Volume 11 Number 2 Summer 1999

 

In the National Interest:
Chinese Policy Toward the Two Koreas

Chang Kong-ja

INTRODUCTION
     Since the beginning of the 90s, Northeast Asian nations have undergone dramatic political changes. After the demise of the Soviet Union, China assumed the role as the world's sole communist superpower in the post-Cold War era. In August 1992, however, China normalized its diplomatic ties with its long-term ally's archrival, South Korea. China's normalization of diplomatic ties with the South served as a turning point in relations between China and North Korea. Moreover, China clarified its position in foreign relations that it would put national interests and national security before ideological similarity.1) In other words, the Chinese government would pursue its pragmatic diplomacy, eliminate the Cold War mindset in diplomatic activities, and discard socialist ideology as a key ingredient in diplomatic policy.2)




     In particular, during last year's summit meeting between Beijing and Seoul, China replaced the expression "blood-ties," long used to describe relations with North Korea, with the term "traditional cooperative friendship," while promoting the ties with South Korea as a "cooperative partnership for the 21st century." This move clearly showed that the Chinese government would emphasize pursuit of national interests over ideological alliance. However, China still maintains a close military ties with North Korea and plays a pivotal role in propping up the communist regime. Supporting the North Korean regime on one hand, China has set up a 'strategic partnership' with Russia, a 'friendly partnership' with the United States, and a 'cooperative partnership' with South Korea on the other.
     Nevertheless, Beijing is very critical of both the amendment of "the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation" and the construction of a Theater Missile Defense system spurred by North Korea's attempt to develop nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. China has been adamantly against the Japanese government's efforts to put a bill through the Diet to implement the Defense Guideline. This stipulates that a Self Defense Force (SDF) will mobilize its naval force on the high seas to assist the U.S. forces, should contingencies occur in the area, north of the Philippines, which includes not only Japan and the Korean peninsula but Taiwan. China is concerned that if the bill is passed, it will enable the Japan's Self Defense Force to actively participate in joint military operations with U.S. Forces. Though the role of the Defense Guidelines is US-Japan military cooperation to defend South Korea from a North Korean attack, until now, it has had to be satisfied with dispatching its units abroad for U.N. peacekeeping activities, but the expanded role of the SDF, would ultimately strengthen Tokyo's position in the region, thus bringing substantial changes to the military dynamics of Northeast Asia. China views the Guideline as a scheme to contain Chinese military power. At this point, the mistaken bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia has aggravated relations between China and the United States, and there is concern that these confilicts may undermine the South Korean government's reunification efforts.
     Northeast Asia is fraught with a number of destabilizing factors, including an unpredictable regime in North Korea, confrontation between China and Taiwan, and territorial disputes among the nations, making it increasingly difficult to forecast political and military developments. Therefore, many nations in the region are seeking to diversify dialogue channels, increase economic cooperation, and promote regional stability.
     A nation's foreign policy is affected by external situations that are subject to continuous change. However, the reaction to the changing situation differs from nation to nation, since each nation has different policy objectives and capabilities for implementing them. At the same time, each nation has its own view of the world, and that affects how they deal with the situation.
     Based on this, the paper will review how China views South and North Korea based on its worle outlook, and the Chinese reaction to Washington's strategy toward Northeast Asia. Then, it will address how the Chinese government has developed its policy toward the South and the North in the process of pursuing national interests. Finally, China's strategic objectives will be examined in connection with peace on the Korean peninsula and the cooperative measures with China to be proposed by the Korean government in the implementation of the engagement policy toward North Korea.

CHINA'S VIEW ON THE TWO KOREAS ON THE BASIS OF ITS WORLD VIEW


     Traditionally the Chinese have believed that their influence over neighboring nations is determined according to their cultural and geographical distance from the "Middle Kingdom." Therefore, such distance was a major factor in defining a neighboring nation's hierarchical position in the region. This belief produced the Chinese view on world order, which puts more emphasis on "concentric hierarchy" with China at the center as opposed a view respecting formal boundaries among nations.3) This view was adapted by Mao Zedong, who saw authority and geography as an important factor.
