Volume 11 Number 2 Summer 1999
The Rising Role of Russia in Settling a Peace
on the Korean Peninsula
INTRODUCTION
Russia's weakened clout concerning diplomatic and security matters in Northeast Asia has created opportunities for expanded roles for the U.S., China, Japan, and the two Koreas. This is evident in the fact that Russia was not included in the multilateral negotiations proposed for dealing with North Korean nuclear development and the replacement of the current Korean Armistice Agreement with a new peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula. Subsequently, Russia's sense of isolation forced it to alter its policies vis-a-vis Northeast Asia, the result of which was to pursue equi-distance diplomacy toward the two Koreas after the summer of 1994.
Presently, it is uncertain what impact Russia's altered position will exert on the existing inter-Korean relations and the settlement of peace there. It is, however, certain that Russia will maintain high interest in the Korean peninsula because of its geographical and strategic significance. North Korea is now showing many symptoms of political instability and social unrest. This being so, there is also no doubt that once Russia improves relations with North Korea, once an ally, it is very likely to play a significant role in bringing about a change in the political dynamics on the Korean peninsula. In addition, we should note that although Russia's pending interests in the Korean peninsula are compatible with those of the U.S., China, and Japan in some respects, it is not the case in other respects. This, too, indicates that Russia will influence the political future of the Korean peninsula to a significant degree.
A new political order has not yet gained a foothold in Northeast Asia with the end of the Cold War. However, it is quite possible that the Kim Dae-jung government's engagement policy, known as the sunshine policy, and corresponding policies of the U.S. and Japan vis-a-vis North Korea will soon develop into "cross-recognition" by the surrounding four powers. Such a new development would contribute to eliminating the uncertainty and instability that have thus far characterized the political climate in Northeast Asia. On the other hand, cross-recognition would also allow North Korea to expand its diplomatic scope and thereby tighten the competition between South and North Korea. South Korea's establishment of diplomatic relations with its four neighboring countries is geared primarily to cementing national security and reunification. Given this, the mission of South Korean diplomacy is to maximize national security and economic interests while not allowing any of the four neighboring countries to become a force opposing reunification.
In recent years, Russia has succeeded in its step-forward policy into the Asian-Pacific region. In 1996 Russia struck a deal with China to establish a strategic partnership; in 1997, in Krasnoyarsk, it agreed with Japan to sign a peace treaty no later than the year 2000 and to gradually resolve the Kuril Islands issue; and in March 1999 it improved relations with North Korea by finally ironing out a preliminary agreement on the "North Korea-Russia Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation."1) It should be noted once again that North Korea is eager to improve relations with the U.S., while Russia has lost much of its capacity to exercise influence over North Korea. Taking this into consideration, in the short run it appears that Russia's balanced distance policy would not cause trouble to South Korea's reunification diplomacy and its relations with Russia. In the long run, however, newly-improved relations between Russia and North Korea might play a negative role in the process of reunification of the two Koreas. This is not to deny that the political circumstances and nature of South-North Korean relations at the time of reunification will largely shape whatever role Russia plays in the process.
Since his inauguration last February, President Kim Dae-jung's policy toward North Korea has been dramatically different from that of his predecessors. The sunshine policy is aimed at laying down the foundation of peaceful reunification while maintaining defense forces strong enough to contain North Korean military aggression under the principle of separating business from politics. The success of the Kim Dae-jung government's engagement policy hinges on improved relations between South and North Korea, which must result most directly from changes in North Korea's policies vis-a-vis South Korea. But it also requires either support for the policy from the four neighboring countries or from their policies designed to induce North Korea to alter its current posture toward the South.
Considering the importance of foreign influence on the future of the Korean peninsula, this paper reviews the history of Russia's policies toward the Korean peninsula, addressing as well the impact on South Korean policies toward North Korea, including the Kim Dae-jung government's engagement policy.
