Volume 11 Number 1 Spring 1999
Recent evidence regarding missile development and alleged nuclear-related underground facilities in North Korea has put US-North Korean relations on the brink of crisis once again after some years of seemingly improved relations since the signing of the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework. In October 1998, the Omnibus Appropriations Bill (HR 4328) was passed by the U.S. Congress that, for the first time since the Agreed Framework, places strict conditions on the Congressional funding of $35 million to KEDO¡ªKorean Peninsula Energy Development Organization¡ªfor the supply of heavy fuel oil to North Korea. The related provision (Sec. 582) in the Omnibus Appropriations Bill emphasizes two major points. First, Pyongyang must clear suspicions over suspected nuclear-weapons facilities at Kumchang-ri, near Yongbyon before May 1999. Second, before the end of 1998, a North Korea Policy Coordinator will be appointed to comprehensively review U.S. policy on North Korea and to lead the US-North Korean negotiations on the North's nuclear weapons and missile program and other fundamental issues relating to the security of the Korean Peninsula.1) Accordingly, the Clinton administration has already held three dialogues with the North on access to the suspected nuclear site at Kumchang-ri and has appointed William Perry, formerly Defense Minister at the time of nuclear talks 1994, as the North Korea Policy Coordinator. He is said to be currently preparing a report on future U.S. policy orientation toward North Korea.
The following is a brief explanation of the background of the revision of U.S. policy toward North Korea and a discussion of the future course of US-North Korean relations. Washington's approach regarding Pyongyang's provocations, as well as the pending issue of recently uncovered underground facilities will also be addressed. In addition there will be an overview of current US-North Korean relations and how they will affect the engagement policy of the South Korean government toward the North.
The Agreed Framework of October 1994, signed to halt Pyongyang's nuclear program, was already the target of criticism at the time it was adopted. Critics strongly opposed the cost of the accord that would grant two light-water reactors to the North in exchange for the freezing of its nuclear program. First of all, the U.S. Congress did not like the idea of rewarding the North for its bad conduct, and despite the fact that the U.S. government considered the Agreed Framework as a major diplomatic feat, differences of opinion existed even within the administration, between the State Department and the Pentagon. Criticism could also be heard from the press and other Korea watchers. But in the absence of a more effective alternative, realism prevailed that the Agreed Framework was the next best option available and it would work if the agreement was properly implemented. For a certain time, this logic outweighed divergent views on what the assumptions and objectives of the Agreed Framework should have been and how North Korea should have been dealt with.
The negotiations that led to the signing of the Agreed Framework were based on the assumption that the North Korean regime's nuclear program was designed for self-defense. Furthermore, it was felt that reform and liberalization were the only choices for the Kim Jong-il regime and that if presented with a clear path out of its predicament, the North would accept. The rapid collapse of the Soviet bloc would render it impossible for the Stalinist regime's isolationist and confrontational policies to endure, and thus it would follow the examples of the successful market reforms of China and Vietnam. Beginning in the 1990's, whatever the initial purposes behind the North's nuclear program had been, observers saw it more as a means of regime survival rather than as a tool of aggression. In fact, U.S. policy had proceeded on the assumption that North Korea's principal objective was indeed regime survival and that Pyongyang has concluded that improved relations with Washington would be essential to achieving that goal. For the North, the nuclear program was not so much a means for acquiring nuclear warheads, but simply a bargaining chip to get what they wanted¡ªbetter relations with the US. Therefore, with these assumptions, the Agreed Framework was signed by the U.S., which believed that by rewarding the North in exchange for freezing their nuclear program the regime would take the path of liberalization and reforms.
In the four years since the signing of the Geneva Agreed Framework, however, events have led to growing skepticism in the U.S. on whether the initial objectives of the Agreed Framework would be attained. Some are asking whether the U.S. government had not fundamentally miscalculated North Korean intentions in signing the Agreed Framework. Before the North's underground facilities were found, the Agreed Framework was rather positively viewed as an effective means for dismantling the North's nuclear program. In fact, the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon have been shut down, and about 8,000 spent fuel rods were sealed and placed put under control of the IAEA. However, recent evidence regarding the suspected nuclear-related underground facilities at Kumchang-ri and the test-launch of multi-stage missiles have raised suspicions on whether the North has completely given up its nuclear program. There are views that the North may have frozen its established nuclear program in return for the light-water reactors while continuing its aggressive intentions and that now it is developing missiles and nuclear facilities covertly.