     Subsequently, besides 'Greater China' including the Chinese mainland and Taiwan, China sees nations with which China shares its border-namely, North Korea, Outer Mongolia, Myanmar, and India as critical to its security. Regarding neighboring nations as buffer states, China has made efforts to prevent other major powers from stationing their troops there. In addition, China attaches much importance to regions such as the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, East Asia, and Southwest Asia, for it has considered the nations in these regions as partners for national independence and economic development. Even though they maintain different political and social systems, nations are considered as China's friends, as they oppose the hegemony of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Also, China includes its enemies in other parallel concentric circles.4) Such a concentric world view has been continued by Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin as well as Mao. Even today, it serves as an integral part of foreign policy. Chinese relations with the two Koreas-that is, in pursuing its roles and national interests-are also based on the above-mentioned world view.
     The Chinese are confident that the Middle Kingdom will someday regain its past domain. Sometimes China cites moral aspects in negotiations with other nations, or takes a lenient attitude toward small nations that oppose hegemony of major powers but accepts the authority of China. At the same time, when the situation becomes unfavorable, China tends to regress into isolationism. Still it cherishes its traditional concentric world view. It thinks that it has right to intervene in the neighboring nation's affairs, while regarding intervention of other major powers in the region as outright aggression. The Korean War and the Vietnam War can be taken as prime examples of China's dual standards stemming from its concentric world view.
     China has spared no efforts in seeking a completely independent nation state and never permits any violation on its sovereignty. If the concept of the "Great China" is a sacrosanct constant to the Chinese, political systems such as democracy and communism are variables subject to continual changes when power is transferred from one regime to another. China has a set of objectives as a sovereign state. The first and foremost objective is to maintain national security and to pursue national interests. China focuses on a buildup of its defense capability through conventional and nuclear weaponry. For China, national interest not only includes intellectual superiority and material gains, but also counts on gaining advantages and avoiding disadvantages in the pursuit of national interests. Second, China aims at national unification. Recovery of territory China ceded to the Western powers through unfair treaties and the "liberation" of Taiwan constitute pillars of national unification policy. Third, China wants to regain its past dominant position over neighboring nations. It is China's goal that these nations establish governments which follow the Chinese system. If such a goal seems impossible in the near future, at least China will try to make the region a buffer zone.
     The Korean peninsula takes on the utmost importance in China's national security. Since the late 19th century, China has recognized the importance of Korea in preventing both Japanese aggression onto the mainland and Russia's attempts to push south. Therefore, China may well consider the Korean peninsula as a bulwark in defense of the mainland. This explains why China has forged close relations with North Korea for decades.

THE U.S. POLICY ON THE NORTHEAST ASIAN REGION AND
CHINA'S COUNTERMEASURES


     First, the United States seeks political stability and dissemination of democracy by containing the spread of communism and supporting democratic regimes in the region. On the economic front, while extolling the superiority of a market economy, the U.S. cites regional security in solving trade conflicts with nations in the region. At the same time, it pushes for market opening and trade liberalization in the region. Third, the U.S. is striving to keep military equilibrium in the region and to prevent any East Asian country from emerging as a regional power.5)
     Along with these three objectives, the U.S. has shifted the strategic focus from Europe to the Asia Pacific, highlighting the importance of Northeast Asia as the emerging dynamic region in the world. Also, considering the fact that China will emerge as the only superpower in the world able to hold the U.S. in check, Washington is not in a position to ignore the strategic importance of the region.
     The phenomenal economic growth of the Northeast Asian nations makes the region a bustling trade hub and an attractive investment target, yet, while all of the world's major powers are competing with one another in the region to ensure their own national interests, there is not a single regional security organization. In 1994 the U.S. exports to the region amounted to $ 150 billion, which translates into 28 million jobs for Americans. Considering such high stakes in the region, it is not surprising that the U.S. pays keen attention to the regional security and does not allow any nation to wield absolute power in the region.
     As the sole superpower in the world, the U.S. will play a role as a leading nation in the international community through active intervention in international affairs, while making the allies share the burden of such activities. The U.S. will use its economic power rather than military prowess in a bid to assume a predominant position in the Northeast Asian region. In July 1994, the Clinton Administration adopted "engagement" and "enlargement" as a principle of official national security strategy.6) The purpose of the move is to maintain a strong defense posture by means of strong military power, to encourage market opening for overall economic growth, to take a leadership in the global economy, to disseminate market-oriented economic system, and to help a democratic system take a firm root on foreign soil.
