Volume 11 Number 2 Summer 1999

 

Security or Engagement?
The Japanese North Korea Policy

Lee Won-deog

PREFACE
     Since the inauguration, the Kim Dae-jung administration, South Korea's foreign policy toward North Korea has pursued fundamental changes. The South Korean government began to promote cooperation with North Korea under the banner of the "sunshine policy" and has attempted to terminate the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula, while seeking ways to bring about inter-Korean mutual prosperity as well. President Kim Dae-jung suggested comprehensive engagement policy aimed at inducing North Korea to abandon its nuclear and missile development programs by encouraging Japan and the United States to endorse the legitimacy of the North Korean regime through the normalization of diplomatic relations. Since the engagement policy of South Korea is supported by major powers such as the U.S., Japan, Russia, and China, the South Korea's initiative on the Korean peninsula is much stronger than it has ever been.
     A series of incidents which took place recently have negatively influenced the security and peace of Northeast Asia. North Korea¤£ worrisome behavior includes: the test-firing of a three-stage Taepodong missile last August, its refusal to allow inspections of a suspected underground nuclear site at Kumchangri, and the incursion of two mysterious vessels into Japanese waters. These events lent strength to U.S. Congressional hawks while at the same time triggering resurgence of Japanese "militarism." On the other hand, North Korea and the PRC have strongly opposed military cooperation between the U.S. and Japan, namely, the new defense guidelines and the Theater Missile Defese (TMD) programs. If the situation in Northeast Asia proceeds in this manner, it will weaken the engagement policy of South Korea and, furthermore, will cast a negative shadow over the Korean Peninsula.
     Since the launch of the North Korean missiles, the so-called "Taepodong shock," Japanese public sentiment toward North Korea has been worse than ever. Taking advantage of this anti-North Korean sentiment, Tokyo proceeded to invoke a hard-line policy against the North, and to consolidate its institutions and laws in efforts to broaden its military role of Japan. The worsening relations between the two countries will surely weaken the the effects of an engagement policy in South Korea and have a negative influence upon security in East Asia. Therefore, while it will be difficult, Japan should actively resume negotiations on the improvement of relations with North Korea, and ultimately normalize diplomatic relations.
     Based on these premises, this article aims to examine following. First, it aims to examine the present situation of relations between Japan and North Korea. Second, it will review the variables that influence Japan's North Korea policy. Third, it will suggest the policy direction necessary for bringing the engagement policy of South Korea and Japan's North Korea policy in line with one another.