The current U.S. policy of engaging North Korea and encouraging it to reform and to open up is under pressure as well. Critics say that despite the North's efforts to bring about limited change in the country during the last four years, no remarkable reforms or liberalization have been realized and in fact, the regime still maintains a hostile confrontational policy toward South Korea. In another unexpected move in September of last year, the Supreme People's Assembly officially inaugurated the Kim Jong Il regime, a clear indication that Kim's dependency on the military may be even greater than before.
Finally, the assumption that time is on the side of the U.S. and South Korea also seems much less convincing today than it did when the Agreed Framework was signed. According to critics, Pyong-yang's military threats have increased rather than diminished during the last four years. As shown by the recent multi-stage missile, Taepodong-I, launched on August 31, 1998, the North may have the technological and manufacturing capability to produce ballistic missiles that is four to five years more advanced than was generally believed.3)
Furthermore, there is also rising skepticism over how to interpret the North's actions in diverting its extremely scarce resources for the development of an advanced missile system and perhaps a covert nuclear program, while over 10% of its population is on the brink of starvation.
Based on these observations, North Korea's real intentions have become increasingly suspicious. Is the North's development program of weapons of mass destruction a mere bargaining chip or is it a potentially more dangerous instrument of aggression? An increasing number of critics are saying that rather than a bargaining tool in return for improved relations with Washington, North Korea's program may be intended to achieve a strategic breakthrough by altering the balance of power in the region and thus excluding U.S. influence on the peninsula.4) By developing nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems that would travel beyond the peninsula, Pyongyang may be forcing a change in the U.S. military commitment toward South Korea.5) In this sense, its goal would be to redesign fundamental security structure of the peninsula, thus building an environment favorable to their revolutionary strategy.
The U.S. Congress' decision to apply strict conditions to funding KEDO as well as to appoint a North Korea Policy Coordinator to comprehensively review U.S. policy on North Korea points out the urgent need to clarify suspicions over North Korea's underground facilities at Kumchang-ri. Moreover, it also reflects the mounting Congressional discontent regarding U.S. policy since the signing of the Agreed Framework. The discontent within the Congress has only been mounting, with the growing concern that the Agreed Framework is leading nowhere. With the unfolding of events in 1998, including the recently revealed underground site, the launch of long-range missiles and the inauguration of Kim Jong-il as the chairman of the National Defense Commission, the U.S. Congress has asked for a fundamental review of U.S. policy toward the North. In addition, a growing number of U.S. journalists, Korea watchers and even officials within the U.S. administration have endorsed the Congressional view, and skepticism has grown on the current U.S. policy toward North Korea and of the assumptions that lay behind the Agreed Framework. The most critical problem, however, is that there is no clear alternative to the current Agreed Framework. Herein lies the dilemma of U.S. policy toward North Korea.
AND US-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS
Currently, the situation involving Pyongyang and the suspected nuclear underground site at Kumchang-ri tops the U.S. agenda. More fundamental, however, is whether the U.S. should maintain its engagement policy toward the North through the continued implementation of the Agreed Framework, the foundation of this policy. The issue of the underground site is indeed important in that it will determine the future course of U.S. policy toward the North. In this sense, the two are closely linked. Pyongyang, claiming that the underground site is a private facility, is demanding significant financial compensation for a one-time look, a request clearly rejected by Washington, which argues that access to the suspected, underground site is part of the obligation under the Agreed Framework. Unless there is clarification on this troubling issue before the end of May 1999, the U.S. Congress will withhold the budget for heavy fuel oil and, as a result, the Agreed Framework will reach an impasse. If negotiations are settled, the U.S. will most likely conduct a renewed overall approach toward North Korea. Thus, a turning point in the U.S. policy and US-North Korean relations can be expected within the first half of 1999 depending on results of the negotiations on the suspected underground site.