THE OBJECTIVES AND RECENT CHANGES
The Objectives of Russian Policy toward the Korean Peninsula
For several years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia had concentrated on the areas and issues that had direct bearing on its national security. Accordingly, the Yeltsin government made diplomatic efforts on the one hand to settle the Chechen conflict, the expansion of NATO, and regional conflicts within the territory of the former Soviet Union, while it strived on the other, to secure foreign aid in order to cope with the economic crisis and to transform its economic system into a market-economy. As a result, Northeast Asia received little diplomatic-security attention from Russia. This also has something to do with Russian leader's appraisals of the importance of security in Northeast Asia, including the Korean peninsula at that time. Unlike leaders of other countries, Russian leaders did not view Northeast Asia as relatively unstable. Nor did they consider instability on the Korean peninsula as a direct threat to their vital security interests.2)
Since early 1993, however, Russia has shown keen interest in the Asian-Pacific region in response to changes in international political circumstances. Many factors contributed to the new direction of Russian foreign policy, for example, the international spotlight on the North Korean nuclear issue; Russian leaders's disappointment with Europe-centered foreign policy outcomes and their perception of themselves as Eurasians who needed to pursue a omnidirectional foreign policy in an attempt to restore their super power status; and the need for economic cooperation with Asian-Pacific countries.
In the case of Northeast Asia, Russia intends to form a new order by establishing bilateral or multilateral relations with countries within that region, while simultaneously retaining the level of traditional influence there. With this intention, Russia has set forth four specific objectives in its foreign policy with respect to Northeast Asia: to prevent the U.S. from becoming the dominant presence in Northeast Asia; to keep in check competition between China and Japan over Northeast Asian hegemony; to contribute to the settlement of peace on the Korean peninsula; and to develop the Far Eastern and Siberian regions through economic cooperation with Northeast Asian countries, and eventually incorporating the Russian economy in the Asian-Pacific economic area.
Russia had limited success in attaining these goals. First of all, it wields much less military and economic muscle than did the Soviet Union, and second, pragmatism focused on pursuing tangible profits, i.e., realism, rather than ideological considerations of the past, is now setting the tone of interaction between countries within Northeast Asia. Moreover, the Far Eastern and Siberian regions are far from Moscow, the center of Russian politics, and they are disadvantaged in terms of climatic conditions and infrastructures, including transportation and communication facilities. Even though Russia has recently improved relations with China, its relations with Japan are still tenuous because the issue of the Kurils is dragging on. The U.S., which does not want to see Russia expand its influence over Northeast Asia, also provides a reason for the limited success of Russia in reaching its foreign policy goals in the region. North Korea is also concentrating its diplomatic efforts on the U.S. while frustrating Russia's desire to involve itself in issues on the Korean peninsula.
In conclusion, the Yeltsin government was forced to adopt a passive policy toward Northeast Asia, for a variety of domestic and international reasons, for example, economic disorder, an incomplete political transition from the old communist system, weakened military prowess, and a new political climate in Northeast Asia following the collapse of the Soviet Union. As shown in Russia's efforts to improve relations with China, Japan, and North Korea, however, the Yeltsin government has recently altered its course of action, trying to intervene in Korean peninsula matters and to actively expand its influence over Northeast Asia.
To narrow the focus to the Korean peninsula, what are the objectives of Russia's policy toward this region? Russia established the primary goal of its policy toward the Korean peninsula as maintaining its vested rights and stability there. With this primary goal in mind, Russia has pursued the equidistance policy toward South and North Korea and the policy of a balance of power between the US, China, and Japan on the Korean peninsula. To be specific, Russia's major concerns in regard to the Korean peninsula include: (a) establishing a nuclear-free zone; (b) maintaining peace and stability by eliminating military and political confrontation; (c) supporting direct dialogue between South and North Korea for the purpose of building up the foundation of peaceful reunification; (d) forming mutually beneficial economic relations; (e) maintaining a power balance with the other three neighboring countries; (f) and cooperating with both South and North Korea in the international community.3) We now turn to the process through which Russia's policy toward the Korean peninsula has evolved into the current one based on the major concerns specified above.
South Korea-centered Policy and Its Evolution Process
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Yeltsin government inherited Mikhail Gorbachev's South Korea-centered policy toward the Korean peninsula. The fact that Boris Yeltsin followed in Gorbachev's footsteps is based on perceptions of South and North Korea, which can be summarized as follows.4)
First, Russia considers South Korea an important country, believed to be now a leading economic development nation in the Northeast Asia and Asian-Pacific regions; it evaluates South Korea as having great economic potential, and estimates that after reunification with North Korea, it could emulate other economic powers in Europe and Asia.
