Volume 11 Number 2 Summer 1999 |
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THE OBJECTIVES OF THE ENGAGEMENT POLICY |
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From the outset of his administration, President Kim Dae-jung has consistently been driving to implement an engagement policy toward North Korea, incorporating three major principles: First, the government will never tolerate any armed provocation by the North that may threaten peace on the Korean peninsula. Secondly, the administration has no desire to harm North Korea nor to absorb it unilaterally. Thirdly, Seoul will do its best to promote inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation. The effectiveness of the engagement policy has been debated both at home and abroad; however, it has been taking shape as the most practical and rational policy to guarantee peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and to improve inter-Korean relations, given the current situation on the Korean peninsula and the post-Cold War world atmosphere. Assurance of Peace on the Korean Peninsula The engagement policy toward North Korea, commonly known as the "sunshine policy," consists of three goals. First, it aims to firmly secure peace and security on the Korean peninsula. The unstable peace still prevails over the Korean peninsula. The inter-Korean military confrontation along the 155 mile-long demilitarized zone (DMZ) consistently causes military tension. It is noteworthy that the Cold War still remains there, despite general improvements in the global post-Cold War mood. Thus, the inter-Korean gap caused by the remnants of the Cold War structure has threatened not only the stability of the Korean peninsula, but that of all of Northeast Asia. In addition, North Korea's self-imposed isolation has worked against peace and stability in Northeast Asia and the Korean peninsula. The assurance of peace on the Korean peninsula is extremely crucial to the safety and prosperity of the entire world, including Northeast Asia. If military tensions continue to increase, it could potentially trigger devastating arms races which will likely increase tensions in the entire region of Northeast Asia. Thus, the assurance of peace is the primary goal of Koreans and of the people in neighboring countries. At this juncture, the South Korean government has firmly set as the first and foremost principle of its foreign policy that no armed provocation by North Korea will be tolerated. It has also, exerted its best efforts to create a peace-keeping mechanism on the peninsula. It has not only established a self-sufficient security system and further strengthened the ROK-US joint defense system to deter North Korea, but has also prepared itself for emergencies while maintaining deterrent over North Korea. Moreover, the South Korea is geared to replace the current armistice system with a consolidated peace regime on the Korean peninsula. As part of its efforts, South Korea is now participating in the four-party talks among the two Koreas, the U.S., and China. Because of the consistent efforts made by the South Korean government to prevent war, to strengthen the state of peace on the Korean peninsula, and to further cooperation with the international community, North Korea could eventually abandon its notion of reunification by force and agree to continue the dialogues with the South for inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation. When and only when it gives up attempts to seek forceful unification, can the Kim Dae-jung administration engagement policy successfully bear fruit. Thus, the assurance of peace on the Korean peninsula should be a top foreign policy priority. Reconciliation and Cooperation The second goal of the engagement policy is to build a conciliatory relationship and to reduce hostility, by way of bilateral exchanges and cooperation based on assured peace. This, however, raises some concerns. The first and long-term issue is the necessity to establish a practical foundation for peace and security on the Korean peninsula. The meaningful and long-lasting peace and security on the peninsula can hardly be achieved as long as there is hostility. It can be realized only when there is mutual trust, cooperation and interdependence. In other words, Seoul should be able to fully convince Pyongyang that cooperation is much more beneficial than its deviant behavior. That is the reason why the South Korean government has persistently implemented inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation in spite of North Korea's occasional infiltrations and provocations. It is desirable to set the stage for reunification, while both sides pursue mutual benefits and national interests. In the post-Cold War era, each country has maximized its national interest by forming "partnerships" with other countries. There is no reason for South and North Korea to be hostile, since the people belong to one homogeneous race and culture. The time is ripe for both Koreas to establish a partnership through inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation based on assured peace, and to heal the painful memories stemming from the division of the country. Full implementation of the Basic Agreement, signed at the inter-Korean high-level talks in 1992, is the most effective short cut to achieving such a positive relationship. Promote Gradual Change The third goal is to create an environment to persuade North Korea to reform itself from within. If it continues its closed-door policy and self-imposed isolation as part of its confrontational policy toward South Korea, it will be very difficult to assure peace and security on the Korean peninsula and to bring about