Volume 11 Number 1 Spring 1999
North Korean Policy Toward the U.S.
and South Korea in the 1990s
This article aims to describe and explain the foreign policy of North Korea in the 1990s, especially its attitude toward South Korea and the U.S. based on that focus, this article will first examine North Korean foreign policy in the latter half of the 1990s, one based on the 'North Korean way of socialism' and its revolutionary unification strategy and secondly, it will predict its policy attitude toward South Korea and the U.S. in 1999. In general, the foreign policy of a nation is decided by the inter-relationship between the intentions of the political leadership and the systems capability. But for North Korea, the decision-maker's intention overwhelms the system's capacity; therefore the result is that political ideology plays the greatest role in the decision-making process in North Korea.
No one can evaluate precisely the intentions and capabilities of the North Korean political system. Moreover it is difficult to find analytic concept or model on North Korea that analyzes both the parts and the whole of its political system systematically, empirically, and without bias, since neither the North Korean political system nor its action system fits western theories, such as the decision-making theory or the rational actor model. Thus, irregularity, unpredicability, and volatility alone depict Pyongyang's behavioral character. For example, it demands $300 million in compensation from the U.S. for the 'privilege' of inspecting the suspected Kumchang-ri underground nuclear site. What is even more troubling is that a country whose people are suffering terribly from a food shortage is engaged in developing weapons of mass destruction.
How can the intentions and behaviors of Kim Jung-il of the Pyongyang government be examined and verified? First, it requires the application of various analytic concepts, models and theories. North Korea's logic, 'Our Way of Socialism' has a variety of characteristics as well as different analysis objects; therefore, different concepts are necessary.
'Our Way of Socialism' is a combination of the following factors.
- The Lenin-Stalinist factor.
- The Confucian patriarchal-ethical governing factor.
- The militaristic factor1)
- The reclusive nationalist factor
- The theory of revolution and ideology first
- The Juche (self-reliance) ideology
- Control over people through brain-washing from the cradle to the grave.
North Korea has endeavored to develop weapons of mass destruction a nuclear and biochemical nature, even while facing serious internal pressures brought on by the economic disaster. North Korea can be described as having two faces, one of them is starvation and the other is a nuclear bomb. Kim Jong-il seems to think that the North Korean system can be maintained not by popular support but by maintaining a strong army. In fact the New Year Address2) broadcast over the North Korean media proves this. "A strong nation and the victory of socialism exist on the basis of the revolutionary gunstock." It called on the party, the People's Army and the populace to arm themselves with the Red Banner ideology and solidify North Korea's own brand of socialism, uniting behind Kim Jong-il.
North Korea has demanded unconditional concessions from South Korea and the U.S, while rejecting even the minimal reforms needed to solve its economic crisis. Moreover, North Korea demands that South Korea change its liberal democratic system into a 'nationalist independent government,' and that the U.S. accept its demands unconditionally.
"I can hardly overstate my concern about North Korea," CIA Director George Tenet recently told the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee. "In nearly all respects, the situation there has become more volatile and unpredictable."3) Moreover, Kurt Campbell declared openly that the North Korean attitude is warlike and provocative.4) Such assessments on the North Korean militaristic system indicate that every actor is a little perplexed because nobody has found the proper policy alternatives that can manage North Korea.
The Strategy of Existence of the North Korean System and Revolutionary Unification
In order to grasp the intentions of the North Korean political leadership, and its critical influence on the behavioral patterns and decision-making process, it is important to understand North Korean reigning ideology and its strateges and tactics for security of the system and revolution.
The basic strategic duality of existence-revolution created by Kim Il-sung in 1970s is as follows: The first stage is termed Strengthening the North Korean Communist System; the second stage is Communist Revolution in South Korea which would culminate in the third stage, Unification of the Korean Peninsula. There have been forced changes in the strategy since the collapse of the Leninist regimes in the USSR and East European countries in the 1990s, which severely impacted on the economy of North Korea. Furthermore, North Korea now faces the decline or retreat of the revolution owing to serious economic problems following Kim Il-sung's death. Even though faced with an inescapable domestic situation, Kim Jong-il has done nothing but changed a few tactical slogans while still adhering to 'Kimilsungism without Kim Il-sung.'
