Volume 11 Number 1 Spring 1999
Japan's Negotiations for Diplomatic
Normalization with North Korea:
History and Prospects
There have been no serious talks recently between Japan and North Korea for diplomatic normalization. This presents a contrast with the early 1990s when the two were actively engaged in such negotiations. What is more, the relationship between two countries has been further worsened by the recent North Korean missile launch.
South Korea ushered in a change in the Cold War confrontation policy on the Korean peninsula with its so-called 'Nordpolitik' in 1990. Only after these efforts was Japan able to attempt to normalize relations with North Korea. The Japanese Liberal Democratic Party government has based its policies vis-a-vis the two Koreas on an overarching principle: preventing a war on the Korean peninsula which could very well threaten Japan's national security, and at the same time supporting South Korea as the only lawful government in Korea. Since the early 1990s, Japan's diplomatic negotiations with North Korea have drawn keen interest from neighboring countries. The negotiations indicate a change in the underlying principles of Japan's policy toward the Korean peninsula, i.e., that South Korea is the only lawful government. Given the goal of the Kim Dae-jung government's 'sunshine policy' to improve relations with North Korea, just how far Japan will go toward normalizing its relations with North Korea is of major concern.
The major focus of this paper addresses prospects for Japan-North Korea diplomatic normalization. With this goal in mind, the history of Japan-North Korea negotiations toward normalization will be reviewed, and second, the reasons for the vicissitudes throughout the history of the negotiations will be discussed. In particular, this paper will pay attention to the U.S.-Japan security alliance whose aim is to restrain the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As the security alliance is an external factor in Japan-North Korea negotiations for normalization, it will be compared to other diplomatic factors in terms of its influence on Japan-North Korea diplomatic negotiations. Finally, the paper will offer suggestions for officials of the South Korean government who are in charge of making policy regarding Japan and North Korea.
BEFORE THE 'NUCLEAR CRISIS'
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the governing party of Japan during much of the past five decades has held fast to antagonistic policies toward North Korea throughout the entire Cold War. In fact, Tokyo's policies vis-a-vis Pyongyang, during that era closely resembled the U.S. position.
Japan normalized its diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1965, while in contrast, it was not until 1981, when the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDP) issued a joint declaration with the Workers' Party of North Korea concerning the creation of a non-nuclear peace zone in Northeast Asia that Japan engaged in diplomatic contacts with North Korea. Since then, Tokyo has tried to keep official and unofficial channels open for talks with Pyongyang, the primary purpose being to restrain North Korean development of weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless, on a few occasions, for example, the terrorist bombing incident in Rangoon in 1983 and the Korean Air bombing incident in 1987, the Japan-North Korea talks came to a halt for several years.
At the beginning of the 1990s Japan expressed a strong interest in renewing contacts with North Korea. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the initiation by South Korea of Nordpolitik, in September 1990, Tokyo dispatched a delegation to Pyongyang. Headed by Shin Kanemaru, it consisted of members of the LDP and the SDP. North Korea, too, responded positively indicating its interest in bilateral negotiations for diplomatic normalization. The reason for North Korean interest was the need to counterbalance the success of South Korea's 'Nordpolitik.' As a result, the Kanemaru-led delegation produced a joint declaration with the Workers's Party of North Korea, spelling out the diplomatic issues pending between Japan and North Korea. The most noticeable section of the declaration dealt with Japan's obligation to extend an official apology and pay ample compensation, not only for the suffering Japan had inflicted on the Korean people during the 35 years of its colonial occupation, but also for the losses North Korea had suffered because of antagonistic policies toward it during the 45-year postwar period. It was for this, considered by many Japanese as a diplomatic blunder, that Kanemaru was severely criticized by other Japanese politicians on his return. On the other hand, the declaration included a provision stating that nuclear weapons should be abolished from the earth, reflecting Japan's concern about alleged North Korean nuclear development. This illustrates that in the post-Cold War era, Tokyo's primary goal in negotiations with Pyongyang was North Korean nuclear development.