inter-Korean cooperative relations. Therefore, North Korea's reform from within is considered essential to breaking down the barriers to prosperity in Northeast Asian countries. North Korea has sustained its regime under the Cold War structure for a half-century. Based on the structure, it has been able to maintain the legitimacy, implementing hostile policies towards the U.S., Japan, and South Korea. However, the Cold War era shield, which had guaranteed its security, has ceased to exist. It no longer has a legitimate cause to demand unconditional loyalty from its people, or to force them to endure the suffering that severe economic difficulties have caused. Propped up by its Cold War mentality, North Korea has continued to maintain a closed-door policy and to strictly control its people in order to keep the current regime. Learning from the past experience of East Communist countries, it believes that reform and openness resulted in the collapse of the countries. The Pyongyang regime, for that reason alone, could not simply abandon its closed stance for survival, but felt compelled to continually show hostility towards South Korea, to waste its scarce resources on maintaining a huge military force and to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD), in spite of its economic collapse. Taking into account North Korea's current situation and the current international environment, the policies Pyongyang has opted for could not provide a permanent solution but have only jeopardized the regime. Recently, the country has suffered from economic difficulties owing to the accumulated errors of its socialist system. It is now in such a dire condition that it cannot even provide the simple necessities of life for its people. The North Korean economy, therefore, is in a vicious circle of economic deterioration, which cannot be corrected without outside help. Inducing North Korea to reform from within is a priority in resolving the inter-Korean issue. Considering North Korea's current attitude, however, coercion or pressure would only bring about a defensive reaction based on its anxiety about possible collapse. Thus, it seems more practical to create, first of all, an environment which can pave the way for the Pyongyang regime to engage in positive and constructive reforms. In order to obtain the expected results, the engagement policy must be a long-term commitment. As North Korea has existed for almost half a century, it would be unreasonable to expect any changes overnight. It is also irrational for South Korea to push for hasty realization of the result. Nevertheless, the two Koreas are on the verge of shifting away from conflictive and confrontational relations to conciliation and cooperation despite many complications, as a result of consistent implementation of the engagement policy during the past year. The Mt. Kumgang Tourism Project The Mt. Kumgang Tourism Project can be seen as the most successful exchange between the South and the North in almost 50 years. The opportunity to cross the DMZ, which has blocked inter-Korean exchanges for half a century, and to tour Mt. Kumgang has charged the emotions of South Koreans as well as those of people around the world. This could be the milestone marking a new direction in the conflictive and confrontational inter-Korean relations, mending 50 years of confrontation. Around 60 thousand tourists had gone to Mt. Kumgang by May 6, 1999, and it is estimated that the number of tourists will reach up to 200 thousand by the year end. The Mt. Kumgang project is a tangible outcome of Seoul's policy to promote inter-Korean economic cooperation, based on the principle of separating business from politics. The tour project is expected to contribute to improved relations and to lead Pyongyang to realize the necessity of cooperation. Furthermore, it will help North Korea to resolve its economic problems and mitigate its hostility toward the South. It is meaningful that the Mt. Kumgang tour is contributing to the reduction in tension and creating an atmosphere for reconciliation, ever in the midst of a crisis stemming from the suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumchang-ri. Inter-Korean Exchanges The engagement policy has also resulted in a drastic increase in inter-Korean exchanges. In 1998, 3,317 South Koreans, excluding Mt. Kumgang tourists, visited North Korea to discuss inter-Korean opportunities in the areas of economy, mass media, culture, and religion. This figure is highly significant as the average number of people visiting North Korea last year has increased ten-fold, when compared to the total number of 2,408 South Korean visitor during the past nine years from 1989 to 1997 who had visited North Korea as a result of the former president Roh Tae-woo's "July 7 declaration," announced just prior to the 1988 Seoul Olympics. The same trend has appeared this year as well. From the start of this year up to March 31, 638 South Korean citizens had visited North Korea which tripled, compared to 228 visitors during the same period last year. Reunion of Separated Families The issue of separated families should be immediately resolved because of the advanced age of those involved. Although the issue has not been fully resolved yet, the number of contacts made between those separated families through third countries has dramatically increased. In 1998, there were 377 cases in which confirmations on surviving family members were issued, and 108 meetings of separated family members were arranged, representing an increase of 230 percent and 170 percent respectively, compared to the figures in 1997. It is a huge improvement and a move in the right direction, considering that only 65 reunions of separated families were arranged through the inter-Korean home town visiting program held in 1985. (See, figure 1)