Based on these facts, a brief description of the basic forms of 'existence of the North Korean Communist System and revolutionary unification,' created by Kim Il-sung, and an explanation of Kim Jong-il's 'Kangsong Taeguk-a nation that is militarily powerful and economically prosperous-line' and the 'Five great guiding principles for great national unity' will be discussed in order.
The basic composition of security-unification strategy in the Kim Il-sung era, first established in the Fifth Central Committee of the Workers' Party in 1970, and later amended several times, is illustrated in <figure 1>.5)
Realizing national emancipation/people's democratic revolution (C) through the three revolutionary forces (B) is the main precept of North Korean security-unification theory. Based on North Korean logics that the North is superior from a nationalist point of view (D) therefore it should create a communist society on the Korean Peninsula (A) is the North Korean ideology and philosophical cloak. This explains and justifies the main objective, i.e., revolution. Since the 1980s, South Korean dissidents have struggled violently against the government which has adopted anti-nationalism (D) above. But as the collapse of the Leninist regimes and the North Korean economic crisis prove, North Korea's theoretical cloak is just a false consciousness or a teleological approach aiming to support revolutionary strategy (C through B), and not a scientific theory gained through an analysis of Korean society either empirically or objectively. Since the rhetoric is obviously without support, it is odd that North Korea would continue to uphold it.
North Korea still insists the South should follow the North (D), an attitude it has maintained toward South Korea, throughout the 1990s. It argues that South Korea is still a 'colony of the U.S.' and that it became economically prosperous as an 'American econo-political base', because the U.S. help it to develop in order to prove 'the superiority of the capitalist system' on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, it defines the new character of South Korean society, as once 'a semi-feudalistic colonial society,' and now 'a semi-capitalist colonial society' which restricts its people's autonomy.'6)
The late Kim il-sung and Kim Jong-il have tapped all North Korean resources to realize the 'unification of the fatherland' and to realize 'the victory of Korean Communist Revolution all over the Korean Peninsula.' They have done so by strengthening of the three revolutionary capabilities over the past 40 years. For strengthening North Korean revolutionary capability (B-a), Pyongyang pursued the following policies. First, politically, to establish Kim Il-sung's monolithic leadership. Second, economically, to strengthen the socialist economic system based on the manufacturing and military industry. Third, socially, to firmly establish Kimilsungism through the systematic 'political programming' of its people. Fourth, militarily, to strongly pursue the 'four-point military policy.' With the collapse of the USSR and Eastern communist systems, however, North Korea began to feel the pain of its unstable security, diplomatic isolation, a shortage of foreign exchange, and the food shortage. As a result, its plans to nurture the world's 'progressive potential' (B-b) and to foster revolutionary potential(B-c) also collapsed.
Kim Il-sung's 'Strengthening North Korean Revolutionary Base' (B-a) line still exists, though after his death it was renamed Kim Jong-il's 'Kangsong Taeguk'-a nation that is militarily powerful and economically prosperous.
Kim Jong-il's the 'Five great guiding principle for great national unity'
On April 18, 1998, Kim Jong-il sent a letter "Let us reunify the country independently and peacefully through the greater union of the entire nation" to the North Korean symposium marking the 50th anniversary of the Joint Conference of Representatives of Political Parties and Public Organizations in North and South Korea. The following is the main theme of the letter, here referred to as the 'five guiding principles.'
7)
It is noteworthy that Kim Jong-il's 'five guiding principles' were declared after the inauguration of Kim Dae-jung's 'the government of the People' while Kim Il-sung's 'ten point guiding principle for great national unity' was introduced after the inauguration of Kim Youngsam's government. While the 'five guiding principles' does not differ much from the 'ten point guiding principles,' there is significance in the fact that Kim Jong-il publicized his feelings regarding Inter-Korea relations and unification.
