Untitled

Volume 11 Number 1 Spring 1999

U.S. - North Korea Relations in the 1990s:
U.S. Foreign Policy Toward North Korea

INTRODUCTION

     In the 1990s, relations between the two Koreas have changed dramatically. South Korea's Nordpolitik (foreign policy toward countries that lie to the north of Korea), contributed to the signing of ROK-USSR and ROK-PRC treaties of amity, even though the USSR and China were allies of North Korea. Thus, South Korea's Nordpolitik was successful in inducing North Korea to join the United Nations with South Korea, and at the same time to sign "The Inter-Korean Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchange and Cooperation" (the Basic Agreement). Furthermore, it drove North Korea to sign the Geneva Agreed Framework proposed by the U.S. and made way for improving its relationship with Western countries including the U.S. and Japan. Even though North Korea abruptly discontinued the North-South Korea dialogues, resorting instead to leverage through its nuclear arms development, the changed relations between the two Koreas coupled with the end of the Cold War era have transformed the traditional dynamics of tension structure in the Korean peninsula. Once part of the Cold-War system, that structure is now confined to the two Koreas only. Moreover, the main source of tension, emanating from North Korea's Vietnam-type of reunification policy now stems from the development of weapons of mass destruction or the possibility of North Korea's collapse.
     The 1992 Democratic victory marked a turning point in U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea through its switch from containment to engagement. In October 1994, the Clinton administration signed the Geneva Agreed Framework through direct negotiations with North Korea under a crisis situation created by North Korea's nuclear arms development. The Agreed Framework reflects the U.S. engagement policy toward North Korea, which aims at resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and inducing the soft-landing of North Korea. That is to say, the Agreed Framework was to aid in bringing about the soft-landing of North Korea, through a treaty of amity, provision of economic cooperation, and energy resources, commensurate with North Korea's resolution of the nuclear issue and cooperation in North-South Korea dialogue. On the other hand, faced with preserving the regime, North Korea has used the threat of nuclear arms development to resist South Korea's efforts at reunification through absorption, as well as to threaten Washington.
     Rather than improving, the North Korean economic crisis has worsened. In the past, four years after the signing of the Geneva Agreed Framework, North Korea, contrary to U.S. expectations, has continued to develop weapons of mass destruction and to maintain its military regime, rather than addressing its structural problems under the 'Juche' system. Thus, military tensions have been heightened on the Korean peninsula, and U.S. public opinion has raised doubts about the effectiveness of the Clinton administration's engagement policy toward North Korea. In this study, the development of U.S.-North Korea relations in the 1990s, especially in terms of U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea will be reviewed, and the possibility of a change in U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea in light of the recent North Korean situation will be considered.

POLICY ORIENTATIONS OF THE U.S. AND OF NORTH KOREA

U.S. Foreign Policy Toward North Korea

     The U.S. has considered security and peace in the Korean peninsula as a critical factor for regional stabilization in Northeast Asia where the U.S. has a great interest. To that end, the U.S. implemented a foreign policy toward North Korea, aiming mainly at preventing North Korean military provocation, which greatly threatened peace and security on the Korean peninsula during the Cold-War era. The U.S. wants security and peace on the Korean peninsula, a geopolitical crossroads of interests of the U.S., Japan, China and Russia, because it fully recognizes the fact that the status quo in the Asian region, highly beneficial to the U.S., can be challenged by geopolitical conditions of the situation of the Korean peninsula exacerbates. If peace and security on the Korean peninsula were to be challenged, it would not only affect the complicated web of geopolitical interests of neighboring countries but would also destroy the status quo in the region. If an incident causing destabilization in the region were to occur, such as a war or the collapse of North Korea, the neighboring countries would react to the situation based on their own interests, thus destabilizing balance in the East Asian region. If the North Korean regime were to collapse, neighboring China would become engaged, fearing the negative influence on itself. On the other hand, the U.S. and Japan, as well as South Korea would consider China's engagement as an effort at expansion. Also, it is highly possible that Japan would pursue expansion of its own military power, faced with the unstable situation on the Korean peninsula. Such scenarios in this region would certainly be unfavorable for the national interest of the U.S. Therefore, the establishment of a security system in this region through enforcing stability on the Korean peninsula will be of great benefit to the U.S..
     Basic U.S. interests relating to security and peace in the Korean peninsula have not changed since the end of the Cold-War era. When we examine the recent U.S. foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula, we can easily assume that the U.S. has the following interests;