THE PRESENT SITUATION OF RELATIONS
BETWEEN NORTH KOREA AND JAPAN

     Until Shin Kanemaru's visit to North Korea, in September 1990, relations between North Korea and Japan were irregular. Japan attached much importance to relations with South Korea, while it had no diplomatic relations with North Korea. Yet, Japan allowed some contacts and trade with North Koreans under the principle of separation of business from politics. The reason that Japan maintained a pro-South Korea policy is strongly related with the fact that the Cold War and the containment policy of the U.S. confined its own foreign policy.1)
     Kanemaru's visit to North Korea produced epoch-making changes in the relations between two countries. It induced the joint declaration of three major parties of two countries; the Liberal Democratic Party, the Social Democratic Party of Japan, and the Workers' Party of Korea. The joint declaration stated that two nations would resume governmental-level negotiations for the normalization of relations. It added, "Japan repents the colonial rule of Korea before and during World War II, and regards normalization talks as a requisite step for settling war-related issues with the North. Through normalized ties, peace and stability may be established in East Asia." Taking this opportunity, Japan actually changed its major policy trends toward the Korean peninsula.
     After the joint declaration, the two countries held eight rounds of governmental-level talks for the normalization of relations, but it ended in vain with the leak of suspicion of North Korea' nuclear development. For those two years, two countries discussed various problems such as compensation, nuclear development, identifying the missing Japanese woman known as Lee Eun-hye and other international problems, but they failed to reach a solution.2)
     The negotiations broke off in November 1992, and there had been no negotiations for six and a half years.
     Although no governmental-level talks were not held during that period, a variety of movements to resume negotiations were conducted at as many levels as possible. In March 1995, a delegation of the ruling three-party coalition of Japan visited Pyongyang to adopt an agreement on the resumption of negotiations on the normalization of relations.3) In that year, Japan sent aid twice totalling 600,000 tons of grains to North Korea. In August 1997, a preliminary conference, the first governmental-level contact since 1992, was held to resume negotiations. At that conference, Japan demanded that North Korea deal in good faith with the issues of Japanese citizens allegedly abducted by North Korean agents, of the homecoming visits by Japanese spouses of North Korea citizens, and of drug-smuggling. Of those demands, North Korea accepted the Japanese demand of the homecoming visits by Japanese spouses of North Korea citizens and allowed them twice to visit Japan.4) In November 1997, the delegation of ruling coalition parties visited Pyongyang again, and tried to pave the way for the resumption of negotiation's for the normalization of diplomatic relations.
     In spite of those movements to resume negotiations, the relations between the two countries became far worse with a series of incidents after mid-1998. Among them, the launch of a Taepodong missile had the most negative influence. North Korea fired the three-stage rocket into the East Sea and over Japan's main island shortly after noon on August 31, 1998. It was observed by the United States and Japan as a test of an intermediate range ballistic missile Taepodong-1, meaning that North Korea could target all of Japan. The launch of the Taepodong missile provoked an angry reaction from the Japanese people, worsened the already negative attitude. Japan claimed that North Korea intentionally launched the missile as a threat, and that it had violated international laws by using Japanese air space without prior notice. In response, Japan decided to impose several sanctions against the North.
     After the launch, Japan decided to freeze negotiations to normalize diplomatic relations; to delay signing of at least $1 billion of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) support; to cease food aid which had been more than $34 million since 1995; to end flights to Pyongyang by canceling nine cargo flights and 14 other flights; to stop the remission of funds from ethnic Koreans in Japan to North Korea; to impose economic sanctions on North Korea; and to bring the case before the UN Security Council. Additionally, as a military response, Japan decided to import a reconnaissance satellite, and to begin joint development of a Theater Missile Defense system with the U.S.5)
     Among these steps, the delay of KEDO support was canceled, at the request of the U.S. and South Korea. The two countries worried about the danger of collapse of the Geneva Agreed Framework aimed at stopping North Korea's nuclear development program. The other sanctions remain in effect. To make matters worse, a pair of suspected North Korean spy boats fled Japanese waters after being fired upon by Japan's naval forces. This incident further infuriated the Japanese public.
     To bring about a solution, the Obuchi cabinet has tried to find some concrete measures to improve relations with North Korea although the people continue to show extremely negative sentiment toward North Korea. The Japanese government states that unless North Korea takes constructive steps to improve relations with Japan, it will no longer try to improve relations with North Korea.6) On the other hand, it has attempted to restore the contact channel with North Korea by cautiously proceeding with the visit to North Korea by former Japanese premier, Tomiichi Murayama.