The first principle states that "The principle of national independence is the key to the national question and the very basis of unity for the entire nation. He who truly desires North-South reconciliation, national unity and national reunification must follow the road of national independence, and not the road of dependence on foreign forces." This indicates that the Kim Jong-il regime will only cooperate with pro-North Korean figures and organizations.
The second principle states that "We will unite the people from the ruling class, figures from the ruling party and the opposition party, major capitalists and generals in South Korea under the banner of the greater unity of the nation, provided that they value the common interests of the nation and desire reunification of the country." In other word, if conditions are met, North Korea will not only cooperate and unite with the South Korean government but with large conglomerates as well.
The third principle explains the origin of the strain between the North and South as indicated in the following statements. "The South Korean authorities' anti-North confrontation policy is at the root of misunderstanding and distrust between the North and the South." Furthermore, North Korea demands the preconditions of reconciliation between the two Koreas, stating: "If South Korean authorities transform their anti-North confrontational policy into a reconciliatory policy of alliance with the North, the North and the South can develop a new relationship of trust and reconciliation, and a new phase toward national unity and national reunification will begin." In fact, this fits logically with the North Korean propaganda stating "if all the fascist laws and machinery that obstruct the unity of the nation and the reunification of the country are abolished and the many political barriers are removed...." In other words, if all the machinery guarding the liberal-democratic system is abolished, then the unification of the country will be achieved.
The fourth principle is closely related with the first, in that it identifies people who allied with the liberal-democratic capitalist system against North Korea as the 'anti-reunification forces,' while regarding those who follow North Korean policies as the 'patriotic, democratic force that fights for reunification.' The fifth principle stresses the solidarity of the people as follows: "Dialogue between the North and South must not be monopolized by a few men in authority or by a particular class or sector. It must be a wide-ranging, nationwide dialogue that pools the opinions of all political parties, groups and social sectors." This resembles the North Korean tactic of 1948, when they called for the meeting of different political parties, groups, and the patriotic force of different sectors of the population in the North and the South.
The 'five guiding principles' is being repeated in the New Year Address and in "A letter to the South Korean authorities, political parties, organizations and people from all walks of life at home and abroad" on February 3, 1999. Kim Jong-il's 'five guiding principles' only repeats Kim Il-sung's policies which were expressed in 'the strategy of strengthening three revolutionary capabilites,' 'the three great principle and five point programme,' and 'the ten point programme of the greater unity of the whole nation.'
Most puzzling is the fact that North Korea still strongly argues its old policies even in the face of the serious politico-economic problems brought on by external changes as well as the internal situation. Diverse but insufficient explanations have attempted ctarification. Is there any logic in North Korea's attempts to elude South Korea's engagement policy? Is it owing to the culture of ruling elites who place more importance on face-saving than on the real issues? Do North Korean leaders believe that South Korea will ultimately yield to the righteous demands of the North?
"Kangsong Buguk Theory" and "Inter-Korean High-level Political Talks"
As previously noted, the basic attitude of North Korea has not yet changed despite the dramatic shifts in the external and internal situation since the 1970s. That does not mean that the tactics of revolution have not changed nor that the focus and the targets of revolution have stayed the same either. In fact, a communist naturally changes his tactics in response to the tide of revolution, that is, according to the ascent or decline of the revolution. It is well known that a revolutionary tactics requires replacing old strategies and organizations and changing slogans.8)
North Korea has changed its tactics several times according to the rise and fall of international communist movements as well as in reaction to changes in Sino-Soviet foreign policies toward the U.S.9) North Korea adapted itself tactically to the following movements; Khrushchev's Peaceful Co-existence Line (1950s), Sino-Soviet Conflict (1960s), Cuban Missile Crisis (1960s), Normalization of Sino-American Relations (1970s), Adopting the Socialist Market System in PRC (late 1970s), and the collapse of the USSR and East European communist regimes (1990s).