After the Kanemaru-led delegation, delegates of Japan met their counterparts from North Korea on January 30 to 31, 1991, for the 'first normalization talks.' Afterwards, the two sides held eight rounds of normalization talks over a period of nearly two years, until November 1992. However, they failed to narrow what turned out to be a gaping chasm between their respective positions. In the end, Pyongyang suspended the talks altogether when, during the eighth round of the normalization talks, Tokyo raised such contentious issues as 'Lee Eun-hye'1) and nuclear weapons development.
The pending diplomatic issues between Japan and North Korea that were revealed during the eight rounds of normalization talks deserve attention. Indeed they still need to be solved both for normalization and for any significant progress between the two countries. For example, Pyongyang demanded, above all, that Japan recognize it as the only lawful government in Korea. In fact, North Korea insisted on this demand, despite their knowledge that Japan would never be able to honor it, an indication that North Korea had deliberately posed a barrier to negotiations for normalization. Furthermore, North Korea never retreated from its position that since its leader, Kim Il-sung, had fought the Japanese army, Japan owed both reparations and compensation for damages. By holding fast to this position, North Korea made it clear that its goal was to maximize the economic compensation it hoped to get from Japan. This position is likely to be a guiding principle on the part of North Korea when it negotiates with Japan for normalization. For its part, Japan argued that because Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese guerrilla activities could not be regarded as the wartime efforts of a sovereign state, North Korea is entitled only to compensatory payment for property claims, not to war reparations between belligerent states. Japan also demanded that the issue of the legitimacy of the North Korean government should be dropped from the negotiation agenda, and that North Korea should fulfill a number of conditions for normalization, namely clarification of the Korean Air bombing incident and the 'Lee Eun-hye' issue.
It is also noteworthy that the alleged North Korean nuclear weapons development surfaced as a critical issue in the Japan-North Korea normalization talks. Japan expressed serious concern about intelligence agency reports on North Korean development of chemical weapons and missiles whose striking range extends over 1,000 kilometers. In March 1993, when North Korea declared its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Japan-North Korea negotiations for normalization reached an impasse, when North Korea was asked to clarify the status of its nuclear development program. Immediately after North Korea announced withdrawal from the NPT, the Foreign Minister of Japan made it a major precondition for normalization talks between the two countries that North Korea recalled its withdrawal from the treaty. Japan's uncompromising position in 1993-94 concerning North Korean nuclear weapons development was adopted in the context of the fact that Washington was weighing the option of applying military sanctions against North Korea. Again, it illustrates that North Korean nuclear weapons development has been the most important issue in Japan's policies toward North Korea.
Japan altered its position vis-a-vis North Korea until the mid-1994 when such hawkish policies as economic sanctions imposed by Japan and the U.S. on North Korea raised tensions between Japan and North Korea to even higher levels. In particular, Japan wanted to establish a basic principle governing its entire policy toward North Korea in order to avoid confusion in foreign policy-making. Officials in the Japanese Foreign Ministry worried that instability in domestic politics caused by the succession of short-lived coalition government after the downfall of the LDP would spill over, affecting the decision-making process. Consequently, representatives of each political party, including the SDP, joined the coalition government and met in a special conference intended to discuss policies toward North Korea. An agreement was reached on April 19, 1994. The coalition government's policy agreement includes a few provisions that warrant our notice. For example, it stipulates that Japan will turn to the United Nations in dealing with North Korea when both the U.S. and Japan view it necessary. This marked a departure from the previous position of abiding by 'Article Nine of the Peace Constitution.' The coalition-party agreement also emphasized close cooperation among the U.S., Japan, and South Korea in coping with the North Korean development of nuclear weapons. The agreement reflected the dovish position held by the Social Democratic Party, as well, which stressed a peaceful solution through dialogues, in order to avoid isolating North Korea from the international community. In short, the agreement can be characterized as a combination of hawkish and dovish positions, revealing an inconsistency between differing voices within the Japanese government.
