve
a self-sufficient defense capability by the end of the first half
of the 1970s. In other words, to guarantee national security, the
DRP insisted on enhancing the military force, while the NDP suggested
that the South should deter the military threat from North Korea
by reforming South Korean domestic politics. Other policies set
forth in the NDP platform included: refraining from using military
power for political purposes, promoting neutrality of the army,
abolishing the reserve forces, and inducing the four powers surrounding
the Korean peninsula to join in peace efforts.
In his fourth attempt at the presidency, Kim Dae-jung
was finally elected as the 15th President of South Korea. In the
meantime, he had already consolidated his ideas regarding security
and unification. Indeed, those ideas were widely known from his
many lectures, seminars, and conferences even before the 1997 election.1)
Second, the
engagement policy is consistent with the post-Cold War atmosphere.
The lengthy ideological confrontation between the West and the East
finally ended in the 1990s. Despite several religious or national
conflicts and the refusal of old socialist countries to accept liberal
democracy, the general global trend has been moving toward the universal
value of peaceful democracy. Such ideas supporting human rights,
the rule of law and the market economic system cannot be ignored,
and in fact, the Korean peninsula has been greatly affected by the
post-Cold War atmosphere.
The
changes in the post-Cold War era, especially after October 1997,
are reflected in the speeches presented in cross-summit meetings
among the four powers: the United States, China, Japan, and Russia,
in which there was agreement to establish a strategic partnership,
and consecutively-held U.S.-China, Japan-Russia, and China-Russia
Summit meetings, as well as a China-Japan Prime Ministerial-level
meeting, all within the previous two months. Under the strategic
partnership, the four countries agreed to cooperate with each other
in dealing with issues of mutual benefit first, and resolution of
complicated issues later. In other words, the partnerships intend
to implement engagement policy over such mutually beneficial issues
as nuclear proliferation, trade, environment, terrorism and drug-trafficking.
The four powers' national interests
regarding the Korean peninsula, also coincide. Remembering that
the Cold War was one of the main reasons for the division and that
it even hastened the icy relationship between the South and the
North, the four powers' cooperation and their eagerness to maintain
peace on the Northeast Asia, opening new opportunities for South
Korea. Above all, by taking a proactive stand in the current situation,
Seoul could establish a cooperative system with them to deter North
Korea's military provocation and prevent the perpetuation of the
division.
Thirdly, the South
Korean government has reviewed the North Korean regime again, and
has established a new policy based on the adjusted perspective.
The North Korean economy is facing the same vicious cycle of economic
deterioration as other former socialist countries. For example,
the North Korean economy has recorded a minus growth rate since
1990, and between 1994 and 1998 its average growth rate stood at
-4.2%. The nominal gross national product (GNP) decreased from 20.5
billion U.S. dollars in 1993, when Kim Il-sung was alive, to 17.2
billion dollars in 1998. Accordingly, the GNP per capita decreased
from 904 dollars in 1993 to 713 dollars in 1998. Since 1995, North
Korea has failed on average to produce over 4 million tons of crops
per year. Moreover, it has suffered a 1 million-ton shortfall in
satisfying its total food demand, with an annual average food production
of 3.8-3.9 million tons. North Korea's energy supply also decreased
from 19.01 million tons of oil equivalent (TOE) in 1993 to 15.18
TOE in 1998. This includes electrical power generation which decreased
from 22.1 billion kwh in 1993 to 19 billion kwh in 1998. In steel
production, North Korea experienced a 42% decrease--from 1.86 million
tons in 1993 to 1.08 million tons in 1998, as well as an 83% decrease
in fertilizer production--from 3.68 million tons in 1993 to 630
thousand tons in 1998. Furthermore there was a 45% decrease in trade
from 2.64 billion dollars in 1993 to 1.44 billion dollars in 1998.
In sum, the North Korean socialist
economy is almost bankrupt. The public food-rationing system, a
symbol of the socialist economic system, has been distributing barely
enough food to survive, forcing the North Korean people to find
food for themselves. The 1995 floods brought further disaster, leading
to an enormous shortage in the food supply and causing many people
to starve to death. When a delegation of the World Food Programme
(WFP) visited North Korea on May 3, 1999, the director of the Flood
Damage Rehabilitation Committee (FDRC) reported that the death rate
had increased from 6.8 per one thousand people in 1995 to 9.3 in
1998. Official figures appear low, but even if they are accurate,
it indicates that at least several hundred thousand people have
starved to death. In addition, North Korean authorities revealed
that the annual death rate among children had climbed to 15% caused
by the rampant spread of epidemics since 1995.