North Korea's reaction to the above-mentioned movements were the following four policies <see figure 2>.
If North Korea responses effectively to the changed enviornment, it usually adopts policies A”ęC”ęD in order, while it reacts in defense mechanism by adopting policies A”ęB”ęC. Based on this premise, we can learn that the first reaction (A) is a constant and reaction B, C, and D are variables. But we must remember that variable B, C, and D are kinds of methods that aim to achieve communist revolution more efficiently. Consquently we should not mistake the recent North Korean tactical changes as a true change in its system, one which will lead to the reform and openness. On the contrary, Kim Jong-il strengthens his position and North Korean political system by beefing up the military.
'Kangsong Buguk' refers to a nation that is militarily powerful and economically prosperous, and seems to be modeled after Deng Xiaoping's 'Four Great Strategies for Modernization,' especially in Kim Jong-il's attachment of great importance to the military.
The New Year Address of North Korean titled "Let this year mark a turning point in building a powerful nation" is a slogan to encourage North Korean people to follow Kim Jong-il's orders faithfully.
In a joint meeting of the government, political parties and organizations of North Korea held on February 3, 1999 in Pyongyang, "A letter to South Korean authorities, political parties, organizations and persons of various social strata." was drafted. It was sent to the South Korean authorities, representatives of political parties and organizations and others, 150 people in all, including South Korean President and the Prime Minister.
The letter stated that for reunification-oriented dialogue, the following preconditions should be satisfied: First, it would be necessary to do away with anti-North Korea cooperation with outsiders, an obstacle to national reunification, and to discontinue joint military maneuvers; secondly, to abolish the 'National Security Law'; and finally, to gurantee the reunification movement and freedom to demonstrate of pro-reunification patriotic organizations and figures in South Korea. The letter proposed to the South Korean government that inter-Korean high-level political talks be held in the second half of the year following the implementation of the above-mentioned measures in the first half of the year. The letter also said that the proposed talks would focus on methods for the implementation of the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement in which the three principles of national reunification would be reaffirmed.
This letter is differs slightly from the others. First, 'the North Korean Government' is included among the host of the political talks. Second, it used official titles such as 'South Korean President' and 'Prime Minister,' indicating that North Korea would recognize the South Korean goverment as its counterpart following the implementation of the above-mentioned three measures. Third, the letter was delivered at Panmunjom, by a Red Cross liaison delegate of North Korea. In the past, letters were announced on television or mailed directly. Fourth, it mentioned the matter of easing the pain of separated families and relatives, a subject which has been stressed by the South. Fifth, it did not directly mention the 'withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea.'
Nevertheless, by mentioning the first pre-condition, the letter is a covert attempt to prevent the U.S. and Japan from cooperatively participating to deter weapons of mass destruction in North Korea.
The main contents of the letter were already suggested in Kim Jong-il's 'five guiding principles.' The third principle calling for the reconciliation policy of alliance with the North is identical with the demand in the letter to implement the three measures.
North Korea is now mired in serious internal and external challenges such as the staggering economic crisis and the global collapse of communism. In spite of the difficulties, Kim Jong-il strongly remains stead-fast against the U.S. and South Korea by calling for the 'Kangsong Taeguk-strengthening the military as the first leader of revolution,' and the 'Red Banner Philosophy.' Furthermore, North Korea is using weapons of mass destruction as diplomatic leverage, and its brinkmanship diplomacy has earned it a great deal. The international community as well as the U.S. and South Korea are very anxious how to manage North Korea. Various methods, from military sanctions to an engagement policy, have been tried, with the most recent attempt being the 'sunshine policy,' a key policy adopted by Seoul toward the North.
Resolving "the Chosun Issue," and North Korea's Policy Toward the U.S.