To repeat, the coalition government's policies toward North Korea represented two contrasting postures: (1) Japan could not allow an unpredictable country such as North Korea to be armed with nuclear missiles whose striking range reaches beyond Japan, and (2) sanctions against North Korea should not lead to a crisis on the Korean peninsula. As noted earlier, a basic principle underlying Japan's policies toward the Korean peninsula has been to prevent a war between the two Koreas, which may very well pose a serious threat to Japanese national security. This explains why Japan has maintained a less stringent position than the U.S. in imposing sanctions on North Korea.
AFTER THE 'NUCLEAR CRISIS'
Carter's visit to Pyongyang in 1994 helped convince the U.S. that a peaceful solution to the nuclear crisis was not beyond reach. In addition, the U.S. decided to be more cautious in dealing with North Korea in order not to aggravate the unstable situation in that country after Kim Il-sung's death. Accordingly, the U.S. altered its stance vis-a-vis North Korea from that of strong sanctions to that of new dialogues. As North Korea responded favorably to the U.S. policy changes, the two sides eventually reached the Geneva Agreed Framework in October, 1994. According to the Geneva agreement, the U.S. asked South Korea and Japan to bear the expense of the light-water reactors and disposal of spent fuel-rods in North Korea.
As previously stated, the Japanese coalition government considered alleged North Korean nuclear weapons development to be the biggest threat to its national security. Moreover, the coalition government believed that establishing stability on the Korean peninsula by inducing North Korea to open its borders to the international community was vital to the Japan's national interest. With this in mind, the Japanese coalition government was eager to normalize relations with North Korea, planning to dispatch to Pyongyang a delegation headed by Wataru Kubo, the Chairman of the SDP. North Korea, however, refused to accept the delegation. On the Japanese side as well, the planned delegation met with strong opposition from the Foreign Ministry and from the LDP. As a result, negotiations on the diplomatic normalization between Tokyo and Pyongyang came to a standstill. Most importantly, many viewed the joint declaration Kanemaru issued with North Korea in 1990 as disadvantageous to Japan. Others argued that the Lee Eun-hye issue should be resolved prior to any serious normalization talks. Still others also pointed out that if Japan were to appear too eager for normalization talks with North Korea, it might end up paying the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) more than it wanted to pay for the light-water reactors to be built in North Korea.
The South Korean government, too, raised objections to the Japanese coalition government's plan to dispatch a delegation to North Korea. President Kim Young-sam made his displeasure clear when he met Chief Cabinet Secretary Kozo Igarashi, in Seoul on October 29, 1994. This demonstrates that Japan cannot be totally free from South Korean influence where normalization talks with North Korea are concerned. Since Japan maintains close diplomatic relations with South Korea, it needs to consult with it before making any real changes in relations with North Korea. Based on this, Seoul has been stalling Japan-North Korea normalization.
After 1995, those who urged the resumption of normalization talks with North Korea including Foreign Minister Yohei Kono, began to vigorously promote their views, gaining approval within the Japanese government. Consequently, in March, 1995, Michio Watanabe, chief of the LDP delegation to North Korea who met with Workers' Party Secretary Kim Yong-sun in order to forge an agreement on reopening normalization talks between Japan and North Korea. In subsequent negotiations, however, the two countries failed to narrow differences in the interpretation of the joint declaration issued by the Kanemaru-led delegation and the North Korean Workers' Party in 1990. The best that Japan could do in the 1995 talks was to nurture an environment conducive to progress toward normalization with North Korea by virtue of providing North Korea with food and financial backing for the KEDO project. In 1996 the government of Ryutaro Hashimoto sent additional food aid to North Korea in hopes of breaking the impasse in normalization talks with North Korea, and as a result, the two sides made secret 'working-level' contacts in Beijing in March, 1996. In the meantime, Japan also tried to foster a friendly atmosphere in order to induce normalization talks with North Korea. For example, in June 1996 it donated six million dollars through the UN for the restoration of flood damaged areas in North Korea. However, the incident involving the North Korean submarine infiltration into South Korea in September 1996 brought the working-level contacts between Japan and North Korea to a halt. Subsequently, after North Korea had expressed regret for the submarine incident in December 1996, the two countries reopened the meetings. Yet, efforts came to a standstill once more in early 1997, when Japan accused North Korean agents of kidnapping a middle-school girl from Niigata. North Korea responded to this suspicion by adopting a conciliatory posture toward Japan, announcing that based on humanitarian grounds, Japanese wives who had gone to North Korea with their repatriated Korean husbands would be allowed to visit Japan. While this gesture was merely an effort to draw attention away from the kidnapping charge, it led to preparatory talks on normalizing diplomatic ties between Japan and North Korea in August, 1997. <Table 1> below summarizes the history of the negotiation process for normalization between Japan and North Korea. The history can be characterized as mutual efforts to make progress toward normalization alternating with intermittent halts in progress. The table shows that the two countries have not only adopted various conciliatory positions so as to create an atmosphere favorable to progress toward normalization, but have also kept working-level contacts in operation since October, 1994.