What future course will U.S. policy follow toward the North? How will negotiations on the underground nuclear facilities at Kumchang-ri conclude? Given that concrete answers are difficult, especially since the outcome of the negotiations depends greatly on the real intentions of Pyongyang, the present report will focus on Washington's basic strategies in dealing with the North.
First, the U.S. is likely to maintain the current Agreed Framework, not so much because it was a diplomatic feat for the Clinton administration, but because there is no clear alternative. If the Agreed Framework were jeopardized and if Pyongyang were to revert to its nuclear program, the alternative would be a return to the 1994 scenario that could force the U.S. to make some tough choices. Consequently, a satisfactory result regarding the suspected nuclear-related underground site would probably lead the U.S. to maintain its engagement policy toward the North.
Second, in dealing with the North over the underground site, the U.S. will seek a more concerted coalition policy with South Korea, Japan and China instead of taking unilateral, coercive measures. However, there is divergence among the U.S. and its allies over the appropriate policy response to North Korean provocations. Ever since Kim Dae-jung took office, South Korea has pursued the 'sunshine policy' of improved North-South relations, and thus, has refrained from making any comments on the North's nuclear-related underground site. The South wants a peaceful settlement, especially since it would be most affected should a renewed conflict occur on the Korean Peninsula. Meanwhile, Japan has taken a hard line with the North since Pyongyang's missile launch, a stance likely to last for a while. China's position is more complicated. Despite the fact that it has sent huge amounts of food and oil to North Korea to sustain it, Beijing is clearly opposed to the North's nuclear development program, worried that North Korea's missile test could trigger US-Japanese cooperation on development of a theater missile defense system. These different views and interests among the concerned parties suggests that the process of coordinating policy may not be easy.
Third, while Washington will most probably not compensate to the North in exchange for access to the disputed underground site, it will likely negotiate with Pyongyang in a comprehensive manner by committing itself to the lifting of trade sanctions, food aid and improved relations based on whether the North satisfactorily addresses fundamental issues such as the nuclear weapons and missile programs, the bio-chemical weapons programs and other conventional military programs. This was a strategy proposed by the South Korean government to the U.S., a comprehensive package solution to tackle the North Korean issues: negotiators would address the North's missiles and nuclear intentions along with the issues of food aid, trade and diplomatic relations. However, even though Washington views Seoul's 'Big Deal' proposal in a positive light, it will consider it in relation to the overall North Korea policy framework after clarification on the suspected underground site, and then, its implementation of the package solution will progress gradually. As a matter of fact, the Agreed Framework itself was the result of a comprehensive deal, and nevertheless, suspicions have been raised concerning North Korea's noncompliance with the Agreed Framework obligation. Given the previous evaluation, the U.S. would see no point in pursuing the "Big Deal", first because it includes concessions over and above those in the Agreed Framework and second, there is a possibility of violation of the deal.
Fourth, in case of failure to persuade the North through a more concerted international coalition, the U.S. might consider a coercive strategy that would include military measures against the North. An alternative in the event of a diplomatic failure, this strategy could also help increase Washington's leverage in negotiations with the North, a bargaining strategy seen previously in the 1994 nuclear crisis.
In short, the results of the talks on the underground site at Kumchang-ri will be an important factor affecting the future course of the U.S. policy and US-North Korean relations. Depending on how the negotiations turn out, relations with the North may be improved and tensions on the Korean Peninsula reduced, otherwise the peninsula will once again be the center of heightened military tensions. This, of course will be determined by the reaction of North Korea. Nevertheless, another crucial factor will be how South Korea responds to the new situation. Then, what are the South Korean objectives and strategies toward North Korea?