Communist North Korea has consistently refused to engage South Korea in political dialogue, asserting that the problems of easing the tension and establishing a peace on the Korean Peninsula, hereafter, termed the 'Chosun issue,' should be discussed only between North Korea and the U.S., while inter-Korean problems should be solved by the two Koreas themselves, without interference from foreign forces.10)
The 'Chosun issues' consist of the negotiation of a Korean peninsula peace treaty, the withdrawal of U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and arms control. On the contrary, the inter-Korean issues include the reconciliation of the two Koreas, promotion of exchange and cooperation between the two halves of the peninsula and the unification of the Korean Peninsula.
North Korea has asserted the policy of 'Tongme Bongnam-containing South Korea through U.S. cooperation' in order to undermine the legitimacy of the South Korean government and to bring about its diplomatic isolation. North Korea's 'Tongme Bongnam' is a revolutionary tactic, aiming to exclude South Korea from a discussion of issues on the Korean Peninsula. In fact, South Korea's reason for proposing the four-party talks was partly to render these North Korean tactics useless.
North Korea joined in the North-South High-level Talks and signed on the 'Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation' (the Basic Agreement) in order to evade the difficulties caused by the collapse of the USSR and East European communist regimes in 1990s a move modeled upon Stalin's tactic known as "respite to recuperate revolutionary forces and to prepare the conditions for a new offensive."11)
North Korean brinkmanship diplomacy induced a concession from the U.S. and South Korea, in the form of the 'Geneva Agreed Framework.' The Agreement was seen by Pyongyang as a great coup in its politico-military struggle against the U.S., and as a foundation on which to solve the 'Chosun issues' bilaterally with Washington.
The Kim Dae-jung administration's proposal of the 'four-party peace talks' placed a stumbling block in the way of the 'Tongme Bongnam' policy, so North Korea sounded a warning to the South that it would strengthen its revolutionary offensive, implying that North Korea is ready to begin a revolutionary offensive against the anti-North Korean linkage between Washington and Seoul. North Korea's threat was followed by the launch of the Kwangmyongsong rocket, inciting shock and anger in neighboring countries. Another revolutionary offensive was revealed by the suspected Kumchang-ri nuclear site, a direct violation of the Agreed Framework, even if it does not violate the international law as the North claims. Furthermore, it certainly challenges the policy of non-proliferation backed by the U.S. and its allies.
North Korean militarists warned that they would revive its nuclear weapons program if the U.S. continues to demand inspections of suspected nuclear sites. Moreover it demanded $500 million per year to halt its missile exports to Iran and Pakistan. Therefore, if North Korea recieves $300 million plus the $500 million for stopping its nuclear program, the hypothesis¤£that North Korea intends to solve its economic crisis through the pursuit of 'Kangsong Taeguk'-would be proven. American conservatives have criticized the foreign policy of the Clinton administration: "Such blatant extortion demonstrates the failure of U.S. policies that have sought to appease the North through promises of aid and trade. It is time for the United States to stop all aid to North Korea until it can be verified that the regime has halted its missile and nuclear programs."12) North Korean reaction was to assert its readiness to attack any part of the world, a tactic aimed at weakening the influence of the hawks in the U.S., South Korea and Japan.
The Pursuit of Economic Interests and the Unified Front Tactics
Kim Jong-il argues that the 'Socialist Kangsong Buguk' can be built on three foundations: a ideologically strong nation, a militarily strong nation, and an economically strong nation. This propaganda is just a new label on the same bottle¤£that is, a new name for an old strategy. Now, since the condition of an economically strong nation cannot be met, the order was changed, putting the military first, as in militarily, ideologically, and economically strong nation, another example being the 'Sonkun Ryongdo-revolution led by the military' This proves that the government led by Workers' Party has failed.