     The U.S. believes that economy and security are inseparable issues and that the nation's prosperity depends on its active engagement in international affairs.
     Along with the strategic viewpoint, the U.S. has felt it necessary to seek a new approach toward China, which realized rapid economic growth and political change through reform and opening to the outside. No doubt China has developed its own socialist market economy system of "No Right in Politics, No Left in Economy," which puts great emphasis on economic development, instead of political reform.7) The most important test of U.S. foreign policy may be how to integrate China with its peculiar economic system into the international community.
     A number of China observers predict that the nation with a vast landmass, 1.2 billion population, and a nuclear arsenal, will surpass the U.S. and Japan in gross national product in the future. As China is a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, and can veto any important issue, its understanding and cooperation is essential in dealing with international problems, especially the issues related with the Korean peninsula. In addition, China's role in the region takes on even greater importance when considering the following: Firstly, the U.S. is losing its control over Japan. Secondly, Russia, for its part, cannot afford to take care of North Korea. Finally, China and Japan are building up their military capacities.8) China and Japan believe that they did not play the role they deserved on the international stage during the Cold War era, owing to the confrontation between two superpowers-and they seem to feel that it is time for them to increase their influence in the political, economic, and military sectors.
     In his recent visit to Europe, President Jiang proposed the "New International Economic Order" including such principles as respect of national sovereignty, non-intervention in internal affairs, and peaceful solutions to international conflicts. And the Chinese government now strongly denounces the U.S. for adopting military intervention in order to solve the Kosovo crisis, and its justification of the use of fire power in maintaining world peace. Since the 90s, China has given ultimate priority to economic growth based on a socialist market economy and has promoted its image as a powerful nation by announcing a foreign policy centered on pragmatism and "peaceful coexistence through omnidirectional diplomacy."9) With this diplomatic strategy China was able to expand its domain by filling in the vacuum left by the shrinking influence of both the U.S. and Russia. In relations with Japan, China is paying keen attention to Japan's move to strengthen its political and military position in the region, while seeking cooperation from Japan in capital inducement and technology transfer.
     Washington is worried about the possibility that China will become a political and military superpower. The anxiety is reflected in the so-called theory on the "Chinese Military Threat" circulating among concerned American intellectuals.10) China is bound to clash with the U.S. in efforts to hold on to vested interests in the region, and now, China has become a major factor in shaping the future of Northeast Asia
     The United States is implementing a comprehensive engagement policy to protect its interests. In February 1995, the U.S. State Department announced in the East Asia Strategy Report that the U.S. will shift its existing China containment policy, but will continue to station a U.S. military force of 100,000 troops in the region for the time being.11) The Council on Foreign Relations also released a report suggesting that the U.S. government maintains the presence of U.S. forces in Asia, seen to be a hub of global economy in the next century, and proposed that the U.S. (a) establish an engagement policy with China, (b) strengthen its alliance with Japan, and (c) develop steps to lead North Korea to a soft-landing. Americans think that it serves the national interest to build a partnership with China and to accept it as a responsible member of the international community.
     The two nations have to cooperate to prevent the outbreak of war between the two Koreas, and to lead the North to a soft-landing. They must realize that peaceful reunification of the South and North serves both of their national interests. At the same time, growing economic interdependence necessitates harmonious relations between the two. However, communist China has so far challenged the U.S. It conducted a series of nuclear tests in accordance with its own strategic program. It supported the Stalinist regime in North Korea. Moreover, it exported missile parts to nations in the Middle East and South Asia, an action running counter to the non-proliferation guidelynes upheld by Washington. At last the two nations agreed to narrow down differences under the banner of "constructive strategic partnership" forged in a summit meeting in July 1997. The rapprochement between the two nations can be interpreted as a strategic move to prepare for the 21st century and to define the relations of the two superpowers in the future.