South Korea's engagement policy toward the North has been a consistent part of President Kim Dae-jung's policy toward the North ever since he took office. The idea is nothing new since it dates back to as early as 1988, when the Roh Tae-woo government declared its determination to build an era of reconciliation and cooperation with the North, while reducing military tensions, and for this purpose allowing South Korea's allies to normalize relations with Pyongyang. This shift in policy was reflected in the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement.6) However, since the engagement policy adopted by previous governments had not been carried out in a consistent manner, it has not yielded tangible results in breaking the confrontational structure on the Korean Peninsula. Regardless of whether the philosophy behind the current engagement policy is similar to what it was 10 years ago, the manner in which it is being carried out now and the degree of confidence in its appropriateness has changed significantly. The current South Korean government appears confident that its engagement policy will succeed if pursued coherently. In sum, if the policies of past governments can be termed 'conditional engagement,' then the current government's policy could be considered 'unconditional engagement.'7) The Kim Dae-jung administration attributes the failure of previous engagement policies mainly to North Korea's intransigence; it does not, however, exclude the failure of past governments to send a coherent message to Pyongyang. In other words, inconsistency in following their own engagement policies, prompted the North to doubt the South's real intentions. This may explain why Seoul has repeatedly expressed a desire for reconciliation and dialogue with the North while renouncing any intention to undermine or absorb North Korea.
Another policy, which is clearly different from those the last governments, is its attitude toward the normalization of relations between North Korea and nations friendly to South Korea, such as the U.S. and Japan. As mentioned above, the South Korean government declared that it would not be against such normalization through the declaration of the '7 7 proclamation.' But the premise was that such normalization should proceed in paralled with advances in North-South relations. In fact, the South Korean government had warned that there could be no expectations for rapid progress in US-North Korea realtions when there was no progress in North-South relations, considering the possible hazard to relations between the U.S and South Korea. Furthermore, the South Korean government had intended to use the progress of U.S.-North Korea relations as leverage to advance North-South relations. Recently, however, Seoul has attempted to change its existing policies toward the North. The government regards thawing 'Cold War' relations on the Korean Peninsula as an urgent precondition to build an environment of peace, reconciliation and cooperation, and for this purpose, the North should improve its relations with the U.S. and Japan. It is reported that the current government is demanding that Washington improve its relations with Pyongyang in order to substantially improve the relations between the two Koreas. It is also reported that the U.S. government is a little perplexed by the demands of the South Korean government to improve those relations at the same time that U.S. antagonism toward the North is intensifying due to North Korea's launch of a ballistic missile and its refusal to open its suspected nuclear sites.
South Korea's current policy toward the North reflects how the Kim Dae Jung's administration perception of North Korea differs from that of previous governments. The South Korean government views Pyongyang's recent provocations and weapons of mass destruction program as a reaction to fear of collapse and a desire to maintain its present regime. In short, the North's nuclear weapons and missile development program, along with other apparent threats, would have been designed for self-defense rather than as a tool of aggression, serving mainly as a bargaining chip to realize the ultimate goal of improving its relations with Washington. In Seoul's estimation, improved US-North Korean relations would be an automatic solution. Seoul also emphasizes that even if there is a breakthrough in the nuclear-related talks, unless Pyongyang's fears are allayed, it will only lead to the emergence of other security-related issues. Thus, South Korea is pressing for a fundamental and comprehensive approach to address the roots of the problem, emphasizing the need for improved US-North Korean relations.
Is the normalization of US-North Korean relations the key to eliminating the Cold-War atmosphere that still lingers on the Korean Peninsula? Will improved relations between U.S., Japan and North Korea ultimately encourage the North to open up and reform, contribute to a better North-South relations and consequently melt the last remaining icebergs of the Cold War? These questions may not be as easy to answer as the South Korean government may think. There is no guarantee that the normalization of US-North Korean relations will encourage Pyongyang to commit itself to improving its relations with Seoul. Far from it, recent provocations by the North are clear evidence that Pyongyang would rather use improved relations with Washington to undermine the structure of US-South Korean Military Alliance, by calling for the withdrawal of US military forces stationed in South Korea. To make matters worse, once the North improves its relations with the U.S., Pyongyang will take less interest in normalizing its relations with Seoul. There also is the risk that too close a relationship between Washington and Pyongyang could exert severe pressure to US-South Korean relations. Furthermore, it isn't even clear whether Washington will want to improve its relations with Pyongyang in light of the North's recent military provocations amid growing international calls for reforms and liberalization. As was previously discussed in this report, there may be a wide divergence of views among Seoul, Washington and Pyongyang. The Clinton administration feels that if North Korea's real intentions had indeed been improved relations with Washington, they would have acted in a more decent and responsible way, rather than resorting to the building of weapons of mass destruction. It is simple common sense that if the North still hasn't given up its nuclear and missile development program, it has other intentions in mind. In this context, urging Washington to improve its relations with the North, arguing that it is the key to solving security issues on the Korean Peninsula, would be too simplistic and would only put US-South Korean relations under more strain.