It was generally believed that the North Korean regime
would not last long, given the seriousness of its economic situation,
and in fact, the Kim Young-sam administration foresaw imminent collapse.
Not wishing to isolate North Korea, the former President announced
that South Korea preferred a course of gradual unification and that
it would not pursue unification by absorption. He nevertheless cautioned
that South Korea should prepare for rapid unification in the event
of North Korea's collapse.2)
His
forecast, however, underestimated the North Korean regime's strength
and Kim Jong-il's dictatorial power over the North Korean people.
Kim Jong-il was designated the General
Secretary of the Workers' Party on October 8, 1997. Then, on July
26, 1998, four years after his father's death, he held a general
election in the Supreme People's Assembly. He also reorganized the
political structure through a constitutional amendment, expediting
his reappointment as head of the North Korean military, "the
national supreme post." Finally, he replaced the
presidential system with a cabinet system to establish a dictatorship
no different from that of his father, Kim Il-sung. After taking
the post, he began threatening surrounding countries with the motto
"Kangsong Taeguk--a militarily powerful and economically prosperous
nation."3)
Soon
after, on August 31, he launched the "Kwangmyungsung I"
ballistic missile, regarded as an attempt to show off the consolidation
of his political power, as well as to affect bargaining with the
U.S.
In the words of Hwang Jang-yup,
the Former Secretary of the Workers' Party who fled to South Korea,
"Kim Jong-il has a cold-hearted brute instinct for power."
In promoting "military-oriented thought," Kim Jong-il
mobilized his army to control the North Korean people. In fact,
the military has occupied all the universities and controls cooperative
farms, railroad operations, and major industrial facilities in efforts
to carry out the dictator's order for a simultaneous operation of
two major People's Fronts (protecting socialism from foreign forces,
and suppressing insurrections by internal traitors and by anti-socialist
movements). It is of course impossible to hold power forever by
means of absolute control over the people, but for now, it does
seem extremely difficult for the rebels to get organized and, therefore,
it is safe to predict that Kim Jong-il's regime will continue unless
he is assassinated in a palace coup d'etat.
The
Kim Dae-jung administration's premise is grounded in the belief
that North Korea will not collapse soon but will last for some time.
In other words, it is pursuing a pragmatic policy toward North Korea,
based on a more practical and rational approach.
Fourthly,
implementation of the engagement policy toward North Korea was inevitable
because peace on the Korean peninsula was essential to overcoming
the South Korean financial crisis as soon as possible. The Asian
financial crisis which began in Southeast Asian countries in July
1997, also impacted South Korea. It seemed impossible for the South
Korean domestic manufacturers to overcome the crisis, with a debt-to-equity
ratio of four to one, worse still, as of election day in December
1997, the South Korean foreign debt was over 110 billion U.S. dollars,
with foreign exchange holdings of only 3.9 billion U.S. dollars.
When Kim Dae-jung was elected President,
he became "heir to a bankrupt company." While a priority
in overcoming the crisis was attracting foreign investment, no foreign
company was willing to invest money in such a perilous economic
climate. While I was serving as Unification Minister in 1998, international
credit-rating firms held discussions there on North Korea's military
movements and inter-Korean talks. We at the Ministry of Unification
explained that North Korea was under heavy surveillance and that
military preparedness was stronger than ever. Moreover, Mt. Kumgang
tourism and other projects in North Korea indicated that the possibility
of all-out war was low.
THE BASIC STRATEGY IN IMPLEMENTING THE ENGAGEMENT POLICY
The Kim Dae-jung administration's
engagement policy is based on his philosophy of "democracy
and market economy." The goal of unification is not a return
to the past before the division occurred, nor does it simply involve
territorial or national unity. A system based on democracy and market
economics is the only way to secure better lives for both Koreas
and to foster universal values in our tradition and culture. The
problem is how to make the strategy work.
First
of all, the engagement policy should be based on a strategy of adaptation.
In other words, the policy toward North Korea should not include
resorting to military measures as past administrations did. Although
North Korea amassed immense military power intending to revolutionize
the South, that must not be the South Korean strategy. Instead,
it must take non-military measures to change North Korea, and should
reserve use of its military for defense purposes only. Military
preparedness is, of course, crucial, but as long as the South Korea-U.S.
joint defense system works, it demonstrates that South Korea has
ample defense capability to deter a North Korean military invasion.