Prevention of another Korean war (resisting North Korean military provocation)
Prevention of a sudden collapse (hard-landing) of North Korea which could destroy regional stability
Seeking soft-landing of the North Korean regime
Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear arms and vallistic missiles
Reunification under liberal democracy and a market system
Prevention fo the establishment fo a hostile government against the U.S. after the reunification of Korea
Prevention of the Korean peninsula from falling under the influence of hostile powers

     Based on those interests, the priority in U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea is to constrain military provocation by North Korea and prevent the subsequent confusion after the sudden collapse of North Korean regime. The United States has actively pursued an engagement policy toward North Korea, instead of the confrontation policy of the Cold War era, in order to control and ameliorate the North Korean crisis. Since it has considered the collapse of North Korea as a great threat to peace and security in the entire East Asian region as well as to the Korean peninsula, the U.S. has judged that engagement policy is more effective in controlling the development of nuclear arms and ballistic missiles by North Korea. The U.S. engagement policy is not designed to bring about the collapse of the North Korean regime, but to help it abandon its development of nuclear arms, to induce a soft-landing of the regime, and to achieve gradual openness and reform of North Korea.
     Since the United States considers normalized relations as vital for keeping open channels with North Korea in order to detect an early crisis and to react effectively, it has supported the establishment of a U.S.-North Korea liaison office, high-level U.S.-North Korea talks, and the four-party peace talks. In short, the U.S. is pursuing an engagement policy, in order to prevent instability in North Korea from developing into chaotic collapse.
     As mentioned above, the Agreed Framework resulted from U.S. engagement policy toward North Korea. Describing in detail, ways to bring about the soft-landing of the North Korean regime as well as to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, the Agreed Framework encourages the exchange of high-level diplomats, the increase of economic cooperation, and the resolution of the North Korean energy issue, contingent on the North Korean attitude in dealing with the nuclear issue and accepting North-South Korea dialogue.
     Although officially, the U.S. claims pursuit of a soft-landing and achieving a peaceful reunification through North-South Korea dialogue as the goals, its own foreign policy interests cannot be discounted. Since the U.S. fully recognizes that the reduction of tension between the two Koreas is critical for peace and security in the Korean peninsula, and considering the importance of the U.S.-South Korea alliance, it seems that the U.S. is not willing to establish a U.S.-North Korea peace treaty.

North Korean Foreign Policy Toward the U.S.