     However, disputes over hegemony in the region could jeopardize the ties between the U.S. and China at any moment. For example, the U.S. government has provoked China when it sought to improve relations with Russia, and has conducted a joint military exercise with the Russian army near the Chinese border. It also renewed diplomatic ties with its old foe, Vietnam and established an appeasement policy toward North Korea. When the U.S. went further, raising the issue over the human rights situation in China, and also providing weapons to Taiwan, China protested. It argued that the U.S. intervention in the Taiwan crisis is the repetition of the old policy used to contain the Soviet Union12) and it denounced the U.S. for "roaring like a lion" about human rights issues in the Tibet Autonomous Region while "squeaking like a mouse" about Yeltsin's attack on the Republic of Chechnya."13) As China links the issues regarding the two Koreas to dynamics between China and the U.S.,14) sour relations between the two major powers are detrimental to a solution on the Korean peninsula.
     As a countermeasure to the U.S. move to recover relations with nations in the region, China mended its fences with Russia by setting up a "strategic partnership" and it signed a treaty with five Central Asian nations (Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) once part of the former Soviet Union, with an aim to build up mutual trust in the military sector. At the same time, it also improved diplomatic ties with Vietnam. Regarding the two Koreas, it strengthened its alliance with North Korea and stressed "cooperative partnership for the 21st century" with the South. Furthermore, the Chinese government criticized "The US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security" and the "Defense Guideline" announced in September, 1997 as an outmoded mindset of the Cold War era, aimed at assuming a predominant position in Northeast Asia by strengthening security cooperation between the U.S. and Japan. it warned that such actions would complicate efforts to bring peace and prosperity in the region. China is loath to see the U.S. form political and economic network in the region. It believes, however, that both China and the U.S. must take part in forming the future of the region and it approaches issues in connection with the two Koreas according to the above-mentioned strategic framework.
     China is asserting that any diplomatic approach is meanless if it rules out China as a major player in the region and that the same must be applied to the establishment of peace regime on the Korean peninsula.15) While China is on the defensive in relations with the U.S., the mightiest nation in the world, it makes clear that it will not tolerate any attempt to include Taiwan in the Theater Missile Defense(TMD) project, calling it intervention. At the same time China strives to assume the voice of authority over the Korean peninsula which it regards as an integral part in its security.


CHINESE POLICY TOWARD THE TWO KOREAS AND ITS
RELATIONS WITH THEM


     Chinese policy toward the two Koreas can be characterized as "Sanfei" (the three worst scenarios) and "Sanbuyuan" (the three last things) China wants to see. The first three "worst scenarios" are the nuclearization of the Korean peninsula, the war between the two Koreas, and the collapse of North Korean regime. The three "last things" include close relations between the two Koreas and the U.S., competitions between the two Koreas and China, and consolidation of the two Koreas through nationalism. China is concerned that with the rapid improvement in US-North Korea relations, Beijing's influence over the Korean peninsula will be sharply curtailed. Therefore, it maintains that it will accept normalization of diplomatic ties between the U.S. and North Korea, only if China's interests and security are guaranteed.