THE MAJOR VARIABLES OF JAPANESE POLICY
TOWARD NORTH KOREA

     Considering the fact that Japanese public sentiment toward North Korea is extremely icy because of suspected abductions and the spy boat incident, it is hardly expected that Japan will take steps to normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea in the short term. Nevertheless, it is clear that Japan cannot neglect the political gains which will derive from normalization.7)
     First, Japan thinks that it can strengthen its influence upon the Korean peninsula by maintaining a consistent relationship with North Korea. Historically, Japan has competed with other major powers surrounding the Korean peninsula such as the U.S., China and Russia to extend its influence upon the peninsula. Since the 1990s, Japan has been relatively weak in this regard compared to other powers. Japan regards this as not in its national interest, but seeks to improve relations with North Korea not to fall behind neighboring major powers.
     Second, Japan has to be cautious about the danger which could follow the sudden collapse of North Korea. Tokyo worries about the possibility of serious internal unrest in North Korea and the negative impact on itself. If any military confrontation occurs, because of sudden change in the situation in North Korea, Japan has no choice but to participate in that confrontation directly or indirectly whether it likes it or not. Japan once prescribed its military role in the case of outbreak of sudden military confrontation on the Korean peninsula by announcing the US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security issued by President Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto in April 1996, and through the review of the Defense Guidelines in September 1997.8) Japan is vigilant to the possible influx of refugees from North Korea in the case of a sudden collapse of North Korea. As a result, Japan feels a strong need to maintain the ability to forecast sudden changes in North Korea, while it pursues the maintenance of relations with the country in order to cope effectively during contingencies.
     Third, Japan thinks that it can reach a solution through the improvement of relations with North Korea. For Japan, normalization of diplomatic relations with North Korea along with the Kuril Islands question are the only unsolved war-related issues.9) Besides, Japan has to solve the problem of collecting unpaid trade loans from North Korea and the unrestricted visits of Japanese spouses of North Korean citizens. Japan must bring about improvement of relations with North Korea in order to pursue an active foreign policy toward Asia.
     Considering these facts, it is expected that Japan will reopen its door to North Korea in the long run, and ultimately normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea.The normalization negotiations, however, will not resume soon, however, since recent incidents dampened possibilities of diplomatic normalization:
     First, the suspicion of abduction of Japanese women by North Korean agents froze incurred the wrath of the Japanese people. The abduction case came to light when Kim Hyun-hee, the terrorist who planted a bomb on a KAL passenger plane, confessed that her Japanese language instructor Lee Eun-hye was a Japanese woman who had been abducted by North Korea agents. Making the situation worse it was recently reported that another Japanese woman, Megumi Yokoda had been abducted by North Korean agents.10)
     Spurred on by the news, the families of abducted persons as well as Diet members formed organizations to address the issue. The former premier, Hashimoto insisted that North Korea respond to questions concerning the abduction. North Korea attempted to calm the situation by allowing the visit by Japanese spouses, but Japan did not alter its position. On June 5, 1998, North Korea reluctantly reported that after investigatons, it had not found any such person. Hashimoto angrily refused to accept this, and relations between the two countries became even worse. Thereafter, the Japanese government stated that there could be no progress in improving relations with North Korea unless North Korea showed sincerity concerning the abduction issue.
     Second, worries about the bellicose attitude of North Korea are increasing, with the Japanese government worrying over nuclear development in North Korea. Despite the signing of the Geneva agreement, Japan is still suspicions about North Korea's resumption of nuclear development. Furthermore, Japan feels a severe threat to its security following the missile launch. As it is well known, the North Korean rocket and satellite development began in the mid-1970s with the help of Soviet technology under the direct supervision of Kim Jung-il.11) It has produced and sold copies of the Soviet SCUD-B missile with a range of approximately 300 kilometers for a one-ton payload, and subsequently built the SCUD-C with a range of 500 kilometers with a 7-kilogram payload, capable of reaching the entire Korean peninsula. At the time, Japan felt no great security threat. Subsequently, North Korea developed the Rodong missile with a range of 1,000~1,300 kilometers with a one-ton payload and once test-fired in may 1993 after achieving only 500 kilometers of flying distance. At this juncture, Japan began to seriously regard North Korean missile development.
     When North Korea launched a three-stage rocket with a range of 1,700 kilometers which flew over northern Japan, it was seen as the most critical breach of security since World War II. The success of the missile launch meant that North Korea had the capability to target all of Japan, including Okinawa. The suspicions that North Korea was also constructing underground nuclear facilities at Kumchangri at the time compounded Japan's shock, and served as a dramatic reminder of its military vulnerability.
     Third, the domestic politico-economic situation of Japan acts as a prohibitive factor regarding its access to North Korea. Clearly, Japan has experienced political unrest since the collapse of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in 1993. Since then, Japanese political parties have repeatedly met and separated to form a coalition government. For now, the Liberal Democratic Party has succeeded in forming a single government after winning the election of the Lower House, but it worries about the collapse of its popular support. A sign of this was revealed when they lost the election of the House of Councillors in July 1998. The Liberal Democratic Party formed a coalition government with the Liberal Party, led by Ichiro Ozawa, to hold a majority in the Upper House. It is doubtful whether such a weak coalition government can take a resolute stance to solve difficult diplomatic problems such as normalization of relations with North Korea. There is no leading figure in Japanese politics who can exert leadership to improve the relations with North Korea, quite a different situation from that of the early 1990s. With no one willing to take the political risk by stepping forward to take the role once taken by Kanemaru or Watanabe, Japanese statesmen are assuming a very passive attitude toward promoting improvements in relations with North Korea.12) It is also unlikely that the incumbent premier Obuchi can show diplomatic leadership to improve the relations with North Korea. Under these circumstances, the initiative in dealing with North Korea is in the hands of bureaucrats, mainly of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The bureaucrats, however, are not only passive about resuming the negotiations with North Korea but they are also sticking to the law, making it even more difficult to improve relations with North Korea.
     Another factor that prohibits Japan from improving relations with North Korea is the serious economic crisis. Japan, faced with the worst economic slump since World War II, compounded by the collapse of its financial system, is concentrating its energies on economic issues. The Obuchi cabinet, which has set the solution of the economic crisis as its priority, is sparing no effort in this direction, and under the circumstances, improving relations with North Korea is far from being a major political concern. Furthermore, Japan feels a financial burden to aid North Korea in the course of normalizing relations with it. That is to say, joining KEDO support and grain aid to North Korea could be a economic burden to Japan right now. What worries Japan more is about the claims for compensation, stemming from the 1910-45 Japanese colonial rule, issues that will reemerge when diplomatic normalization is achieved.



THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF JAPANESE POLICY

     Given the situation, it is expected that Japanese foreign policy toward North Korea will proceed cautiously, and it is clear that Japan will not take any concrete steps to resume negotiations for the time being. On the contrary, Japan will try to put diplomatic pressure on North Korea, at the same time, pursuing development of deterrent power against it. For a while, Japan will be angry over the missile incident, symbolic of the North Korea's unacceptable brinkmanship diplomacy aimed at prolonging its regime and its disregard of Japan and other neighboring countries. It will take resolute measures in dealing with Pyongyang so that it realizes Japan's influence.
     Under these circumstances, this article explores two major tasks to solve those problems. One points to a desirable Japanese foreign policy toward North Korea, and the other suggests what should be done to make Japan follow that policy direction. Before answering this, the aims of South Korean foreign policy toward North Korea should be reexamined first. the Kim Dae-jung administration initiated the engagement policy, aimed at putting North Korea on the path of openness, reform and inter-Korean reconciliation. The Seoul government has repeatedly said it would push forward with its "sunshine policy" of stepped-up business, cultural and personal contacts with North Korea, while postponing unification until some time in the distant future.
     The Kim Dae-jung administration announced some major tasks for solving the military threat based by North Korea, and for lasting peace on the Korean peninsula. The first was to eliminate the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula. In this context, South Korea strongly demanded the improvement and normalizations of Pyongyang's relations with Washington and Tokyo.13) The joint declaration of Korea and Japan, adopted during President Kim Dae-jung's visit to Japan in October 1998, stated that Japan would heartily support the sunshine policy of South Korea and return to the KEDO program. This could be a good chance for Tokyo to revamp its foreign policy toward Pyongyang with the support of South Korea. Kim Dae-jung administration further suggests a comprehensive package deal aimed at solving such problems at the same time as the North Korean nuclear and missile development program, lifting the economic sanctions imposed on North Korea, and securing the North Korean regime. It goes without saying that this comprehensive package may include the unsolved issues between Japan and North Korea.
     As long as South Korea has limited means to deal with North Korea, the influence of Japanese foreign policy toward North Korea can be negligible in no way. Hence, the South should encourage Japanese foreign policy to move more toward North Korea, in line with its engagement policy. In the long run, the improvement of Japan's relations with North Korea and achieving the diplomatic normalization may induce two positive results such as the following:14)
     First, Japan's normalization of diplomatic ties with North Korea could bring about the "cross recognition" of the two Koreas by the four major powers, thus inducing North Korea to join the international community. Normalization of relations with North Korea, either by the U.S. or by Japan, will decisively contribute to eliminating the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula. It will lead North Korea to alter its hard-line policy toward South Korea, and will put it on the path to openness, reform and inter-Korean reconciliation. And this could improve the transparency of North Korea, so that its behavior is more predictable. Considering the fact that peaceful reunification requires peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas, the cross recognition of the two Koreas by the four powers is unavoidable.
     Second, the improvement of relations between Japan and North Korea will induce Japanese investment in North Korea. It is expected that when diplomatic normalization is achieved, about $5~10 billion will be provided as compensation for North Korea's damage claims resulting from colonial rule. The Japanese funds could be used to rebuild the infrastructure of North Korea which is in danger of total collapse. Above all, it could play an important role in restraining North Korea from a sudden collapse. In the long run, the Japanese capital will have a positive influence on the process of peaceful reunification led by South Korea, by reducing unification expenses.
     Considering this, South Korea should try to encourage Japan to resume negotiations leading to improved and normalized relations with North Korea. For now, South Korea should do everything possible to temper the hard-line policy of Japan, and to gain its support and cooperation for the success of the KEDO program and the four-party talks.
     If diplomatic normalization can't be achieved for the time being, Japan should try to enhance and strengthen diplomatic channels, at least for communication. The most serious problem for Japan regarding its policy toward North Korea is the distortion of communication caused by the lack of proper dialogue channels. It is vital that Japan try to build a direct line of communication with North Korea. If Japanese public sentiment prohibits the resumption of negotiations with North Korea, a separate contact channel should be put in place.15) In this context, Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi's proposal to participate in the missile talks between the U.S. and North Korea and to hold the six-party dialogue among the concerned countries needs to be examined positively.
     It is desirable for Japan to solve its problems with North Korea through diplomatic negotiations, even though it may be costly. For Japan, $10 billion is not a high price to pay for stopping the North Korea's nuclear development. When Tokyo decides to renew diplomatic negotiations, the North may alternate between threats and signs of flexibility in order to reap more benefits from Japan. Yet if Japan were to refuse negotiations altogether, it could face direct military threat and the intensification of tensions. Therefore Japan can regard the negotiations with North Korea as security expenses.