     There are two kinds of analyses about the objective of North Korean foreign policy toward the U.S. First of all, it aims to cause the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea through a Vietnam-type peace treaty with the U.S. in order to achieve a Vietnam-type of reunification. Secondly, it wishes to neutralize the influence of the U.S. forces in South Korea through the establishment of a U.S.-North Korea peace treaty in order to guarantee their security and prevent South Korea's goal for reunification through absorption, and finally, to obtain economic cooperation from Western countries for the survival of its regime.
     Realistically, however, the North Korean regime can hardly consider withdrawal of the troops or isolation of South Korea within the realm of possibility, if they look at their current situation. In 1997, South Korea's economy was approximately 24 times as large as that of North Korea and the gap is widening with the South Korean economy accumulating twice as much wealth as North Korea in a year. Moreover, it is estimated that even if South Korea maintains the annual 3% GNP earmarked for military costs for the next 2~3 years, the level will equal that of the entire North Korean GNP.1) Besides the ever-increasing gap between the two Koreas, North Korea faces a distinct lack of allies to guarantee its security.
     Ironically, there is nobody but the U.S. that can guarantee the security of North Korea and aid in its economic rehabilitation, while deterring South Korean reunification by absorption and persuading Japan and South Korea to give economic aid. North Korean foreign policy toward the U.S. is based on four objectives: deterring South Korean reunification by absorption, establishing the U.S.-North Korea peace treaty, neutralization of the U.S. forces in South Korea, and complete reduction of barriers to trade and investment. North Korea would like to make the U.S. play the honest broker in relations between the two Koreas, for the sake of its security through the establishment of the U.S.-North Korea peace treaty. Thus, we can assume that North Korea may want the U.S. troops to stay in South Korea as a neutralized force, instead of wishing a complete withdrawal. North Korea seems to perceive that as relations with the U.S. normalize, sanctions from the Western countries against North Korea will be lifted. Therefore, it is showing interest in removing barriers that restrict economic cooperation, such as the Provision on Prohibition of Trade with Hostile Countries.
     From a long-term perspective, it can be assumed that in pursuit of survival the revolutionary tone of Pyongyang's foreign policy will be diluted. However, it does not mean that North Korea will abandon its hope for Vietnam-type reunification. It is possible that the long-standing North Korean regime could try to strengthen its domestic legitimacy by mobilizing support from the people based on such propaganda as the liberation of South Korea. In practice, North Korean foreign policy toward the U.S. aims to guarantee the regime's survival, and maintain its past policy, at the same time promoting the withdrawal of U.S. troops by establishing a U.S.-North Korea peace treaty and Vietnam-type reunification. There is a great possibility for North Korea to revert to its previous policy in the event at serious chaos in South Korea.
     Pyongyang faces a dilemma in negotiations with the U.S., since it has no bargaining chips other than its development of weapons of mass destruction. Normalized relations with the U.S. will be difficult as long as it sticks to the development of nuclear arms or missiles. On the other hand, if it throws away its nuclear card, the U.S. will have no reason to negotiate.

PROGRESS OF U.S.-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS IN THE 1990s