     Up to the present, China has offered full support to the communist regime in North Korea, which it views as a buffer state.16) In addition, China regards any pressure or military threat toward the North as a serious challenge to its authority over the neighboring nation. History reminds us that China once announced its decision to participate in the Korean War, not because North Korea was a socialist state, but because it was a neighboring country.17) In this context, it has every reason to pay keen attention to North Korea's drive to improve relations with the U.S. and Japan. Certainly, it opposes absorption of the North by South Korea, let alone any attempt from the outside to spur the collapse of the North Korean regime. As the US-Japan defense guideline as well as a military alliance between South Korea, Japan and the United States could trigger significant changes on the Korean peninsula, China is keeping a close eye on developments in the region, which are sure to affect its strategy to deal with the international community18)
     Although China and North Korea are both socialist states, their definitions of socialism differ, as do their understandings of world order and their socialist systems. For pragmatic China, the world has changed. With nations working to achieve peace and economic prosperity in a new world order, war can no longer be used as a means to eliminate contradictions between incompatible systems. Ideology cannot serve as an absolute criterion to distinguish friends from foes. Imperialism is not an enemy of socialist nations.19)
     As long as peace is guaranteed, all nations on the planet, including developing nations, have a right to pursue economic development, improve the lives of their citizens, and build an excellent welfare system for their people. Likewise, for China, it is time "to pursue peace and prosperity."20)
     North Korea's paramount leader Kim Il-sung died on July 8, 1994, and was succeeded by his son, Kim Jong-il. The new leader's policy direction is embodied in his thesis titled "Socialism Is a Science," There, he argues that "traitors of socialism are now engaged in farcical efforts to reform socialist system. They have a fantasy about capitalism and their worship materialism and a market economy. They have knelt down before imperialists." This fiery criticism is obviously directed at China.21) Sometimes, the two socialist nations in the region have been at odds, while at other times, they have shown firm solidarity. They well know that they must cooperate in order to meet their needs and to survive. In the past, the two nations enjoyed a blood-ties alliance sharing an ideology and revolutionary tradition. Today, they are just friendly nations in pursuit of their national interests. However, this does not mean that China has become less important to North Korea. Therefore, it would be safe to say that the ties between the two states have "loosened," rather than "changed." As China adopted pragmatism and opened its doors to the outside world, it felt a need to change a number of the Marxist and Leninist principles.22)
     Thanks to such changes in China, South Korea was able to increase trade and economic activities as well as to boost personal and material exchanges with it, resulting in a new economic partnership. A number of Chinese leaders thought that it would serve the national interests to recognize Seoul as one of its major partners,23) and finally, the two nations established diplomatic ties on August 24, 1992.
     Since then, China has made it clear that it would reduce military assistance to North Korea and restrain from responding to requests from the North unless such requests were deemed necessary for defense of the communist state.24) At the same time, China announced a set of principles in formulating policy toward the two Koreas: China will not hold political or military meetings with North Korea; China does not want ideological conflicts to escalate tensions between the two Koreas; China supports a denuclearized Korean peninsula, thus opposing any nuclear experiments and import of weapons of mass destruction from the outside; China supports dialogues between the two Koreas to promote peaceful reunification; Friendly relations between China and South Korea will contribute to bringing peace in Asia.25)
     On the other hand, China declared that "it would consistently develop friendly and cooperative ties with North Korea" and it clarified that all treaties agreed with the North, including the treaty of Friendly Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, would remain valid in the future.26) In addition, at the unveiling of Korean War Victory Monument and War Museum in 1993,27)
     China reiterated its commitment to supporting the Kim Jung Il regime. In the meantime, Premier Li Peng, during his visit to Seoul on November 11, pledged to maintain an objective and impartial position in relations with the two Koreas and not to discriminate against either the South or the North on the basis of ideology or social system. This shows that China's policy toward North Korea has not been formulated in accordance with consistent principles or rules, but was designed to meet its changing diplomatic needs. It also indicates that as long as the two Koreas are feuding, it is hard to expect the current Chinese leadership to expand political and military relations with South Korea. And Beijing's decision-making process will not help in improvement of relations with Seoul, either.
     Unless armed conflict occurs on the peninsula, a divided Korea is beneficial to China. Therefore, China supports South Korea's sunshine policy and will, for the time being, maintain the status quo in its foreign policy regarding the two Koreas-expanding economic exchange and cooperation with South Korea without renouncing its political and military alliance with North Korea. It is ironical that the more China feels it necessary to strengthen its ties with South Korea, the more it will emphasize its relations with the North.
     There are some good examples of Chinese policy-making. In 1988, the Chinese government announced that "Five Principles for Peaceful Coexistence," which had been applied to nations with different socioeconomic systems, would be implemented in relations with socialist nations including North Korea. In another case, along with the U.S. and Japan, China urged North Korea to open its nuclear sites to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection. Likewise, China turned down the North's request made during Premier Li Peng's visit to Pyongyang in May 1991, to veto South Korea's admission to the U.N.28)
     In sum, China complies with Pyongyang's requests selectively in order to prevent North Korea from undermining stability in the region. Thus, Beijing will encourage permanent rivalry between the two competing regimes on the Korean peninsula, playing one against the other, in order to strengthen its own political position in the region.