Second, Russia believes that South Korea and Russia would be mutually beneficial, in that, besides their geographical proximity, they could complement each other's economic and industrial structures. This being the case, Russia expects South Korea to be able to help usher it into membership in the Asian-Pacific economic arena, as well as to contribute to its economic development. On the other hand, Russia holds a positive view about the possibility of economic cooperation with North Korea. More importantly, Russia believes that it could eventually develop bilateral economic cooperation with North Korea into multilateral economic cooperation with the inclusion of South Korea as an additional participant.
Third, Russia would like the Korean peninsula to remain peaceful and stabilized, and free of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, Russia wants to establish an international system, whose participants include the U.S., China, Japan, South and North Korea along with Russia, in order to secure cooperation and dialogues that will serve to maintain peace and stability and a nuclear-free status on the Korean peninsula. In addition, Russia views the issue of reunifica-tion between South and North Korea as a matter to be resolved by the two concerned parties only; it also supports a peaceful reunifi-cation through dialogue.
Fourth, Russia believes that the South Korean experience of economic development provides a model for its own economic transformation and democratization. It further hopes that as its transition progresses and deepens, it will share with South Korea more commonalities, increasing mutually beneficial interaction in various areas.
The above perceptions have led to a rapid improvement in relations between the two sides, despite nearly 100 years of diplomatic estrangement. A brief review will clarify the current status of South Korea-Russia relations.
South Korea normalized relations with Russia on September 30, 1990. Shortly after, President Roh Tae-woo made a trip to Russia (December 1990) and President Gorbachev responded by visiting Korea in April 1991. Both presidents' efforts to improve relations were followed by ministerial-level exchanges of visits between the two countries: Ruslan Khasbulatov, chairman of Soviet (December 1991), Andrei Kozyrev, Foreign Minister (May 1992), Aleksander Shokhin, Deputy Prime Minister (May 1992), Lee Jin-sam, Health and Youth Minister (May 1992), and Lee Sang-ok, Foreign Minister (June 1992).
In November 1992, President Yeltsin made a state visit to South Korea and signed the "Treaty on Basic Relations between the Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation" with President Roh. Exchange of the treaty's ratification instrument in July 1993 marked the beginning of a new phase in relations between the two countries, i.e., laying down a legal and institutional foundation. It was a significant advance over the initial action of mere establishment of political relations.
Yet, South Korea-Russia relations came to a halt for a while, partly because the expectations of each country were quite different, and partly because both countries were in a transitional period of domestic political development. Over time, however, both countries became increasingly aware of the need to develop a friendly cooperative partnership. A variety of issues contributed to this awareness: for example, North Korean nuclear weapons development; legal status of the Korean community and North Korean loggers in Russia; scientific and technological cooperation; mutually complementary economic cooperation and exchange of accumulated expertise. Aware of the need to realize stronger relations, in June 1994, President Kim Young-sam paid a visit to Moscow and agreed with Yeltsin to develop a "constructive and complementary partnership" between the two countries.
Both South Korea and Russia have tried to put the 1994 agreement into action. For example, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, who came to Seoul in September 1995 to celebrate the fifth anniversary of diplomatic normalization between South Korea and Russia, struck a deal with the South Korean government to accelerate participation in the Sakhalin gas development projects and to promote stronger scientific and technological cooperation. Two months earlier, South Korea had accepted Russia's proposal that it would repay its economic cooperation loan with goods such as defense equipment at its earliest convenience. In July 1997, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny M. Primakov visited South Korea, and the first session of the Korea-Russia Joint Committee for Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation on the deputy prime ministerial level was held in Seoul.
In general, however, South Korea and Russia have failed to live up to the words of their agreement concerning their relationship of "friendly cooperation." There have been no summit conferences between them for the past five years and economic cooperation has fallen far short of expectations. It may be also recalled that both countries expelled diplomats in July 1998. The lull in relations between the two countries is attributed to ongoing domestic or international political circumstances. That is, South Korea discarded its Russia-centered foreign policy in response to the North Korean nuclear weapons development and abolition of the armistice agreement. On the Russian side, Yeltsin's health problems and the resulting disarray in his administration posed a barrier to any significant progress toward a substantial partnership between Seoul and Moscow.