     The United States allowed diplomatic contacts with North Korea and met North Korean Counsellors in Beijing after South Korea's '7กค7 Declaration' on July 7, 1988, thus inducing the beginning of normalized relations between the U.S. and North Korea. North Korea demanded a direct dialogue, normalizing relations with the U.S., high-level talks and the establishment of a U.S.-North Korea bilateral peace treaty. The U.S. for its part requested a constructive North-South dialogue, the signing of a nuclear arms agreement and allowing inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, repatriation of the remains of U.S. soldiers, and the cessation of terrorist activities. With Pyongyang's signing of "the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," and allowing inspections by the IAEA, the U.S. accepted the proposal for the high-level talks. In January of 1992 in New York, high-level talks were held between Arnold Kanter, Undersecretary of U.S. State Department, and Kim Yong-sun, Secretary of the Central Committee of North Korean Workers' Party, with the condition that it would be held just one time. In that conference, Pyongyang strongly requested continuous U.S.-DPRK high-level talks to normalize relations with the U.S. Washington responded that a guarantee of nuclear transparency by North Korea was a precondition for normalizing relations, and as a result, contacts between the U.S. and North Korea were again reduced to that of counsellor-level in Beijing.
     The skepticism of the past was replaced by that of hope when the Clinton administration came to power,2) and the U.S. worked actively toward normalizing relations with North Korea. The IAEA's request for a 'special inspection' of two suspected nuclear waste sites at the nuclear complex was met with Pyongyang's public declaration that it was withdrawing from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It finally demanded direct bilateral negotiations with the U.S. as a precondition for the final resolution of the nuclear issue. On March 29, 1993, the North Korean Foreign Department asked for direct bilateral negotiations with the U.S., arguing that direct U.S.-North Korea negotiations based upon the principle of equality and reciprocity in mutual trust should be realized to resolve the nuclear issue. The South Korean government acquiesced to bilateral negotiations with the U.S. and North Korea for the sake of preventing North Korea from developing nuclear arms, even though it went against "the principle of direct negotiations between the concerned parties" on the Korean peninsula issue. Although the South Korean government allowed direct U.S.-North Korea negotiations, it still pursued direct dialogue with Pyongyang. The mere fact that South Korea allowed U.S.-North Korea direct contact, signalled the transfer 'to the U.S.' of Seoul's initiative in negotiations, and thus, a valuable element of 'the principle of the concerned parties' was given away.
     The first high-level talks were held in New York in June 1993, and led to the signing of 'the Geneva Agreed Framework' on October 21, 1994. It had taken 19 months of prolonged negotiations beginning with North Korea's declaration of withdrawal from the NPT. After difficult negotiations, the result was a package deal in which North Korea promised to stop the development of nuclear arms and the U.S. pledged to cooperate on ways to reduce tension on the Korean peninsula; in return a U.S. promise to 'normalize relations' with North Korea, and to lend some measures of political legitimacy and economic support to North Korea. The Agreed Framework promised comprehensive improvement of the U.S.-North Korea relationship, stipulating the lifting of sanctions against North Korea and establishing ambassadorial level diplomatic relations, based on Pyongyang's achieving nuclear transparency.
     Finally, North Korea could succeed in sustaining its regime in the post-Cold War era by direct negotiations with the U.S., excluding the IAEA and South Korea through nuclear brinkmanship. The Agreed Framework seemed to be a audacious diplomatic victory for North Korea, yielding both political and economic compensation, including the light-water reactors, heavy fuel oil, and normalization of relations with the U.S. In return, North Korea promised to freeze, halt, and eventually dismantle its nuclear reactors and related facilities based on the construction progress of the light-water reactors, and that it would enter full compliance with the safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
     In the process of nuclear negotiations, North Korea managed to achieve its hoped-for direct bilateral negotiations with the U.S. In addition, it established a precedent for excluding South Korea, a tough counterpart, from the negotiations. Therefore, since North Korea could achieve a channel for direct dialogue with the U.S. in the Agreed Framework, it could avoid the binding force of "the principle of direct negotiations between the concerned parties," especially on the Korean peninsula issue, based upon 'the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement.' However, the supreme achievement for North Korea was the preservation of its regime through the Geneva Agreed Framework.
     First of all, the Agreed Framework, allowed Pyongyang to maintain the vagueness concerning the North Korean nuclear situation for a considerably long time, and more importantly, it received a formal assurance against threat or preemptive use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. With the U.S. promise of full normalization of political and economic relations with North Korea, the formerly reclusive nation has improved relations with Western countries including Japan, thus helping to create a favorable international atmosphere for survival. Furthermore, the Agreed Framework assured North Korean economic solvency through emergency energy resources such as light-water reactors and heavy fuel oil. Thus, following the lifting of sanctions by the U.S. and the normalization of relations with the U.S., North Korea created a base for rehabilitating its economy, being assured of economic cooperation from the West.