Inter-Korean Economic Exchange The South Korean government has promoted inter-Korean economic exchange based on the principle of separating politics from economic issues. It seems desirable since the exchange has been conducted under the auspices of the business sector, rather than for political reasons. Without any doubt, the inter-Korean economic relationship, including the Mt. Kumgang tourism project, has been successfully implemented owing to the consistent efforts of the South Korean government. The inter-Korean trade volume of $22.194 million in 1998, decreased by 28 percent from that of 1997, the result of worsened trade conditions, in turn caused primarily by the hike in exchange rates. Following China and Japan, South Korea became the third-biggest trade partner of North Korea. The number of items being traded totaled 486, compared to 293 items in 1996 and 414 in 1997. Inter-Korean trade, amounting to $35.24 million, for the months of January-February in 1999, showed an increase of 65.3 percent over the same period last year. Since the inauguration of the "Government of the People," 11 businesses have been approved for inter-Korean economic cooperation. Currently, a total of 41 firms have been granted "cooperation partnership" status and 15 of them have also been granted the "cooperation project" status. Still, they are in the early stages of implementation. The delay in carrying out economic cooperation has been due to unattractive conditions for investment in North Korea, their lack of willingness to be more open, defects in legal and institutional support for the investments, and a lack of infrastructure, such as direct shipping, transportation, and a telecommunication system.
Easing Tension There was noteworthy progress in the establishment of a peaceful environment on the Korean peninsula. The channel for dialogues to discuss maintaining the Korean Armistice Agreement, which came to a complete halt seven years ago, has resumed as general officer-level talks at the truce village of Panmunjom. Agreements on the creation and the operational procedures of two subcommittees on "the establishment of a peace structure" and on "tension reduction," were reached in the third and the fourth rounds of the four-party talks. The discussion of practical matters was completed during the 5th round, held in April, 1999. Changes in North Korea North Korea itself, has shown some positive signs of change. For instance, it has, on a limited basis, approved visits by South Korean journalists and has dealt positively with various inter-Korean cooperative businesses. Furthermore, North Korea adopted market economy concepts in the economic articles of its Constitutional Amendment of September 5, 1998. In addition, it has dispatched a number of officials from the economics field to Western countries to learn economics and business administration. The number of the officials sent overseas last year was estimated to be over 100 people. Prospects for Inter-Korean Relations Considering North Korea's pragmatic attitude and the auspicious international atmosphere, the prospects for inter-Korean relations appear fairly bright. First of all, the fact that the Kumchang-ri issue has been settled and other pending issues between Washington and Pyongyang seem to have been worked out, indicates a positive step toward a stable security environment. Moreover, the South Korean people, and also the four major countries responsible for the division of Korea, including the U.S., Japan, China, and Russia, are basically in support for the engagement policy. On the other hand, it is possible that North Korea may treat the inter-Korean relations with its same pragmatic attitude, shown during the process of negotiations with the U.S. Nevertheless, the South Korean government will move forward with its engagement, and yet, it will be fully prepared for future contingencies through close cooperation with the U.S. and Japan. Pyongyang authorities should be convinced that there is no other way but to accept inter-Korean direct talks to improve inter-Korean relations, and to give up its hostile policy toward South Korea. It should also show some tangible proof of its sincerity by addressing the separated family issue, and setting up a legal and regulatory mechanism to promote inter-Korean economic cooperation. The South Korean government is paying closer attention to the remarks about the resumption of high-level political talks made by North Korea on February 2, 1999, and expects that North Korea will agree to unconditional inter-Korean direct talks in the near future. Direction of the Engagement Policy Seoul has a plan to implement the engagement policy based on the three security-related principles which were emphasized by President Kim Dae-jung in a meeting of the National Security Council on January 4, 1999: Assurance of peace and security on the Korean peninsula; Achievement of reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea; And maintenance of international support and cooperative systems with other countries. Assurance of Peace and Security on the Korean Peninsula: Abolishment of the Cold War System on the Peninsula Through a Comprehensive Approach The South will act tough in the face of any North Korean provocation with a strengthened South Korea-US joint defense system, and will pursue peaceful resolution of inter-Korean problems including missile launches, based on the confidence earned through settlement of the Kumchang-ri issue. On the other hand, the South has taken a comprehensive approach to end the Cold-War structure and to establish a peace and security mechanism on the Korean peninsula with the close cooperation of other concerned countries. In order to end the Cold-War structure on the peninsula, the most realistic way for every concerned party is to undertake wide- ranging scale and comprehensive negotiations, thereby reaching an agreement, that includes full and proper implementation. All factors, comprising the Korean peninsula's Cold War structure, are closely related, therefore, settlement of only isolated issues will not bring about a fundamental solution, but only perpetuate an unproductive "provocation and compromise cycle." Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo have discussed a comprehensive approach in order to end the Cold War structure. The South Korean government recommends carrying out the following five measures: First, the relationship between the two Koreas must be improved. It is almost impossible to end the Cold War structure on the peninsula without efforts to transform the present hostile situation to conciliatory and cooperative relations. Second, it should put an end to its self-imposed isolation. It is especially important for the North Korean regime to normalize its relations with the U.S. and Japan, which hold an interest in peace and security on the Korean peninsula. Third, the North should establish cooperative relations with the outside world, participating with international organizations such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. However, it must first abandon its closed attitude and its Cold War mentality before it can establish cooperative relations with the international community. To this end, the South Korean government has consistently encouraged its international participation and has shown preparedness to aid Pyongyang with diplomatic support. In addition, Pyongyang should not only abandon the further development of WMD, but also participate in arms control on the peninsula. The continuous development of weapons of mass destruction and the substantial show of military force on both sides will hardly foster tension reduction or assure peace on the Korean peninsula. In particular, the development of WMD by North Korea should be stopped, since it could eventually lead to total destruction of both Koreas. Finally, the Korean Armistice Agreement must be transformed into a peace agreement. Only with the establishment of a legal and institutional mechanism can the present unstable armistice structure move toward a completely peaceful regime, thus bringing to a permanent end, the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula. To Achieve Inter-Korean Reconciliation: Multiple Steps Toward Engagement With a strengthened security stance, the South Korean government will maintain the engagement policy to consolidate reconciliation and cooperation and heighten North Korea's dependence on South Korea. As a first step, it will increase the chances for future inter-Korean exchanges and provide aid to North Korea, creating a favorable environment for reconciliation. Then there will be active efforts to resolve the separated family issue and to resume inter-government level talks. Simultaneously, the South Korean government will consistently expand future inter-Korean economic cooperation based on the principle of separating business from politics. It will focus on removing existing barriers which could potentially slow down the progress to inter-Korean economic cooperation. The following steps will be taken: South Korea will lend inter-Korean cooperative funds to South Korean small- and medium-sized "cooperative partners" suffering from a lack of capital, and expand inter-Korean business to the areas of agriculture and fisheries; it will endeavor to improve the inter-Korean transportation system including modernization of North Korea's port facilities; It will establish a legal and institutional mechanism, such as an investment guarantee agreement concluded through government-level talks, and a long-term project promoting direct trade, by way of an inter-connected transportation network and telecommunications between two Koreas. The South Korean government will more actively support the Mt. Kumgang project. It will emphasize not only personal security and convenience, but also create more tourism-related facilities and diversify tour attractions. Mindful of environmental issues, the South Korean government will discreetly and gradually implement the Mt. Kumgang tourism project. The South will provide food aid to North Korea to ease suffering from the food shortage, which is expected to continue to this year as well. The volume of food production in 1998 was estimated at 3.886 million tons, up by 11 percent from the previous year, but it is still short of 1.627 million tons of food this year, despite the 22% reduction in rations. In summary, there is a 600 thousand ton food shortage, over and above the aid from the international community. The food crisis in the North has been somewhat alleviated this year. Since the food shortage derived fundamentally from structural factors, the remedy is not simply timely food aid. Therefore, the South has decided to focus on agricultural development, including finding ways to increase of agricultural productivity. Moreover, the South will choose methods and aid items, depending on the degree of transparency and on a cost/benefit basis. In the case of government-sponsored aid, large-scale direct support will be more flexibly applied, provided on the consensus of the people, and based on the principle of reciprocity. Humanitarian support, on the other hand, will be provided with no reciprocal strings attached. First of all, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross decided to participate in the fertilizer delivery project, announced on March 11, 1999, and has raised money to buy and send fertilizers to North Korea. It will pay 18 billion won for buying and shipping 50 thousand tons of fertilizers. The Red Cross will also participate in the fifth appeal of the United Nations, but details regarding the time-frame and the scale of the donations will progress according to the development of inter-Korean relations, the international atmosphere, and domestic economic considerations in South Korea. The South is now reviewing its participation in the areas of health, medical service, and agricultural development. On another front, Seoul will activate privately-sponsored support. Various procedures and regulations related to inter-Korean exchange and cooperation were modified as of March 18, 1998 resulting in the following: the ceiling on investment in North Korea was lifted; the term of validity for stays in the North was extended to three years; and the multiple-entry permit system was broadened. Private organizations have gained approval to open their own channels on February 10. Five organizations, including the Korean Church Federation of Support for North Korea have currently opened their own channels. Seoul will attract aid for Pyongyang, based on inter-Korean economic cooperation such as for the mill industry. Under the principle that inter-Korean issues must be solved by the two Koreas themselves, the South has endeavored to hold inter-Korean dialogues through various channels. The Kim Dae-jung Administration's efforts to resume talks between South and North Korea resulted in working-level talks between the two Korean Red Cross societies, held in March 1998 in Beijing, along with inter-Korean government talks held from April 11 to 17, the same year. Three rounds of four party talks have been held since March 1998 in Geneva to discuss ways to maintain peace and security, and to alleviate tension on the peninsula. The inter-governmental talks are most crucial for normalization of inter-Korean relations. At the meeting in April, for the first time in three years and nine months, North Korea requested that the South donate fertilizer. In return, South Korea asked the North to take positive measures to relieve the suffering of separated families by setting up a Family Reunion Center. Seoul also proposed an exchange of special envoys with the North and urged Pyongyang to implement the "Basic Agreement" of 1992. The meeting ended without substantial results, due to North Korea's decision not to compromise on the issues of family reunion and improvement of inter-Korean relations. However, after the talks in Beijing, the government offered the "principle of reciprocity" and the "principle of separating business from politics" to the North, laying the groundwork for future inter-Korean dialogues. Another urgent task is the resolution of the separated family issue. The separated families are by far the worst victims of the division of Korea. The number affected totals nearly 7.67 million people, including the second and the third generations, as well as around 690 thousand people are over 60 years old, belonging to the first generation of the separated families. The South Korean government has given priority to resolving the separated family issue this year, and plans to mobilize every possible policy measure. Therefore, it is working to select the meeting place for the separated families, to obtain confirmation on whether the separated family members are alive or not, and to arrange exchanges of letters. Moreover, it will support private-level activities for inter-Korean exchange of the separated family through third neutral countries, and once a dialogue is resumed, Seoul will also work to establish a reunion center and a postal exchange center. COOPERATION AND SUPPORT No trace of the Cold War can be found anywhere in the world today. Thus, there is no reason for the Korean peninsula to be singled out as a buffer zone. The continuation of the Cold War on the Korean peninsula, and the threat to peace and security there, helps no one. In the 20th century alone, there were five major and minor conflicts surrounding the Korean peninsula, and the rest of world has been tremendously affected by their aftermath. The destabilization of the peace system on the Korean peninsula clearly threatens the security and prosperity of Northeast Asia, as well as the rest of world. We are on the verge of a new millenium. It is time for us to end the 20th century Cold-War legacy of animosity and confrontation, and to create a more peaceful and affluent community for all people. The resolution of the remaining the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula will certainly guarantee future prosperity and peace in East Asia. The engagement policy is the most rational and realistic measure to improve inter-Korean relations and to assure peace on the Korean peninsula, given the changing international environment and the worsening situation of North Korea. The persistent implementation of an engagement policy will bring about a successful outcome. The South Korean government will consistently promote the engagement policy toward North Korea in cooperation with other concerned countries, and will exert efforts to end the Cold-War system on the Korean peninsula through a comprehensive approach. The positive support and cooperation from other concerned countries, in addition to efforts by the two Koreas, are indispensable to achieving a positive outcome. It is hoped that the 21st century will open up an era of prosperity, through resolution of the inter-Korean issues: peace, reconciliation, and cooperation. |