Consolidating a Friendly Posture toward North Korea
North Korea-Russia relations turned sour after Gorbachev's reform policy and diplomatic normalization between South Korea and Russia. Relations between North Korea and Russia deteriorated further when North Korea announced official support for the coup in Russia, staged by hard-line conservatives in August 1991. To add fuel to the fire, Russia also participated in the international cooperative efforts to solve the North Korean nuclear problem.
The North Korean leadership was concerned about Russian reform policy for democratization and transformation of the economic system into a market-economy, for it could cause political instability within North Korea by encouraging dissident activities there. North Korean leaders were also worried about a possible scenario in which anti-communist Russian factions would build an anti-North Korean front together with South Korea, the U.S., and Japan. After Russia discontinued economic assistance, anti-Russian sentiment became more firmly entrenched within the North Korean leadership as economic conditions grew worse.
Russia's decision to stop supplying North Korea with defense equipment and technologies spoiled the country's plan to build up its military strength, compelling it to move toward nuclear weapons development. Russia-North Korea relations hit bottom in early 1992. Russia was eager to improve relations with South Korea, and consquently, it closed all channels to North Korea. In spring 1992 Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev announced plans to suspend all military cooperation with North Korea in order to pressure it into giving up its nuclear weapons development plan. Moreover, President Yeltsin made it clear that the "Kreaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance," signed between North Korea and the former Soviet Union in 1961, was, de facto nullified.
The Yeltsin government allowed North Korean loggers to defect to South Korea, emphasizing the point by successfully insisting on inclusion of a provision regarding North Korean loggers' human rights in the renewed "forestry development agreement." In addition, it pressed North Korea for repayment of $3.5 billion dollars in loans. Regarding trade, it refused to purchase North Korean products, saying they were "poor quality." Furthermore, the Yeltsin government arrested scientists and technicians, on their way to Pyongyang to assist in North Korean weapons development. To add insult to injury, Russia took the lead in uncovering details of Kim Il-sung's early life and handed over the Korean War-related documents to South Korea.
North Korea responded to Moscow's antagonism in kind. As time passed, however, North Korea realized that it was necessary to maintain some degree of cooperation with Russia because of its economic and military dependence. When North Korea adopted a conciliatory policy toward Russia, it was also considering the possibility that pro-North Korean communists might once again assume power after the heated confrontation between conservative and progressive groups in Russia. In the summer of 1994, Russia initiated the balanced diplomacy toward South and North Korea, resulting in resumption of normal diplomatic relations with the North.
A review of the history of relations between Russia and North Korea will be presented in more detail. Before South Korea-Russia diplomatic normalization, North Korea was allied with Russia according to the 1961 treaty. Immediately before and after Gorbachev's ascendency to the presidency, Kim Il-sung made two trips to Moscow (May 1984 and October 1986). In return, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze visited Pyongyang. In those days, the two countries maintained close cooperation in many areas as indicated by a series of agreement reached between them: a border agreement (April 1985), a nuclear power plant construction agreement (December 1985), and a fishery cooperation agreement (May 1987).
However, diplomatic normalization between South Korea and Russia shifted Russia-North Korea relations from that of an ideological nature to the one based on economic and political considerations. Because of deterioration of Russia-North Korea relations, there wasn't a single exchange visit by a ministerial-level official until the end of 1995. In the case of Russia, in 1992 Foreign Deputy Minister Igor Rogachev visited Pyongyang, expressing a desire to maintain neighborly relations, and stressing mutually beneficial cooperation.
When Russia emerged as a new nation, it continued to maintain military cooperation with North Korea to some extent, as indicated by a March 1992 visit to Pyongyang by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Commander in Chief Vladimir Samsonov. Military cooperation between the two sides has been brought to a halt, however, Russia's participation in an international move to abort North Korean nuclear weapons development as well its upgrade of military cooperation with South Korea.