     As the U.S. has successfully forced North Korea to remain a party to the NPT through the Agreed Framework, it was able to reduce a negative influence upon the extending the life of the NPT in 1995. Therefore with the U.S. controlling the North Korean mass-production of nuclear arms through the Agreed Framework, the worst scenario will not materialize. The reason that the U.S. sticks to the nuclear proliferation issue rather than simply to the resolution of the past nuclear issue, is that while the past nuclear issue is only concerned with one or two nuclear bombs, the nuclear non-proliferation issue is closely related with nuclear proliferation throughout the world. That is to say, the U.S. takes the long view in recognizing the seriousness of the issue. If the U.S. does not instantly freeze North Korea's nuclear production capability, North Korea could establish a mass production system to produce enough plutonium yearly to arm 30 nuclear bombs, and export them to Middle-Eastern countries. The U.S. can fully control the nuclear arms of North Korea at its current primitive level, which has a limited influence on the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia, while maintaining South Korea and Japan under its bilateral security system, and keeping them under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
     The Agreed Framework has inevitably resulted in a revolutionary transformation in the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula. As the process of normalizing the U.S.-North Korean relations has begun, and animosity between the two has ceased through the Agreed Framework, impacts of the international Cold War on the Korean peninsula have come to an end, and only the confrontational situation between two Koreas remains.
     Through signing the Geneva Agreed Framework, North Korean foreign policy seemed to have given its best efforts to the issue of normalizing relations with the U.S. and Japan in order to create ideal conditions for the preservation of its regime. However, with a delay in the formal succession of Kim Jong-il after Kim Il-sung's sudden death, it has demanded the establishment of a U.S.-North Korea bilateral peace treaty, rather than trying to normalize the relations for survival. North Korea has delayed opening of the U.S. liaison office, a short-cut to normalizing relations with the U.S., and instead, has focused only on political-military issues such as an unacceptable peace treaty which completely excludes South Korea from the process. Thus, it appears that North Korea is indulging in an illusion that if political-military issues were to be resolved, all other problems would disappear.North Korea has intentionally heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula demanding a new peace order on the Korean peninsula to replace the Military Armistice Commission in Panmunjom.3) pulling its members out of the MAC. The type of a new peace order, demanded by North Korea, was vague. It is clear, however, the demand directly addressed to the U.S. and is closely related to the establishment of a U.S.-North Korea bilateral peace treaty.
     Moreover not long after signing the Geneva Agreed Framework, North Korea strongly demanded a bilateral peace treaty with Washington. When Thomas Hubbard, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, visited North Korea to negotiate the release of a U.S. pilot whose helicopter was brought down in North Korean air-space. He agreed in a December 1994 Letter of Understanding with North Korean authorities, to maintain proper military contacts in order to avoid unnecessary incidents that might threaten peace and security on the Korean peninsula.4) This U.S. acknowledgment of the necessity of a U.S.-North Korea direct military channel in case the Military Armistice Commission became powerless, gave rise to South Korea's antipathy.
     In view of the fact that North Korea pursued normalizing relations with the U.S., completely denied a North-South direct dialogue, and demanded establishment of a U.S.-North Korea bilateral peace treaty, the South Korean government has pursued a new way to replace the existing armistice with a long-lasting peace agreement. South Korea and the U.S. have worked closely to implement the so-called four-party talks in which the two Koreas, China and the U.S., who shared some reponsibility during the Korean War, would participate. In April of 1996, South Korea and the U.S. formally proposed the four-party peace talks to North Korea and China at the South Korea-U.S. summit meeting held on Cheju Island in South Korea. As South Korea no longer linked U.S.-North Korea direct contact with North-South dialogue, it adopted measures so that the U.S. could discuss current issues through institutionalized U.S.-North Korea high-level talks.
     In the midst of the unfolding economic disaster, North Korea agreed to the four-party peace talks, based on the U.S. pledge to supply food aid in 1997 using the U.S.-North Korea high-level talks as collateral. While South Korea, the U.S. and Japan were indirectly providing food aid for North Korea through international organizations, in December of 1997 the four-party talks were held for the first time since the Geneva meeting to deal with the end of the Korean War broke down in 1954. While it agreed during the four-party talks to set up two subcommittees to address constructing a peace-keeping order and tension reduction issues on the Korean peninsula, North Korea does not seem to have changed its position on the withdrawal of U.S. forces and the establishment of a U.S.-North Korea bilateral peace treaty.
     In pursuit of its two-tiered strategy, North Korea superficially participates in North-South indirect dialogues through the four-party talks, in order to change the security structure on the Korean peninsula and to normalize relations with the U.S. in the U.S.-North Korea direct talks at the same time. For its part, the U.S. is attempting to strengthen its ongoing contingency crisis management system. Also, the U.S. feels the necessity to discuss confidence-building measures (CBM), arms control, and the armed forces reorganization issue for tension reduction on the Korean peninsula and finally, the soft-landing of North Korea. It will deal with these issues particularly through assistant-minister-level talks with North Korea and the four-party peace talks.