CONCLUSION

     The aims of the Japanese government during the two years of negotiations (1990~1992) were to normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea by settling war-related issues. After talks broke off in November 1992, the primary concern of Japan was to solve the suspicion of nuclear development programs of North Korea. After the announcement of the Geneva Agreed Framework in October 1994, the Japanese policy toward North Korea changed again, primarily in response to the possibility of sudden collapse of North Korea and its serious food shortage. During that period, Japan donated grain to North Korea on humanitarian grounds.
     The situation took a rapid turn, however, with information of the suspected abduction of Japanese girl by North Korean agents. Japan changed its policy line and stated that it would not resume negotiations on normalization of relations with North Korea unless it seriously addressed the issues. To make matters worse, North Korea launched a Taepodong missile in August 1998. Thus, pivotal policies of Japan toward North Korea have centered around retaliation against North Korean threats. Until now, Tokyo has been unable to suggest any progressive policy toward North Korea because of the negative public sentiment of its people toward Pyongyang.
     Judging from this, it can be said that the Japanese policy toward North Korea was a passive adaptation to circumstances rather than a proactive policy according to principles and consistent aims.16) It is also clear that Japan had no choice but to adapt itself to circumstances without any long-term strategy because of the unexpected actions of its counterpart, North Korea.
     At the summit meeting with South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, Japanese premier, Keizo Obuchi, stated that Japan would pursue the principle of discussion and deterrence as its foreign policy toward North Korea, which is interpreted as meaning that Japan is showing willingness to resume the negotiations with North Korea, in line with the "sunshine policy" of South Korea. Recent Japanese policy toward North Korea was concentrated on deterrent measures such as a review of the defense guidelines, enacting related laws, the import of a reconnaissance satellite, and beginning joint development of TMD programs, a policy that further froze the relations between the two countries, caused resistance from China, and exacerbated the political situation of Northeast Asia.
     In Japan's dealings with North Korea, deterrence and negotiations are inseparable, and the most effective deterrence is deterrence through negotiation. A deterrent policy without discussion and negotiations can only escalate the conflict and confrontation. It is clear that if Japan's policy direction, exclusively defense-oriented since the end of World War II, takes a militaristic turn under the pretext of a North Korean threat, it could reap unfortunate results.
     It is desirable that Japanese foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula be promoted under the principle of contributing to the peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula. Japan should return to its original stance, that is, to settle war-related issues through normalization negotiations.17) The improvement and normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea will surely contribute to easing the tension in Northeast Asia, as well as to encouraging inter-Korean reconciliation. In this regard, Japan's active role in the establishment of a peaceful Asia is more needed than ever.
     The new South Korea-Japan Partnership for the 21st Century has already made invaluable progress toward the promotion of mutual cooperation and friendship between the two countries. Once all its programs are successfully implemented, a new chapter in the history of Korea-Japan relations will be written; one which promises to benefit posterity for generations to come.
  1. Regarding the relations between North Korea and Japan before Kanemaru' visit, see, Masao Okonogi, Japan and North Korea: 5years from now (PHP, 1991).
  2. Regarding the two year negotiations between Japan and North Korea and their attitude toward the four major agenda discussed in it. See, Choi Sang-yong, Lee Won-duk, and Lee Myun-woo, Issues on Korea-Japan Relations after the Cold War (Seoul: Chipmoondang, 1998), pp. 188-201.