DIPLOMATIC NORMALIZATION
Foreign policies are the product of dynamic interactions between domestic factors such as policy-makers's interests and policy-making structure on the one hand, and international environmental factors on the other. Hence, we need to consider both domestic and international factors in addressing prospects for the present position of the Obuchi government toward North Korea.
Keizo Obuchi, the current Prime Minister, served in Ryutaro Hashimoto's second cabinet as Foreign Minister. Obuchi is known to emphasize 'harmony,' a traditional Japanese value, but is felt to lack charismatic leadership. Given this, it is less likely that he will initiate policies of his own in the process of normalization between Japan and North Korea. Hashimoto did not show enthusiasm for normalization with North Korea, and since Obuchi served under Hashimoto, he is expected to mirror Hashimoto's lukewarm attitude toward North Korea. In fact, Obuchi is pro-South Korean, valuing close relations with South Korea over normalization with North Korea. Taking this into consideration, it can be said that Obuchi's approach will be influenced by strong input from South Korea. Yet, all this does not indicate that Obuchi will turn a blind eye to normalization talks with North Korea. It is important to note that Shin Kanemaru, who broke the impasse in Japan-North Korea normalization talks in 1990, is a senior leader of the Takeshida faction, to which Obuchi belongs. Note also that Kiichi Miyazawa, who served as Prime Minister when Japan was actively engaged in normalization talks with North Korea, now serves in the current Obuchi cabinet as Finance Minister. If circumstances allow, therefore, Obuchi may begin negotiations with North Korea. To support this claim, in August 1998 Obuchi expressed his wish to make progress in normalization talks with North Korea after Kim Jung-il becomes State President.
Obuchi's newly appointed Foreign Minister, Masahiko Komura, served in the Hashimoto cabinet as State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Komura, who belongs to the old Komoto faction, has visited South Korea to negotiate a fishery treaty between Japan and South Korea. Komura's foreign affairs team holds the position that rapid progress toward normalization between Japan and North Korea is not presently anticipated because of the pending issue involving the kidnapping in Japan of ten Japanese citizens by North Korean agents. Besides this, Komura cites other barriers to progress toward normalization between Japan and North Korea: the possibility of North Korean collapse, and the uncertain effects of costs that Japan will have to pay to North Korea in the form of compensation, reparations, or assistance in the process of normalization between Japan and North Korea.
Note also that the issue of Japan-North Korea diplomatic normalization reveals a core element in Japan's grand strategic scheme. In other words, as far as the Japan-North Korea normalization issue is concerned, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot claim sole jurisdiction. In fact, the North Korea-related policy-making structure involves various stages; North Korea-related policies are first reviewed in the Foreign Affairs Division and the National Defense Division headed by the Chairman of the Policy Research Council within the LDP. Then, the reviewed policies are passed along for discussion, to the party's Secretary General and the Chairman of the General Council. The present Secretary General under the Obuchi leadership, Yoshiro Mori, currently shows high interest in normalization with North Korea although he was previously known to be passive toward negotiations for normalization with North Korea. The current Chairman of the Policy Research Council is Yukihiko Ikeda, who has long been a strong proponent of diplomatic normalization between Japan and North Korea. Given the influence these two leaders have on foreign-policy making in Japan and their views on normalization with North Korea, it seems that Japan-North Korea normalization could soon be raised as a critical issue despite the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affair's less than eager posture. The progressive liberal position held by Koichi Kato, the previous Secretary General of the LDP, is also indicative of the possibility that demands for normalization talks with North Korea would resurface in Japan in the near future. Kato, a leader of the Miyazawa faction, is still very influential in the Japanese political landscape because of the network he cultivated during his tenure as Secretary General of the LDP, and has long voiced a strong opinion for normalization talks with North Korea.