     Therefore, the more South Korea requests that China put pressure on North Korea to abandon its ambition to develop nuclear weapons, the more influence China will have over matters regarding the two Koreas. As a consequence, it is China that benefits most from confrontation between the two Koreas. China supplies crude oil and grain to North Korea and acts as a patron of the North in the international community.29)
     It is important to note that, according to a report of the 8th National People's Congress, China will maintain close ties with the North, while developing cooperative relations with the South for mutual interests.30) Given this goal, it is no surprise that China shows little effort to defuse tensions on the Korean peninsula even though it could play a mediating role. It is expected that Beijing keep its will continue its current direction in the foreseeable future.
     For China, stability in the region is a precondition for sustainable economic growth and modernization. Its goal therefore, is to emphasize good neighborly relationships with nearby nations and to focus on pursuing mutual interests, regardless of ideological differences. Beijing has sought to establish diplomatic ties with the two Koreas simultaneously, in accordance with the "Five Principles for Peaceful Coexistence." 31)
     Competition between the U.S. and China over North Korea could be triggered by such factors as Washington's active and increased role in North Korea, Chinese efforts to increase strategic interests in the region, and deteriorating relations between the U.S. and China. Should China lose out to the U.S., it will be relegated to a weak position in the region or regress into isolationism.32) One aim of Beijing's omnidirectional diplomacy33) is with the help of Washington, to reduce the possibility of North Korea provoking armed conflict in the region, thus maintaining the status quo on the Korean peninsula. With peace and stability on the peninsula as the major foreign goal in the Northeast Asian region, the Chinese government has expressed concerns over nationalist movements burgeoning in its front areas.
     Beijing is making efforts to consolidate its control over the Tibet, Sinkiang-Uigur, and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and is concerned about the impact that collapse of the North Korean regime might have on this region. China is demanding that the North open its nuclear facility to an IAEA inspection team, and it is stressing non-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula in order to prevent Japan from arming itself with nuclear weapons. By wielding absolute influence over North Korea, it can secure a powerful position in Northeast Asia as well as on the Korean peninsula. Its ultimate foreign policy goal, therefore, is to stop the U.S. from wielding unchallenged hegemony in the region and to secure a position as a regional power, playing a vital role in the region. Beijing will not stand idly by and let its socialist ally on the Korean peninsula collapse or be absorbed by an other regime with a different ideology.
     As mentioned before, relations between the two communist allies are not always amicable and cooperative. On one hand, North Korea thinks that establishing a peace regime on the Korean peninsula is subject to negotiations between Pyongyang and Washington. However, China insists that even though South Korea is not a signatory of the Armistice Treaty of Korean War, as a major concerned party in connection with peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, Seoul has every reason to play a role during the process.34)
     Of late, China and North Korea seek to maintain comprehensive cooperative relations in their military sector. In particular, on the occasion of the 34th anniversary of conclusion of the Treaty of friendly Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, the two nations stressed development of cooperative ties and announced that they had no intention of abolishing what they regard as a military alliance treaty. It is safe to say that relations between the two states will remain unchanged for a while.
     All things considered, China does not want the dire economic situation to hasten the Pyongyang regime's collapse, since North Korea plays a significant geopolitical role in China's security. At the same time, China will encourage the communist regime in the North to open to the outside world and to integrate itself into global economic system for its economic survival. 35)
     Yet, China does not want reunification of the two Koreas because this would mean the createion of a democratic regime with different social and ideological system on the Korean peninsula. For China, abandoning pyongyang means abandoning its influential position over the Korean peninsula. Therefore, China will never act the idle spectator regarding the collapse of North Korea nor will it passively allow the U.S. to shape a new order in the region. Since it aspires to be treated as a major player in the region, its sterategy is simple. It will consistently work to keep the U.S. in check and to support North Korea as a strategic ally of China.

CONCLUSION: COOPERATIVE MEASURES BETWEEN
SOUTH KOREA AND CHINA


     China is sparing no efforts to achieve its policy objectives for the 90s. The major objectives include creating an environment conducive to reform and an open policy for modernization of the four major sectors, securing its position as a regional power in Northeast Asia, and unifying with Taiwan and regaining the territory it had to grant to Western powers in the past. For this to happen, peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula is an absolute precondition for China's security. At the same time, China has to show its full commitment for solidarity with nations that pursue the same goals of national independence and economic development. In order to achieve reunification, the Chinese government will not recognize the Kuomintang regime in Taiwan, which it regards as a renegade province. Such measures will inevitably lead China into a collision course with the U.S. However, based on its pragmatic foreign policy, China will avoid outright confrontation with the only superpower in the world. Rather, the two will cooperate on one hand and compete on the other.