THE POSSIBILITY OF CHANGES IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
TOWARDS NORTH KOREA

     Around the time that North Korea's suspicious nuclear development was confirmed, the Clinton administration adopted an engagement policy.5) To that end, the Geneva Agreed Framework meant a linkage strategy in which the U.S. would gradually reduce barriers to trade and investment and would normalize relations with North Korea, depending on North Korea's compliance with the agreement. Thus, U.S. engagement policy for North Korea in compliance with the Agreed Framework, had an objective to not only resolve the North Korean nuclear problem but also to strongly urge North Korea to become a responsible law-abiding member in the international community. Contrary to the U.S. expectations, however, four years have passed, and the North Korean situation has not changed. Instead, some critical preconditions of the U.S. engagement policy have been undermined.
     First, a precondition of the Agreed Framework was that North Korea would maintain a nuclear freeze and ultimately abandon its nuclear arms development. However, there is a great possibility that North Korea has secretly developed nuclear arms, as evidenced by the alleged underground nuclear facility at Kumchang-ri.6)
     Underground nuclear facilities such as nuclear reactors require huge amounts of water, and since the underground nuclear facility at Kumchang-ri is equipped with a dam and a cooling system, there is a great possiblity that the facility is intended for military purposes. Furthermore, it is reported that North Korea has continued to test triggering devices for nuclear bombs, in complete disregard of the Agreed Framework.7) If North Korea has been developing nuclear arms, then, the preconditions of the KEDO agreement including the provision of the two light-water reactors and heavy fuel oil, the Agreed Framework itself is meaningless.
     Secondly, while the U.S. had considered its engagement policy toward North Korea as useful in inducing North Korea's reform and openness, for the past four years North Korea has only regressed, further institutionalizing its militaristic system. In the midst of the deepening economic disaster and food shortage, North Korea, under the rule of Kim Jong-il has neglected to take the necessary measures toward reforming and opening. As can be seen in North Korea's stubborn adherence to political-military strategies, such as pushing for a U.S.-North Korea bilateral peace treaty, rather than normalizing relations, it has rarely shown any effort to reverse its reclusiveness. Instead it has focused on the preservation of its regime through strengthening the militaristic system and its policy of confrontation. Given the fact that the North Korean regime is losing control over the people and the local governments, the militaristic system can be considered as the institutionalization of an 'ongoing crisis management system' under which the military, through physical force and far-reaching organizations will resume control, subjugating the now impotent North Korean Workers' Party.
     The U.S. perspective on North Korea has changed drastically. With the North Korea's launching of a Taepodong missile over Japanese territory in August 1998, the institutionalization of the militaristic system through a revision of the Constitution in September, and the Kumchang-ri issue, the basic preconditions of the Clinton engagement policy have been rendered useless. The engagement policy, designed to induce North Korea to ultimately abandon nuclear arms development and change its regime, is being questioned. As the Republican-led Congress took a hawkish position, the Clinton administration was asked to submit a meaningful resolution by May 31, 1999. Consequently, the Clinton administration appointed William Perry, former U.S. Defense Secretary, as a policy coordinator to totally review U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea.
     We will have to watch and wait to see which direction U.S. foreign policy will finally take toward North Korea. Nonetheless, we can assume that the U.S. will adhere to the existing engagement policy framework, while at the same time strengthening retaliatory measures in case North Korea deviates from the stipulations. Thus the U.S. foreign policy for North Korea will focused more on preventing the nuclear arms and ballistic missiles development rather than on helping its soft-landing.