The situation was no different in the area of economic cooperation. In 1991, Russia modified trade relations with North Korea requiring cash payment based on international market prices, a move in stark contrast to the previous friendly prices and the barter system. This change rapidly aggravated economic cooperation with North Korea. As a consequence, the 1991 trade volume plummeted from $25.6 billion to $0.47 billion.5) Reductions in trade volume continued in subsequent years: $0.29 billion in 1992, $0.23 billion in 1993, $0.14 billion in 1994, and $0.1 billion in 1995.6)
Recently, Russia-North Korea relations are being gradually restored, with Russia deciding to pursue its balanced distance policy on the Korean peninsula. To cite an example, Yeltsin sent telegrams on Kim Il-sung's death and on the anniversary day of the establishment of North Korean regime, stating that "improved relations are in the interest of the two countries and they are crucial in keeping stability on the Korean peninsula." Russia also dispatched foreign deputy minister Alexsandr Panov to Pyongyang, to discuss various issues for normalizing relations with North Korea. Some news agencies reported that the talks were largely concerned with military cooperation. On the other hand, North Korea invited Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the head of the Liberal Democratic Party of RussiaÇô far right nationalist party, to Pyongyang from September 30 to October 4, 1994. In those meetings Zhirinovsky hinted that he might establish a cooperative relationship between his party and the Workers' Party of North Korea.
Since 1996, Russia has increased its efforts to improve relations with North Korea. Various factors can explain this: the emergence of conservative and nationalist sentiments in Russian foreign policy, and Russia's worry about dwindling influence over Northeast Asia due to the expanded leverage of the U.S. and Japan over North Korea. In fact, Yeltsin sent Deputy Foreign Minister Alexandr Panov and Vice Premier Vitaly Ignatenko to Pyongyang in April 1996. There, Panov and Ignatneko held the "Russia-North Korea Joint Committee for Economic, Scientific, and technological Cooperation," with North Korean counterparts for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. They also made diplomatic efforts to reduce tension on the Korean peninsula that augmented as a result of North Korean violating armistice agreement. At the same time, Russia promised to provide North Korea with large-scale economic assistance. If the agreement is honored, it would be the first of its kind since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Russia and North Korea met in Moscow in October 1997 for the second session of the Joint Committee for Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation. In March 1999, Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin travelled to Pyongyang for the preliminary signing of a new accord, which is expected to be concluded by Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov in Pyongyang in May of this year.
North Korea's move to ally itself with Russia is hastened by global events as well. The recent NATO bombing of Yugoslavia coupled with Japan's increased defense spending and a strengthened military alliance with the U.S. have posed a threat to North Korea, prompting it to expedite improvement of North Korea-Russian relations.
TOWARD NORTH KOREA
As mentioned earlier, the Kim Dae-jung government has pursued an engagement policy based on three fundamental principles toward North Korea. His government has chosen to provide economic assistance to help the country to pull itself together, while at the same time, steadfastly refusing to accept military provocation from North Korea. Placing conciliation ahead of containment is intended to induce North Korea to reform and to open itself and to eventually create a basis of peaceful reunification. To this end, Seoul has set forth a comprehensive package regarding policy toward North Korea. The guidelines include: (a) to take measures for elevating the level of mutual trust; (b) to increase exchanges and cooperation between South and North Koreas; (c) to control an arms race between the two Koreas and to induce North Korea to pledge to relinquish development, production, disposition, and exportation of weapons of mass destruction; (d) to help the U.S. and Japan normalize relations with North Korea; (e) to support lifting of U.S. economic sanctions against North Korea and to encourage the U.S. economic assistance to North Korea; (f) to transform the current armistice agreement into a peace regime for peaceful coexistence. These issues are now being addressed at the four-party talks, and a bilateral missile conference between Washing-ton and Pyongyang is also in progress. In addition, Seoul has already made overtures to North Korea for a direct bilateral dialogue.7)
Russia enthusiastically supports the Kim Dae-jung government's engagement policy. Below, Russia's position on the major issues concerning South Korea's policies toward North Korea is surveyed.
Reunification and Peaceful Coexistence
The engagement policy, stressing separation of politics and the economy, is aimed at preventing an abrupt collapse of North Korea by nurturing an environment conducive to the reform of North Korea, and it is designed to eventually convince North Korea of the merits of peaceful coexistence on the Korean peninsula. In Russia's opinion, the abrupt collapse of the Kim Jung-il regime would harm to stability in Northeast Asia; thus, it does not want to see rapid change in the political dynamics on the Korean peninsula. It hopes that South and North Korea work out political and economic matters, such as reunification, the South-North exchange, and promotion of cooperation, through bilateral dialogues.