The Research Commission on Foreign Affairs, an advisory commission of the LDP, plays an important role in foreign-policy making in Japan, as well. The commission is also well-informed on the LDP's keynote policies toward North Korea, given that Professor Masao Okonogi, one of Japan's leading experts on the North, is a member of the commission. The four-point guideline that the commission proposed in 1997, representing the gist of the policies toward North Korea reflects Professor Okonogi's long-held view that Japan should normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea in order to prevent its collapse. The four-point guideline includes: (1) to bring North Korea into the international community by being actively involved in North Korea-related matters in the spirit of 'cooperation and gradual progress'; (2) to propose multi-country security dialogues, in addition to maintaining the U.S.-Japan security system, for peace on the Korean peninsula; (3) to lead North Korea toward opening its system by realizing Japan-North Korea diplomatic normalization as well as through economic exchanges between South and North Korea as soon as possible; and (4) contingency measures that could be taken when an emergency occurs on the Korean peninsula, in the event that cooperation-based policies toward North Korea fail.2) In short, the commission urges diplomatic normalization between Japan and North Korea as soon as possible.
The U.S. is an important external factor in Japanese foreign policy; thus, its cooperation in dealing with North Korea, must likewise, not be omitted in the list of factors structuring Japan's policies toward North Korea. As with the Hashimoto government, the current Obuchi government needs to consult closely with the U.S. to ensure a stable international politico-economic order including peace in Northeast Asia and the Asian economic crisis. This is well-recognized in the fact that Yukihiko Ikeda, Hashimoto's Foreign Minister, emphasized in his diplomatic speech immediately after taking up his post as the Foreign Minister, that he would do his best to reinforce the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and to maintain a stable international economic order. Ikeda's speech is a carbon-copy of the view promoted by those who want to expand Japan's contribution to the regional security such as Ichiro Ozawa, Seizaburo Sato, Satoshi Morimoto, Shinichi Kitaoka, Akio Watanabe, and the Yomiuri Shimbun. It represents a strategic scheme calling for Japan to anchor its post-Cold War foreign policy firmly to the maintenance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. This strategy is in accordance with the Study Group on Comprehensive Strategy led by Yasuhiro Nakasone who is known as the originator of neo-conservatism in Japan, as well as the report of the panel on Defense Issues (1994) established by former Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa. At the time the recent coalition government was formed, Japan had already announced that it would do its best to work for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, Japan is obligated to respect the Geneva agreed framework signed by the U.S. and North Korea, which is intended to curb North Korean development of nuclear weapons. Japan also shares the same view with the U.S. that it should work toward normalization with North Korea for the purpose of contributing to the 'soft-landing' policy, aimed at preventing the likely threats to national security arising from North Korean collapse. In other words, the main idea behind Japan's contacts with North Korea is close cooperation with the U.S. for its regional security.
Other external factors influencing Japan's decision to seek diplomatic normalization include its intention to preclude instability on the Korean peninsula. Tokyo hopes to induce Pyongyang, facing a possible political crisis due to the food shortage, to become a reformed and open country. It appears that Japan has an interest in normalizing relations with North Korea because it wants to secure a channel through which to assist North Korea economically, to lead it toward becoming an open society and to monitor its compliance with the Agreed Framework.
North Korea's launch of a missile carrying a satellite on August 31, 1998 added fuel to Japan's anxiety concerning weapons of mass destruction. In response to the missile launch, Japan has sought to participate actively in the theater missile defense (TMD) research, and to introduce a reconnaissance satellite at the earliest time possible in order to tighten its security readiness. Moreover, the missile launch is expected to push Japan toward a tougher posture regarding North Korea for the time being. Nonetheless, Japan will make efforts to avoid further provoking Pyongyang. Recall that the long-term objective of Japan's policies toward the Korean peninsula is to prevent a war in that area. Furthermore, Japan will opt for leaving open a dialogue channel with North Korea as long as the South Korean government's 'sunshine policy' toward North Korea and the U.S. engagement policy toward North Korea remain in place.