  3. The Liberal Democratic Party, the Social Democratic Party of Japan, the New Party Sakigake (Shinto Sakigake) and the Workers¤£Party of (North) Korea jointly announced the following agreement: "We will try to actively promote the normalization of diplomatic relations by resuming talks without any preconditions."
  4. It is reported that the two visits by Japanese spouses of North Korean citizens had a negative effect because Japanese spouses consistently praised the Kim Jong-il and the North Korean regime, and exaggerated their satisfaction with North Korea.
  5. Lee Won-duck, "The Launch of Taepodong Missile and the Foreign Policy of Japan Toward North Korea," Foreign Relations, Korean Council on Foreign Relations , January 1999.
  6. At a press conference after the ROK-Japan summit meeting, Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi stated that Japan would lend its full support to the "sunshine policy" of engagement with the North. But he also stated that Japan could take a progressive posture toward the North only if North Korea stopped its aggressive actions such as the missile launches.
  7. Choi Sang-yong et al., op. cit., pp. 216-217.
  8. See Lee Won-duck and Jin Chang-soo, Japan's Role and the Security of Northeast Asia (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1998).
  9. In Japan, some individuals claim that Japan should settle war-related issues by normalizing diplomatic relations with North Korea. Those are politicians from the Japanese Socialist Party, progressive intelligentsia and artists. They claim that the main agenda of normalization talks is to liquidate the unfortunate past of the colonial rule over the Korean peninsula. About this, see, A Group Claiming the Improvement of Chosun Policy, Japanese policy on North Korea (Iwanami Publishing Co., 1989), or Tsuyoshi Yamamoto "The Focus of the Diplomatic Normalization between Japan and North Korea: Was Colonial Rule Legitimate?" Sekai, November 1991.
  10. In February 1997, the suspicious abduction by North Korean agents was amplified when defecting North Korean agent said that a Japanese girl called Yokoda, who had been disappeared on a Niigata beach in 1977, was kidnapped by North Korean agents.
  11. The launch led the Japanese government to take hard line toward North Korea; to freeze negotiations, to normalize diplomatic relations, to delay signing for KEDO support, to cease food and economic aid, and to end flights to Pyongyang by canceling cargo flight. And Japan also plans to bring the case to the UN Security Council to appeal its hard line policy toward North Korea.
  12. Considering Japanese diplomatic history after World War II, it is clear that prominent politicians had played decisive roles in solving the difficult diplomatic problems like improving relations with North Korea by bringing the conservative line of the Foreign Ministry under their control. Some notable examples are as follows: the role of the former premier Ichiro Hatoyama in normalizing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the role of former premier Kakuei Tanaka in normalizing diplomatic relations with China, and the role of the former premier Eisaku Sato in recovering Okinawa from the U.S.
  13. The Kim Young-sam administration, which reiterated the principle of harmony and simultaneous progress, opposed the improvement of Pyongyang's relations with Washington and Tokyo without the improvement of Seoul's relations with Pyongyang. Japan also showed a negative attitude toward approaching North Korea, pointing to South Korea's demands as an excuse.
  14. Choi Sang-yong et al., op. cit., pp. 221-227.
  15. izumi hazime, "The Day North Korea Explodes," Sekai , February 1999, pp. 272-273.
  16. The passive attitude of Japanese foreign policy was already pointed out by many scholars. See, Kent E Calder, "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State," World Politics Vol. 40, July 1988; Wada Haruki "Decision-Making of Japanese Diplomacy: Beyond the Empty Political Culture," Asution , January 1990.
  17. Wata Haruki, "The Way of Preventing North Korea's Contingencies," Sekai , April 1999, pp. 99-101.