When an old problem cannot be solved with old methods, it is only natural to try to address the issue by means of a totally different approach and new thinking. This require a fresh analysis of not only the problem, but of investigative methods to discover what went wrong. In this sense, it is quite understandable that the current Kim Dae-jung's government has adopted a new approach and new thinking to solve the Korean Peninsula issue, which still in the midst of confrontation and heightened tension after 50 years since its division. However, it should not be forgotten that while a new approach brings new opportunities, it also poses unexpected risks. The present South Korean government's comprehensive policy line toward the North, focusing on improved US-North Korean relations, holds considerable pitfalls. The government should ask itself whether policy-making based on simplified or rigid assumptions of Pyongyang's real intentions is effective or not. The US-South Korean Military Alliance's capability to deter the North's provocations, could be directly or indirectly affected by improved US-North Korean relations. This is why the question of improved relations between U.S., Japan and North Korea should be addressed in a more careful and complex way. Instead of falling into the trap of unjustifiable optimism, the South Korean government should be more realistic in analyzing how influential improved US-North Korean relations can be in improving its relations with the North. Close consultation and coordination between Washington and Seoul remain critical if the United States and South Korea are to present a coordinated strategy toward Pyongyang. The reconciliation of U.S and South Korean views should proceed from mutual recognition that current assumptions underlying policy toward the North need to be reevaluated. In addition, instead of strictly basing improved US-North Korean or Japan-North Korean relations on future North-South dialogues, Seoul should be more creative and flexible in taking advantage of the North's better relations with its neighbors. There is no single easy solution to the complex questions surrounding the Korean Peninsula. However, a careful policy toward the North based on a thorough analysis of both the opportunities and risks it holds will help maintain security on the peninsula and further improve North-South Korean relations.
- These conditions imply that unless suspicions over the Kumchang-ri underground facilities are cleared up before the end of May, 1999, the Congressional funding of $20 million for the supply of fuel oil to North Korea will be stopped which, in turn, could cause the Agreed Framework into unravel. In this context, the first half of 1999 will likely see the North's nuclear issues at a crisis point once again.
- Robert
Manning, "Time Bomb," The New Republic (November 1988), p. 28.
- Presented to
the U.S. Congress in July last year, the Rumsfeld Report on
Ballistic Missiles Threats states that development of the Taepodong II missile is now under way in North Korea. Despite the lack of information on how far the work has progressed, the report predicts that the missile could be test-launched within six months if authorities decide to do so. The North's missiles are below Western standards in accuracy, reliability and safety, making them even more dangerous. The report concluded that in five years, Pyongyang will have acquired ICBMs capable of threatening the U.S.
- United
States Institute of Peace, Special Report-Mistrust and the Korean
Peninsula , November 1988. (http://usip.org/oc/sr/sr_korea.html)
- "Kim
Kyung-won Column," Chosun Daily , 23 November, 1998.
- 'The Inter-Korean Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchange and Cooperation' (the Basic Agreement), the first inter-governmental agreement between the North and South since the division of the Korean peninsula, was signed on December 13, 1991 during the fifth round of Inter-Korean High-lebel Talks in Seoul.
- Seoul has shown its willingness to maintain its current policy emphasizing the importance of a peaceful settlement on the North's nuclear program and the need to save the Agreement Framework. For instance, at the National Security Council held early this year, the South Korean government declared that it would strengthen its engagement policy toward the North by resuming North-South talks, relaxing restrictions on the principle of reciprocity, and dismantling of the Cold War structure.
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