     As China strives to improve its diplomatic ties with the U.S. and Japan, it is beginning to recognize the importance of South Korea. Beijing regards South Korea as China's potential partner in a united front against Russia and as an important foreign policy card to play against the U.S. and Japan. South Korea realizes that it needs the cooperation of neighboring countries in solving the North Korean nuclear issue and feels the need to expand its cooperation with China and Russia. At the same time, Seoul and Beijing share fears and anxiety over construction of the TMD in Japan. Taking into consideration the possibility that Beijing and Seoul can cooperate in holding the U.S. and Japan in check, the two should develop their relations in such a way that both can benefit from mutual cooperation in the security and foreign policy sectors.
     In Northeast Asia, the U.S. and Japan are emerging as major players with China and Russia separately exerting influence to counter hegemony of the two powers. Will the U.S. lose its hegemonic power in the future? Or, will Japan free itself from Washington's control and go its own way? Let us take another scenario. What if the U.S. and Japan agree to share hegemonic influence? That is, the U.S. will take charge of politics and the military sector while Japan wields influence over the regional economy. In this case, China may challenge this consensus. At this point, South Korea and China could work cooperatively in order to reduce the bloated economic power of Japan in the region. At the same time, China is anxious that collapse of the Stalinist regime in North Korea will have a negative impact on implementing its development strategy and thus, it supports South Korea's sunshine policy. It is important for South Korea and China to form cooperative ties which will ensure the stability and peace in the region.
     However, in settling North Korean problems, South Korea cannot count on China alone, nor can it expect Beijing to bring about changes in Pyongyang. Both South Korea and China want peace on the Korea peninsula. However, they have totally different approaches for achieving a lasting peace regime in Korea. China remained a passive onlooker when North Korea violated the armistice agreement and dispatched spy submarines into the South. It also failed to play an appropriate role during the four-party talks. It remains reluctant to put an end to the current armistice and to establish a peace regime on the peninsula. Therefore, South Korea should make consistent efforts to lead China into playing an active and constructive role to build cooperative ties with South Korea and maintain stability in the region.
     As matters stand now, overall Seoul-Beijing ties will show gradual development, progressing according to the dialogues between the two Koreas. At the same time, economic and human exchange between the two nations will keep increasing. China will accept unified Korea only if the two Koreas can achieve peaceful reunification without any external dominance by other hostile powers. However, should such hostile forces wield influence over the Korean peninsula, it will be tempted to use its military muscle to correct the imbalance in power. The Middle Kingdom still thinks that it has the responsibility to protect its border nations as well as itself, from hostile outside forces. With this in mind, South Korea should be very cautious in dealing with its immense neighbor. Seoul cannot afford to sacrifice its alliance with the U.S. and Japan to improve relations with China, and vice versa. South Korea should not try to put pressure on North Korea through China, either. At the same time, aggravated relations between Washington and Beijing will hamper peace not only on the Korean peninsula, but in all of Northeast Asia as well. As a nation that is divided into two hostile regimes and surrounded by major world powers, what would be the best way for South Korea to maximize its national interests and its diplomatic position? It is up to South Korea to make a correct and prudent choice.
  1. Renmin Ribao , December 17, 1998.
  2. Hsieh I-hsin, Theory and Principle of New Chinese Foreign Policy (Seoul: Asia Munhwasa, 1995), p.15; Chin Chiang-i, "China's Policy Toward Korean Reunification and the Two Korea's Foreign Policy for Reunification," Toward Peace and Reunification, National Reconciliation (Advisory Council on Democracy and Peaceful Unification, December 3, 1998), p. 120.
  3. J.K. Fairbank, "A Preliminary Framework," The Chinese World Order: Traditional Chinese Foreign Relations (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University press, 1968); Chang Kong-ja, "China's View on Reunification of the Korean Peninsula," Research on International Relations (International Relations Research Institute, Chungbuk University, 1996), Vol. 9.