As mentioned above, the North Korean system is controlled by the policy of 'Sonkun Ryongdo.' However, it has never given up its revolutionary offensive; simply changed its tactics. Whereas it eased up on its anti-American campaign by degrees after the Geneva Agreement it instead began aggressively denouncing the South Korean government. At the same time it has demanded that South Korea do away with anti-North Korea policies and move on to a reconciliation policy of alliance with the North. On the other hand, North Korea reacted to the Kim Dae-jung Administration's 'sunshine policy' negatively: "The 'sunshine policy' is an anti-North Korea policy which aims to open and destroy the North Korean system, an action we repudiate." North Korea also denies the principle of reciprocity as a violation of its autonomy, yet gladly accepts the economic cooperation with South Korean enterprises.
To that end, North Korea approved Hyundai's Mt. Kumkang development project, which promises to invest $397 million in its territory. It appears that North Korea has used Kim Il-sung's 'ten-point guiding principle' as an excuse to approve the project for the purpose of earning foreign currency. Given the widespread famine and starvation among its people, it was the only hope of relief from the economic disaster. Therefore, if Hyundai's investment succeeds, the economic cooperation between two Koreas would reach a new turning point. We can predict this from the editorial of the Workers' Party's organ. "It is a method of gaining practical interest to flexibly operate the economic activities in response to the changing situation." Still, it is doubtful whether North Korea will consider even minimal economic reforms in order to feed its people with the earnings from the Mt. Kumkang tourism project.
North Korea has never acknowledged the South Korean government as its counterpart, instead, regarding it as the target of the communist revolution. As mentioned above, it was proved that the basic agreements between the two Koreas signed in 1972 and 1992 respectively were merely delaying tactics on the part of North Korea or one of its 'united front' ploys. Every principle set forth by Kim Il-sung or Kim Jung-il has been composed of political lines, policies and tactics aiming at achieving 'the revolution first, and the unification last.' Indeed, the letter delivered on February 3 was a 'united front' move to create a favorable environment for the investment by South Korean enterprises in the North. Furthermore, North Korea was initiating hostile actions such as the infiltration of the sub-marine and semi-submersible vessels, proof that North Korea will not abandon its revolutionary policies.
In light of the changing domestic and foreign situation, how can Kim Jong-il formulate policy according to the thirty-year-old revolution-unification strategic frame? Kim Jong-il's policy could be evaluated through the two perspectives of continuity and change. In 1999, North Korea will pursue some changes while not veering the continuity of its present policy?
The foundation of Kim Jong-il's strategy can be seen in 'the New Year Address of 1999,' that is, to build a 'Kangsong Buguk,' a ideologically, militarily and economically strong nation, by following the line of 'the military-led revolution.' Therefore, North Korea will mobilize its every resource to secure its system and revive its economy. Some predictions follow, concerning the agenda of North Korean policy toward the U.S. and South Korea.
First, in following the precept of building a militarily strong nation, North Korea will concentrate its investment on the development of long-distance missiles. It will also pursue economic interests by adopting a brinkmanship diplomacy with regard to negotiations with the U.S., and the normalization of relations between the U.S. and North Korea at the same time. It may even launch another ballistic missile. Moreover, it will try to exclude South Korea from negotiations involving non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, while at the same time, receiving concessions from the South through bellicose provocations. CIA Director George Tenet made the point at a wide-ranging hearings of the Senate Armed Services Committee, "North Korea's unstable situation will encourage it to rely still more heavily on risky brinkmanship in its dealings with the United States." Since his remarks, North Korea still continues to expand its conventional military forces and its ballistic missile capability.13)
Second, it will propose to hold inter-Korean high-level talks for two reasons. One will be to achieve the three preconditions expressed in "the Letter to the South in 1999." North Korea believes that the South Korean government will work to fulfill the three preconditions. It appears that the South Korean government is reacting to the demands of the North positively. For example, the South Korean government decided to adopt a stance of flexible reciprocity in dealing with North Korea. A key aide to the Chief Executive of South Korea said that Seoul will no longer spoil Korean inter-governmental negotiations by sticking to simultaneous give-and-take commitments in dealing with the Stalinist country. He said, "North Koreans, like South Koreans, put too much importance on saving face in negotiations. Any deal indicating concession is immediately regarded as loss of face, which has frequently spoiled the otherwise smooth negotiations."14) Furthermore, President Kim has adopted a few core principles in dealing with North Korea, one of which is reciprocity, policy consistency, and encouragement of rapprochement between Washington and Pyongyang. Kim's three main principles include "no tolerance of armed provocation by North Korea," "no intention to unify the two Koreas through absorption of the North," and "the active pursuit of inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation." The last principle is to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula, since tensions threaten its efforts to improve relations with the U.S.