In contrast, however, Russia insists that military and security matters, such as building a peaceful environment on the Korean peninsula should be resolved at a multi-party international conference. Since the matter has significant implications for security in the region, it maintains that all countries having a stake in Northeast Asia should take part. Based on this argument, Russia expressed strong dissatisfaction when the presidents of South Korea and the U.S. excluded it from the "four-party talks" proposal.
Citing the underlying principle of the four-party talks proposal, that inter-Korean issues must be solved between the two Koreas themselves, South Korea attempted to persuade Russia to lend its support. As a result, in July 1997, the Russian foreign minister released a joint statement with his South Korean counterpart in Seoul, stating "We hope that the four-party talks will succeed and will contribute to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula."8) Nonetheless, Russia still holds the view that all the concerned parties should be involved in addressing the issue of stability and peace in Northeast Asia, including the Korean peninsula.
In contrast, South Korea believes that the proposed four-party talks should stick to the "principle of direct negotiations between the concerned parties." With respect to the role of Russia, South Korea proposed that Russia would be invited to play the role of a guarantor, together with Japan, once the four-party talks succeeds in ironing out an agreement on the establishment of the peace regime on the Korean peninsula.9)
North Korean Nuclear Development and Participation in KEDO
Holding fast to the policy of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, South Korea has made every diplomatic and economic effort to prevent North Korea from developing weapons of mass destruction including nuclear weapons. Russia, too, has opposed the North Korean nuclear development, arguing that it should abide by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It now advances a view that an international conference should be held in order to address the issue of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. Russia has also sought to exert influence on the resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem by taking advantage of the experience of its previous nuclear cooperation with North Korea. Indeed, Russia provided assistance in efforts of the international community to abort North Korean nuclear development and in spring 1994, it proposed the "eight-party dialogue" for settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue.10)
After many complications, an agreement between the U.S. and North Korea on nuclear development was reached on October 21, 1994. Russia warmly embraced the agreement and vigorously marketed the Russian-designed light-water reactor (LWR) model.11)
On the other hand, South Korea recognized that LWR assistance to North Korea would be a solution to the North Korean nuclear problem, a form of the South-North exchange, and a basic industrial facility that would be used long after reunification. With this in mind, South Korea enthusiastically moved to support LWR assist-ance to North Korea; it also chose its own type of LWR, based on the principle of "only those who bear expenses should play a role." The project of South Korean-model LWR assistance had made satisfactory progress until recently, when North Korea launched a missile or an artificial satellite, and Washington and Tokyo responded with stricter sanctions. However, South Korea is well aware that the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) project holds special significance because of its symbolic ramifications in terms of the South-North exchange and the opening of North Korea. Thus, South Korea holds the position that the LWR assistance through KEDO should continue. To promote this position, South Korea is, if necessary, willing to convince the U.S. and Japan that the KEDO project is a way to freeze the North Korean nuclear development.
While Russia has declared its intentions to cooperate with KEDO, it is not anxious to participate. It has also made it clear that when it cooperates with KEDO, it will provide technical assistance and other expertise acquired through its past nuclear cooperation with North Korea, but will not share the costs for the KEDO project. And Russia's intention with respect to KEDO is now favorably welcomed by South Korea.
Russia-North Korea Basic Friendly Relations Treaty
After diplomatic normalization with Russia, South Korea repeatedly requested Russia to abrogate its "Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance" of 1961 with North Korea. Russia decided to honor the request, given the changing international political circumstances and the reality of its relations with both South and North Korea. In August 1995, Russia notified North Korea that it would replace the 1961 treaty with another. Since then, the treaty has remained inoperative.
In September 1995, Russia proposed a new "Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation." After several years of negotiations, the two countries finally concluded an agreement in March 1999. Unexpected delays in reaching the agreement were caused by North Korea's insistence on inclusion in the treaty of the phrase "Russia supports the Unification Plan of Koryo Confederate Republic." North Korea's pressure on Russia to stop selling weapons to South Korea has also contributed to the prolonged negotiation process.