  4. Joseph Camilliri, Chinese Foreign Policy; The Maoist Era and its Aftermath (Seattle: University of Washington Press), 1980.
  5. The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century , October 1998.
  6. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Overview of the United States , 1998, pp.73-74.
  7. Chang Kong-ja, op. cit.; Chang Chen-na, "PingTengHsiaopingTiNamHsun ChiangHua," (Comments on Deng Xiaoping's Tour of Southern Provinces), ChungKuoTaLuYenCuiu (Chinese Continent Research), May 1992, pp. 5-12.
  8. Samuel S. Kim, "China and the World in Theory and Practice," Samuel Kim ed., China and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-cold War Era (Westview Press, 1994), pp.3-41.
  9. James C. Hsiung, "China's Omnidirectional Diplomacy: Realignment to Cope with Monopolar U.S. Power," Asian Survey, 35:6, June 1995, pp. 573-586.; wenhui bao , March 24, 1994.
  10. Seo Jin-young, Modern Chinese Politics , (Seoul: Nanam Publishing Co., 1997), pp. 430-436.
  11. William J. Perry, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, Department of International Security Affairs, February 1995; Overview of the United States , pp. 73-74.
  12. the JoongAng Ilbo , June 11, 1995.
  13. the International Herald Tribune , August 16, 1995, April 13, 1993.
  14. Harry Harding, China and the U.S.: Dilemma of Hegemony (Seoul: Nanam Publishing Co., 1995); Chung Kyong-man and Park Won-kon, Development of the US-China Relationship and Security of the Korean Peninsula , Thesis June 96-1132 (Seoul: Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, 1996).
  15. Hsieh I-hsin, op. cit., p. 15.
  16. Chang Chien-hua and Chung Kuo-mien, LinTiWenTi (Critical Issues Concerning China), (Beijing: Chingchi Ribao, 1998), pp. 104-105.
  17. Takung bao, June 22, 1994.
  18. Chin Chiang-i, op. cit., p. 116.
  19. Hsieh I-hsin, op. cit., p. 15.
  20. Tien Tseng-pei ed., KaiKoKaiFangILaiTiChungKuo (Chinese Foreign Policy after Reform and Marketing Opening), (Beijing: Chingchi Ribao, 1993), p. 6-7.
  21. Rodong Shinmun , November 4, 1994.
  22. Shin Sang-jin, "Overview on Changes of Socialism in North Korea," a paper presented at the seminar sponsored by the Korea Association of World Region Research, April 2, 1999, p. 1-4.
  23. Chang Kong-ja, "China's Role in Improvement of Relations between South and North Korea," Sino-Soviet Affairs , 19:4, The Asia-Pacific Research Center, Hanyang University, 1995, p. 127-154.
  24. The International Herald Tribune , April 13, 1993.
  25. Vladimir S. Myasnikov, "China's Policy toward North Korea: First Steps of a New Policy Line," Sino-Soviet Affairs, Spring 1994, The Asia-Pacific Research Center, Hanyang University, pp. 100-102; Addresses by Li Peng to Foreign Ministry , February 1993.
  26. Renmin Ribao , August 24, 1992.
  27. FBIS-CHI-93-114, July 29, 1993.
  28. Korea Institute for National Unification, Environment for Reunification and Relations between South and North Korea : 1992-1993 (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 1992), p. 44.
  29. Shin Sang-jin, "Pyongyang-Beijing Relations and China's Policy Toward North Korea," Vantage Point , April 1999, p. 43.
  30. Renmin Ribao , March 31, 1993.
  31. The Five Principles Includes mutual respect for sovereignity and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/e/c/ec.htm)
  32. Park Du-bok, "South Korea-China Relations," The 6th South Korea-China International Seminar, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, 1997, p. 113.
  33. Wenhui bao , March 24, 1994.
  34. The Chosun Ilbo , October 31, 1994.
  35. Ahn In-hae, Research on Relations between North Korea and China in The Post-Cold War Era , Research Report 95-21 (Seoul: Korea Institute for Naional Unification, 1995), p. 87