The U.S. sometimes applies military pressure on North Korea, with the intention of securing the upper hand in the bargaining. In those cases, Japan-North Korea diplomatic contacts will be brought to a temporary halt. But, when circumstances change, Japan will soon be back on a conciliatory path in dealing with North Korea.
One of the foreign policy objectives that the U.S. is most concerned about in the post-Cold War era is preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated delivery systems. In fact, the U.S. monitors North Korean nuclear weapons development with particular interest because nuclear weapons developed in North Korea not only indicate a weakening of the nuclear control regime, but it also means that they can be exported to the Middle East, or to other areas where religious and ethnic wars are being waged. Given its vital interest in preventing nuclear proliferation, the U.S. chooses to adopt an engagement policy toward North Korea at the expense of substantial diplomatic losses. Citing the U.S.-Japan alliance, the U.S. in the past requested that Japan side with it in dealing with North Korea. For this reason, too, we may conclude that while keeping step with the U.S., the Obuchi government will continue to make efforts for progress toward normalization with North Korea. How speedy the progress will be is contingent in part upon the strength of the regime's conviction to normalize relations with Japan.
The objective of South Korean policies toward Japan includes the following three tasks: (1) to expand cooperation in various forms between Japan and South Korea, both of which value democracy and a market economy; (2) to induce Japan to contribute to stability on the Korean peninsula; and (3) to establish future-oriented Japan-South Korea relations by removing barriers to neighborly relations between the two countries.
In particular, in the second task introduced above, Japan has the capacity to help North Korea in moving from the perilous situation of collapse to becoming a member of the international community. The collapse of North Korea will cause neighboring countries to endure enormous difficulties. South Korea is now suffering from its own misfortunes. Under prescription of the IMF, it is devoting its energies to the restructuring of its economy. It is, therefore, a fair appraisal of the reality that severe instability in North Korea resulting from an internal war or insurgence would lead to the simultaneous collapse of the two Koreas. Therefore, the South Korean government should do its best to persuade Japan to normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea in the near future. Japan will then be able to provide North Korea with economic assistance sufficient to help prevent such an emergency as its collapse. The Kim Young-sam government has been evaluated as having failed to formulate a coherent position toward Japan-North Korea normalization out of its apprehension concerning contacts between the U.S. and North Korea, and between Japan and North Korea. However, the recent change in policy characterized by the Asian economic crisis and IMF control over the South Korean economy requires that South Korea adopt a different attitude toward improved relations between the U.S. and North Korea, and between Japan and North Korea. That is, South Korea could eliminate an unstable factor on the Korean peninsula, perhaps the possibility of the abrupt and violent collapse of North Korea, through Japan's initiatives toward fostering an atmosphere conducive to Japan-North Korea diplomatic normalization.
To view Japan-North Korea normalization in a positive light is in line with the Kim Dae-jung government's guideline toward North Korea, which supports improved relations between the U.S. and North Korea. It is beyond doubt that Tokyo wants to maintain cooperation with Seoul. Accordingly, it is time to discard the victim-mentality which dictates that improved relations between Japan and North Korea would harm stability on the Korean peninsula. Meanwhile, South Korea should make it crystal-clear that it no longer has the desire to annex North Korea for reunification. In doing so, South Korea will be able to convince North Korea of the merits of creating circumstances favorable to reconciliation between the two sides. Then, they can begin to show their good faith in direct bilateral dialogues.
- A Japanese woman allegedly kidnapped from Japan by North Korean agents. Lee Eun-hye served as a tutor to Kim Hyeon-hee, the North Korean spy who placed a bomb on a commercial plane, KAL 757 in 1987, killing 115.
- See Research
Commission on Foreign Affairs, Liberal Democratic Party, The
Guideline on Liberal Democratic Party's Foreign Policy , 1997. pp.32-35.
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