While South Korea considers establishment of friendly and cooperative relations between Moscow and Pyongyang to be desirable for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, it had hoped that the 1999 treaty between Russia and North Korea would be a general prescription for maintaining diplomatic relations, that is, something similar to the 1992 South Korea-Russia Basic Relations Treaty. As such, South Korea did not want the new Russia-North Korea treaty to include a provision concerning "consultation" between the two countries when national security of either country is in danger, nor did it want a pledge of Russia¤£ support for Koryo Confederate Republic. The contents of the new treaty in their entirety have not been made public; but it is known that the treaty does indeed include the "consultation" provision.
Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia
South Korea has strongly supported the creation of a multi-party organization for security cooperation and multilateral security dialogues for peace and stability in Northeast Asia. For example, President Roh Tae-woo proposed the "Six-Country Cooperative Organization for Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia" when he addressed the UN General Assembly in 1988 and 1992. In May 1993, President Kim Young-sam also proposed establishing a multilateral organization for security cooperation in Northeast Asia, which would resemble the "Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe" on a small scale. In May 1994, President Kim Young-sam addressed ASEAN Regional Forum Senior Official Meeting (ARF-SOM) to propose the "Northeast Asia Security Dialogue" whose participants would include all six Northeast Asian countries.
Since the Brezhnev era, Russia has promoted the idea of a collective security system in Asia, including Northeast Asia. In a speech in the National Assembly during his visit to South Korea in November 1992, President Yeltsin highlighted the need to install a multi-party dialogue mechanism in Northeast Asia. Specifically, he proposed an "Asia-Pacific Region Conflict Prevention Center" and an "Asia-Pacific Center for the Study of Strategic Problems" in order to better manage crises in the region. Former Defense Minister Pavel Grachev also proposed establishing a "Northeast Asia Multilateral Security Cooperation" in April 1994 and May 1995.12)
Russia has given steady support to the existing pro-multiparty internationalism for the purpose of maintaining its influence over Northeast Asia and rationalizing its intervention in the security matters in that region. The Kim Dae-jung government, too, is likely to keep pursuing multi-party internationalism such as the four-party talks, in order to settle the Korean peninsula issue. The idea of the "Six-Country Joint Declaration" for peace and stability in Northeast Asia, which surfaced following the inauguration of the Kim Dae-jung government, could very well be realized in time. Russia has given a warm reception to the Kim Dae-jung government's idea for a "Six-Country Joint Declaration."
The Kim Dae-jung government's engagement policy cannot be successful without a change in North Korea's policies toward both South Korea and the international community, especially the neighboring four countries.' As discussed earlier, Russia's policies toward the Korean peninsula mesh well with the engagement policy. Specifically, South Korea should spare no diplomatic effort to keep intact the current policies of Russia toward the Korean peninsula. President Kim Dae-jung's visit to Russia, scheduled for the end of May this year, will provide an excellent opportunity to solidify Russia's support and cooperation for his administration's engagement policy.
President Kim Dae-jung maintained as early as the early 1970s that stability and peace on the Korean peninsula and peaceful reunification were contingent largely upon the cooperation of the four neighboring countries, and that, South Korea should seek diplomatic and security cooperation with them. His visit to Russia, which will complete the rounds of summit diplomacy with four nations started last June, will be a huge stride toward friendly relations with Russia. The two countries have already agreed to settle the issues between them in a mutually beneficial way. In addition, they want to jointly promote such common interests as a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia, expansion of economic cooperation, and cooperation in international organization activities, among others.
As mentioned earlier, Russia has pursued the balanced distance policies toward South and North Korea for the past several years in an effort to restore friendly and cooperative relations with North Korea. The new treaty between Russia and North Korea is expected to contribute to stability on the Korean peninsula and to play a positive role in inducing North Korea to reform and open itself.
Despite its balanced distance policies toward the two Koreas, Russia is currently leaning more toward South Korea, a position that will not change unless the Communist Party wins the Russian Federal Assembly election in December of this year, and the presidential election next June. Nonetheless, it is possible that South Korea-Russia relations could turn sour if an unforeseen diplomatic conflict arises. In fact, experts and government officials present differing views as to the future relations between the two countries. Based on these uncertainties, South Korea should do its best to strengthen cooperative relations with Russia. To this end, the Kim Dae-jung government needs to pay heed to the following points.