The ideological competition between
the two Koreas is over. North Korea's goal to establish a utopian
system, the so-called "Our Own Way of Socialism," advocating
a Kangsong Taeguk, is no longer believed by the many North Korean
people or by the intellectuals, and certainly not by the South Korean
people. Therefore, South Korea must employ an attractive strategy
to change the fundamental attitudes of the North.
South
Korea's economic, social, cultural, and diplomatic strength as well
as its religious beliefs are the most powerful means for changing
the North. All such non-military measures should be implemented
as a basic strategy for influencing the North.
President Kim Dae-jung once commented
that the idea for his engagement policy came from past strategies
of the U.S. toward the Communist countries. Communist regimes collapsed
not because they lacked nuclear or conventional weapons, but because
they first of all, failed to maximize the creativity of human beings
to increase economic wealth and second, because they neglected spiritual
values. Establishing one-party dictatorships and centralized command
economies, they disregarded democracy and market economy. Now, as
the U.S. did in the past, South Korea must demonstrate the superiority
of democracy and a market economy to the North Korean people. The
superiority of the South lies not in advanced-technological weapons,
but in its affluent society where the people can enjoy quality of
life, economically, socially, and culturally. The basis of our strategy
toward North Korea is to let the people know about South Korean
superiority and to correct their distorted perceptions of the country.
If the North Korean people realized that their leadership had lied,
and how much South Korea has developed, the military capability
of North Korea would dramatically wane. No one would go to battle
for a regime it no longer trusted.
The
three principles of the policy toward North Korea proposed by the
Kim Dae-jung administration are based on that strategy. First, the
engagement policy aims at deterring any kind of military provocations
from North Korea and consolidating a peace system on the Korean
peninsula. Here, I want to point out the importance of making efforts
to deter unbalanced attacks from North Korea. That is, South Korea
should cooperate with its friendly neighbors to deter the development
and distribution of weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear
weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons, as well as to
prepare to counter any special-operations raid from North Korea.
Secondly, the engagement policy will
increase mutually beneficial inter-Korean exchanges based on the
coexistence of the two Koreas. Distrust and difference between them
have deepened the remaining hurt from the Korean War and inter-Korean
confrontation and antagonism during the past fifty years. The countries
are now even exhibiting differences in their language and life styles
as well as in their political and economic ideas. Moreover, the
poverty suffered by the North Korean people since the collapse of
their economy is indescribable. Therefore, it is urgent that the
inter-Korean exchanges increase. South Korea should have no reservations
about providing aid and cooperation to North Korea since it will
enhance optimum conditions for a "de facto unification"
or "unification by process" (gradual unification). This
is preferable to simply pursuing legal or institutional unification.
Thirdly, the engagement policy will
induce North Korea to reform itself from within. In order to grant
the North Korean authority some time to figure out ways to help
itself, The South Korean administration declared that it did not
wish to absorb North Korea unilaterally. Although Kim Jong-il is
well aware of the best ways to preserve his regime, having learned
from the lessons of Chinese and Vietnamese reform and openness,
he is hesitant. Bottom-up reform could finally topple him by endangering
the fundamentals of the Juche (self-reliance) Idea which has been
the basis of his political legitimacy. Of course, "reform from
the bottom" could happen in North Korea. Even then, however,
Kim Jong-il could hold on to his power if he fully mobilized his
men, military generals and intellectuals. While nobody can force
him to hasten reform, only if Kim Jong-il shows willingness to reform
and open his country, will the major powers and South Korea provide
the North with the necessary aid.
The Kim Dae-jung administration
has reaped excellent results from the engagement policy. Some of
the tangible outcomes are the Mt. Kumgang tourism project, increased
inter-Korean exchanges in the areas of economy, society, culture,
and religion, and expanded aid for the North. The number of people
who have visited North Korea between March of last year and the
end of June, this year has reached more than 5,600. The figure has
more than doubled compared to the number of 2,408 people during
the past nine years from 1989 to 1997. The number of people touring
Mt. Kumgang reached a record 86 thousand during the seven months
between November 1998 and May 1999, and the reunion of separated
families in third countries has increased as well. Confirmed figures
on whether the separated family members are alive or not increased
from 164 in 1997 to 377 in 1998, and stood at 128 in April of this
year. The number of reunion of separated families increased from
61 in 1997 to 108 in 1998, and was already 82 by April of this year.
Moreover, inter-Korean commercial trade has recommenced. Although
the amount of trade had dropped from 300 million dollars in 1997
to 200 million dollars in 1998 because of the South Korean financial
crisis, the trade level of this year has been restored to that of
1997.
There was notable progress
in the establishment of a peaceful environment on the Korean peninsula.