CONCLUSIONS

     Although the U.S. will basically attempt to maintain the outlines of the Geneva Agreement, it seems to have limited policy alternatives regarding the Kumchang-ri issue. Thus if North Korea does not take positive measures to resolve the issue, the U.S. may have to adopt strong sanctions against it.
     However, now that the suspected underground nuclear site at Kumchang-ri has been uncovered, North Korea will attempt to exact as much compensation from the U.S. as possible. In other words, compliance will be exchanged through new incentives for North Korea, such as reduced trade barriers and investment and additional food aid. Still North Korea will not completely abandon its nuclear arms and missile development program, for if it were abandoned, even though it could physically survive through the establishment of a U.S.-North Korea peace treaty and economic cooperation, North Korea would be reduced to a small, inconsequential nation. Its political survival would be impossible, considering the huge imbalance in national power between the two Koreas. Thus, abandoning the nuclear arms program is hardly an option.On the other hand, led by the U.S. in the post-Cold War era, the achievement of non-proliferation weapons of mass destruction has become one of the most important international security issues. Indeed the issue of the development of weapons of mass destruction is an international web with its center in North Korea.8) Moreover, the DPRK's launching of a Taepodong missile and the issue of the Kumchang-ri nuclear facility have raised the necessity of stronger control over North Korea. As a result, the U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea will stress the issue of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.The U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea in the 1990s has been to resist military provocation by North Korea through an engagement policy based upon the Agreed Framework. Even though it was triggered by the nuclear issue, it resulted in creating channels for U.S.-North Korea direct dialogue. Subsequently, the U.S. and North Korea have been able to hold direct negotiations over other current issues. What is more, this change has not been possible since the Korean War, and it thus indicates the key role that the U.S. still plays on the Korean peninsula.

According to The International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Military Balance 1998/99 (Oxford: 1998), in 1997, South Korea's GDP was estimated as 443 billion dollars and North Korea's GNP 18 billion dollars, and South Korea's economy was approximately 24 times as large as that of North Korea, also South Korea maintained 14.7 billion dollars for military costs in the year of 1997, that level equaled 80% of North Korean GNP.
As the Clinton administration inaugurated, William J. Crowe, Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, presented a report regarding U.S. foreign policy toward the Korean Peninsula, "the Summit Council For World Peace, American Foreign Policy and the Future of the Two Koreas" (1992). It said that hard liners's policy of the Bush administration was not efficient, and recommended that the Clinton administration adopt an engagment policy to resolve North Korean nuclear issue.
In April of 1994, the DPRK Foreign Ministry pulled its representative of military armistice committee out of Panmunjom, right after its unilateral declaration to draw fuel rods of nuclear reactors. Moreover North Korea demanded the U.S. to replace the armistice treaty with a peace treaty and to establish 'a new peace system' in order to replace the Military Armistice Commission.
Dong-a Ilbo, December 31, 1994. In February of 1996, the DPRK Foreign Ministry demanded the establishment of a U.S.-DPRK provisional treaty including management of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), contingency plans for emergencies, and establishment of a joint military committee, as an intermediary step toward a bilateral peace treaty. North Korea, at the same time, threatened that it would take some measures against the U.S., if it objected to its demands. In April of 1996, North Korea repeatedly heightened tension on the Korean peninsula by dispatching heavily armed forces into the Joint Security Area of Panmunjom, declaring disapproval of demilitarized zone.
On the other hand, there is a great possibility that North Korea assumed that if it kept the nuclear freeze, the U.S. would lift sanctions against North Korea and normalize relations.
New York Times , August 17, 1998.
Asahi Shimbun , November 22, 1998.
As North Korea has an international web for the development of missiles with Egypt, Iran, Pakistan and Syria, North Korea could have established current mass production system to produce missiles, cooperation in the fields of market, funds, technology, and parts. Esecially through the cooperation wilth Egypt and Pakistan, many USSR scientists seemed to have helped North Korea to develop missiles since the collapse of the Soviet Union.