First, it should not respond nervously to Moscow's attempt to improve relations with Pyongyang, Seoul needs to deepen its close cooperation in various areas with Russia to encourage its continued lean toward South Korea. Second, South Korea must induce Russia to play a positive role in the peace settlement on the Korean peninsula and the reunification process. Since Russia believes that a unified Korea will not harm its national interests, it is more supportive of reunification than any of the other powers. Third, South Korea should grant more gravity to relations with Russia than it has in the past, in order to secure a balance in relations with its neighbors. Fourth, South Korea needs to actively assist Russia with its transformation to a market-oriented economy. Such a transform-ation in Russia will be conducive to Russia-North Korea economic cooperation as well as to South Korea-Russia economic cooperation. Fifth, the South Korean government should do its best to resolve pending issues in relations with Russia as soon as possible. There are several ongoing issues between the two countries, including the North Korean nuclear issue, the four-party talks, repayment of economic cooperation loans, exchange and compensation for the previous Russian embassy site, South Korea's lack of respect for Russia relative to other neighboring countries, to name a few.
Since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1884, with the exception of the Cold War period, Russia has been very friendly to South Korea. Given the current situation, Russia feels that it has been unfairly treated by South Korea. The Kim Dae-jung government must realize that this Russian perception will not serve South Korean national interests and that Seoul should begin as soon as possible to resolve at least some of these issues in the spirit of mutual benefit. Then, the two countries can begin to develop a genuine friendship.
- The existing North Korea-Russia treaty expired in September 1995. During negotiations to renew the treaty, North Korea demanded that Russia's support of its inter-Korean unification formula, and its pledge of automatic military intervention in emergencies on the Korean peninsula be included in the treaty. Although the request was turned down, the two countries agreed to launch consultations in the event of a military situation on the peninsula.
- Alexander G.
Savelyev, "Russia as a North-East Asian Country: Economics over
Security," in UNIDIR News Letter (No. 35, 36), The Korean Peninsula:
Today and Tomorrow (Geneva: United Nations, 1984), p. 14.
- Yevgeniy V.
Afanasyev, "Russia's Security and Economic Interests in the Asia and
Pacific Region," A paper presented at the Institute of Foreign Affairs
and National Security, January 1996; Georgui F. Kunaze, "Russia's Policy
toward the Korean Peninsula after Abrogating North Korea -Russia
Treaty," Korea Forum (December 1995), pp. 5-8; M.L. Titarenko, "Koreiskii Poluostov I Bezopasnost'b SVA: Vzgliad iz Rossii," A paper presented at the first South Korea-Russia Forum (October 17-18, 1995, Seoul).
- "Kontseptsiia Vneshnei Rossiiskoi Federatsii,"
Diplomaticheskii Vesnik (February 1993), pp. 3-23; M.L.
Titarenko, "Korean Peninsula in the System of Russia's National
Interest," Sino-Soviet Affairs , 18:4 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 57-66.
- Kim Bu-ki,
"Russia's North Korea Policy," East Asian Review , 7:1 (Spring 1998), p. 53.
- V. Yakubovsky, "Economic Relation Between Russia and North Korea: Problems and Perspectives," A paper presented at the seminar (May 3, 1995) sponsored by the Asia-Pacific Research Center.
- Park Sang-sik, "Dismantling of the Cold War Structure on the Korean Peninsula and Cooperation in Northeast Asia," A paper presented at the conference for Regional Cooperation in Northeast Asia and Peace on the Korean peninsula (April 16, 1999), sponsored jointly by the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security and the Center for East Asian Studies, Cheju University.
- "Russian-Korean Joint Statement" (Seoul: The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, July 24, 1997); for the Russian
reference, see Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik (Moscow, August 1997), No 8, pp. 17-18.
- Ko Jae-nam, "Russia's policies toward the Korean peninsula and the six-party conference," A paper presented at the special academic conference (June 20, 1998) sponsored by the Korean Association for Slavic Studies.
- Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik , No 7-8 (April 1994, pp. 29-30.)
- For the
details of the U.S. and Russia negotiations for the North Korean nuclear
problem, see Yoon Duk-min, Prospects for Nuclear Negotiations with
North Korea (Seoul: Haere Publishing Co., 1995).
- Andrei Kortunov, "Russian Perspectives and Policies," A paper presented for the International Conference on the Korean peninsula and the Northeast Asian Security, organized by the Institute of foreign Affairs and National Security, November 26-27, 1996 , p.11.