The channel for inter-Korean dialogues to discuss maintaining the
Korean Armistice Agreement, which came to a complete halt seven
years ago, was resumed at the general officer-level talks in the
truce village of Panmunjom. The four-party peace talks were already
held in Geneva and, in fact, the 6th meeting was held in June, 1999.
The inter-Korean talks resumed also. In April of 1998, the inter-Korean
vice ministerial-level talks were held in Beijing but failed to
produce any substantive results. Also in June 1999, another meeting
was held to discuss sending 200 thousand tons of fertilizer to North
Korea. Further talks on the reunion of separated families were held
as well.
North Korea itself has
shown some small signs of institutional change within its regime.
It adopted market economic concepts such as price, cost, and profit
in the economic articles of its Constitutional Amendment at the
first session of the 10th-term Supreme People's Assembly, held on
September 5, 1999. In another move, it has dispatched over 100 economic
officials to Western countries to study economics and business administration
under the capitalist system. These minor changes can be seen, however,
as a tactic to earn foreign currency and normalize relations between
the U.S. and North Korea, rather than as a serious efforts to reform.
Moreover, in response to Seoul's declaration of the engagement policy
toward North Korea, the North launched a submarine incursion in
the South Korean East Sea in June 1998, another armed infiltration
on the East Sea coast in July 1998, a spyboat intrusion onto the
Kanghwa-do seashore in November 1998, and a semi-submersible vessel
intrusion into the South Sea in December 1998. These consecutive
invasions from North Korea seemed to have been designed to express
its vehement rejection of the engagement policy, regarded as a strategy
to subdue the socialist regime peacefully. Through its public media
broadcasts, North Korea announced that the engagement policy was
a total sham, blaming the Unification Minister and the Defense Minister
of South Korea in particular.
Given
the North's tendency to such reactions, South Korea has proposed
"comprehensive approaches." The approaches, introduced
by President Kim Dae-jung on December 7, 1998, were based on the
perception that the inter-Korean issue could not be resolved without
the resolution of the Cold War issue on the Korean peninsula. Under
the approaches, the concerned parties are free to deliberate broadly
on the inter-Korean issues, to reach various kinds of agreement,
and to suggest methods of implementation. Judging from our experience
during this past year, it is clear that the vicious cycle of "increased
tension, confrontation, and compromise" will not end with an
ad hoc case-by-case approach. Thus, the three parties, namely South
Korea, the U.S. and Japan will jointly carry out negotiations with
North Korea after an agreement is reached.
The
comprehensive approaches have three methods of implementation: First,
tension reduction between the two Koreas, Secondly, inducing North
Korea to abandon its Cold War attitude and undergo reforms. Thirdly,
the normalization of relations between North Korea and the surrounding
countries.
They also include the following five goals:
1) To replace
the inter-Korean hostile relationship with a cooperative one;
2) To normalize North Korea-U.S. and North Korea-Japan relations;
3) To persuade North Korea to reform itself from within, establishing
cooperative relations with the outside world;
4) To realize
arms reduction, giving up weapons of mass destruction;
5)
To establish a peaceful environment on the Korean peninsula,
replacing the Korean Armistice treaty with a Peace Regime
In May 1999, William Perry, the
U.S. North Korea policy coordinator, visited North Korea, carrying
the so-called "joint proposal" after several rounds of
discussions on the five issues with South Korea, the United States
and Japan. North Korea has yet to make an official comment on it.
Meanwhile, two incidents have occurred since last May. One is North
Korea's preparations for the second test-firing of its new ballistic
missile, and the other is the naval confrontation between the two
Koreas on the Northern Limit Line in the West Sea.
The second
test-firing of its new ballistic missile has become a serious issue,
heightening military tension in East Asia and antagonizing the Japanese.
On the other hand, even though North Korea was completely defeated
in the naval confrontation on the NLL, it gave the North good reason
to pursue U.S.-North Korea bilateral talks to resolve the military
issue. In addition, the detention of a South Korean tourist by North
Korean authorities within a week after the naval confrontation,
resulted in the suspension of the Mt. Kumgang tourism project. Since
the incident, South Korea's Hyundai Group and North Korea's Asia-Pacific
Peace Committee have been discussing safety guarantee measures and
detailed regulations for the tour.
Therefore,
there is serious concern that the planned inter-Korean exchange
projects could end in a deadlock and that South Korea might slow
down implementation of the engagement policy toward North Korea,
and there seems to be no clear answer as to how the issues can be
resolved easily. Thus, we can only assume that the confused state
of inter-Korean relations will continue.