Third, the North will strengthen ties with the People's Republic of China for the revival of its economy and to bolster its power to negotiate with the U.S. Besides, Kim Jong-il will direct its economic policies for his own interest. For the revival of its economy he will encourage economic cooperations with the South, while strengthening its so-called 'mosquito net policy,' that is, selectively accepting policies which are favorable to North Korea. Kim Yong-sun, Chairman of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, denounced that 'the sunshine policy' of South Korea is 'an anti-North Korea policy which contradicts the three great principles of the unification of the Fatherland.'
Fourth, the North will use the proposal of inter-Korean high-level talks in a number of ways. It will create an favorable environment for a change in anti-North Korea policies into a reconciliation policy of alliance with the North, while continuing to carry out its revolutionary policies at the same time. Through nationalist democratic front tactics, it will attempt to persuade the middle class and the bourgeoisie in the South to creat more favorable attitues toward the North. It will also try to encourage positive feelings about the North through the mass media. Meanwhile, it will continue to pursue revolutionary action such as the infiltration of semi-submarine vessels to the South.
In conclusion, all of the policies mentioned above can be changed or abandoned according to the response of South Korea, the U.S. and Japan. Such variables as 'the Perry Report' (to be announced in the near future), the level of cooperation among South Korea and its alliances, and the intensity of internal pressures in its own system will determine the range of change within the frame of continuity.
- Kim Jong-il's militaristic policy is termed 'Social Militarism.' While outwardly pursuing socialism, in reality he governs by militaristic rule.
- On New
Year's Day, an editorial was printed in unison by the organs of the
Party, the army and Youth League. Referred to as the New Year Address,
the full text can be found in Jayu Shinmun . no. 249, January 16, 1999, pp.8-9.
- The
Korea Times , February 4, 1999.
- Statement by Kurt M. Campbell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, "Hearing on U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula" at Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, September 10, 1998.
- For the
basic composition of security-unification strategy of North Korea in
1970s, see Huh Chong-ho, Theory of South Korean Revolution and
National Unification Based on the Juche Idea (Pyongyang: Social Science Publishing Company, 1975).
- Korean
Central News Agency , Pyongyang, March 12, 1995.
- Rodong
Shinmun, May 16, 1998. For more details, see Kim Gahb-Chol, "The
Principle of Separating Economics from Politics, and Prospects for
Improvement in South-North Relations," East Asian Review , 10:2 (Summer 1998), pp.28-29.
- The terms in
this paper are based on Stalin's definitions, used by North Korean
Intelligentsia. See Josif V. Stalin, The Foundations of
Leninism (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965), pp.82-100.
Stalin's lectures delivered at the Sverdlov University, The
Foundations of Leninism were published in Pravda in April and May 1924.
- Kim
Gahb-chol, "Adaptation and Reaction of the North Korean Regime to the
Changes in the International Enviornment," Social Science , Social Science Institute at Konkuk University, Vol.15(1991).
- Kim
Tae-seo, "1998 Perspective of the North and the Situation Around the
Korean Peninsula," Kukdongmunjae , The Institute for East Asian Studies (February 1999), pp.13-15.
- Stalin,
The Foundation of Leninism , p.99.
- Richard D.
Fisher, Jr., "Time to Stop North Korea's Missile Blackmail," The
Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum , no.550 (September 8, 1988).
- The
Korea Times , February 4, 1999.
- The
Korea Times , February 13, 1999.