PROSPECTS FOR THE ENGAGEMENT POLICY
In this paper, I have commented
on the engagement policy of the Kim Dae-jung administration, the
background and the results of the comprehensive approaches, and
the current deadlock of inter-Korean relations. Based on my own
experience as a participant in the inter-Korean talks in the 1970s
and having served as Unification Minister under Kim Dae-jung, it
seems clear that the problems surrounding the inter-Korean talks
are serious. But, whether we like it or not, or whether we obtain
the desired results, I would like to stress that there is no other
way but to continue negotiations with North Korea in order to maintain
peace on the Korean peninsula. I say with confidence that the "engagement
policy" is far better than containment or non-intervention.
I reminded representative of the U.S. State Department, Charles
Kartman, that patience was the most important attribute in talks
with North Korea. Seoul has not participated in the inter-Korean
talks in the belief that Pyongyang has reformed itself. Rather,
it has participated in the talks, in spite of the lack of positive
signs of change toward reform or openness.
The
issue is how much time and what kinds of conditions South Korea
needs to help North Korea realize that dialogues and negotiations
are the only way to guarantee the survival of its regime. South
Korea cannot continue providing unilateral aid to North Korea without
the approval of the South Korean people. On the other hand, it cannot
stick to the diplomatic principle of "give and take,"
namely the principle of reciprocity. Here lies the difficulty in
negotiations with North Korea. South Korea should maintain a balance
between unilateral aid and the principle of reciprocity in the inter-Korean
negotiations or the inter-Korean exchange projects. Otherwise, all
dialogues and negotiations will come to a halt.
It
is South Korea which is vulnerable to North Korea's military threat.
Seoul is located only 40 km away from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ),
where 21 million people, 42% of the South Korean total population,
are residing. Therefore, it is the most useful bargaining chip for
North Korea. Indeed, past administrations have been highly sensitive
to military provocation by North Korea, knowing that Seoul was within
the range of North Korean conventional weapons.
Overcoming
the strategic vulnerability of Seoul is an onerous task. If the
Kim Jong-il regime, on the verge of collapse, should wage war against
South Korea, Seoul would be in ruins. Thus, South Korea is opposed
to any kind of preemptive military actions by its friendly neighbors
against North Korea; favoring a prevention of military provocation
(nuclear or missile launch) in advance. Peace-keeping, by means
of dialogue and negotiations, is the only way for both Koreas to
survive. Even though the engagement policy has produced no tangible
results so far, no other alternative exists for peace and unification
except dialogue or negotiations to deter a war and reduce military
tension between the two Koreas. If the four powers understood that,
they too, would be patient with North Korea and help bring it to
the negotiating table. The fact that North Korea will soon conduct
a second test-firing of its new Taepodong ballistic missile is a
source of worry for the U.S. and Japan. Some U.S. Congressmen have
stated that they will stop the heavy-oil supply to North Korea and
impose harsh sanctions against it if the missile is launched. Meanwhile
Japan has threatened North Korea with suspension of payment of its
share for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)
project. It is no surprise that the U.S. and Japan reacted as such,
but it is my hope that they will be more rational, given South Korea's
position. Each country has a different set of priorities, depending
on its own national interests and concerns. Since it is incredibly
difficult for several countries to have the same priorities, close
strategic cooperation among countries is crucial. In the future,
strategic cooperation among South Korea, the U.S. and Japan as well
as other powers such as China and Russia must increase in order
to deter North Korea's irrational behavior and promote peace and
security in Northeast Asia. In conclusion, inducing North Korea
to change from within is the best way to promote peace and security
in Northeast Asia. Thus, the engagement policy is not only South
Korea's policy toward North Korea, but it can also be the common
policy of all countries concerned.
<notes>
- His unification policy is well summarized in
The Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation for Asia-Pacific Region, Kim Dae-jung's Three Steps for Unification: A
Focus on South-North Confederation (Seoul:
Asia-Pacific Peace Press, 1995). In the book, he provided a
theoretical basis for the engagement policy toward North Korea,
summarizing the three principles, including deterrence of military
provocation, a pledge not to attempt reunification by absorption,
and the increase of inter-Korean exchanges under peaceful coexistence.
- During the Liberation Day ceremony on August
15, 1994, the former President stated the following: "I
want to stress again that we will pursue a course of gradual
unification, however, since unification could be realized suddenly,
we must consider every possibility and prepare for it. Whenever
or however unification takes place, we should begin to work
toward making the two different societies one unified national
community."
- "A commentary," Rodong
Shinmun, August 22, 1998.
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